Joshua W. Grigsby, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Joshua Grigsby (“Grigsby”) appeals his six convictions for Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon ¹ and the seventy-two (72) year sentence imposed thereon. He argues that: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court was biased and prejudiced; (3) his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate; and (4) his sentence is inappropriate.

[2] Concluding that Grigsby has: (1) waived appellate review of his evidentiary error argument; (2) failed to meet his burden to show that the trial court was biased and prejudiced; (3) failed to meet his burden to show that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate; and (4) failed to meet his burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm Grigsby's convictions and sentence.

[3] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether Grigsby has waived appellate review of his evidentiary error argument.

2. Whether Grigsby has met his burden to show that the trial court was biased and prejudiced.

3. Whether Grigsby has met his burden to show that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate.

4. Whether Grigsby has met his burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

[4] The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that Grigsby and his three brothers, Matt (“Matt”), Mark (“Mark”), and Ezra, live on a large property in Crawford County identified as 3722 East McClure Road (“3722 East McClure Road”). Each brother lives in his own mobile home on the property. Grigsby and Matt share a driveway and a mailbox, which bears the address 3722 East McClure Road.

[5] In 2016, Grigsby was convicted of Class B felony dealing in a schedule I controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Based on this conviction, Grigsby was classified as a serious violent felon, and he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

[6] On October 8, 2024, Mark, who was hospitalized with a gunshot wound, told a law enforcement officer that forty-four-year-old Grigsby had shot him. That same day, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for Grigsby and a search warrant for 3722 East McClure Road (“the first search warrant”). The first search warrant specifically authorized law enforcement officers “to enter into or upon the person: Mark A Grigsby[,] [w]ho may be found at 3722 E McClure Road ․ and [to] diligently search said property for” evidence of Level 3 felony aggravated battery and the remains of a round discharged from a .38 caliber revolver. (Ex. Vol. 4 at 59) (emphasis removed).

[7] Crawford County Sheriff's Department Chief Deputy William Breeding (“Chief Deputy Breeding”) contacted the Indiana State Police (“the ISP”) to assist the sheriff's department with the execution of the warrants. That same day, the ISP SWAT Team and several sheriff's department deputies went to 3722 East McClure Road to execute the warrants. Chief Deputy Breeding surveilled the scene from a helicopter. While the law enforcement officers were executing the warrants, the officers, who knew that Grigsby had been classified as a serious violent felon, entered Grigsby's mobile home (“the mobile home”) and saw firearms in plain view.

[8] The officers left the mobile home, and Chief Deputy Breeding applied for a second search warrant (“the second search warrant”), which the trial court issued. The second search warrant authorized law enforcement officers to search the mobile home for and to seize, among other things, firearms, ammunition, illegal substances, and drug paraphernalia. That same night, during the execution of the second search warrant, law enforcement officers found in Grigsby's bedroom a Springfield Trapdoor Rifle (“the Springfield Rifle”) on one side of the bed and a Stevens Shotgun on the other side of the bed.

[9] The officers also found a gun safe in Grigsby's bedroom. After removing the gun safe's door, the officers found, inside the gun safe, the following firearms: (1) a Springfield .45 firearm (“the Springfield .45”); (2) an FEG 9mm firearm (“the FEG 9mm”); (3) a Pursuit .50 caliber muzzle loader (“the Pursuit .50 Caliber Muzzle Loader”); (4) a silver revolver from an unknown manufacturer (“the Silver Revolver”); (5) a Remington 870 Express Magnum shotgun (“the Remington 870 Express Magnum”). In addition, in the living room, the officers found the upper receiver of a Ruger .44 (“the Ruger Upper Receiver”). The officers also found ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia in the mobile home.

[10] Two days later, on October 10, 2024, the State charged Grigsby with the following ten counts: (1) Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm (the FEG 9mm) by a serious violent felon; (2) Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm (the Springfield .45) by a serious violent felon; (3) Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm (the Silver Revolver) by a serious violent felon; (4) Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm (the Remington 870 Express Magnum) by a serious violent felon; (5) Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm (the Pursuit .50 Caliber Muzzle Loader) by a serious violent felon; (6) Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm (the Springfield Rifle) by a serious violent felon; (7) Level 4 felony possession of a firearm (the Ruger Upper Receiver) by a serious violent felon; (8) Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine; (9) Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana; and (10) Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.²

[11] Two weeks later, on October 24, 2024, Grigsby, by his retained counsel, Charles Daugherty (“Counsel Daugherty”),³ filed a motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, Grigsby asked the trial court to suppress all evidence that law enforcement officers had seized from the mobile home during the execution of the second search warrant. The gravamen of Grigsby's argument was that the first search warrant had not authorized law enforcement officers to enter the mobile home. According to Grigsby, all evidence seized during the execution of the second search warrant was “forbidden fruit of the poisonous tree and [had to be] excluded as unconstitutional.” (App. Vol. 2 at 41). Grigsby further argued that the law enforcement officers had known that he was not at home when they had attempted to execute the arrest warrant.

