Heather R. VanDusen, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Heather R. VanDusen appeals her conviction for Level 6 felony auto theft,¹ arguing the State presented insufficient evidence. Concluding the State met its burden, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 7, 2024, Indiana State Trooper Tyler Vermillion was conducting highway patrol when he observed a gray Chrysler 200 cross the center dividing line three times. Trooper Vermillion conducted a traffic stop and approached the driver and sole occupant—VanDusen. VanDusen was unable to provide the officer with a registration for the car. When asked about the owner of the vehicle, VanDusen initially reported she borrowed it from a friend. Trooper Vermillion ran the license plate through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) database. BMV records showed a different expiration date than the one on the license plate. Upon closer inspection of the license plate, Trooper Vermillion realized the numbers had been altered. He then ran the Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) on the window of the vehicle, and the results revealed the 2015 gray Chrysler 200 had previously been reported stolen. Trooper Vermillion placed VanDusen under arrest for auto theft, and he faced some resistance from her. On the way to the county jail, VanDusen told Trooper Vermillion she had traded her Nissan for the Chrysler.

[3] The State charged VanDusen with Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. At the jury trial, the parties stipulated that the car VanDusen drove when arrested had been stolen from a car dealership, but the stipulation did not indicate when the theft occurred. VanDusen testified in her own defense, stating she made a deal with another individual to exchange her 1996 Nissan and $300 for the 2015 Chrysler. She acknowledged she lacked a valid registration or proof of insurance for the Chrysler at the time of her arrest but denied knowing it was stolen.

[4] The jury found VanDusen guilty only of auto theft.

There was sufficient evidence to convict VanDusen of auto theft.

[5] VanDusen argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction. She alleges the State failed to prove she had anything to do with the original theft because the amount of time elapsed between the theft and VanDusen's arrest was unproven. See Appellant's Br. at 9.

[6] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[7] A defendant commits Level 6 felony auto theft if she knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of another person, with the intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(i). “[W]here any considerable length of time has elapsed from the time of the theft to the time of the arrest there must be some showing that [the] defendant has had exclusive possession of the property during that period of time.” Girdler v. State, 932 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Muse v. State, 419 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (Ind. 1981)). In the event a defendant is in possession of property not recently stolen—and there has been no showing of exclusive possession during the relevant timeframe—we may consider additional evidence tending to support the conviction. Shelby v. State, 875 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “Both exclusive possession of stolen goods and knowledge that they were stolen may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citing Muse, 419 N.E.2d at 1303–04).

[8] In this case, there is no dispute VanDusen was driving a stolen car. At the time of her arrest, she had no insurance coverage and knew she lacked proper registration for the vehicle. VanDusen first claimed the vehicle she was driving belonged to a friend, but she later asserted she had traded her significantly older vehicle for it. The plates on the Chrysler had been altered, and registration records showed the VIN belonged to a stolen car of the same make and model. VanDusen's failure to register or insure the car, the altered license plate, and her inconsistent statements to Trooper Vermillion were circumstantial evidence tending to show she knew the car was stolen. At trial, VanDusen insisted she made a deal to trade her 1996 Nissan plus $300 for the 2015 Chrysler. But the jury was not persuaded. And contrary to her argument on appeal, the State need not show she was the original thief, so long as the necessary elements of auto theft are satisfied. See Girdler, 932 N.E.2d at 771 (clarifying the State need only prove the necessary elements of Section 35-43-4-2 to convict a defendant of theft). The State presented sufficient evidence to support VanDusen's conviction.

Conclusion

[9] There was sufficient evidence to prove VanDusen knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over a stolen vehicle.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1) (2022).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.