IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.O.A.W. (Minor Child) and A.J.W. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.W. (“Father”) appeals the Tippecanoe Superior Court's termination of his parental rights over his minor child A.O.W. (“Child”). Father presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of his home will not be remedied.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] M.C. (“Mother”) and Father had one child together, Child, who was born February 11, 2011. A few months before Child's birth, Father was arrested in Michigan and later pleaded guilty to armed robbery. He was sentenced to fourteen to twenty-two years’ incarceration; his release is expected in December 2026.

[4] Child lived with Mother until Mother's death from a fentanyl overdose in September 2022. Child then lived with maternal grandmother until her death in August 2023. When no other caregiver could be found, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). The court granted that petition, and in October, DCS placed Child with a foster mother, D.S., where she thrived.

[5] Sometime in late 2023 or early 2024, Father's cousin obtained D.S.’s contact information and passed it along to Father. Father and D.S.

began having regular contact ․ without the knowledge or consent of DCS. [Father and D.S.] talked on the phone three (3) to four (4) times per week. The phone calls started during November of 2023 and by December of 2023, Father and Foster Mother started a romantic relationship. Neither informed DCS or Court of their relationship.

Ex. Vol. 1, p. 143.

[6] In April 2024, a prison official “informed [DCS] that Father and Foster Mother were having an inappropriate romantic relationship.” Id. D.S. was also allowing Father to have more phone calls with Child than were authorized. When the trial court ordered that Father's calls with Child would be supervised by someone other than D.S. going forward, Father continued to contact Child through D.S. At one point, Father and D.S. told Child that they were engaged, and they refused to end their relationship. Ultimately, DCS removed Child from D.S.’s home and placed her in a new foster home.

[7] Child was “devastated” to have to leave D.S.’s home, and she blamed Father. Tr. p. 79. Child refused to engage in telephone visits with Father for a few months. In her new foster home, Child was miserable, and she “went into a tailspin” that landed her in the hospital, where she was diagnosed with “major depressive disorder.” Id. at 79-80. Child was prescribed medication to treat her depression. Later that year, DCS moved Child to a new foster home with S.R.

[8] Child thrived in S.R.’s home. During a telephone visit with Father in September, Child told Father that she was already calling S.R. “mom” because they got along so well. Ex. Vol. 2, p. 155. And during a phone call in October, Child told Father that she did not want to live with him when he got out of prison. She told him that she wanted to get to know him first. Father disagreed and told Child that she would be done with foster care when he was released from prison. Child confided in a case worker that she was not “comfortable” with the idea of living with Father because she has “[PTSD] being around men” as a result of “past sexual abuse.” Ex. Vol. 3, p. 5. During another phone call in October, Father voiced his objection to Child's use of medication to treat her depression despite Child's assurance that the medication helped her.

[9] In August 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights over Child. S.R. hoped to adopt Child, and Child wanted to be adopted by S.R. During a hearing on the petition, Father testified that during his incarceration he had obtained his GED and had taken college courses. Father was only three courses shy of an associate's degree. Father also completed a class called Thinking for a Change. But Father did not take parenting classes. Father testified that his expected release date is December 29, 2026, and he will serve three years on parole after that.

[10] Child was fourteen at the time of the hearing. She testified that she loves Father but that she wants to have a permanent home with S.R. Child testified that she feels like she “belong[s]” in S.R.’s home and she “finally [has] somebody that cares about [her] ․” Tr. p. 9. Child stressed, “I really want to be adopted.” Id. at 12.

[11] Child's home-based case worker, Lauren Wilhoite, testified that she believed that adoption is in Child's best interests because

[Child] expressed the need for permanency and I think, given her past anxiety and all that she went through, that it'd ․ help her move forward with some of the things that she's (unintelligible) mentally with anxiety and give her, help her with her identity, to help her boost her ․ self-esteem, and develop coming into her own self.

Id. at 54. In addition, both Lashata Price, the family case manager, and Donna Fekete, the CASA, testified that termination of Father's parental rights over Child is in Child's best interests.

[12] Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings and conclusions in support of terminating Father's parental rights over Child. The trial court found that Father had been incarcerated for Child's entire life and that their relationship consisted of weekly telephone calls. The court found that, by the time Father is released from prison, Child will have lived in foster care for more than three years. The court found that Child

has suffered extensive trauma throughout her life, including physical abuse, sexual abuse, the loss of her Mother from an overdose, the loss of her maternal grandmother and caregiver, being bullied at school, and being removed from a foster parent she felt comfortable with due to ․ Father's poor choices.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 20. The court found that Child needs permanency. And the trial court observed that both the family case manager and CASA had testified that any further delay in permanency for Child posed a threat to Child's well-being.

