MCANALLY v. MCANALLY (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Scott McAnally (“Father”) appeals the Sullivan Circuit Court's order denying his petition to modify custody of his children and resolving other issues in this dissolution proceeding. Father presents several issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition to modify custody of his children with Shanna McAnally (“Mother”).

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mother's petition to modify legal custody of the parties’ children.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to find Mother in contempt.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay Mother one-half of the parties’ 2023 tax refund.

5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay a child support arrearage of $6,750 within ninety days of the court's order.

6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that Mother may take the annual tax exemption for all three children.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother were married and have three children together, B.M., born June 17, 2008, and twins L.M. and E.M., born December 20, 2015. While the parties were married, Mother stayed at home to raise the children while Father worked outside of the home.

[4] In June 2023, Father filed a petition to dissolve the marriage, the parties filed a partial mediated agreement, and, in April 2024, the trial court entered a final decree. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, they shared joint legal custody of the children and Mother had primary physical custody of the children. The decree, however, left several issues to be resolved, including child support. Following a hearing in December, the parties agreed that Father would pay $250 per week in child support.

[5] Father exercised regular parenting time with the twins, but Father only rarely saw B.M. in early 2025. Father asked Mother to insist that B.M. visit with Father, but Mother was unable to persuade B.M. Mother did not keep Father informed about medical appointments for the children, and she did not tell Father when she enrolled the twins in elementary school in Jackson Township.

[6] In early 2025, Father filed two petitions to modify custody and three motions for rule to show cause why Mother should not be held in contempt of the court's orders. And in April, Mother filed a petition to modify legal custody. Following a hearing on all pending motions in August, the trial court denied Father's petitions to modify custody and motions for rule to show cause, and the court granted Mother's petition to modify legal custody of the children. In addition, the trial court: ordered Father to pay Mother one-half of the parties’ 2023 tax refund; ordered Father to pay a child support arrearage of $6,750 within ninety days of the court's order; and ordered that Mother may take the tax exemption for all three children on her annual tax returns. Father filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.

[7] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[8] Our Supreme Court has made clear that, in family law matters, Indiana has a preference “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993)). A trial court's decisions regarding custody modification and parenting time lie within its broad discretion, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); Gomez v. Gomez, 887 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court misinterpreted the law.” Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An appellate court is “in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[9] “[O]n appeal we will not ‘reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.’ ” McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). “[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Duncan v. Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “It is not impossible to reverse a trial court's decision regarding child custody on appeal, but given our deferential standard of review, it is relatively rare.” Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[10] Mother has not filed an appellee's brief. When the appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court's decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error. McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In this context, prima facie error is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was established to make clear that it is not the burden of the court on appeal to rebut apparently valid arguments advanced for reversing the trial court's judgment. See McGill, 801 N.E.2d at 1251. That said, it is affirmatively the appellant's burden to show prima facie error.

Issue One: Petition to Modify Physical Custody

[11] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition to modify custody of the children. “The party seeking a modification of custody bears the burden of demonstrating that the existing custody order should be altered.” Maddux v. Maddux, 40 N.E.3d 971, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The trial court “may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under [Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8].” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21(a).

[12] In making its determination, the trial court is required to “consider the factors” listed under section 31-17-2-8. I.C. § 31-17-2-21(b). The list of factors in section 31-17-2-8 is as follows:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

[13] Here, the trial court made thorough findings addressing each statutory factor. The court found that a modification of custody was not in the children's best interests because Mother has always been the primary caregiver and changing that would be detrimental to the children's wellbeing. The court observed that B.M., who was seventeen at the time of the hearing, testified that he wanted to continue to live with Mother. The twins were too young to testify, but the court noted that B.M. had described the twins as “more withdrawn while with Father and often want[ed] to go home to Mother.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 9. The court noted that Father blamed Mother for B.M. not seeing Father enough, but the court credited B.M.’s testimony that Mother had encouraged him to visit with Father. The trial court also found that Father had no excuse for his consistent failure to exercise mid-week parenting time. Notably, the trial court found that “Father has failed to take any responsibility for his actions or for his children's feelings and instead shifts blame to Mother.” Id. at 10.

[14] In his brief on appeal, Father argues that two of the statutory factors require a change in custody here, namely, the interaction and interrelationship of the children with the parties and the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. In particular, Father contends that “[t]he record was replete with evidence that Mother's conduct had negatively impacted the minor children's relationship with their Father.” Appellant's Br. at 17. And Father asserts that the trial court made no findings on the mental and physical health of the children despite the evidence he characterizes as showing Mother's lack of supervision and “lack of attention to the children's needs.” Id. at 18.

