SU v. PIKE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Xiaoyan Su (“Su”) appeals the denial of her motion to set aside a default judgment entered in favor of Dallis Pike ¹ and Peiyan Shao (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). We conclude that Su untimely filed her appeal and, accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Issue

[2] Su raises several issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as one dispositive issue: whether Su timely appealed the denial of her motion to set aside the default judgment.²

Facts

[3] On November 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Su alleging that Su impersonated them online and used Pike's personal identifying information to submit false complaints concerning their social-media account. Su did not answer the complaint or otherwise appear, and Plaintiffs filed a verified motion for default judgment. On March 20, 2024, the trial court entered a default judgment against Su and in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $9,501, plus court costs and post-judgment interest at eight percent per annum. See Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 24-25.

[4] Su first sought relief from the default judgment on August 5, 2024, when she filed her first motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied that motion on October 16, 2024, and Su did not appeal. On December 30, 2024, Su filed a second motion seeking to vacate the default judgment, and the trial court entered an order that same day advising Su to hire an attorney and setting the matter for a hearing on February 5, 2025.³ On May 22, 2025, Su filed a third motion seeking relief from the judgment. Following a hearing on November 5, 2025, the trial court denied Su's third motion to set aside the default judgment by order entered on November 13, 2025.

[5] On December 29, 2025, Su filed a motion to modify the damages amount. The trial court thereafter conducted a hearing on damages on January 12, 2026, at which Su appeared and challenged the evidence supporting the award. On January 15, 2026, Su filed a motion for a protective order against Plaintiffs and their agents. Three days later, on January 18, 2026, the trial court denied Su's motion for a protective order. On January 20, 2026, the trial court entered an order declining to modify the damages award, and Su filed another motion to reconsider on that same day. On January 21, 2026, Su filed her Notice of Appeal without waiting for a ruling on the motion to reconsider.⁴

Discussion and Decision

[6] Su appeals and challenges the denial of her motion to set aside the default judgment. Plaintiffs, however, argue that Su's appeal is untimely. Su argues that her Notice of Appeal was timely because the trial court ruled on her motion for a protective order in January 2026 and her motion to reconsider the damages award remained pending when she filed her appeal. We disagree.

[7] Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) provides: “A party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk ․ within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” (emphasis added). Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) also provides that “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by [Post-Conviction Rule] 2.”⁵

[8] The question before us, therefore, is whether the trial court's November 13, 2025 order denying Su's motion to set aside the default judgment was a final judgment, such that Su's deadline to file her Notice of Appeal was December 15, 2025. Put another way, the question is whether Su's subsequent filings extended the time for her appeal. A ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment is deemed final by rule, even when other issues remain pending. Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014). Trial Rule 60(C) provides that “[a] ruling or order of the court denying or granting relief, in whole or in part, by motion under subdivision (B) of this rule shall be deemed a final judgment, and an appeal may be taken therefrom as in the case of a judgment.” See Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Constr. Co., 798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. 2003) (“A ruling denying or granting relief on a motion to set aside a default is deemed a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken.”).

[9] Here, Su filed her third motion to set aside the default judgment against her on May 22, 2025, pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B), citing excusable neglect, fraud or misrepresentation, and extraordinary circumstances. See Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 38-39. The trial court denied this motion on November 13, 2025. This decision “shall be deemed a final judgment” under Trial Rule 60(C), even though Su later filed motions concerning the amount of damages and a protective order. Those filings did not extend the appeal deadline imposed by the November 13 denial.⁶ See Ind. Trial Rule 53.4(A) (“[A] motion by any party or the court or such action to reconsider by the court shall not delay the trial or any proceedings in the case, or extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion, or proceedings under these rules.”); Fry v. Indiana Dep't of Correction, 893 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “the time for appeal is not extended by motions to reconsider”). Su did not file her Notice of Appeal until January 21, 2026, more than one month after the December 15, 2025 deadline. Thus, pursuant to Appellate Rule 9(A)(5), Su forfeited her right to appeal.⁷

Conclusion

[10] Su did not timely file a Notice of Appeal and, thus, forfeited her right to appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

[11] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Some of the trial court documents spell Dallis Pike's last name as “Pyke.” After consulting various documents and evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, we conclude that the correct spelling is “Pike.”

2.   One of the issues Su raises in her Appellant's Brief concerns the denial of her request to waive the appellate filing fee. Su twice sought to avoid paying the appellate filing fee by requesting in forma pauperis status. She filed a fee-waiver motion in the trial court on January 21, 2026, the same day she filed her Notice of Appeal, and the trial court denied that motion. On January 22, 2026, she then filed a Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis in this Court, which this Court denied by order dated January 30, 2026, directing her to pay the appellate filing fee within ten days. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(E). Su paid the filing fee on February 2, 2026, and has not sought a refund. Su's challenge to the denial of her fee-waiver requests is, therefore, moot. Moreover, Su's argument on this point is waived because it is not cogent. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8).

3.   After a continuance, the hearing was held on March 5, 2025.

4.   The record does not clearly identify which trial court ruling Su appeals. In her reply brief, Su appears to contend that she appeals the denial of her motion to modify damages, asserting that “damages remained pending” until the trial court's January 2026 orders. Appellant's Reply Br. p. 6. Although Appellate Rule 9(F)(3) requires an appellant to designate the appealed-from judgment or order, Su did not do so. Based on the substance of Appellant's Brief, however, we construe her appeal as challenging the denial of her motion to set aside the default judgment.

5.   The Post-Conviction Rule exception is not applicable here.

6.   In her Reply Brief, Su raises an additional issue concerning the amount of damages. Appellee's Brief characterizes this as “the only issue preserved for appeal.” Appellee's Br. p. 8. We disagree with that characterization. The default judgment was entered on March 20, 2024, in the amount of $9,501, plus costs and interests. Su did not file her motion to modify or reconsider that amount until January 2026, and that motion remained pending when Su filed her Notice of Appeal. A motion to reconsider does not extend the time to appeal, and Su's deadline to appeal the damages award had already expired. Su has, therefore, forfeited her right to appeal the damages award, and we need not address the damages issue.

7.   Su makes no cogent argument in either her opening brief or reply brief that extraordinary circumstances justify her belated appeal. In In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014), our Supreme Court recognized a “mechanism allowing this Court to resurrect an otherwise forfeited appeal” where “extraordinarily compelling reasons” exist. Here, Su neither argues nor demonstrates any extraordinarily compelling reasons to resurrect her appeal, and we find none. We, therefore, decline to restore her forfeited appeal.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.