IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.S. and W.S. (Minor Children) and T.C. (Mother) and W.S. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this consolidated appeal, T.C. (“Mother”) and W.S. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to their two children on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Parents present one consolidated issue: Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents have two children together: a daughter, A.S. (born in October 2017), and a son, We.S. (born in October 2023) (collectively, “Children”). Children have seven half-siblings from Parents’ other relationships, and all nine children have been adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) at various times. We refer to the half-siblings and their CHINS matters only as necessary to give context to Children's cases.

[4] The following facts are taken largely from the unchallenged findings of the trial court. When A.S. was born in 2017, Mother was living with J.C., with whom she had three other children (“maternal half-siblings”). DCS first alleged A.S. and maternal half-siblings were CHINS in September 2020 based on illegal substance use in the home and housing instability. During the case, a DNA test established Father's paternity of A.S. Like Mother, Father had three other children from another relationship (“paternal half-siblings”).¹ As to A.S., Father admitted his illegal substance use impacted his ability to parent her, he was willing to participate in substance use treatment, and his impending incarceration prevented him from providing for A.S.’s basic needs until his sentence was complete. On Father's admissions,and after a factfinding hearing as to Mother, A.S. was adjudicated a CHINS.² In March 2022, A.S. was placed with Father on a trial home visit, and the CHINS case closed in May with A.S. in Father's custody.

[5] Around the time A.S. reunified with Father, Mother gave birth to half-sibling K.C., whose father is M.C. (K.C. is not part of this case.) DCS removed K.C. from Mother's care and filed a CHINS petition alleging K.C. was born exposed to illegal substances and showed withdrawal signs. Mother admitted K.C. was a CHINS because Mother was incarcerated on two criminal matters, she could not provide for K.C.’s basic needs, and she needed mental health treatment and parenting education. Mother was incarcerated through most of 2022.

[6] Sometime after her release from jail, Mother moved in with Father for a few months. A.S. was still in Father's care. In March 2023, Mother left that home and moved in with her mother (“Grandmother”). On June 1, 2023, DCS filed petitions alleging A.S. and her paternal half-siblings were CHINS and removed those children.³ DCS alleged Father had abandoned A.S. to Mother's care, and Mother had a history of substance use and was currently involved in an out-of-home CHINS case related to half-sibling K.C. At the factfinding hearing for A.S., Mother admitted she needed assistance with parenting skills, housing, and finances, and Father admitted he needed substance use treatment, case management, and financial assistance. The trial court adjudicated A.S. a CHINS in September 2023. The trial court's dispositional order required Parents, among other things, to: maintain housing with adequate bedding, functioning utilities, a way to safely store and prepare food, and an adequate food supply for all household members; maintain a legal and stable source of income adequate to support Children; complete a substance use assessment and participate in any recommended services; submit to random drug screens; refrain from illegal substance use; attend all parenting sessions; and participate in individual therapy and family preservation services, to the extent recommended by the service provider.

[7] Father and Mother's son, We.S, was born in early October 2023. A.S. was then placed in Parents’ care on a trial home visit. Around December 2023, Parents and Children moved in with Father's sister (“Aunt”). After Mother and Aunt engaged in a domestic violence incident in We.S.’s presence, DCS removed Children from Parents’ care in January 2024. DCS filed a petition alleging We.S. was a CHINS. During the adjudication hearing, Mother admitted to the incident with Aunt, that afterwards she left the home, and she could not provide housing for Children. Both Parents admitted they were already required to participate in services in A.S.’s CHINS case. Based on Parents’ admissions, the trial court adjudicated We.S. a CHINS.

[8] Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Stephanie Ashbaugh was assigned to the family in February 2024. Consistent with the dispositional orders, FCM Ashbaugh referred Mother for individual therapy, a substance use assessment and recommended treatment, homebased casework (to address housing, employment, transportation, and budgeting), supervised parenting time, and drug screening. She referred Father for a substance use assessment and recommended treatment, homebased casework, parenting education, supervised parenting time, and drug screening.