[15] On both factors, Father's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. In addition, Father does not support his argument with citation to relevant authority.¹ Given the lack of cogent argument and the evidence supporting the trial court's findings on this issue, Father has not shown reversible error.

Issue Two: Petition to Modify Legal Custody

[16] Father next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mother's petition to modify legal custody. Father contends that the court ignored “blatant evidence that Mother consistently was the parent at fault for the parties’ lack of communication and co-parenting.” Appellant's Br. at 19. We do not agree.

[17] As this Court recently explained:

When considering a modification from joint legal custody to sole legal custody, we must determine whether there has been a substantial change in one or more of the factors listed in Indiana Code § 31-17-2-15, in addition to considering any substantial change to the factors in Indiana Code § 31-17-2-8, as is typically necessary for physical custody modifications.[ ] J.W. v. M.W., 77 N.E.3d 1274, 1277-1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (footnote omitted) (citing Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 56 N.E.3d 634, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15 provides:

In determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section 13[ ] of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. The court shall also consider:

(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;

(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;

(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;

(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;

(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:

(A) live in close proximity to each other; and

(B) plan to continue to do so; and

(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.

The factor under subsection (2) of Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15 is of particular importance in making legal custody determinations. Milcherska, 56 N.E.3d at 641 (citations omitted). “Where ‘the parties have made child-rearing a battleground, then joint custody is not appropriate.’ ” Id. at 642 (quoting Periquet-Febres v. Febres, 659 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied). “Indeed, to award joint legal custody to individually capable parents who cannot work together is tantamount to the proverbial folly of cutting the baby in half in order to effect a fair distribution of the child to competing parents.” Id. (quoting Swadner v. Swadner, 897 N.E.2d 966, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)).

Richter v. Richter, 277 N.E.3d 123, 127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[18] Here, the trial court made thorough findings to support the change of legal custody to Mother. The court emphasized Father's historical lack of interest in either the children's schooling or medical care. And the court cited evidence showing that Father was to blame for making coparenting with Mother “a battle ground ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 6.

[19] In his brief on appeal, again, Father does not support his argument with citations to relevant legal authority. And he ignores the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. Father's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence. Father has not shown reversible error.

Issue Three: Contempt

[20] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motions for rule to show cause why Mother should not be held in contempt. “It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Steele, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (quoting Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2012)). “We will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.” Id.

[21] As our Supreme Court explained in Witt,

[c]rucial to the determination of contempt is the evaluation of a person's state of mind, that is, whether the alleged contemptuous conduct was done willfully. [City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 170 (Ind. 2005)] (“In order to be held in contempt for failure to follow the court's order, a party must have willfully disobeyed the court order.”); In re Perrello, 260 Ind. 26, 29, 291 N.E.2d 698, 700 (1973) (“The willful disobedience of a court order can constitute indirect ․ contempt. However, the act must be done willfully and with the intent to show disrespect or defiance.” (citations omitted)); Meyer v. Wolvos, 707 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“When a person fails to abide by a court's order, that person bears the burden of showing that the violation was not willful.”). The determination of whether to find a party in contempt permits the trial court to consider matters which may not, in fact cannot, be reflected in the written record. The trial court possesses unique knowledge of the parties before it and is in the best position to determine how to maintain its “authority, justice, and dignity” and whether a party's disobedience of the order was done willfully.

964 N.E.2d 198, 202-03 (Ind. 2012).

[22] Father alleged that Mother should be held in contempt for three reasons: Mother denied Father additional parenting time; Mother discouraged B.M. from visiting Father; and Mother was not communicating with Father regarding school and medical decisions for the children. The trial court found that Father had not verified any of the contempt motions as required by Indiana statute. And the trial court found no credible evidence to support the first two allegations.

[23] Regarding Mother's failure to communicate about school and medical decisions, the trial court found as follows:

71. Father presented no credible evidence that Mother has refused to communicate with him regarding education and medical issues affecting the minor children. Mother did not inform Father of a field trip out of mistake. Mother's actions were not intentional[ ] but out of habit.

72. Father has voluntarily chosen not to involve himself with the children's education. He presented no credible evidence to the Court, in which Mother has refused to communicate with him. On the contrary, Father chooses to not answer Mother's phone calls when she attempts to discuss child-related matters with him.

