Illiana Disposal Partnership, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Portage Township Assessor, Porter County Auditor, Porter County Treasurer, Porter County Assessor, Porter County Prosecutor, and American Financial Credit Services, Inc., Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Illiana Disposal Partnership (“IDP”) appeals the 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) dismissal of its tax-related action against several governmental parties (“the Defendants”)¹ where IDP sought, among other things, a declaration that Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-10(a) rendered certain disputed property taxes not yet due while it was pursuing administrative appeals. Consolidating and restating the issues, we address whether the trial court erred in its determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the case.² We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the tax years of 2021, 2022, and 2023, IDP owned tangible business personal property in Porter Township, Porter County, Indiana—specifically, IDP owned waste containers used in connection with a contract with the City of Portage. For each of those tax years, IDP timely filed returns and paid the resulting property taxes in full based on the values it reported. In January 2024, the Portage Township Assessor (“the PTA”) notified IDP that there would be an audit of IDP's self-reported assessments. On July 5, 2024, the PTA issued an adjusted tax bill for tax years 2021, 2022, and 2023 that claimed IDP owed $28,785.08 based on the results of a third-party audit.

[3] The PTA maintains that it notified IDP of the changes in the valuation of IDP's property on March 6, 2024; IDP maintains that it did not receive notice of the changes in valuation until the adjusted tax bill arrived on July 5, 2024. On August 7, 2024, IDP filed appeals with the PTA to review the assessment changes for the three affected tax years. The PTA has maintained that the appeals were untimely because they were not filed within forty-five days of March 6, 2024, as required by Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-1.1(b)(3). IDP has maintained that the filings were timely, including on the ground that a taxpayer has three years to challenge the legality or constitutionality of an assessment under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-1.1(b). IDP's appeals with the PTA have not been adjudicated or otherwise determined by the PTA.

[4] Meanwhile, on January 4, 2025, on behalf of Porter County, American Financial Credit Services, Inc. sent IDP a demand for “delinquent personal property taxes, penalty[,] and collection expenses” totaling $40,222.11. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 126. On April 4, 2025, IDP filed the instant action in the Porter Superior Court. IDP sought a declaration that the taxes resulting from the assessment increases were not yet due under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-10(a) because there were pending administrative appeals. IDP also requested a preliminary injunction that would bar further collection activities premised on a delinquency finding.

[5] In May 2025, the PTA moved to dismiss under Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6), arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Indiana Tax Court. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 88. In the alternative, the PTA asked the trial court to deny IDP's request for a preliminary injunction. In July 2025, the trial court held a hearing addressing both the motion to dismiss and the request for a preliminary injunction. At the hearing, all parties agreed that the court was not being asked to decide whether the administrative appeals were timely. See Tr. Vol. 2 p. 14.

[6] On September 8, 2025, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the case involved “essentially matters of tax collection” within the jurisdiction of the Indiana Tax Court and that IDP had “not fully exhausted its administrative remedies.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 8–9. IDP now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] IDP claims the trial court erred in dismissing under Trial Rule 12(B)(1), which permits dismissal for “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ․” This type of motion “presents a threshold question concerning the court's power to act.” Tingley v. First Fin. Bank, Tr. of Land Tr. No. 428, 252 N.E.3d 428, 432 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ind. 1994)). “Subject-matter jurisdiction turns on one question: does a court have the constitutional or statutory power to hear the case.” Id. Because the pertinent facts are undisputed in this case, whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 431–32.

I. Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Tax Court

[8] IDP challenges the trial court's determination that the Tax Court had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the case. In general, the Porter Superior Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases. I.C. §§ 33-29-1.5-2; 33-33-64-1, -3. But the Indiana Tax Court has “exclusive jurisdiction over any case that arises under the tax laws of Indiana and that is an initial appeal of a final determination made by: (1) the department of state revenue with respect to a listed tax (as defined in IC 6-8.1-1-1); or (2) the Indiana [B]oard of [T]ax [R]eview” (the “IBTR”). I.C. § 33-26-3-1 (emphasis added). “Thus, there are two statutory prerequisites to the Tax Court having exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.” Robinson v. Ind. Dep't of Local Gov't Fin., 99 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “First, the case must ‘arise under’ the tax laws, and second, there must be a ‘final determination’ by a relevant agency.” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Zoeller v. Aisin USA Mfg., Inc., 946 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Ind. 2011)). Both prerequisites must be satisfied. Id. Where they are not satisfied, the trial court retains subject matter jurisdiction, and it is error to dismiss the case under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1). See Zoeller, 946 N.E.2d at 1151–53.

