Robert C. Brenneman, Jr., Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2017, Robert C. Brenneman, Jr., pled guilty to Level 4 felony attempted child molestation and Level 4 felony burglary pursuant to a fixed-term plea. The trial court accepted Brenneman's plea and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement. On July 27, 2023, Brenneman petitioned for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing him, he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that his plea had not been made knowingly or voluntarily. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Brenneman's petition. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Pursuant to the probable cause affidavit filed in the underlying criminal case, on or about May 26, 2015, Jocelyn Crawford lived in a duplex in Marion County with her then-fifteen-year-old daughter, A.S., and her then-eleven-month-old daughter, C.Q. Crawford had briefly left the residence and, upon returning, found Brenneman in the bedroom where her two daughters were sleeping. Brenneman was “wearing red lingerie that came down to his knees, split on the sides, no [socks] and no underwear, and his penis and testicles were exposed.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 2. Brenneman “had one hand moving down the rear of [A.S.’s] pants and [C.Q.] was lying on her back with her legs spread and [Brenneman] had two fingers on the inside [of] the leg portion of her diaper.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 2. Brenneman fled after a brief struggle with Crawford.

[3] Crawford discovered a broken window and underwear that did not belong to her or her daughters in her bathroom. Several pairs of women's underwear and a pink women's dress that “was long and had slits in the sides running from the bottom of the dress to the hip line” were recovered from the basement crawl space of the attached residence, to which Brenneman had fled. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 4. Brenneman was arrested soon thereafter and told the arresting officer that “he was an exhibitionist and he was the guy in the daycare in a bikini.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 5. The arresting officer learned that Brenneman had been on parole at the time of the incident involving Crawford's daughters and the GPS records for Brenneman's monitoring device indicated that he had been in both residences in the duplex on the date in question.

[4] On May 28, 2015, Brenneman was charged with Level 1 felony attempted child molesting, Level 4 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony burglary, Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Level 6 felony sexual battery. In March of 2017, Brenneman pled guilty to the amended charge of Level 4 felony attempted child molesting and Level 4 felony burglary. In exchange for Brenneman's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss all of the remaining charges. The plea agreement indicated that “[t]he sentence on both counts shall be identical and served concurrently[ ]” and that Brenneman

shall serve a total sentence of twelve (12) years. Six (6) years shall be executed. Three (3) years shall be served in the Department of Correction [(“DOC”)]. Three years shall be served on Home Detention with GPS.․ Six (6) years shall be suspended, and four (4) years shall be served on sex offender probation.

Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 6 (emphases omitted).

[5] The trial court conducted a guilty-plea and sentencing hearing on March 29, 2017, at which the following factual basis was provided:

Court: Did you sir, here in Marion County, Indiana on or about May 26, 2015, break and enter the dwelling of Jocelyn Crawford, which is a residence located at the 800 block of North Oxford, with the intent to commit a felony, which is sexual battery and/or sexual misconduct with a minor and/or child molesting, is that true sir?

Defendant: Yes[.]

Court: Also sir, on or about May 26th 2015[,] did you attempt to perform or submit to fondling or touching with [C.Q.] a child under the age of fourteen years of age ․ with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of yourself or [C.Q.] by engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step towards the crime of committing child molesting which was you touched [C.Q.’s] leg with your hand and/or inserted your fingers into her diaper, is that true?

Defendant: Yes, sir.

Court: I find that [Brenneman] knowing and willingly enters in the plead guilty. He understands the charges, the possible penalties, the constitutional rights he gives up. I find a sufficient factual basis[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. The trial court “found [that] the plea was knowing and voluntary and ․ sentenced Brenneman in accordance with his negotiated plea agreement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. “Brenneman did not appeal his sentence or conviction[s.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97.

[6] On July 27, 2023, Brenneman petitioned for PCR, claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing him; his trial counsel, Jessica Cicchini, had provided ineffective assistance; and his guilty plea had not been knowingly or voluntarily made. The post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 13, 2024, at which Cicchini and Brenneman testified.