[12] Following a hearing, the trial court denied Grigsby's motion. Specifically, the trial court found that the first search warrant had authorized the law enforcement officers to search the mobile home because that warrant had included the mobile home's address. The trial court further explained that it was not “even getting into ISP's attempt to serve an arrest warrant and then backing out, being like what really would be viewed as overly cautious by any Court above [the trial court], and then reapplying for another search warrant, based upon what was viewed in plain open sight[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35).

[13] On December 8, 2024, one week before Grigsby's trial began, an incarcerated Grigsby sent the following chirp ⁴ to an unknown recipient: “․ every gun that worked was locked up it be hard for them to prove that safe was mine but idk[.]” (Ex. Vol. at 46) (grammatical errors in the original). The following day, December 9, 2024, Grigsby sent his adult son the following chirp: “․ I kno u don't like to but u need to call charlie and matt and get everyone ․ [t]o help me get this figured out or there prolly going to send me to prison tell them that the owner of that safe is my only issue[.]” (Ex. Vol. at 45) (grammatical errors in the original).

[14] A few days before Grigsby's trial began, Grigsby's friend, Matt Bline (“Bline”), contacted Counsel Daugherty and told him that the gun safe, the guns in the gun safe, and the guns found in the mobile home belonged to him. In addition, shortly before trial, Grigsby told Jail Corrections Officer Austin Wilson (“Officer Wilson”) that Grigsby was getting ready to go to trial “for gun charges.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 166). In addition, Grigsby told Officer Wilson that Grigsby had “got it beat ․ [b]ecause [the State] ha[d] no evidence that he could open the safe and the [mobile home] wasn't in his name[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 166-67).

[15] Grigsby's trial began on December 16, 2024. During Grigsby's opening statement, Counsel Daugherty told the jury that the gun safe, the guns in the safe, and the guns found in the mobile home belonged to Bline. According to Counsel Daugherty, the gun safe had been locked, and Bline had had exclusive access to the gun safe because he had had both keys. Counsel Daugherty explained that Bline would testify during the trial and open the gun safe's lock with one of the keys. Counsel Daugherty further told the jury that “if the key fits, you must acquit.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 127).

[16] Also, during the trial, Deputy Chief Breeding testified that he had obtained a search warrant for 3327 East McClure Road and that during the execution of that search warrant, law enforcement officers had seen firearms in plain view in the mobile home. According to Deputy Chief Breeding, because the firearms had been outside the scope of the first search warrant, he had applied for the second search warrant to allow law enforcement officers to return to the mobile home and seize them. Deputy Chief Breeding further testified that during the execution of the second search warrant, law enforcement officers had seized multiple firearms and the gun safe, which had been found in Grigsby's bedroom in the mobile home. When the State asked the trial court to admit the firearms into evidence, Counsel Daugherty stated, “No objection.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 144). Further, when the State asked Counsel Daugherty if he had any objection to publishing the admitted evidence so that the jurors could look at the firearms, Counsel Daugherty again stated that he had “No objection.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 162).

[17] In addition, Officer Wilson testified about Grigsby telling him that he had the charges beat because the State had no evidence that he could open the gun safe. Further, according to Officer Wilson, following jury selection in this case, after Grigsby had learned that Officer Wilson would be testifying against him at trial, Grigsby had started crying and had asked Officer Wilson why he was going to do that. Officer Wilson testified that he had told Grigsby that it was his job and that he wished that Grigsby had never told him that information so that he would not be in the position to testify against Grigsby. Thereafter, according to Officer Wilson, Grigsby had told Officer Wilson that Officer Wilson “could get out if [he] just lied to the courts and to tell them that [he had been] lying about all of this.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 168).

