IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.J. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.D. (“Mother”) and A.J. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to K.J. (born 2019), E.J. (born 2022), and M.D. (born 2024) (collectively, “Children”) on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Father presents one issue for review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence over Father's objection?

[2] Mother presents the following restated and reordered issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion to continue the factfinding hearing?

2. Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision?

[3] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] DCS was involved with Parents before any of Children were born. In January 2017, DCS filed a petition alleging Mother's one-month-old son, Br.D., was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).¹ The petition alleged Br.D. had been found unconscious in Mother's home with drug paraphernalia nearby. A month later, the State charged Mother with one count of Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent, to which she subsequently pleaded guilty. Mother was sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction with two years executed on home detention. Mother did not fully engage with services during the CHINS proceedings, and she refused to participate in substance use treatment. Mother consented to Br.D.’s adoption in 2020.

[5] On May 3, 2018, Z.J. was born to Mother and Father.² DCS filed a CHINS petition the next day, alleging Z.J. was born with drugs in his system because Mother had been “using illegal substances while she was pregnant.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 57. Parents were non-compliant with services in Z.J.’s CHINS case. Father consented to Z.J.’s adoption. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Z.J. in 2021.

[6] On August 1, 2023, DCS removed E.J. because “Mother was homeless and [E.J.] was living in a tent.” Id. at 132. K.J. was not immediately removed as he had been residing with his maternal grandmother. The next day DCS filed a CHINS petition, alleging K.J.’s and E.J.’s physical or mental conditions were seriously impaired as a result of neglect. Parents admitted K.J. and E.J. were CHINS and the trial court adjudicated them as such. DCS assigned Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Brianna Rojas to work with the family, and the court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”). The court issued a parental participation decree, ordering Parents to engage in a home-based program referred by the FCM. Mother had to complete a parenting assessment and submit to random drug screens. In the event she tested positive for an illicit substance or missed a drug screen, Mother was obligated to undergo a substance use assessment. Initially, the trial court placed K.J. and E.J. with their maternal grandmother. The court later placed K.J. and E.J. in foster care and allowed Parents supervised visits.

[7] Mother gave birth to M.D. on January 25, 2024. DCS removed M.D. on an emergency basis because he tested positive for amphetamine at birth. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. She “appeared to be under the influence” during her stay at the hospital. Id. at 164. DCS filed a petition alleging M.D. was a CHINS. DCS alleged Parents lacked stable housing, were not compliant with services in the CHINS proceedings for K.J. and E.J., and failed to provide M.D. “with a safe and appropriate living environment free from use of illegal substances.” Id. at 163. Following an initial hearing, the trial court appointed a GAL and found continued removal was necessary to protect M.D. M.D. was placed in the same foster care home as K.J. and E.J.

[8] Parents missed a dispositional hearing for K.J. and E.J. in Fall 2023, and Father failed to attend a periodic case review for the two minors in March 2024. In April, Parents admitted M.D. was a CHINS. The court again ordered Parents to engage in a home-based program and participate in random drug screens. The trial court also ordered Mother to complete a substance use assessment. In November, DCS filed a petition seeking termination of Father's and Mother's parental rights to K.J. and E.J. DCS alleged in part there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[9] Following a hearing in January 2025, the trial court approved a permanency plan of adoption for Children. See id. at 183–85. The court found Parents continued to use “illicit substances and [did] not have stable income or housing.” Id. at 185. In addition, Parents did not engage “in any of the ordered services” and failed to maintain “consistent parenting time with” Children. Id. Not long after, DCS petitioned to terminate the parent-child relationship between Parents and M.D., alleging in part there was a reasonable probability the conditions that led to M.D.’s removal would not be remedied. In March, the trial court suspended parenting time until Parents engaged “in services consistently for a period of 30 days.” Id. at 186.

[10] The termination factfinding hearing began on July 23. Parents attended the hearing but did not testify. The trial court heard testimony from Parents’ visitation and home-based services providers. According to testimony of two visitation facilitators, Parents had been inconsistent, “missing a lot of visits, probably one per week.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Other times Parents were unprepared, lacking diapers or clothing for Children. Because of Parents’ pattern of last-minute cancellations and no-shows, Parents were required to confirm each visit 24 hours in advance. Ultimately, visits were terminated because Parents refused to follow guidelines, struggled with scheduling, and appeared intoxicated during at least one meeting.

[11] Parents similarly failed to participate in home-based services. The regional director of Ireland Home Based Services testified referrals for Parents were “on hold” because of the “lack of [P]arents meeting for services.” Id. at 66–67. She clarified “on hold” meant the service provider made no attempt to engage Parents unless they reached out.

