IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.B. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.B. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to A.B., K.B., C.B., and Da.B. (“Children”). Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights, but we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Father raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Father's parental rights.

Facts

[3] Father and S.B. (“Mother”) had three children: A.B., born in May 2014; K.B., born in July 2015; and C.B., born in June 2016. In July 2020, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed A.B., K.B., and C.B. from Parents’ care due to domestic violence and poor home conditions. Parents admitted to methamphetamine use and the abuse of prescription medications. On July 10, 2020, DCS filed petitions alleging that A.B., K.B., and C.B. were children in need of services (“CHINS”). In March 2021, DCS, however, dismissed the CHINS action and converted the case to an informal adjustment. The informal adjustment was closed in October 2021.

[4] In 2020, the State charged Father with interference with the reporting of a crime, a Class A misdemeanor, and domestic battery in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony. In March 2021, Father pleaded guilty to domestic battery, and the interference charge was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Father to 400 days with his remaining time suspended to probation. As part of his probation, Father completed an assessment at Southwestern Indiana Mental Health Center and disclosed abuse of alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. Father was referred to Matrix for an intensive outpatient treatment program and Abuse Awareness and Accountability to address domestic violence. The assessment recommended that Father participate in weekly case management, group therapy three times a week, and individual therapy twice a month. Father, however, failed to schedule orientation and he was “referred back to probation due to non-compliance.” Ex. Vol. VIII p. 10. In December 2021, a petition to revoke Father's probation was filed. In May 2022, Father admitted to violating his probation, the trial court modified the sentence to time served, and the trial court ordered Father's probation to be terminated unsatisfactorily.

[5] In October 2023, Mother, A.B., K.B., and C.B. began to reside with maternal grandmother due to domestic violence and drug usage in the home with Father. At the time, Mother was pregnant and due in February 2024. Mother, however, moved back into the home with Father on November 11, 2023. DCS received a report regarding the family, and Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, but Father refused to participate in a drug screen. DCS found “[d]og feces on the floor, on the children's mattresses, strong smell of urine in the home, and dirty clothes all over the home as well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 72. The children reported a lack of food, arguments between Mother and Father, and drug usage by Father. The children “had missed a significant amount of school,” had delays in their learning, and were behind in “all their subjects” in school. Id. at 73. DCS removed A.B., K.B., and C.B. from Parents’ care on November 11, 2023.

[6] On November 14, 2023, DCS filed petitions alleging that A.B., K.B., and C.B. were CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, and the trial court found that they were CHINS. In January 2024, the trial court entered a dispositional order, which required Father to, in part: maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; maintain a legal and stable source of income; avoid the consumption of illegal controlled substances, unprescribed substances, and alcohol; complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; attend all scheduled visitations with the children; participate in the Abuse Awareness and Accountability Program; and complete an evaluation for family treatment court.

[7] Da.B. was born in January 2024 to Mother and Father. Mother admitted to using methamphetamine during her pregnancy, and Father also admitted to using methamphetamine. DCS filed a petition alleging that Da.B. was a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, and the trial court granted the petition. The trial court entered a dispositional order, which required Father to complete the same services as those required in the earlier dispositional order.

[8] Father was arrested in February 2024 for burglary, a Level 4 felony; possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; and operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (“ACE”) of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor. Father was incarcerated until August 2024, when he pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Father to 540 days suspended to probation and ordered Father to participate in a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations as a condition of probation.

[9] Father completed a mental health assessment in August 2024. Father reported that “he had been smoking an 8 ball of meth weekly, drinking a pint of alcohol daily, and snorting 2-3 Xanax ‘whenever [he could] get them.’ ” Ex. Vol. VIII p. 90. He reported that his last usage of illegal substances was before his arrest and that he had “no friends that do not use.” Id. at 91. Father denied the domestic violence allegations. The assessment revealed diagnoses of a severe stimulant use disorder, a severe alcohol use disorder, and a moderate nicotine use disorder. It was recommended that Father participate in Matrix, which Father did. After Father was released from probation in February 2025, however, he began cancelling his individual sessions and failed to “successfully complete” the program. Ex. Vol. IX p. 10.