[9] During 2024, Mother submitted to drug screens and consistently tested positive for THC, with occasional positive tests for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Two of her sixteen drug screens that year were negative for illicit drugs. During a similar time frame, Father completed seventeen drug screens. He tested positive eleven times for drugs including THC, amphetamine, methamphetamine, buprenorphine, and cocaine. Three screens were negative and one screen was not tested. Both Parents participated in substance use intake assessments referred by DCS. In Mother's assessment, clinical therapist Carol Childress determined Mother was “polysubstance dependent on cannabis and methamphetamine.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 127. However, neither Parent followed through with treatment recommendations through DCS providers. Father, on his own initiative, enrolled in and completed a twenty-eight-day inpatient treatment program; soon after he left treatment, he resumed drug use.

[10] Regarding housing in 2024, Parents moved into a rental together in April. They were evicted in July and returned to Grandmother's home. Mother participated in homebased case management services from April to August, until the provider closed the service due to missed appointments. Parents re-engaged with homebased case management in the fall. They participated in supervised visitation with Children. Father and Mother generally visited with Children separately. Parents attended most visits, and the visit supervisors observed Parents were bonded to Children and appropriately parented them. However, visitation remained supervised because Parents’ drug screens continued to show illicit drug use.

[11] In December 2024, Parents engaged in an incident of domestic violence. Both were arrested, charged, and pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Also that month, Father's parental rights to paternal half-siblings were involuntarily terminated. On that basis, DCS moved for an order in this case that reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Children were no longer required. See Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4) (2024). The trial court granted the motion. After that, Father's participation in services dropped off and the service providers closed the files. Father continued to have some supervised visitation with Children until the trial court addressed visitation at a February 2025 status conference and entered an order which stated, in relevant part, “The DCS is no longer required to provide Father with parenting time.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 127; Exhibit Vol. 3 at 166. Father briefly relocated to Tennessee in the spring, until he returned to Indiana to deal with a pending criminal matter.

[12] In February 2025, Mother's parental rights to K.C. were involuntarily terminated. As a result, DCS likewise sought an order in this case that reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with Children were no longer required. While that motion was pending, DCS continued to offer Mother reunification services.

[13] From January to May 2025, Mother completed five drug screens. Three were positive for THC; one was positive for THC, methamphetamine, and cocaine; and one was negative. In April, Mother completed another substance use assessment and then attended four sessions with a therapist. Mother worked with the same homebased case management provider from November 2024 to June 2025 to pursue goals of obtaining stable housing and income. During that time, Mother attended half of the fifty-four scheduled meetings. Mother held various part-time jobs, including providing in-home health care for Grandmother, and attended cosmetology school. In May 2025, Mother rented a one-bedroom apartment in a duplex, and Father moved in. Children's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) visited the rental and was concerned Parents “thought that this was ․ an adequate place to bring children” because it was very “run-down,” there was graffiti on the walls, and most of the windows were boarded up. Tr. Vol. 3 at 40. Based on the hours Mother was working and the rent, her homebased caseworker was concerned about Mother's ability to make ends meet when renting her own place versus living with Grandmother.⁴ Mother continued attending supervised visitation with Children.

[14] On May 8, 2025, DCS moved to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children. Mother took four drug screens in early June, and all were negative for illegal drugs. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted DCS's request to find that reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with Children were no longer required, due to the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights to half-sibling K.C.

[15] The trial court held a joint factfinding hearing on July 31 and August 1. Due to the “no reasonable efforts” orders, neither Parent was participating in services through DCS. As of July 8, an order of possession had been entered on Mother's apartment. Mother testified she had worked things out verbally with the landlord but also admitted she was still behind on rent. Mother had a car but no valid driver's license. Mother stated she had completed some therapy sessions on her own.