[18] During Grigsby's case in chief, Bline testified that the gun safe, the guns in the safe, and the guns found in the mobile home belonged to him. Bline further testified that, in early October 2024, he had left the gun safe in Grigsby's bedroom with Grigsby's permission. Further, during the trial, Bline used a key in his possession to unlock the lock on the gun safe's door.

[19] Grigsby testified in his own defense and stated that in 2016, he had been convicted of Class B felony dealing in a controlled substance because he had sold Lortabs to have enough money to purchase gas to visit his father in the hospital. According to Grigsby, he would “do it all over again” to see his father. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 208).

[20] During cross-examination, the State asked Grigsby about the chirp that he had sent his son. Specifically, the State asked Grigsby if he was “asking [his] own son to do something [his son] didn't like, he didn't feel comfortable doing[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 217). Grigsby acknowledged that his son did not “like to get involved in [that] because he's got three kids[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 217). When the State again mentioned that this was Grigsby's son, Grigsby called the prosecutor “a piece of shit.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 217).

[21] The State asked Grigsby if it was correct that on December 9, he had sent the chirp to his son asking his son to contact someone named Matt because the gun safe was his only issue and that a few days later, Matt Bline had contacted Counsel Daugherty and stated that the gun safe and the guns belonged to him. Grigsby responded, “[y]ou are so wrong. I was telling him to talk to his Uncle Matt, right behind you bub.”⁵ (Tr. Vol. 2 at 218). Following additional questions by the State, Counsel Daugherty objected and argued that the State was “putting words in [Grigsby's] mouth and not letting him answer[.] [Grigsby] [was] saying that ․ that ain't the right Matt.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 218). Grigsby then interjected that it was “[n]ot the right Matt at all.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 218). At that point, the trial court stopped the proceedings and stated as follows: “What everybody needs to understand that's in this room right now, if everyone is talking at the same time, their confused, the record's jumbled up and it's a circus and I'm not going to have a circus.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 218). The trial court told Grigsby to let the State finish its question and to then answer it.

[22] Shortly thereafter, Grigsby became frustrated with the State's questions and stated as follows: “Because y'all look at this, y'all are pulling chirps, you're pulling CO's, I mean, you never had enough evidence to convict me to begin with, but here I sit. If I'm not going to be able to talk, I'm gonna remove myself off here bub.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 220). The trial court again told Grigsby that when the State asked him a question to answer that question. Grigsby responded that the State “was trying to trip [him] up and reword stuff and turn stuff around.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 221). The trial court told Grigsby to just answer the question. Thereafter, the State asked Grigsby if the “idk” in the December 8 chirp was an abbreviation for “I don't know.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 221). Grigsby responded, “[y]ou're pretty smart.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 221).

[23] When the State asked Grigsby another question about the chirp, Grigsby had another outburst and stated as follows: “I mean Jesus Christ. If I had been caught with a pistol I could understand it. I mean if I get caught with something, I understand. You're talking about some chirps I sent while I was in jail. Jesus Christ man. I plead the Fifth. I can't help you.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 222). The trial court told Grigsby to “have a seat[,]” sent the jury out of the courtroom, and stated as follows:

Mr. Daugherty your client was testifying and made a complete circus and mockery of what we're doing here. Mr. Grigsby what you need to understand is if you're going to sit in this courtroom and participate in your trial, you're going to follow the rules․ They are not hard rules to follow and you're the only person in this entire room that's having trouble following them. I understand that you're going to be asked questions that you don't like from people that you don't like about things that you don't like. That's the nature of what we're doing. You chose to testify. You did not have to․ You don't be disrespectful to me, you don't call people names in the courtroom․ Just answer the questions you are asked. Stop. Sit down. Answer the questions that you are asked and that's it․ So, while we are still on the record and without the presence of the jury I would note for the record that Mr. Grigsby is in the witness stand. He has already testified on direct examination from his attorney, Mr. Daugherty. We're in the middle of cross examination when things went basically side ways. Mr. Grigsby you indicated, or you made the statement that you were going to assert your Fifth Amendment Right. You've already started testifying.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 222-24). Grigsby responded that he wanted to continue testifying.

[24] After reviewing the chirp that Grigsby had sent to his son, the State turned to a September 16, 2024, Facebook Marketplace message that Grigsby had sent to the seller of an item. Specifically, Grigsby asked about the availability of an item and told the seller of that item that he had “a nice 45 Springfield[,]” which he was apparently offering to trade for the item. (Ex. Vol. at 4 at 50).