[10] While Father did visit with the Children when he was not incarcerated, the visits were not consistent. Father never progressed beyond supervised visitations. Father failed to enroll in or complete both the Abuse Awareness and Accountability Program to address domestic violence and the Fatherhood Engagement program. Father's participation in random drug screens was inconsistent, and he missed many screens. Although Father claimed to DCS that he worked at Toyota and a construction company, he later admitted that he had not worked at either company. Finally, Father never obtained stable housing and lived with relatives. A.B., K.B., and C.B. informed a therapist that, while in Parents’ care, they felt that they did not have enough to eat, wore dirty clothing, and felt that Parents were too drunk or high to properly care for them.

[11] On August 11, 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights. DCS alleged, in part:

i. That the child has been removed from the parent and has been under [the supervision of] the local office for at least [ ] fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and, despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 3 1-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home;

ii. That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied;

iii. That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of the child[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 24, 46, 70, 94.

[12] Mother later consented to the Children's adoption. A fact-finding hearing was held on October 6, 2025. At that time, Father was living in the dining room of a relative's house and was working for a church doing renovations. He claimed to be drug and alcohol free for “[a]lmost two years” and to be “a very changed person.” Tr. Vol. II p. 69. Father testified that he recently signed up for the Abuse Awareness and Accountability program.

[13] On December 9, 2025, the trial court entered an order terminating Father's parental rights to the Children. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon and found, in part:

a. The Children have been placed outside of the home for at lea fifteen (15) of the last twenty-two (22) months.

b. There is a reasonable probability that the reasons for placement outside of the home will not be remedied.

c. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the Father child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the [C]hildren.

d. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the [C]hildren's best interests because the [C]hildren's need for permanency is paramount.

e. DCS has a plan for the [C]hildren's continued care and treatment, namely, to have the [C]hildren adopted.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 126-27. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[15] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.¹ Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[16] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

* * * * *

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

* * * * *

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).²

[17] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.

A. Challenges to the Findings of Fact

[18] Father first challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact. Accordingly, we must determine whether those findings of fact are clearly erroneous. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[19] Findings 1, 2, and 3 detail the reasons for DCS's involvement with the family in October and November 2023, which are detailed in the CHINS petitions and preliminary inquiries. Father notes that DCS did not request that the trial court take judicial notice of the CHINS actions. The trial court, however, “may take judicial notice on its own.” Ind. Evid. R. 201(c)(1). These findings are, accordingly, not clearly erroneous.

[20] Finding 6 notes that Father did not appear at the CHINS continued initial hearing regarding Da.B. on February 6, 2024, but Father contends that he appeared by phone. Father, however, misinterprets the record. The CCS for Da.B.’s CHINS matter provides the following regarding the February 6, 2024 hearing:

Mother and Father were present when this date and time was set for continued initial hearing. Court finds mother and father have voluntarily failed to appear. Mother and Father have outstanding No Bond Writs. Over the objection of counsel, Court holds fact finding and after hearing evidence, Court declares the child a CHINS.

Ex. Vol. III p. 86. The record indicates that Mother and Father attempted to appear by phone for the January 23, 2024 hearing, not the February 6, 2024 hearing. The trial court denied the request for a telephonic hearing on January 23, 2024, because Mother and Father had “active writs” through the other CHINS matters. Id. at 84. Father has failed to demonstrate that the finding is clearly erroneous.

[21] Finding 8 provides: “The children had been removed from Mother and Father as part of a prior CHINS from a domestic incident which occurred in front of the three oldest children in 2020 in another county.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 123. Father, however, notes that Da.B. was not born until 2024 and was not removed in 2020. Although the finding should have said that the three oldest children were removed in 2020, we find that this minor error is harmless and does not impact the trial court's ultimate determinations. See, e.g., In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 924 (Ind. 2011) (holding the trial court's minor error in a finding of fact to be harmless).

