Christine White, Appellant-Petitioner v. Denis White, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After she petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Denis White, Christine White now appeals the trial court's decision to dissolve the marriage. She also argues the trial court erred by including a certain debt in the marital estate and ordering an equal division of the marital assets. We affirm the trial court in part but find it mistakenly gave Denis double credit for certain payments he made pursuant to the provisional order. We therefore reverse in part and remand for recalculation and division of the marital estate.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Christine and Denis were married in 2009 and never had children together. During the marriage, Denis changed jobs a few times and his yearly salary increased incrementally, eventually reaching low six figures. In early 2025, he got a new job earning $135,000 as an automotive trainer for TEXA. Until 2017, Christine made between $45,000 to $118,000 per year working on a commission basis for American Management Systems. She was forced to stop working in 2017 when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident, after which she received permanent disability benefits in the amount of $3,000 per month.

[3] In 2018, the parties purchased the marital residence on Bass Lake in Starke County. The property was mortgaged in Denis’ name, and later the parties took out a home equity line of credit (HELOC) together. The two-bedroom ranch “was in pretty poor condition” and needed various repairs. Transcript Vol. 2 at 58. The parties wanted to make it “big enough that [their] children [from prior relationships] could come home for holidays and have rooms that were theirs,” so they began a large-scale renovation that included adding multiple rooms. Id. at 65. They secured the permits necessary to do the project themselves, and Denis, who had “been involved in building ․ half a dozen” homes, functioned as the “general contractor[.]” Id. at 100, 209. Christine drafted floor plans for the new rooms, but the parties never made blueprints or consulted engineers or architects.

[4] On September 18, 2023, before the parties finished the renovation, Christine filed a verified petition for dissolution of marriage. She alleged there “ha[d] been an irretrievable breakdown in the marital relationship ․” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 33. In December, the trial court approved an agreed provisional order which gave Christine temporary exclusive possession of the marital residence and made Denis responsible for paying the mortgage and HELOC on the home. It also required Denis to pay various utility and service bills for the marital residence, Christine's car payments and health insurance premiums, certain credit card bills, the costs associated with the couple's timeshare, and his expenses related to living in a Missouri home he had purchased before the marriage. Christine had to pay her cell phone bill, car insurance, medical bills, and life insurance premiums. In January 2024 and June 2025, Christine filed petitions to hold Denis in contempt for failing to make certain payments under the provisional order. However, she dismissed those petitions at the final dissolution hearing held on November 13, 2025.

[5] At that hearing, the court heard testimony from Denis, Christine, and Patrick Troy, who appraised the marital residence. Although the hearing focused on the value of the marital residence and the financial burden Denis experienced during the provisional period, there was also testimony elicited and evidence submitted regarding the parties’ various bank accounts, investment accounts, and personal property.

[6] Christine testified that she wanted to keep the marital residence—she had continued to fund repairs during the dissolution proceedings and was willing to continue fixing up the home. When Troy appraised the marital residence in September 2023, he valued it at $700,000. Later, Christine asked Troy to reconsider his valuation in light of a property inspection report, structural engineering report, and various estimates she'd obtained for repairs to the home totaling approximately $360,000. After reviewing those reports and estimates, Troy revalued the marital residence at approximately $340,000.

[7] Christine testified that “[t]he amount that [they] owe[d] on the home [was] more than” the value of the home. Id. at 135. She added that banks would not allow her to refinance the marital residence “until [the home] was one hundred percent complete.” Id. at 140. She asked the trial court to keep the mortgage in Denis’ name for nine months so she could finish the repairs and secure a loan, and she said she would be able to pay the expenses associated with keeping the marital residence until that time. Her boyfriend, who owned a construction company, was living in the marital residence and helping her with the project.

[8] Though he did not provide his own quotes, Denis gave some reasons why he disagreed with the repair estimates obtained by Christine. For example, he testified that the roof “could be redone simply, not for $104,000” as Christine suggested. Id. at 82; see Exhibits at 148. He explained that the renovation was 75 to 80% complete when he moved out in September 2023. While Denis offered to move back into the home and complete the renovations himself, he proposed “selling the home as-is” so that the parties could “both move on ․ Tr. Vol. 2 at 214.