[16] At the time of the hearing, A.S. was seven years old and W.S. was twenty-two months old. Since their removal in January 2024, neither child had returned to Parents’ care. Children had been living together in the same foster home since the end of November 2024. Children were doing well in that placement. Shaunna Stamm, A.S.’s therapist since March 2025, testified A.S. had been in twelve foster and kinship placements since her initial removal from Mother's care during the 2020 CHINS matter. When Stamm began working with A.S., A.S. was struggling with daily functioning at home and school due to emotional dysregulation. But A.S. had shown improvement over the summer. Foster mother Tamela Fish testified A.S. had significant gaps in her knowledge base, shut down after parent visits, and expressed worry about her half-siblings. However, according to Fish, A.S. was “the sweetest girl,” was very energetic, was adjusting well to the foster home, and had become involved in 4-H because of her love of animals. Tr. Vol. 2 at 209. Fish had also been getting We.S. appropriate medical care to address respiratory and other health issues. Fish stated Children got along well with the seven other children in the Fish household. Fish testified she and her husband wanted to adopt Children and had retained counsel and filed petitions to do so.

[17] Children's CASA MacKenzie Dunckel also testified. She had worked with Children since 2023 and had also been involved in some of Children's half-sibling's cases since 2020. Dunkel described Parents’ relationship as “very rocky. One minute they're together, the next minute they're apart. There [have] been domestic violence issues between the both of them.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 41. To her knowledge, Father was still using illegal drugs and Mother was using marijuana. In Dunckel's opinion, it was in Children's best interest to terminate the parent-child relationship:

With this case, it has stayed in the same spot for many years. There has been no forward progression. We are no further than we were at this point last year. It's always been employment instability, housing instability, continued drug use; and it just is a tireless loop. And ․ [A.S. has] been in many, many foster homes․ I mean, she has gone through it, and I just want her to feel safe, and calm, and connected to her current foster family, which I feel like she does․ And I don't feel like [Parents], in my opinion, are capable of getting it together for these kids.

Id. at 44.

[18] The trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Children. As to Children's best interests, the trial court concluded, in relevant part:

The children were removed from their parents’ care in January 2024. Despite being offered a variety of reunification services, neither parent has enhanced their ability to care for these children to the level where either child could be safely returned to either parent's care. Additionally, the DCS has no legal obligation to provide reunification services for either parent. [․]

Through the date of this trial, the children have not been in the care of either parent for over eighteen (18) consecutive months, and have been continuously cared for by other adults during that time.

Since late 2024, the children are placed together in a loving foster home, with adults who have already established a stable home, and have demonstrated their ability to care for the children. The children get along well in this home.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 132. With respect to Parents’ inability to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Children's removal, the trial court concluded:

In both instances, the children were removed from their parents due to allegations of “abuse and/or neglect.” The order from the detention hearing, following the January 2024 removal from home, includes the CHINS Court's legal conclusion that returning these children to their parents would be contrary to the children's health and welfare because of the parents’ inability to provide the children with shelter, care, and supervision. Since the children were removed in January 2024, and despite the provision of reunification services, ․ neither parent has been able to remedy these concerns.

Since the children were removed, Mother has been positive for use of illegal substances, nearly every time she was tested․

Since the children were removed, Father has submitted fifteen (15) drug screens. One sample was not tested. Of the fourteen (14) analyzed screens, all but two (2) exhibited Father's ongoing use of THC, sometimes supplemented with cocaine, buprenorphine, and methamphetamine.

To address the parents’ substance use, the DCS made various service referrals for them both․ Father completed an intake at Centerstone, resulting in treatment recommendations that he did not even start. Another referral was made for an intake at Meridian, and Father did not go. Commendably, Father completed a 28-day inpatient program in March 2024, however declined the exit recommendation that he move to a sober living environment. Drug screens since the inpatient program show that Father promptly returned to substance use.