[7] Cicchini testified that while she did not have access to all of her notes regarding Brenneman's case,¹ she remembered “talking to [Brenneman] specifically about trying to get a plea with no registry requirements[ ]” and that she and Brenneman had gone “back and forth on that for kind of a long time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Cicchini acknowledged that “some length of parole is an automatic consequence of being in the [DOC].” Tr. Vol. II p. 23. During plea negotiations, Brenneman had been “very adverse to parole[ ]” and “also adverse to the sex[-]offender registry.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. As it relates to an offender's placement on parole, Cicchini testified that a sex offender receives “ten years of parole” but a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) receives “lifetime parole.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. Cicchini indicated that Brenneman “is on the registry because he's a [SVP]. The [SVP] is one of the reasons that lifetime parole is required.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 23–24. “[T]hat status is automatic based on [the Indiana Code,]” and is “not something that [one] could separately negotiate with the State[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 24.

[8] Cicchini indicated that she “remember[ed] specifically talking to [Brenneman] about the registry[,]” and that Brenneman eventually “decided to take the plea with the registry requirement.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Cicchini further indicated that it was her practice to be “very in depth[ ] about [her] recommendations” regarding registry and parole requirements because the sex-offender registry is “so complicated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Cicchini had engaged in that practice before representing Brenneman, with a case file from a 2013 case involving similar charges containing detailed notes “about advising [the] client that the registry [requirement] would come with lifetime parole[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 17.

[9] Cicchini indicated that parole had been a subject of her discussions with Brenneman, noting that she believed that they had talked specifically about lifetime parole. Cicchini remembered that she and Brenneman had “talked a lot about the registry and what requirements [Brenneman] would have[,]” that Brenneman “really wanted to avoid the registry particularly because of [his] prior experience on parole[,]” and after the State refused to offer a plea deal that would not include registry requirements and parole, she “advised [Brenneman] to take the plea knowing [he] would be on lifetime registry and parole.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Cicchini and Brenneman “spent a lot of time talking to each other about all of what would be [Brenneman's] requirements after [he] was released.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. While Cicchini could not “under oath pinpoint a moment in time that [they] talked exactly about parole[,]” she believed they did, despite not being able to “say for sure when that was.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21.

[10] When questioned by Brenneman, Cicchini indicated that

Part of that was why it took so long to get to a guilty plea because I spent an extensive period of time trying to get you just a burglary charge. The prosecutor was not willing to do that. You were facing a Level 1 felony and I was able to secure a plea to two Level 4's, which you would be released in a couple of months on home detention. I advised you to take that plea and I still believe that was the best choice for you.

Tr. Vol. II p. 22. On cross-examination, Cicchini indicated that she

was actually very focused on making sure clients understood what they had to do because I think quite honestly, it's impossible for anyone to follow the rules of the sex offender registry or lifetime parole. I think lifetime parole has no teeth, so I think it's kind of pointless because once you do all your time, they can't do anything.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 24–25. Cicchini further indicated that it is the failure to comply with the sex-offender registry that “has teeth[,]” as it can result in penal consequences. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Cicchini made “significant efforts” to negotiate a “non-registry plea,” but “the prosecutor just simply wouldn't agree” to such a plea. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Cicchini reiterated that at the time she represented Brenneman, she had been “focused on advising [her] clients about the registry and the lifetime parole.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26.

[11] Contrary to Cicchini's testimony that she had discussed the lifetime parole requirement with him, Brenneman testified that he had not been informed that a conviction for attempted child molestation “mandated lifetime parole by operation of law.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. He also acknowledged that his status as an SVP was by operation of law due to his attempted child-molestation conviction but claims that he believed that the trial court should have had a duty to inform him of that status during sentencing. Brenneman claimed that he “was first advised of the lifetime parole term immediately before [his] release in August 2022.” Tr. Vol. II p. 33. Brenneman acknowledged that

I was well aware of the parole attachment to any conviction in general and sex offenses also. I was aware that even after I got out, that I would technically be on parole, but since I was going out on house arrest and probation, that parole would more than likely let house arrest and probation take over the supervision. But the point is, I understood that supervision to be finite with a fixed discharge date and I understood those supervision stipulations would be determined by the Court and objections to or violations of same would be considered by the Court and not the parole board whom I considered at that point, objectionably unfair.