[9] During the provisional period, Denis was regularly spending more than his monthly income on expenses he was ordered to pay. He paid almost $6,100 per month toward bills and over-drafted his bank account once. Between August and October 2025, he borrowed a total of $10,683.75 from his adult son to keep his mortgage and HELOC payments current. In all, Denis estimated he paid over $118,000 during the provisional period toward the loans on the marital residence and Christine's car.

[10] At the end of the final dissolution hearing, the trial court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In those submissions, both parties indicated that a significant equalization payment in their favor represented a fair division of the marital estate. While Denis advocated for an equal division of the marital estate, Christine believed she was entitled to more than half because Denis’ income was substantially greater than hers. She also claimed that by taking on the marital residence construction project and despite being “woefully underqualified[,]” he had dissipated the marital assets. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 81.

[11] On December 5, the court entered a final order and decree of dissolution which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. In addition to finding that “[t]here ha[d] been an irreparable breakdown of the marriage[,]” the court concluded Christine “failed to rebut the presumption that an equal division of the marital estate [was] a just and reasonable disposition.” Id. at 10, 20. After calculating the marital estate and applying various credits, the court determined Christine owed Denis “an equalization payment of $55,047.27 for an equal distribution of all assets and debts, excluding the issue of the marital residence ․” Id. Regarding the marital residence, the court found Denis and Christine “made a joint financial decision to renovate [it] themselves to save money, and to make it their retirement home.” Id. at 22. While there were “clearly issues with the home, ․ the issues [did] not appear to be as extreme as represented by [Christine], nor as minimal as presented by [Denis].” Id. at 28. Considering the parties’ requests and financial situations, the court found it “clear that the former marital residence need[ed] to be sold ‘as is’ to extinguish the mortgages ․ while recouping whatever equity may be available to them.” Id. Therefore, the court declined to put a valuation on the marital residence, noting “only the market c[ould] truly determine [its] value ․” Id. The court appointed a real estate agent to sell the marital residence and left instructions for how to proceed depending on whether the home was sold at a profit or loss. Christine now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Irretrievable Breakdown

[12] Christine argues the trial court erred in granting her “petition for dissolution of marriage because neither party provided any evidence that there was an irretrievable breakdown of the marital relationship and that [she] is or is not pregnant.” Appellant's Brief at 15.

[13] “Indiana is a ‘no-fault divorce’ state[.]” Dierckman v. Dierckman, 225 N.E.3d 185, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Either party to a marriage may seek its dissolution by alleging, among other things, there has been an “[i]rretrievable breakdown of the marriage.” Ind. Code § 31-15-2-3(1) (2025). The petition for dissolution must be verified and contain specific information, including “[t]he grounds for dissolution of the marriage” and “whether the wife is pregnant.” Ind. Code § 31-15-2-5 (a)(1), (a)(2)(D), - (E) (2025). The trial court must grant dissolution if it “finds that the material allegations of the petition are true[.]” Ind. Code § 31-15-2-15(a)(1) (2025). It makes this determination by considering evidence at a hearing on the petition, “including agreements and verified pleadings filed with the court.” I.C. § 31-15-2-15(a).

[14] The irony of Christine's argument is that she petitioned to dissolve the marriage. In her verified petition, she alleged “there ha[d] been an irretrievable breakdown in the marital relationship existing between [her] and [Denis], which ha[d] made it wholly impossible for [her] and [Denis] to continue living together as a married couple.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 33. She did not include any allegation regarding her pregnancy status.

[15] Given that Indiana recognizes the procedural principles articulated below, we are particularly persuaded by the approach taken by the Illinois Appellate Court in dealing with an argument like Christine's:

There is something fundamentally awry when a party is allowed to attack a judgment providing her with the relief she requested. Likewise, there is something amiss when a party on appeal attacks the sufficiency of their own case. The absurdity of petitioner's position is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that nowhere has she claimed that she does not desire the divorce. Nowhere does she argue that she desires or hopes to resume the state of marriage․

The scope of judicial review is tempered by a number of procedural rules․

Although courts have labeled these rules under the headings of waiver, estoppel, invited error[,] or consent to a decree, all of these rules have a common thread. The purpose for these rules is to promote finality of judicial orders and efficiency in the court system․

With these factors in mind, we hold that the petitioner cannot now contest the sufficiency of her evidence or pleadings on the question of whether grounds for the dissolution existed. A party will not be heard to complain of an order or ruling which is not prejudicial. Petitioner here has not endured any prejudice.