[22] Finding 10 provides: “Father's visitation was inconsistent after he was released from jail; and he sometimes canceled due to work.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 123. Father contends that he only missed seven visits of the fifty-six visits actually held. The evidence demonstrated otherwise; Father did not visit the Children while he was incarcerated; Father admitted that he sometimes missed visits because he said that he had to work; Father also stopped attending visits at one point because he and Mother “stopped talking”; and Father admitted that he canceled a visit to run errands with Mother. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. Given this evidence, the finding is not clearly erroneous.

[23] Similarly, Finding 12 provides: “Father missed a significant amount of drug screens.” Id. Father contends that he has been sober for almost two years and argues that only one compliance report was entered into evidence. The evidence, however, demonstrated that, before Father's incarceration in February 2024, he was “smoking an 8 ball of meth weekly, drinking a pint of alcohol daily, and snorting 2-3 Xanax ‘whenever [he could] get them.’ ” Ex. Vol. VIII p. 90. After his release from incarceration in August 2024, Father did test relatively consistently until his probation ended in February 2025. Following his probation term, Father's drug screens became very inconsistent. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.

[24] And Finding 17 provides: “Father has failed to maintain stable and safe housing. Since his arrest, he has resided with his brother and now resides with his mother in her dining room area.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 124. Father contends that DCS had not visited either residence and that there is no indication either residence was unsafe or inappropriate. It is undisputed, however, that at the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father was sleeping in the dining room of a relative and there is no indication that the residence was appropriate for the four children. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.³

B. Remedy of Conditions

[25] Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.”⁴ Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[26] Father contends that the Children were removed due to allegations of domestic violence between Parents, unsanitary living conditions, and drug abuse. According to Father, Parents are now divorced; Father claims to have been sober for almost two years; and he has an appropriate residence. Father's visits with the Children were positive according to Father. Father's argument, however, is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence.

[27] The Children were initially removed due to Parents’ drug usage, domestic violence, and unsanitary home conditions. DCS presented evidence that Father participated in services while he was on probation, but his participation declined after his probation was complete. Father's participation in visits with the Children and random drug screenings were inconsistent; Father failed to complete substance abuse treatment, domestic violence treatment services, and Fatherhood Engagement services. Father failed to secure a stable income or appropriate housing for four children. Under these circumstances, the trial court's conclusion that “[t]here is a reasonable probability that the reasons for placement outside of the home will not be remedied” is not clearly erroneous. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 124, 126.

C. Children's Best Interests

[28] Next, Father challenges the trial court's determination that termination of his parental rights is in the Children's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[29] Father contends that he substantially complied with the parent participation plan and that he should be given more time to engage in services. Our determination, however, focuses on the Children's best interests. In Parents’ care, A.B., K.B., and C.B. felt that they did not have enough to eat, wore dirty clothing, and felt that Parents were too drunk or high to properly care for them. They reported hearing arguments between Parents and witnessing drug usage by Father. They “had missed a significant amount of school,” had delays in their learning, and were behind in “all their subjects” in school. Tr. Vol. II p. 73. Further, the CASA testified that the Children were doing well in their preadoptive home; the Children were progressing in school; and the Children were participating in community activities. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[30] The evidence supports the termination of Father's parental rights to the Children. Accordingly, we affirm.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

2.   This statute was amended effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition in August 2025, under the latest version of the statute.

3.   Father also challenges Finding 20, Finding 21, and Conclusion 11. We will address those in the analysis of the remaining issues.

4.   Father also argues DCS failed to demonstrate that: (1) despite DCS's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the Children's family under Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the Children being placed in care outside the parent's home; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the Children. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2), (d)(4). DCS, however, was only required to prove the existence of one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d). See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1). The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children's removal or reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address Father's other arguments regarding the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.