[25] The State then showed Grigsby an October 3, 2024, Facebook Marketplace message wherein Grigsby had stated that he had “a nice pistol [to] trade” for another item. (Ex. Vol. 4 at 52). When the seller of the item asked Grigsby what kind of firearm he had to trade, Grigsby responded, “a Springfield 45[.]” (Ex. Vol. 4 at 53). The State pointed out that it appeared that Grigsby had been offering to trade the Springfield .45, which had been found in the gun safe, before Bline had left the gun safe in the mobile home.

[26] However, during re-direct examination, Grigsby testified that the Springfield .45 to which he had referred in the messages was not the same Springfield .45 that had been found in the gun safe. Thereafter, the following colloquy ensued between Counsel Daugherty and Grigsby:

[Counsel Daugherty]: Okay, but that Springfield .45 is you saying that and it's not the same one that's in the safe?

[Grigsby]: No it's not.

[Counsel Daugherty]: So what's going on? What explains that?

[Grigsby]: Well, I got people that has guns and they want to trade them off or whatever, sell them, they call and try and sell them to me. I try to figure out ways to help them sell their guns, trade them off or whatever. As a matter of fact, even [Counsel Daugherty] has, he buys cars from me, I've given cars to his ministry. I've donated money to his ministry. He's got his own half way house he's starting up there in Corydon and he is also my attorney but he's my friend too. Actually his .45․

[Counsel Daugherty]: Yea, as a matter of fact, isn't the .45 that's here, wasn't that my .45?

[Grigsby]: I mean, I'm pretty sure that, I mean the one we're talking about right here is.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 232-33).

[27] Thereafter, during re-cross examination, Grigsby acknowledged that he could not possess guns but testified that he believed that he could “barter a deal.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 238). When the State asked him if he could sell guns, Grigsby responded that so long as he did not have guns in his possession, he did not believe that selling guns was a crime.

[28] During the State's closing argument, the State mentioned Officer Wilson's testimony that when Grigsby had learned that Officer Wilson was going to testify against him, he had cried and had told Officer Wilson that Officer Wilson could tell the trial court that he had lied about what Grigsby had told him. When the State had completed its sentence, the trial court paused the State's argument and asked the bailiff to remove the jury from the courtroom. Thereafter, the trial court told an officer to escort Grigsby back to the jail. In response, Grigsby stated as follows: “Can I say something? I'm not a cry baby bro. I'm either dangerous or I'm a cry baby, which one is it going to be? Mother fucker is fucked. (Inaudible).” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 8).⁶

[29] After Grigsby had been removed from the courtroom, the trial court stated as follows:

At this time Mr. Grigsby is being escorted out of the courtroom. Mr. Daugherty remains at counsel table, all parties other than Mr. Grigsby are present still․ We are on the record still and the jury is getting ready to come back in. We will finish the State's closing․ I'm not going to sit here and listen to anyone cuss and carry on and be disrespectful anymore than what I have already today. I think we can all agree that I've been about as patient as I could possibly be with Mr. Grigsby in this circumstance. I've listened to him cuss and carry on here and listening to the same stuff over there. I've tried to explain to him and allow him the opportunity to remain in here, but at some point enough is enough. It's disgusting and it's a distraction. So, we're going to finish this. We are finishing this but I'm done with that. So, we will wait for the jury.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 8-9).

[30] During Grigsby's closing argument, Counsel Daugherty argued as follows:

So, I'm glad you're here and I trust you all. [Grigsby] is upset so he's not in here right now. You can probably tell he's upset. I would be too. Frankly, I am a little upset. I'm upset for him. He's caught in the middle of something but this guy has a good heart, he does. He's a good guy․ I needed help with my ministry, I help people in recovery from drugs and alcohol, try to change their lives. I've been doing it for three years and I don't know have a lot of money and [Grigsby has] helped me a lot. And he helped me get some vehicles (inaudible)․ The last thing I have to tell you and I already kind of touched on this and I really hadn't even planned on going there until this morning, I had not planned on going there at all today until the whole .45 Springfield pistol came up. It isn't that one and it was mine and I tear up every time I deal with this case because that guy there has helped me more with my ministry than anybody else. Flat out. Flat out. Every time I've needed something he's been there for me. When other people gave up on me, he didn't. I love him to death, he's a good guy with a good heart (inaudible). So, I personally trust in you to use common sense here and let him get back to doing what he does, let him get back to helping me and other people. Don't put him away for this. Don't put him away for this. That's all I have. Thank you.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 11, 14, 18-19). The jury convicted Grigsby of six counts of Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and acquitted him of the count charging him with possessing the Ruger Upper Receiver.