Tr. Vol. II p. 34. Brenneman indicated that he “would not have agreed to plead guilty had [he] known [his] sentence included lifetime parole[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 34.

[12] On May 1, 2025, the post-conviction court denied Brenneman's request for PCR. With regard to Brenneman's claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing him, the post-conviction court concluded as follows:

7.) Here, Brenneman's claim of trial court abuse of discretion was clearly available and known at the time of a possible direct appeal. His claim is that, by the trial court failing to advise him of his parole obligation, he was not informed of the minimum sentencing consequence of his plea, and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to do so. This would have been immediately known to Brenneman at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing because the court did not discuss any parole obligation with him. By failing to raise the issue on direct appeal, Brenneman cannot present the issue in post-conviction proceedings and the issue is waived.

8.) Waiver notwithstanding, Brenneman was aware of his parole obligation. Further, a judge is “not required to advise a defendant of the parole consequences of his plea. The parole impact of a plea is neither a constitutional right nor an advisement required by statute.” Fulmer v. State, 519 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (Ind. 1988) (citing Jones v. State, 491 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 1986)[)].

9.) For these reasons, Brenneman's ․ claim fails.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 18. With regard to Brenneman's ineffectiveness claim, the post-conviction court concluded as follows:

4.) Here, Brenneman claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not advised by his trial counsel of a lifetime parole obligation for a conviction for child molesting. The court finds that it is more likely than not that he was, in fact, advised of this lifetime parole requirement. Trial counsel was extremely familiar with the collateral consequences and obligations for sex offenses, and it was her standard practice to discuss these with clients. This is further evidenced by her discussion with Brenneman regarding the lifetime registration requirement. Further, it is clear that Brenneman knew of his parole obligation upon conviction, given he was seeking a counteroffer that would not include parole.

5.) Brenneman has failed to prove this claim.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17. With regard to Brenneman's claim that his guilty plea had not been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because he was unaware that his plea required lifetime parole, the post-conviction court concluded as follows:

11.) At the outset, the court finds that Brenneman was aware of the parole requirement by pleading guilty to child molesting. Brenneman is correct that he was not advised by the trial court of a parole obligation. As cited above, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of the parole consequences of his plea. Fulmer, 519 N.E.2d at 1238 [ ]. Subjecting a prisoner to their statutory parole obligation, even if not informed of it at his sentencing, was not improper or a breach of the plea agreement. See Kyner v. State, 990 N.E.2d 524, 2013 Ind. App. Unpub. LEXIS 896 (Ind. App. 2013) (citing and applying both Fullmer and Jones cited above).

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 18–19.

Discussion and Decision

[13] “Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal.” Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 1999). “Instead, they create a narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, challenges which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules.” Id. A petitioner who has been denied PCR appeals from a negative judgment and as a result, faces a rigorous standard of review on appeal. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001); Collier v. State, 715 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[14] Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, in order to prevail, a petitioner must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. When appealing from the denial of a PCR petition, a petitioner must convince us that the evidence, taken as a whole, “leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. “In other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did.” Id. (emphasis in original). “It is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as contrary to law.” Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Brenneman

[15] Brenneman contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, arguing that the trial court had failed to properly advise him that his child-molestation conviction qualified him as an SVP and thereby subjected him to lifetime parole.

For the most part, completion of Indiana's direct appellate process closes the door to a criminal defendant's claims of error in conviction or sentencing. However, our law allows defendants whose appeals have been rejected to raise a narrow set of claims through a petition for post-conviction relief. The scope of the relief available is limited to issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or that were not available on direct appeal. Issues available but not raised on direct appeal are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.

Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations and quotation omitted); see also Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1193–94 (Ind. 2006) (“The law in this jurisdiction is settled that sentencing issues which are known or available at the time of direct appeal but are not raised are waived for post-conviction review.).

[16] As the State notes, “Brenneman spends a significant portion of his brief complaining that the trial court failed to properly advise him of his SVP status and the related lifetime parole requirement[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 19. The State also correctly notes that “[i]n his post-conviction petition, Brenneman only challenged the trial court's failure to advise that he would be subjected to lifetime parole, not that the trial court had failed to make an SVP determination.” Appellee's Br. p. 19. Thus, to the extent that Brenneman is attempting to raise a separate, distinct claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make an SVP determination, any such claim is waived because it was not raised before the post-conviction court. See Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ind. 1997) (“[C]laims not advanced until appellant's brief in an appeal from the denial of [PCR] are waived.”).

[17] Moreover, Brenneman's argument regarding the trial court's alleged failure to advise him of his parole obligation was available for direct appeal but was not litigated. Stated plainly, “[i]f an issue was available on direct appeal but not litigated, it is waived.” Strowmatt v. State, 779 N.E.2d 971, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Because Brenneman did not raise his sentencing argument in a direct appeal, his argument is waived, and he cannot raise it for the first time in the instant post-conviction proceedings.² See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 905; Strowmatt, 779 N.E.2d at 975.

II. Brenneman Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[18] Brenneman also contends that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting his claim that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. “The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “ ‘The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)). “ ‘The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).

[19] A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy two components. Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. 2007). Under the first prong, the petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating that counsel's representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “We recognize that even the finest, most experienced criminal defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or the most effective way to represent a client,” and therefore, under this prong, we will assume that counsel performed adequately and defer to counsel's strategic and tactical decisions. Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind. 2002). “Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id.

[20] Under the second prong, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769. A petitioner may show prejudice by demonstrating that there is “a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (italics added, internal quotation omitted).

[21] A petitioner's failure to satisfy either prong will cause the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to fail. See Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154. Stated differently, “[a]lthough the two parts of the Strickland test are separate inquiries, a claim may be disposed of on either prong.” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006) (citing Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154). The post-conviction court determined that Brenneman had received effective assistance from trial counsel, and we agree.

[22] While Brenneman testified that Cicchini had not informed him of the parole obligations to which he would be subjected after pleading guilty, Cicchini testified that while she could not pinpoint an exact conversation with Brenneman during which she had informed him of his parole obligations, she believed that she had done so and, at the time that she had represented Brenneman, it had been her practice to do so. The post-conviction court found Cicchini to be credible, finding that “it was more likely than not that he was, in fact, advised of [the] lifetime parole requirement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17. The post-conviction court, acting as the trier of fact, was in the best position to judge credibility and was not required to credit Brenneman's self-serving testimony. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (“[T]he fact finder is best positioned to judge the credibility of these witnesses, is free to credit or discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence.”); Conder v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1197, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The postconviction court was not obligated to believe Conder's self-serving testimony that he was not consulted about the motion.”).

[23] Cicchini testified that at the time she represented Brenneman, she had been “very focused on making sure clients understood” any reporting or parole obligations. Tr. Vol. II p. 24. Cicchini remembered “talking to [Brenneman] specifically about trying to get a plea with no registry requirements[ ]” and that she and Brenneman had gone “back and forth on that for kind of a long time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Cicchini indicated that she “remember[ed] specifically talking to [Brenneman] about the registry[,]” and it was her practice to be “very in depth[ ] about [her] recommendations” regarding registry and parole requirements because the sex-offender registry is “so complicated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. She had engaged in this practice before representing Brenneman. While Cicchini could not “under oath pinpoint a moment in time that [they] talked exactly about parole[,]” specifically lifetime parole, she believed they did, despite not being able to “say for sure when that was.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21.

