Paternity: C.N.E., Appellant-Petitioner v. C.L.G., Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.N.E. (“Mother”) and C.L.G. (“Father”) are the parents of B.G. (“Child”). In November of 2025, Mother sought permission to relocate with Child from Columbia City, Indiana, to Terre Haute, Indiana. Father, who resides in Bluffton, Indiana, objected to the relocation. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mother's request to relocate, finding that Mother had failed to prove that the proposed relocation had been made in good faith and for a legitimate reason. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Mother's stated reason for the relocation to Terre Haute was not legitimate or made in good faith. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court should consider all factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(c), including factors relating to Child's best interest.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father are the parents of Child, who was born on November 26, 2013. Mother resides in Columbia City and has primary physical custody of Child. Father resides in Bluffton and “exercises parenting time on a regular and consistent basis, primarily on alternating weekends, with additional parenting time as agreed by the parties.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8.

[3] Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate on November 13, 2025, stating that she intended to relocate with Child to Terre Haute. Father objected to the relocation the next day. The trial court conducted a hearing on Mother's relocation request on January 9, 2026.

[4] During the hearing, Mother testified that she wanted to move to Terre Haute to live with her fiancé, whom she had known and had been dating for approximately a year. Mother claimed that the move would give her more financial stability. Mother explained that she has

always been in an apartment, or I've been in, you know, crappy apartments at that; and so she, you know, we have a bedroom and a house and all that. And so I just feel like it would be better routine and standard for [Child], you know.․ I pay for [Child's] medical care ․ there's a better doctor down there; and my fiancé also works at a – a dental office so I'd be able to get [Child] in without having insurance if I ever lose it ‘cause right now, I have to pay for it.

Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Mother further claimed that Child would attend “a good school” in Terre Haute and the move would allow her to continue her educational pursuits. Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Mother stated that she and Father would have to “see if [they] could work something out” regarding any of Child's extra-curricular activities that might be scheduled to occur during Father's parenting time if Child were to move to Terre Haute with her. Tr. Vol. II p. 13.

[5] Mother acknowledged that Terre Haute is 154 miles, an approximately three-hour drive, from her current residence. The move would require Child to change schools, but Mother, who works remotely for a medical billing company, would retain her same job. Mother did not anticipate that the move would significantly affect Father's parenting time, as the parties could meet halfway between Terre Haute and Bluffton to facilitate Child's parenting time with Father “[e]very other weekend.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9.

[6] For his part, Father objected to Child's relocation, stating that “well, now, there's already an hour distance in between us; [Mother] can't even keep a steady [ ] schedule. Every weekend's always a hassle.․ [A]nd you're taking him away from his closest siblings, which [are] his brothers.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Father detailed what he termed a “lack of communication” from Mother and expressed concern that this would continue or worsen if Mother were to relocate further away with Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Father indicated that he had already had “to sacrifice [his] weekends some weekends” so that Child could participate in sports, an issue that would potentially continue if Child resided further away.¹ Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Father opined that relocation would not be in Child's best interest because it would take “him away from close family[,]” leaving him without a good support system. Tr. Vol. II p. 19.

[7] While Father indicated that he would be willing to assume primary physical custody of Child if necessary, he stated that “I'm not trying to change custody; I'm just trying to stop a relocation. Um – I don't think she's a horrible mom at all; I think she's done very good for [Child].” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Father expressed concern, however, that Mother had been involved in prior acts of domestic violence that had “actually, winded her up in jail;” with at least two instances occurring “in front of” Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 16. After one domestic incident, Mother had moved from Bluffton to Columbia City without notice to the trial court. Father also expressed concern that Mother had “just recently got out of a relationship that turned [violent] and jumped into this one, so no, I don't feel comfortable with the move” to Terre Haute. Tr. Vol. II p. 15.