[31] At the January 2025 sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed Grigsby's presentence investigation report (“the PSI”), which revealed that Grigsby has a criminal history that includes the 2016 Class B felony dealing in a controlled substance conviction. In addition, he has a 2003 Class A misdemeanor domestic battery conviction and a 2015 Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance conviction. Also, at the time of Grigsby's sentencing hearing, he had pending charges for Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 5 felony domestic battery, and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. These charges related to Grigsby allegedly shooting his brother, Mark.

[32] During the sentencing hearing, Grigsby argued that his criminal history was “practically none.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 41). Grigsby specifically minimized his 2016 conviction for Class B felony dealing in a schedule I controlled substance by arguing that no one had been harmed and that no violence had occurred. In addition, Grigsby asked the trial court to sentence him to the minimum sentence for each of his six convictions, to order those sentences to run concurrently with each other, and to suspend that aggregate sentence to probation.

[33] After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court stated as follows in determining Grigsby's sentence:

Level Four felony carries a penalty of two to twelve years with the advisory being six. So, we start at six, that's the advisory on each count and there's mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances that you look at in each case and that kind of moves the scale up or down, whether you stay at the six, you go up or you move it down. That's based upon what aggravating circumstances there might be or mitigating circumstances that there might be. In this particular case, when I look at the PSI, I set through the trial, I listen to the testimony. So, in this particular case when you look at the aggravating circumstances, criminal history is an aggravator. The court would find that a criminal history is an aggravator in this scenario. There are multiple cases that Mr. Grigsby has been convicted of in the past, not even taking into account the Floyd Superior case that got him to be deemed a serious violent felon, even if you take that out of the mix and don't consider that, there are other cases in Mr. Grigsby's criminal history that warrant that being an aggravating factor. Another aggravating circumstance in this matter would be the degree of harm caused and so you know, when I look at that on the face, the degree of harm caused, so the six counts that Mr. Grigsby was convicted of was possession of firearms by a serious violent felon. And, you know, I sat through the trial and I listened to everything. You know, I listened to testimony from all of the witnesses. Mr. Grigsby, you testified, I listened to counsel, you know, argue to the jury and, even here this morning, I've heard, in the short time I've been sitting here, the statements made by counsel and when you look at the degree of harm caused, the testimony at trial and the statements made by counsel was that Mr. Grigsby was basically peddling firearms and he admitted to that. Any Mr. Daugherty, you admitted that he had done that for you personally, selling a firearm and as far as the degree of harm caused, the Court would find that there is a great deal of harm caused to our community by just those acts alone, peddling firearms to people who might not need to have firearms in their hands. I mean look at the violence that occurs all across our State, Southern Indiana had an incident in Orange County what two weeks ago and so peddling firearms to people who probably shouldn't have firearms or are restricted from having firearms by our Legislators, yea, the court finds that's a pretty serious, that's, it does not serve our community well to have someone doing that and the statements made multiple times about the Floyd County case, which was dealing controlled substances and that there really wasn't a victim, there's no victim in that, he was just selling a pain pill. That's garbage because as we all know sitting in this room there's a large amount of harm done and victims created from individuals illegally selling drugs and controlled substances and preying on people because that person, that victim is so addicted to that pain pill or so addicted to whatever drug you're selling, that they will do anything to have it or buy it and I just find it ironic that there were statements made Mr. Daugherty by you during this trial about how much help and how much good Mr. Grigsby has done for you in some half way house that you have helped create or run and then in the next breath make light of your client illegally selling pain pills and peddling firearms to help the half way house. That's one of the most ironic things I have ever heard in my entire professional life․ [T]he Court finds dealing in controlled substances serious and that it does a great deal of harm to all communities as well as peddling firearms. I don't find that there's any mitigating circumstances in this matter. None have been brought up here this morning. As it relates to Mr. Grigsby's testimony, well he had the chance to testify or the opportunity, he didn't have to, he chose to, that's fine, it's his right. But, I would also note that throughout the entire trial, there were instances and behaviors that were completely disrespectful to the jury, to the Court, to everyone in the room and I was very patient. I was as patient as I could be because I'm trying to facilitate a trial and make sure that we can get to the end of that trial. The whole purpose of why we are all here and in my entire professional career I don't know, and I did criminal law, I was a defense attorney and I represented the most serious accused individuals in the entire State of Indiana with every level felony, Murder, all the way down and I don't recall, I don't think I've ever had any client or witness or anyone have to be removed from a courtroom during a trial simply because their conduct is so detrimental to everything and everyone that's in the courtroom until this trial and Mr. Grigsby had to be removed from the Courtroom because of the things that he was saying and the conduct and it shows a complete lack of respect for the court, for the jury, it's just a complete disdain for any rule or law that might be out, you know, that might be on the books. There's no respect for that․ There was testimony by Mr. Grigsby in regards to convictions that he has and the dealing case that if he, if he had to do it again, or if he was given the opportunity to do it, that he would do it. There's no remorse. His testimony, under oath was that he would deal controlled substances again without blinking an eye. He's not been rehabilitated. I don't know that he can be․ Given the aggravators that we've talked about, given the conduct that I've witnessed first hand, the fact that I didn't even have confidence today just as I didn't when I brought the jury back in to read the verdict, I've got to have Mr. Grigsby in shackles which I'm not a fan of in the courtroom, because I don't have any confidence that he won't act out or do something. He's given me no confidence because he has a complete disrespect for rules, a complete disrespect for the rule of law. Based upon that behavior, based upon the things that occurred during trial, the lack of respect for the rule of law, the criminal history, the testimony under oath that he would deal, he would absolutely deal controlled substances illegally if given the opportunity and then even today acknowledging that he's a facilitator, that he peddles firearms, puts people together, that's what he does is not, that is not an individual that needs to be walking the streets of Crawford County. It isn't safe for anyone, the families, the kids.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 43-48).⁷