[13] The court concluded that it is reasonably probable that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and led to the continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied. The court also concluded that the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Child and Father poses a threat to Child's well-being. And the court concluded that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. The court also found that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the care of Child, namely, adoption.

[14] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[16] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[17] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).

[18] In addition, DCS must prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4). We need only discuss one of these elements raised by Father in this appeal, namely, whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

[19] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[20] Father purports to raise two issues on appeal, namely, whether the trial court erred when it concluded that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of his home will not be remedied and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child. However, in the argument section of his brief, Father only raises the first issue. As DCS correctly points out, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) is written in the disjunctive, Father's failure to argue both issues on appeal results in waiver.

[21] Waiver notwithstanding, we address Father's contention that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of his home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[22] Initially, we note that Father does not challenge the trial court's findings, which we accept as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 614 n.2. Father is correct that incarceration, without more, is not a sufficient reason for terminating a parent's parental rights. In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 643 (Ind. 2015). And Father argues that he should be given time to provide a stable home for Child upon his release in December 2026. In support, Father cites three cases, only two of which are valid case law.¹

[23] In In re G.Y., our Supreme Court reversed the termination of a mother's parental rights over her minor son. 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009). In that case, mother was incarcerated the year after her son's birth for an offense she had committed before his birth. Mother's expected release date was two years after the hearing on DCS's petition to terminate mother's parental rights. Mother was her son's sole caregiver during the first twenty months of his life before her incarceration. While incarcerated, mother had monthly in-person visits with her son, and she completed programs including a fifteen-week parenting class, an eight-week drug rehabilitation program, college classes, culinary arts classes, and a job placement program. And the Court observed that “the record shows that since her incarceration [m]other has maintained a consistent, positive relationship with G.Y.” Id. at 1264. The Court reversed the trial court's order terminating mother's parental rights.

[24] We reject Father's attempt to analogize In re G.Y. to his case. Unlike the mother in that case, Father had no relationship with Child before his incarceration, and their relationship is based solely on phone calls after twelve years of absolutely no contact from Father, indeed for Child's entire life to that point. Moreover, Father's inappropriate relationship with Child's foster mother D.S. led to Child's removal from a stable home where she was thriving. In short, as the trial court found, Father caused Child substantial emotional pain by his selfish behavior. We reject Father's request that we follow the analysis in In re G.Y. here.

[25] Father also mentions this Court's reversal of the termination of the parents’ rights in In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Father argues that the trial court should not have focused on his failure to take a parenting class while incarcerated. He maintains that the court should have noted his initiative in working on himself to “improv[e] his ability to provide for [Child].” Appellant's Br. at 13. And Father emphasizes his imminent release date. But, for the reasons stated above, the facts here are distinguishable from those in In re A.L., and we are not compelled to follow it.

[26] Father asks us to give him more time to show that he can provide Child with a safe and stable home. But that is a blatant request that we reweigh the evidence. The trial court found and concluded as follows:

[Child] was removed because the Father was not able to provide a home and care for her. The Father remains incarcerated and will be for at least the next year, and is therefore unable to provide a home and care for her. During the CHINS case, the Father had supervised telephone calls with [Child] but failed to successfully participate in and/or complete any other services.

While incarceration, by itself, is not a sufficient basis for terminating a parent's right, K.E. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 39 N.E.3d 641 (Ind. 2015), courts may consider incarceration along with other relevant facts, including but not limited to the anticipated release date, the involvement of the parent in the child's life prior to incarceration, and the parent's participation in relevant programs while incarcerated. In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d 745, 751-752 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2015). Thus, the Court finds relevant that the Father has been incarcerated for [Child's] entire life; that [Child] is 14 years old; that the Father had no relationship with [Child] prior to the CHINS case; that the Father's relationship with [Child] during the CHINS case has been limited to supervised telephone calls; that the Father will not be released for at least one more year; and that the Father will be on parole for 3 years following his release. In considering all such facts, along with the incarceration, the Court concludes that the reasons for [Child's] removal have not and will not be remedied to allow for placement with the Father. Individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.[] J.W. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1046 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2025) transfer denied; Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2006). Courts may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2002).

While the Father has maintained contact with [Child] via supervised telephone calls, he has not had any in-person contact or visits throughout the life of the case. Courts may consider the contact a parent has maintained during the CHINS case. Land v. Starke County Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. [Ct.] App. 2007).

All of the foregoing show[s] there is a reasonable probability that the reason[s] for removal or placement have not been remedied, satisfying I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 22-24.

[27] The trial court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside Father's home will not be remedied is supported by the findings, and the findings are supported by the evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this issue.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We do not consider Father's argument based on our memorandum decision in In re K.E., No. 82A04-1407-JT-320, 2015 WL 849473 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2015), because it was vacated on transfer. See In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641 (Ind. 2015). In any event, In re K.E. is inapposite.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.