73. Mother has failed to inform Father of all of the children's medical appointments. Mother's actions are not willful. It has always been customary for Mother to handle all of the children's medical appointments and illnesses. Father has only sporadically discussed the children's medical needs with Mother. The issue of the children's medical appointments was only brought to Father's attention when Father chose to change the children's medical insurance without informing Mother. Father called the children's doctor's office regarding the insurance change; however, never bothered to discuss with Mother. Text messages were presented to the Court of Mother informing Father of the children being ill with pneumonia and influenza. Father chose not to exercise his scheduled parenting time due to the children being ill.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 14-15.

[24] Father maintains that Mother's refusal to involve him with these decisions was willful. In support, Father cites a single page of the transcript, and he does not cite any relevant case law. Father simply asserts that Mother's testimony that she did not need to “guide” Father since the divorce shows that her actions were “intentional and willful ․” Appellant's Br. at 21. But the context of that statement supports the trial court's conclusion. Mother explained that she had always told Father that he could “reach out” to her with any questions, and he only asked about the twins’ school two weeks after the school year had started. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 88. Mother also testified that she assumed Father knew where the twins would go to school based on where she was living, which was only seven minutes away from their school. Father has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion on this issue.

Issue Four: 2023 Tax Refund

[25] Father argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay Mother one-half of their 2023 tax refund. On this issue, the trial court found as follows:

35. The parties were married for the entirety of the 2023 tax year.

36. I[.]C[. §] 31-15-7-4 states,

“in an action for dissolution of marriage under I[.]C[. §] 31-15-2-2, the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:

(1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;

(2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:

(A) after the marriage; and

(B) before final separation of the parties; or

(3) acquired by their joint efforts.”

37. The tax refund is considered a marital asset and subject to division between the parties. Furthermore, to avoid a court hearing, Father signed a written statement that he would equally share the refund with Mother. Mother relied upon Father's assurance and signed all necessary tax documents. Both parties stipulated that Father received $7,000 in a refund and provided none of it to Mother.

38. Father believes that he does not owe Mother her portion of the tax refund because he claims Mother damaged the marital home prior to her departure. Father's evidence is not sufficient to support his claim. [B.M.] testified that the home and barns typically stayed in the state of disarray allegedly portrayed in Father's videos. Furthermore, [B.M.] testified that the parties, especially Mother, cleaned and did the best they could do prior to their departure from the marital home.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 7.

[26] Once again, Father does not provide any citation to legal authority in support of his argument, which amounts to another request that we reweigh the evidence. Father accuses the trial court of “selectively ignor[ing]” his own evidence showing the alleged damages to the marital residence after Mother moved out. Appellant's Br. at 22. Father maintains that he was entitled to the full tax refund as compensation for the damages. However, the trial court, as the fact-finder, was entitled to credit Mother's evidence over Father's. Father has not shown any abuse of discretion.

Issue Five: Child Support Arrearage

[27] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay a child support arrearage of $6,750 within ninety days. Father asserts that there was no evidence to support that amount, and Father maintains that the court should not have ordered him to pay it in a lump sum. Father does not support this argument with either citation to legal authority or the record on appeal. Without any cogent argument, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.

Issue Six: Tax Exemption

[28] Finally, Father argues, without citation to either legal authority or the record on appeal, that there was no “factual foundation” for the court's order that Mother be able to claim the annual tax exemption for all three children. Appellant's Br. at 23. We review a trial court's allocation of tax exemptions for an abuse of discretion.

[29] Under Indiana Child Support Guideline 9, the trial court must “specify in a child support order which parent may claim the child(ren) as dependents for tax purposes.” As for the allocation of this exemption, Guideline 9 also specifies that the trial court must review “each case ․ on an individual basis” and make a decision “in the context of each case.” Moreover, Guideline 9 refers to provisions of the United States Code specifying that, in general, only one parent is eligible for the exemption. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 152. By default, that parent is the “custodial parent,” which federal law defines as the parent who has custody for the greater portion of the year. 26 U.S.C. § 152(e). However, federal law permits the “custodial parent” to sign a written release of the right to claim the child as a dependent in a particular tax year. 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2).

[30] Here, the trial court cited 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) and Guideline 9 ² and found that

Mother's income is significantly less than Father's, yet Mother provides for the majority of the children's care and expenses. Father's household income is significantly higher and in a higher tax bracket than Mother's. Additionally, Father's wife has three (3) dependents of her own residing within the household.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 16. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that Mother would get the annual exemption.

[31] Without cogent argument, Father baldly asserts that there is no evidence to support the trial court's order on this issue. Father has not shown that the court abused its discretion.

Conclusion

[32] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The only legal citations Father includes in his brief on appeal are found in a section entitled “Standard of Review.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Nowhere in the Argument section of his brief does Father tie case law to the facts of this case to make cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

2.   The trial court cited Guideline 6, but that is a typographical error.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.