[34] Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Grigsby to twelve (12) years for each of his six Level 4 felony convictions and ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other for an aggregate sentence of seventy-two (72) years. Further, the trial court ordered Grigsby to serve seventy (70) years in the DOC and two (2) years on probation.

[35] Grigsby now appeals his convictions and sentence.

Decision

[36] Grigsby argues that: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court was biased; (3) his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate; and (4) his sentence is inappropriate. We address each of his contentions in turn.

1. Admission of Evidence

[37] Grigsby first argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. However, after a completed trial, “the question of whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress is no longer viable.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013) (cleaned up). Instead, “the appeal is best framed as challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Id. (cleaned up). And, when a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is predicated on the constitutionality of a search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo. Curry v. State, 90 N.E.3d 677, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[38] Here, the gravamen of Grigsby's argument is that the trial court erred when it admitted the firearms into evidence. However, when the State asked the trial court to admit the firearms into evidence, Grigsby stated that he had “No objection.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 144). This Court has previously noted that “[o]ur supreme court has stated that ‘we will not review claims, even for fundamental error, when appellants expressly declare at trial that they have no objection.’ ” Maddox v. State, 213 N.E.3d 579, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017), reh'g denied, cert. denied). Accordingly, we will not review Grigsby's claims of error and fundamental error regarding the admission of the firearms.  ⁸ See Maddox, 213 N.E.3d at 579-80.

2. Bias and Prejudice

[39] Grigsby also argues that the trial court “demonstrated bias and prejudice [during the sentencing hearing] that denied [him] due process of law.” (Grigsby's Br. 14). Our Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “[m]erely asserting bias and prejudice does not make it so.” Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. 2002). The law presumes that a trial court is unbiased and unprejudiced. Id. To rebut that presumption, the burden is on the defendant to establish from the trial court's conduct actual bias or prejudice that places the defendant in jeopardy. Id. “Such bias and prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or where the [trial court] expressed an opinion of the controversy over which [it] was presiding.” Id. Further, “[t]he imposition of the maximum sentence does not support a claim of bias.” Id.

[40] Here, Grigsby contends that the statements that the trial court made during the sentencing hearing demonstrate its bias and prejudice. Specifically, he directs us to the trial court's statements that Grigsby: (1) would sell drugs “without blinking an eye” if given the opportunity to do so; (2) is a career criminal; (3) is a peddler of firearms” (4) sells firearms to persons who are prohibited from possessing firearms;⁹ and (5) engages in and associates with persons engaging in criminal conduct, particularly trafficking firearms and selling drugs. (Grigsby's Br. 28).