Since the children's removal in January 2024, Mother completed an intake at Centerstone, but did not follow up with any services. Another intake took place about four (4) months later, with more services recommended, but ignored by Mother. Mother did complete an intake at Meridian in April 2025, and attended four treatment sessions prior to the entry of the “No Reasonable Efforts Required” order. Mother also participated in three (3) sessions of some form of therapy with Reid Health, and a remote appointment with Brightside.

To further move the family toward reunification, the DCS provided both parents with “case management” services, to assist the parents with finding and maintaining stable and suitable housing, employment and income, transportation, and family budgeting․ Father has remained employed for the most part, other than a few days spent in jail. Additionally, Mother has worked a variety of part-time job[s]. Nonetheless, the parents, even jointly, have not been able to obtain or maintain housing suitable for the children to be returned to their care. They have largely lived in a small apartment with [Grandmother], and when they have rented places of their own, they have been evicted shortly afterwards.

Further, while the parents participated in supervised visits with the children, a couple of hours each week, they did not advance to the point that non-supervised visits were implemented, nor to the point that the children could be returned to their care on a trial basis.

Id. at 133–34. And finally, as to the reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court concluded:

[E]ven with supportive services in place, the parents have not been successful in addressing the barriers to reunification with their children. At this stage in the CHINS cases, the DCS is no longer required to provide any services for either parent. If the parents were not successful in reunification with services in place, there is an even lesser chance they will succeed in the absence of supportive services, thereby establishing a reasonable probability that the issues resulting in the children's removal will not be remedied from this point forward.

Id. at 134.⁵ On Mother's unopposed motion, this Court consolidated Mother's and Father's separate appeals.

Standard of Review

[19] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[20] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3) (2024). DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more of twelve statutory circumstances warranting termination. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)–(12). If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (burden of proof).

[21] We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the termination decision.

[22] Parents do not challenge the trial court's factual findings, and so we accept them as true. See Matter of A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“When, as in this case, the factual findings are unchallenged, we accept those findings as true.”). Instead, Parents argue the findings do not support the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved the elements of the termination statute by clear and convincing evidence.

A. Subsection (d) Circumstances

[23] As noted above, DCS must allege and prove the existence of “one (1) or more” of twelve statutory circumstances warranting termination. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Of the twelve circumstances under Subsection (d), DCS alleged three existed. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 23 (petition to terminate alleging the circumstances of Subsection (d)(2)–(4)). The trial court concluded DCS proved two:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(3); Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 133–35 (termination order).⁶ DCS was only required to prove one of the two circumstances; accordingly, we focus our review the Subsection (d)(3) circumstance that there is a reasonable probability the conditions leading to removal and placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[24] To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. First, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's placement outside the home, then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[25] Here, A.S. was removed from Parents’ care based on their inability to provide her with shelter, care, and supervision. Mother was already involved in an out-of-home CHINS case involving half-sibling K.C. stemming from Mother's incarceration and illegal substance use. Mother admitted she needed assistance with parenting skills and housing, and Father admitted he needed substance use treatment. A.S. returned to Parents’ care on a trial home visit after We.S.’s birth. But just three months later, Children were removed after a domestic violence incident between Mother and Aunt.

[26] After Children's removal and until the “no reasonable efforts” orders were entered, Parents struggled to make progress toward reunification, despite the provision of services to assist them. Throughout the life of the case, Parents lacked stable housing. Parents largely moved between relatives’ homes, and when they had their own places, were quickly evicted. On appeal, Father argues he obtained suitable housing, pointing to testimony about the home Parents rented in April 2024. See Appellant Father's Br. at 16 (citing Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 17). But Parents were evicted from that property in July 2024. Parents participated in drug screens, which showed an ongoing pattern of illegal drug use. Although Father completed inpatient treatment in 2024, he immediately relapsed and continued to use illegal drugs throughout the case. Mother completed assessments in 2024 but did not follow through with recommended treatment. Parents engaged in a domestic violence incident in December 2024, leading to both being jailed for a few days.