[8] As of the date of the evidentiary hearing, Father resided with his grandmother but had plans to retain a larger home within “a few months.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Father was employed at “Team Mantra” in Bluffton, making $16.00 per hour. Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Father also had plans to obtain ownership of a landscape business. Father acknowledged that he had a “slight” child-support arrearage but would “catch it up[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 19.

[9] The trial court took the matter under advisement and, on February 2, 2026, issued an order denying Mother's petition to relocate to Terre Haute with Child. In denying Mother's petition, the trial court concluded as follows:

3. Based upon the evidence presented, the Court concludes that Mother's proposed relocation is driven primarily by personal relationship considerations rather than by a demonstrated necessity affecting [Child]. The Court further concludes that Mother failed to present persuasive evidence that the proposed relocation would result in a substantial and concrete benefit to [Child] sufficient to offset the significant reduction in Father's parenting time, the loss of regular and consistent contact between [Child] and Father, and the resulting disruption to [Child's] education.

4. The Court further concludes that the increased geographic distance associated with the proposed relocation would materially impair Father's ability to exercise frequent, meaningful parenting time with [Child] during the school year. The Court concludes that maintaining stability in [Child's] schooling, community, and established parental relationships is of significant importance and weighs against the proposed relocation.

5. The Court has also considered Mother's testimony that relocation would provide improved financial stability and opportunity. In that light, the Court has further considered evidence regarding Father's child support arrearage. While Father does have an arrearage, the Court concludes that it is not so significant or substantial as to support Mother's contention that relocation is necessary to meet [Child's] financial needs, nor does it outweigh the disruption to [Child's] stability and Father's ongoing relationship with [Child].

6. The Court further concludes that Mother has previously relocated without complying with Indiana's relocation statute, having moved from Bluffton following her conviction for domestic battery and resulting court-imposed no-contact restrictions. That prior relocation was necessitated by circumstances arising from Mother's personal relationship rather than a long-term, child-centered plan. The Court considers this history relevant in assessing whether the proposed relocation to Terre Haute is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason and reasonably calculated to provide a stable and permanent benefit to [Child].

7. The Court further concludes, based upon the evidence presented, that Mother has experienced multiple significant relationship changes in recent years. This history bears upon the anticipated permanence and stability of the proposed relocation and weighs against a finding that Mother has met her statutory burden.

8. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mother has failed to meet her initial burden under Indiana Code § 31-17-2.2, to establish that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason. Because Mother has not met that burden, the burden does not shift to Father, and the Court is not required to conduct a full best-interest reweighing under the relocation statute. The Court further concludes that granting the proposed relocation would not preserve the stability and continuity of [Child's] relationship with both parents.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 9–11. The trial court further ordered that

[i]f Mother elects to relocate from [Child's] current community and school district notwithstanding the denial of her relocation request, custody of [Child] shall immediately transfer to Father by Operation of this Order, without further hearing. Upon such relocation by Mother, Father shall become [Child's] primary physical custodian effective immediately, and the Court retains jurisdiction to address parenting time, child support, and any ancillary issues upon proper petition.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 11.

Discussion and Decision

[10] At the outset, we note that Father has not filed an appellee's brief.

When an appellee has not filed an answer brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf. Rather, we may reverse the trial court if the appellant presents a case of prima facie error. Prima facie error means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. If an appellant does not meet this burden, we will affirm.

Henderson v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[11] Where, as here, a trial court has issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review, determining first whether the evidence supports the findings and second whether the findings support the judgment. Sexton v. Sexton, 970 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. In reviewing the trial court's order,

we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. We therefore consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, and we will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support the findings, the findings do not support the judgment, or the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.

M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 281–82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations and quotations).

[12] The Indiana Supreme Court has expressed a “preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters[,]” and has emphasized “that we afford such deference because of trial judges’ unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face.” H.H. v. A.A., 3 N.E.3d 30, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court has further emphasized that “our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). As such, “we will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Id. at 33–34 (internal quotation omitted).