[24] Cicchini remembered that she and Brenneman had “talked a lot about the registry and what requirements [Brenneman] would have[,]” that Brenneman had “really wanted to avoid the registry particularly because of [his] prior experience on parole[,]” and after the State had refused to offer a plea deal that would not include registry requirements and parole, she had “advised [Brenneman] to take the plea knowing [he] would be on lifetime registry and parole.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Cicchini and Brenneman had “spent a lot of time talking to each other about all of what would be [Brenneman's] requirements after [he] was released.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. Cicchini reiterated that at the time she had represented Brenneman, she had been “focused on advising [her] clients about the registry and the lifetime parole.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26.

[25] Cicchini noted that during plea negotiations, Brenneman had been “very adverse to parole[ ]” and “also adverse to the sex[-]offender registry.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. Cicchini had made “significant efforts” to negotiate a “non-registry plea,” but that “the prosecutor just simply wouldn't agree” to such a plea. Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Cicchini explained that Brenneman's status as an SVP was “automatic based on [the Indiana Code,]” however, and was “not something that [she] could separately negotiate with the State[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 24.

[26] At the very least, Cicchini's testimony supports the reasonable inference that she had informed Brenneman of his parole obligations. Given that the record indicates that Brenneman had been notified of his lifetime-parole obligation, he has failed to establish that Cicchini's performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769. Brenneman has therefore failed to prove that he was subjected to ineffective assistance of trial counsel as he failed to establish deficient performance by Cicchini. See Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154 (providing that a petitioner's failure to satisfy either prong will cause the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to fail).

III. Brenneman's Plea was Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered

[27] Brenneman also contends that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered because he had not been aware of his lifetime parole obligation. Guilty pleas must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A trial court “shall not accept a plea of guilty ․ without first determining that” the defendant: (1) understands the nature of the charges against him, (2) has been informed that he waives certain rights by pleading guilty, (3) has been informed of the minimum and maximum possible sentences and any possibility of consecutive sentences, (4) has been informed that he will lose the right to possess a firearm if convicted of a crime of domestic violence, and (5) has been informed that if the court accepts the plea agreement, it is bound by the terms of said agreement. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2(a).

[28] In sentencing Brenneman, the trial court satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2(a). To the extent that it did not inform Brenneman of the parole consequence of his guilty plea, it was not required to do so. See Fulmer, 519 N.E.2d at 1238 (“The judge was not required to advise the defendant of the parole consequences of his plea. The parole impact of a plea is neither a constitutional right nor an advisement required by statute.”); Jones, 491 N.E.2d at 543 (“There is no requirement in the law that a person entering a plea of guilty be advised as to the possible future effects the parole statutes will have upon his incarceration.”).

[29] In rejecting Brenneman's claim to the contrary, the post-conviction court found that Brenneman “was aware of the parole requirement by pleading guilty to child molesting.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 19. Brenneman engaged in lengthy plea negotiations before ultimately deciding to plead guilty to the two Level 4 felonies, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges—including a Level 1 felony—and a fixed sentence. During these negotiations, Brenneman unsuccessfully attempted to secure a plea that would not include a sex-offender registry requirement or lifetime parole, supporting the inference that he knew of the parole consequences of his guilty plea. This fact coupled with Cicchini's testimony that she had informed Brenneman of the parole consequences of his guilty plea supports the post-conviction court's finding that Brenneman was aware of the parole consequences of his plea. Because Brenneman was aware of these consequences at the time he entered his guilty plea, he has failed to establish that his guilty plea had not been knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made.

[30] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cicchini indicated that at some point after the resolution of Brenneman's case and the PCR hearing, the Public Defender Agency had lost her file.

2.   In any event, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion by failing to inform Brenneman of his parole obligation as “[t]here is no requirement in the law that a person entering a plea of guilty be advised as to the possible future effects the parole statutes will have upon his incarceration.” Jones v. State, 491 N.E.2d 542, 543 (Ind. 1986); see also Fulmer v. State, 519 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (Ind. 1988) (“The judge was not required to advise the defendant of the parole consequences of his plea. The parole impact of a plea is neither a constitutional right nor an advisement required by statute.”).

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.