[27] After the “no reasonable efforts” order was entered as to Father in December 2024, DCS continued to provide services to Mother. In April 2025, just before DCS filed the termination petitions, Mother completed a new substance use assessment. After the petitions were filed, she participated in four therapy sessions in May and June. The four drug screens she took from June 4 through 12 were negative for illegal substance use. After the “no reasonable efforts” order was entered as to her, Mother sought out some type of therapy on her own. Mother also rented an apartment in May, although by the time of the factfinding an eviction order had been entered. Based on this evidence, Mother argues that at the time of the factfinding hearing, her “situation was improving, she had demonstrated a real commitment to change, and she had addressed the barriers to reunifying with” Children. Appellant Mother's Br. at 17. She contends this shows DCS failed to carry its burden to prove there was a reasonable probability she would not remedy the conditions that led to Children's removal. However, it was within the trial court's discretion to weigh Mother's prior history more heavily than the efforts she made shortly before termination. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. We cannot reweigh that evidence.

[28] Parents could not remedy the conditions leading to Children's removal and continued placement outside the home, even with the provision of supportive services. At the time of the factfinding, DCS no longer had an obligation to provide either Parent services, making it even more unlikely Parents would be able to remedy the conditions. The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal and continued placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[29] Parents both argue DCS failed to meet its burden to show termination was in Children's best interests. Mother argues the trial court overlooked her “strong emotional bond” with Children and her “notable parenting skills.” Appellant Mother's Br. at 13, 14. Similarly, Father notes he and Children were bonded, Children enjoyed visits, and the visitation supervisors observed no concerns with Father's parenting.

[30] When deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Simply stated, children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[31] As Parents argue, the visit supervisors observed Parents were well-bonded with Children and demonstrated appropriate parenting skills. But throughout Children's lives, Parents have continued to use illegal drugs, failed to provide stable housing, engaged in criminal behavior resulting in periods of incarceration, and failed to complete recommended services designed to help reunify Children with Parents. As Children's CASA observed, Parents made little to no progress toward reunification and appeared to be trapped in a “tireless loop” of housing instability and drug use. Tr. Vol. 3 at 44. CASA Dunkel testified to the negative impact Parents’ instability has had on Children, especially A.S., who has cycled between twelve placements in her young life. For these reasons, CASA Dunkel testified it was in Children's best interest for the parent-child relationship to be terminated and for them to be adopted. Children simply should not have to wait indefinitely for Parents to create the safe, stable, drug-free home they deserve. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. At the time of termination, Children were doing well in a pre-adoptive home with foster parents able to provide them with permanency.

[32] The trial court's conclusion that termination is in Children's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[33] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[34] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The paternal half-siblings are all older than A.S. They were adjudicated CHINS and subject to the court's jurisdiction from 2014 to 2017. They lived with a foster family until they were returned to Father's care at the end of their first CHINS cases. The foster family stayed in touch and remained a support system for paternal half-siblings.

2.   Maternal half-siblings were also adjudicated CHINS, and they now live with their father.

3.   As noted in the termination order, the DCS assessment case manager “did not have a clear recollection of what occurred” in the assessments that led to A.S.’s and paternal-half sibling's removal. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 117. It appears from the record that in the summer of 2023, Father left paternal half-siblings in the care of their foster parents from their previous CHINS case. It is unclear from the record where A.S. was living, only that DCS located and removed her.

4.   Despite the fact Grandmother's house “was kind of always a landing place” for Parents, Children's CASA explained DCS never considered Grandmother's home an appropriate placement for Children due to Grandmother's alleged drug use. Id. at 42–43.

5.   Parents also raised some due process arguments in the trial court, and the trial court's order addresses those issues. However, neither parent raises due process issues on appeal.

6.   On appeal, Father argues DCS failed to establish there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being (Subsection (d)(4)). Although DCS alleged this factor, the trial court did not find DCS had proven it by clear and convincing evidence, and so we need not address Father's appeal in this regard.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.