In re Marriage of Melton, 417 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (internal citations omitted); cf. Moore v. Moore, 654 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (reviewing the non-petitioning husband's argument that the wife had not sufficiently proven an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage). Like our Illinois sister court, this Court regularly applies the doctrines of invited error, waiver, and estoppel in the dissolution context. See, e.g., Hickey v. Hickey, 111 N.E.3d 242, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding wife had invited error in the dissolution proceedings); Israel v. Israel, 189 N.E.3d 170, 177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding husband waived two arguments by raising them for the first time on appeal), reh'g denied, trans. denied; Ohning v. Driskill, 739 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding ex-wife was judicially estopped from challenging ex-husband's status as the father of her child because she stipulated in the divorce proceedings the child was a product of the marriage), trans. denied.

[16] Here, as in Melton, Christine did not express a desire to remain married to Denis at the dissolution hearing or in this appeal. Indeed, her proposed findings and conclusions stated that “[t]here ha[d] been an irretrievable breakdown in the marriage, and it should be dissolved.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 74. Similarly, her petition alleged there were “[n]o children were born of th[e] marriage” but failed to address her pregnancy status. Id. at 33. Yet, despite seeing her petition through to conclusion, she asks us to vacate the dissolution decree for lack of evidence on these elements. We join the Illinois court in recognizing that Christine cannot now challenge whether she sufficiently proved her own allegations that there were grounds for a divorce.

[17] That said, Christine may dispute which assets and debts should have been included in the marital estate and how they were divided, so we next turn to those issues.

2. Post-Petition Debt

[18] Christine argues the trial court erred in including the $10,683.75 loan Denis received from his son in the marital pot. She apparently does not take issue with the trial court's finding that the loan was used to pay marital bills under the provisional order,¹ or that Denis could be credited for those expenditures.² Instead, she complains that the court included this debt in the marital pot rather than “giv[e] [Denis] credit for marital expenses paid[.]”³ Appellant's Reply Br. at 8.

[19] We, however, conclude there is a different error related to the son's loan which requires correction. It's clear the trial court intended to reimburse Denis for half of the payments he made to fulfill marital obligations under the provisional order. But when it came to the $10,683.75 loan he received from his son, the court reimbursed Denis for that amount twice. On its balance sheet, the court assigned the mortgage and HELOC on the marital residence their values at the time of the final dissolution hearing. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 31; Tr. Vol. 2 at 189-90. It then equally divided amongst the parties the substantial payments Denis made toward the mortgage and HELOC after Christine petitioned for dissolution. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 31. With those payments already accounted for, the court erred when it also credited Denis for the loan he took out to make such payments on the mortgage and HELOC. On remand, the trial court should recalculate the marital estate and divide it in accordance with this conclusion.

3. Division of Marital Estate

[20] Finally, Christine contends “[t]he trial court erred in denying [her] request to deviate from the statutory presumption of an equal division of the marital estate.” Appellant's Br. at 21. We review a trial court's division of the marital estate for an abuse of discretion. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors.” Id. And when, as here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).

[21] As the party challenging the trial court's division of property, Christine bears the burden of proof on appeal. Randolph v. Randolph, 210 N.E.3d 890, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). She must overcome the strong presumption that the court followed the property division statute and properly considered the evidence. Id. In our review, we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment and neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Lopp v. Lopp, 270 N.E.3d 44, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We will affirm the court's division of assets unless there is no rational basis to support it. Randolph, 210 N.E.3d at 901.

[22] “It is well settled that ․ all marital property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.” Lopp, 270 N.E.3d at 50 (quoting Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)); Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a) (2025) (amended effective July 1, 2026). Once the marital pot is established, the court must divide it “in a just and reasonable manner ․” I.C. § 31-15-7-4(b). The court is to “presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5 (2025). But this presumption can be rebutted by evidence pertaining to the following factors:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Id. “This statutory list is nonexclusive ․ and no single factor controls the division of property[.]” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (internal citation omitted). Still, if the trial court orders an unequal division of marital assets, it “must consider all of these factors and state [its] reasons for” deviating from the statutory presumption. Lopp, 270 N.E.3d at 52.