[9] The trial court dismissed because “the Indiana Tax Court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction over any case that arises under the tax laws of Indiana” and this case involved “essentially matters of tax collection.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 8–9. That reasoning addresses only the first statutory prerequisite. The second—that the case is an initial appeal of a final determination by a relevant agency—is not satisfied here. IDP's complaint was not an appeal of a final agency determination; it was an original action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief filed in a court of general jurisdiction. Because the second prong was not met, the Tax Court did not have exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, the Porter Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See W. Ohio II, LLC v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 9 N.E.3d 267, 268–70 (Ind. T.C. 2014) (dismissing a tax appeal because the statutory requirements were not satisfied).

II. The “Inextricably Intertwined” Argument

[10] The Defendants present a second theory. They argue that even if the Tax Court's exclusive jurisdiction was not directly triggered, the trial court still lacked power to hear this case because deciding whether the taxes were “due” under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-10(a) is “inextricably intertwined” with the question of whether IDP timely pursued the administrative appeals. Appellees’ Br. pp. 12–13. That is, they argue that timeliness determines whether an appeal is “pending”; whether an appeal is “pending” determines whether Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-10(a) suspends the tax obligation; and the question of timeliness belongs before the relevant administrative agency, not the trial court. Therefore, they contend, the trial court cannot answer IDP's question about whether the additional assessments (and any resulting penalties) are “due” under the statute without first deciding something that should be decided in administrative proceedings. See Appellees’ Br. pp. 16–17.

[11] Although the Defendants frame this argument as a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the argument instead presents a sequencing concern. As earlier discussed, the Porter Superior Court has the power to hear the case. That power is unaffected by whether IDP's administrative appeals ultimately prove timely. If they do not, the Defendants might have a winning merits defense under the statute—but a merits defense does not strip a court of power to hear a case. What the Defendants are really arguing is that the trial court's decision will hinge on whether an administrative body determines that IDP timely filed its administrative appeals. This is an argument about the proper order of decision-making, not about subject matter jurisdiction.³ The interrelationship between these cases does not provide grounds for dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(1), which tests a court's power, not the order of operations. Cf. Tingley, 252 N.E.3d at 432 (“Subject-matter jurisdiction turns on one question: does a court have the constitutional or statutory power to hear the case.”).

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

[12] The Defendants also argue that IDP failed to exhaust administrative remedies, pointing out that IDP could have bypassed administrative appeals at the county level after 180 days and elevated the matters to the IBTR under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-1.2(k). See Appellees’ Br. pp. 14–17. They argue that by not “pursu[ing] this administrative avenue,” there is a “defect in subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 14. This argument glosses over the fact that the IBTR lacks the authority to decide whether the increased assessments are “due” or suspended under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-10(a)—in other words, whether a delinquency can be declared—regardless of whether that issue is presented before the local board or the state board. See Appellees’ Br. p. 13 (“IDP argues that the IBTR and [T]ax [C]ourt do not have jurisdiction to determine interest and penalties․ That is a correct statement of the law.”). That limitation was recognized in Irwin Mortgage Corp. v. Indiana Board of Tax Review, where the Tax Court held that “the [IBTR] did not have any authority to decide anything regarding the appropriateness of a penalty for late payment of taxes and consequently neither does this Court.” 775 N.E.2d 720, 723–24 (Ind. T.C. 2002), rev. denied. The Court explained that, under the circumstances, the taxpayer's “remedy in [c]ourt, if any, lies with the Marion County courts of general jurisdiction ․” Id.

[13] A party need not exhaust administrative remedies if “the exercise would be futile,” such was where “the administrative agency was powerless to effect a remedy” or “it would have been impossible or fruitless and of no value under the circumstances.” Johnson v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc., 829 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Ind. 2005) (quoting M-Plan, Inc. v. Ind. Comprehensive Health Ins. Ass'n, 809 N.E.2d 834, 839–40 (Ind. 2004)). Because the IBTR lacked authority to decide whether the increased assessments are “due” or suspended under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-15-10(a), the Defendants have not identified a defect, let alone one depriving the Porter Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction in the case.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action and erred in dismissing under Trial Rule 12(B)(1).⁴

Conclusion

[15] The trial court erred in dismissing on grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[16] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Defendants include the Portage Township Assessor, the Porter County Auditor, the Porter County Treasurer, and the Porter County Assessor, who all participate in this appeal. Two additional defendants, the Porter County Prosecutor and American Financial Credit Services, Inc., do not participate on appeal.

2.   IDP also claims the trial court erred to the extent it otherwise concluded that IDP failed to state a claim. We need not reach this issue, as the Defendants sought dismissal exclusively on grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, which is the only issue the Defendants address on appeal. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 88–103 (asking the trial court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

3.   Moreover, as IDP points out, the trial court could feasibly engage in statutory interpretation and decide that, regardless of timeliness, the appeals are “pending” because there are no orders or decisions by the PTA.

4.   As the motion to dismiss was entirely premised on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need not address the trial court's reference to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) as additional authority for dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.