[41] However, our review of the evidence reveals that each of the trial court's statements was fully supported by the record. Specifically, Grigsby testified that he would sell drugs again to see his father. In addition, at the time of the sentencing hearing, forty-four-year-old Grigsby had a more than twenty-year criminal history. Further, during his trial testimony, Grigsby acknowledged that he bartered gun deals for others, including Counsel Daugherty. We agree with the State that “[i]t was reasonable for the [trial] court to infer that a serious violent felon such as Grigsby who was willing to trade guns on Facebook Marketplace might also be willing to overlook the recipients’ credentials.” (State's Br. 20-21).

[42] In sum, Grigsby has failed to meet his burden to rebut the presumption that the trial court was unbiased and unprejudiced. See Smith, 776 N.E.2d at 823 (concluding that Smith had failed to rebut the presumption that the trial court was unbiased and unprejudiced where each of the trial court's statements that Smith had challenged was fully supported by the record).¹⁰

3. Unconstitutionally Disproportionate Sentence

[43] Grigsby further argues that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate. He specifically contends that his sentence is “so ‘disproportionate’ to the severity of the crime that it constitutes a violation of both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.” (Grigsby's Br. 25).

[44] Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” “Though we cannot set aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty merely because it seems too severe, Article 1, Section 16 requires us to review whether a sentence is not only within statutory parameters, but also constitutional as applied to the particular defendant.” Luke v. State, 273 N.E.3d 450, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (cleaned up), trans. denied. “Article 1, Section 16 is violated only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Id. (cleaned up).

[45] Grigsby argues that his aggregate seventy-two-year sentence is disproportionate because “[i]f [he] had been convicted of premeditated murder, Indiana's sentencing guidelines would advise he serve 55 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3.” (Grigsby's Br. 26). However, the length of Grigsby's sentence is largely due to the fact that he was convicted of six offenses, and we agree with the State that “[h]is comparison to a single conviction for murder is therefore inapt[.]” (State's Br. 23). Further, the State is correct that “[b]ecause the sentencing range for most murders is 45 to 65 years, a person who is convicted of six murders can be sentenced to 390 years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a) (2015).” (State's Br. 23). Grigsby has failed to meet his burden to show that his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate. See Luke, 273 N.E.3d at 462 (concluding that a 61.5 year aggregate sentence for two Level 4 felony stalking convictions and fifteen Level 6 felony invasion of privacy convictions was not unconstitutionally disproportionate).¹¹

4. Inappropriate Sentence

[46] Lastly, Grigsby argues that his sentence is inappropriate.¹² Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. “Our principal task is to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a correct result in every case.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1248 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). The supreme court has explained that “7(B) review is a holistic approach.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). In other words, we assess a sentence in light of the whole picture before us. Id. “And we generally defer to the sentence imposed unless a defendant presents compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offense and [his] character in a positive light.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1248. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate and that a revised sentence is warranted. Crum v. State, 239 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[47] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Wills v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1273, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. A jury found Grigsby guilty of six counts of Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is between two (2) and twelve (12) years, and the advisory sentence is six (6) years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. The trial court sentenced Grigsby to twelve years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other for an aggregate sentence of seventy-two (72) years. Further, the trial court ordered Grigsby to serve seventy (70) years in the DOC and two (2) years on probation.

[48] We begin our analysis with Grigsby's character, which we analyze by considering a wide range of facts, including Grigsby's criminal history, background, and behavior before and during both the trial and the sentencing hearing. See Crum, 239 N.E.3d at 861. Grigsby argues that his character warrants a sentence revision because he: (1) has a very limited criminal conviction record with no history of violent offenses; (2) is a hardworking business owner; (3) is a father and a grandfather; and (4) is not a monster.

[49] However, our review of the record reveals that there is more to his story. Specifically, there is much more to Grigsby's character than the positive attributes that he sets forth in his appellate brief. For example, Grigsby has a more than twenty-year criminal history that includes a conviction for Class B felony dealing in a schedule I controlled substance, which led to his classification as a serious violent felon and prohibited him from possessing firearms. Grigsby also has Class A misdemeanor convictions for domestic battery and possession of a controlled substance. In addition, at the time of Grigsby's sentencing hearing, he had pending charges for Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 5 felony domestic battery, and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. These charges related to Grigsby allegedly shooting his brother, Mark. Grigsby's criminal history reflects poorly on his character.

[50] We further note that before committing the offenses in this case, Grigsby bartered gun deals for others, including Counsel Daugherty. In addition, while incarcerated before his trial, Grigsby manipulated his son into becoming involved in his case and attempted to manipulate Officer Wilson into deceiving the trial court by telling the court that he had lied about things that Grigsby had told him. These actions also reflect poorly on Grigsby's character.