[23] Christine argues the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her a larger share of the marital pot because she had worse economic circumstances at the time of division and “roughly 1/414 the income earning capacity of [Denis]” due to her disability. Appellant's Br. at 25. Christine's argument mostly consists of challenging two of the trial court's findings:

63. [Denis] and [Christine] agreed that [Denis] paid the majority of the marital bills during their marriage, due to [Christine] being disabled.

64. Nevertheless, it appears [Christine] was able to save more assets than [Denis] during their marriage, including her investment accounts, and bank accounts.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 20. Christine argues the former failed to treat the income Denis earned to pay those bills as “a marital asset” and the latter “makes no logical sense” given that “the [t]rial [c]ourt then awarded [Denis] portions of [Christine's] assets.” Appellant's Br. at 24.

[24] One spouse's greater contribution to the family income can be a factor in the trial court's analysis of whether it's just and reasonable to deviate from the statutory presumption. Maloblocki v. Maloblocki, 646 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). That said, “[m]arriage is to be considered a partnership in which profits [and liabilities] are presumed to be shared equally even though one partner contributed more in income.” Id. A finding that one spouse earned more during the marriage becomes problematic if it is primarily or exclusively relied upon to support a certain division of property, particularly an unequal one. See id. (“Without more this reason does not justify an unequal distribution of the marital estate.”).

[25] Here, however, the trial court made several unchallenged findings pertaining to the statutory factors, including noting the property Christine would take in the divorce, that both parties contributed to the acquisition and renovation of the marital residence, and that Denis had not dissipated the home's value. Christine has failed to prove the trial court did not properly consider the statutory factors.

[26] Christine's reliance on Schwarz v. Schwarz is similarly unpersuasive. 250 N.E.3d 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). There, a panel of this Court upheld the trial court's decision to award 60% of the marital estate to a wife who could only earn one quarter of the husband's income. Id. at 439-40. Because the trial court had properly considered all the factors, this Court concluded that the husband “failed to meet his burden to overcome the strong presumption that the trial court complied with the statute[.]” Id. at 440. While Christine argues she and Denis have an income disparity like the parties in Schwarz, she fails to address the presumption of equal division and the presumption that the court complied with the law in dividing the marital estate. Schwarz did not create a bright-line rule that one spouse's superior earning capacity requires an unequal division in favor of the lesser-earning spouse, and Christine has failed to prove the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that an equal division was just and reasonable.

Conclusion

[27] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's decisions to dissolve the parties’ marriage and divide the marital estate equally. However, because we find the trial court twice credited Denis for some of the payments he made toward the mortgage and HELOC on the marital residence, we reverse in part and remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate an equal division of the marital estate without considering the $10,683.75 loan Denis received from his son.

[28] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his opening statement at the final dissolution hearing, Denis noted the substantial amount of money he expended toward pre-existing marital obligations under the provisional order. Tr. Vol. 2 at 13-14. He later testified that he would have defaulted on the loans securing the marital residence had he not borrowed money from his son. Id. at 198.

2.   “Generally, the marital pot closes on the day the petition for dissolution is filed” and “debts incurred by one party after that point are not to be included in the marital estate.” Kakollu v. Vadlamudi, 175 N.E.3d 287, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. However, this Court has “held that in dividing marital property a court may consider temporary maintenance and joint marital debts paid by one spouse under a provisional order[.]” Maloblocki v. Maloblocki, 646 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); see also Herron v. Herron, 457 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (reasoning a “provisional order requiring [the husband] to make house payments [did not] prejudice[ ] his right to have the court consider such payments in dividing the marital property” (citing Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-7(e) (repealed 1997) (current version at Ind. Code § 31-15-4-13 (2026))).

3.   See Fiste v. Fiste, 627 N.E.2d 1368, 1372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crediting the husband for his payment of temporary maintenance under a provisional order); Herron, 457 N.E.2d at 567-68 (“Giving [Husband] credit for paying joint marital obligations [under a provisional order] was an appropriate means of ensuring that the marital property was divided ‘in a just and reasonable manner.’ ” (quoting Ind. Code 31-1-11.5-11(b) (repealed 1997) (current version at Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b) (amended effective July 1, 2026))).

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.