[13] “When a parent files a notice of intent to relocate, the nonrelocating parent may object by moving to modify custody or to prevent the child's relocation.” Myers v. Myers, 13 N.E.3d 478, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). If the nonrelocating parent objects, the burden of proof is on the relocating parent to prove “that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-5(e). “If the relocating [parent] meets the burden of proof under subsection (e), the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-5(f).

[14] In considering the proposed relocation, the trial court must weigh the following factors:

(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.

(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating individual to exercise parenting time or grandparent visitation.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting time and grandparent visitation arrangements, including consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the relocating individual, including actions by the relocating individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating individual's contact with the child.

(5) The reasons provided by the:

(A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and

(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the child.

(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-1(c).

“Other factors affecting the best interest of the child” include, among other things, the child's age and sex; the parents’ wishes; the child's wishes, with the wishes of children fourteen years or older being given more weight; the child's relationship with parents, siblings, and any other person affecting the child's best interests; and the child's adjustment to home, school, and the community.

Myers, 13 N.E.3d at 484.

[15] Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that her request to relocate to Terre Haute with Child was not made in good faith or for a legitimate purpose. There are “no explicit criteria for determining whether a relocation request is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason[.]” Gold v. Weather, 14 N.E.3d 836, 841–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We have

generally required that the moving parent demonstrate an objective basis—that is, more than a mere pretext—for relocating. It is commonly understood in today's society that individuals move in order to live closer to family members, for financial reasons, and for employment opportunities. As such, we infer that these and similar reasons are what the legislature intended in requiring that relocation be for legitimate and good faith reasons.

B.L. v. J.S., 59 N.E.3d 253, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotations, brackets, and ellipsis omitted), trans. denied. “[T]he resolution of [a] relocation request[ ] ultimately turns on a judicial determination regarding the best interests of the [child.]” H.H., 3 N.E.3d at 36.

[16] Mother's stated reason for moving to Terre Haute was to live with her fiancé, which, according to her, would create more financial stability and a better standard of living for her and Child. In finding that Mother's stated reason was not made in good faith or for a legitimate reason, the trial court concluded that “Mother's proposed relocation is driven primarily by personal relationship considerations rather than by a demonstrated necessity affecting [Child].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 9. In H.H., we concluded that the mother's stated reason for her request to relocate to Hawaii with the Child, i.e., to live and create a family life with her new husband, was sufficient to prove that her request was made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose. 3 N.E.3d at 36. We reached the same conclusion in Paternity of X.A.S. v. S.K., 928 N.E.2d 222, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, in which we noted that the father had remarried, his wife had a job in California, and he was moving to California to be with his wife. Upon review, we conclude that Mother's stated reason for relocating, i.e., to live with her fiancé, giving her more financial stability, is not merely pretextual and is of the type of reasons that the Indiana General Assembly “intended in requiring that relocation be for legitimate and good faith reasons.” B.L., 59 N.E.3d at 259 (internal quotations omitted).

[17] On remand, we instruct the trial court that it must consider all factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(c), including factors affecting the best interest of the child. In re Paternity of J.J., 911 N.E.2d 725, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We further instruct the trial court that should it deny Mother's petition to relocate on remand, it's order cannot include a provision allowing for an automatic change of custody if Mother nonetheless chooses to relocate because “[a]n automatic, future custody modification order violates Indiana's custody modification statute.” Myers, 13 N.E.3d at 486. Stated plainly, “a trial court may not prospectively order an automatic change of custody in the event of any significant future relocation by” a custodial parent. Bojrab v. Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. 2004).

[18] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.²

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother suggests that Father had, on occasion, chosen to forego his parenting time with Child rather than transport him to practices or games.

2.   We note that Mother challenged some of the trial court's specific findings and conclusions. Given that we have remanded the matter for further proceedings, we need not address Mother's specific challenges to the trial court's order.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.