[51] Lastly, we turn to Grigsby's egregious and disrespectful behavior at trial and at his sentencing hearing. Specifically, throughout the trial, Grigsby called the State names and engaged in profanity-laced outbursts. Indeed, Grigsby was so disruptive that the trial court had to twice remove the jury from the courtroom. The first removal occurred when Grigsby had an outburst during cross-examination. The trial court reprimanded Grigsby for his behavior, and the jury returned to the courtroom. The second removal occurred when Grigsby had another outburst during the State's closing argument. This time, the trial court removed Grigsby from the courtroom.

[52] Grigsby's behavior at trial led the trial court to order that Grigsby be shackled to prevent further outbursts. Also, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that during its entire career, it had never seen anyone removed from the courtroom for bad behavior. The trial court further stated that Grigsby had demonstrated a complete disdain for the law and found that Grigsby was a threat to public safety.

[53] In sum, Grigsby has failed to show good character that warrants revising his sentence. Therefore, he must make an even stronger showing regarding the nature of his offenses to prevail. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (explaining that “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.”). However, our review of Grigsby's two-paragraph inappropriate sentence argument reveals that he has made no argument at all regarding why the nature of his offenses warrants the revision of his sentence. This Court has recently explained that “[w]e will not become an advocate for an appellant by supplementing an argument lacking essential analysis.” Van Hawk v. State, 275 N.E.3d 954, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. In sum, Grigsby has failed to show that the nature of his offenses warrant revising his sentence.

[54] Based on the nature of the offense and his character, Grigsby has failed to persuade this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm Grigsby's sentence.

[55] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.

2.   In December 2024, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, without prejudice, the drug and drug paraphernalia related counts.

3.   Counsel Daugherty represented Grigsby at trial and on appeal.

4.   A chirp is an electronic message sent by a jail inmate.

5.   Matt was apparently sitting in the courtroom. Further, Grigsby called the prosecutor “bub” numerous times during his testimony.

6.   We note that Transcript Volume 3 is missing page number 2. As a result, the pagination on the transcript page is not aligned with the pagination on the PDF. We cite to the page number typed on the transcript page.

7.   In its written sentencing order issued following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Grigsby's criminal history; (2) the degree of harm caused and the threat to the community; (3) Grigsby's lack of remorse; and (4) Grigsby's disdain for authority and court orders as exhibited at the jury trial.

8.   We further note that Grigsby raised the fundamental error argument in his reply brief. This Court has previously explained that “[a]ttempting to salvage review for fundamental error by addressing the issue for the first time in a reply brief results in waiver.” Perry v. State, 267 N.E.3d 20, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. In addition, we note that “[f]undamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple for defense counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. 2025). In the Ryan case, our Indiana Supreme Court further noted that “[w]here the procedural posture of a claim is affected by counsel's failure to object at trial, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be more on point than a claim of fundamental error. Although fundamental-error and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are different, they often yield the same result.” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668 n. 4 (cleaned up).

9.   We note that Grigsby has misrepresented the trial court's statement. Our review of the trial court's sentencing statement reveals that the trial court stated that Grigsby sells firearms to people who might not need to have them, who probably should not have them, or who are restricted from having them.

10.   Grigsby asks us to revisit the trial court's statements in his argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. However, because we have just found that the trial court's statements were supported by the record, we need not further address this argument.

11.   Because Grigsby does not argue that the Eighth Amendment requires a different analysis than Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, his federal constitutional claim is waived, and we consider only his state constitutional claim. Cf. White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 2002) (explaining that because the defendant did not argue that the search and seizure provision in the Indiana Constitution required a different analysis than the federal Fourth Amendment, his state constitutional claim was waived, and we considered only the federal claim).

12.   In his two-paragraph argument, Grigsby contends that his “sentence is so manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, no reasonable person could find his sentence appropriate.” (Grigsby's Br. 26-27). However, “the manifestly unreasonable standard is obsolete.” Marcus v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1134, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (cleaned up). Specifically, the manifestly unreasonable standard for reviewing sentences and Appellate Rule 17(B) were replaced more than twenty years ago with the inappropriate standard under Appellate Rule 7(B). See id. “We urge counsel to be more careful in the future in preparing briefs to this court.” Id.

Pyle, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.