[12] At the end of day one of the hearing, the court gave notice of the continuation date to all parties in open court, stating: “We will recess this case[,] and we have given everyone a date of September the 29th commencing at 9:00 AM.” Id. at 70. The court then stressed, “I won't continue [the case] because I need to get done with this hearing for” the parties involved. Id.

[13] Parents failed to appear on day two of the termination hearing. When the proceedings began, Father's counsel moved to continue the matter, and Mother's attorney asked to “join in that request” on her behalf. Id. at 77. DCS objected. The trial court denied the oral motion, explaining: “both mother and father were ․ here at the last hearing, were given the date for this hearing and we started a little bit late” to give Parents “extra time” to arrive. Id. at 78. The court noted the “very serious timelines on these [termination] cases[,]” particularly the statutory timelines requiring courts “to adhere fairly closely to those so that we can remain in compliance with what the law dictates[.]” Id. Lastly, the trial court emphasized it was in “the best interest of these children to have permanency in their lives.” Id.

[14] Kaleb Viergutz—Children's prospective adoptive father—testified at the hearing. Viergutz had helped care for Children since their arrival from another foster home in January 2024. Viergutz testified Children were healthy and maintained consistent routines. He explained issues arose following visits with Parents, with some of Children having “intense tantrums” and trouble sleeping on those occasions. Id. at 83. Viergutz assured Children would have contact with Br.D. and Z.J. as he had known the family caring for the two older siblings for over a decade.

[15] Children's FCMs and GAL testified about Parents’ lack of full participation in reunification efforts. FCM Rojas stated Parents never reached the stability DCS had hoped was possible with the services offered. She reiterated Parents failed to participate in home-based and education services. She stated Mother had completed just three drug screens and Father zero. Neither Mother nor Father completed substance use assessments. FCM Rojas recommended termination of the parent-child relationship. FCM Jeffrey Theil—who replaced Rojas—testified Children were “thriving in their current environment” and had the stability they needed. Id. at 94. He too recommended termination. The GAL similarly recommended termination of parental rights because of Parents’ lack of engagement with services and ongoing substance use issues.

[16] During the presentation of its case, DCS moved to admit various exhibits—including several concerning Z.J.’s CHINS adjudication and eventual adoption. Father's counsel objected, arguing the evidence was not relevant because the name on the documents was not the same as Father's because they included an additional first name. Father made a continuing objection to the admission of eleven exhibits. He raised no additional grounds for objecting. The trial court admitted the exhibits over Father's objection.

[17] In October, the trial court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children. As to best interests, the trial court concluded, in relevant part:

(7) DCS and the GAL have reasonably asserted that providing Mother and/or Father with more time to complete services would not be in the best interests of the Children. No service provider or FCM has recommended that Mother or Father be given additional time to complete services. Additional time would not be in the best interests of the Children.

(8) Mother has one other child who was removed from her care due to substance abuse. Mother signed a consent for this child to be adopted.

(9) Mother has another child with Father who was removed from their care due to substance abuse. Father signed a consent for the child to be adopted, and Mother's parental rights were terminated.

(10) Mother and Father have had sufficient time to remedy the reasons why the Children are placed outside of their care. Mother and Father were observed to be under the influence as recently as January 2025. There is no evidence that Mother or Father are any closer to sobriety today than when they admitted Children were CHINS due to their substance use.

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(18) DCS and the GAL asserted that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children. The Children are in a safe and stable home that is willing to adopt them. Mother and Father have been provided with multiple services and opportunities to address the issues that led to the Children remaining outside of their care, and despite DCS’ and the service providers’ best efforts, Mother and Father have not availed themselves of these opportunities.

(19) The Children deserve the stability and support offered by their current placements which the parents have been unable to provide․ Coupled with the recommendations from the FCM and GAL, there is sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that termination is in each Child's best interests.

Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 189–92.

[18] Regarding the reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied, the court concluded:

(1) Each of the Children has been removed from Mother and/or Father, and has been under the supervision of the Department of Child Services for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date each child was removed from Mother's and/or Father's home, or in the case of [M.D.], since being born at the hospital and immediately removed to a foster placement, the removals as a result of each of the Children being alleged to be a [CHINS]; and

(2) [D]espite DCS's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify each of the Children with Mother and/or Father, ․ neither Mother nor Father has been [ ]able to remedy the circumstances that resulted in each child being placed in care outside Mother's or Father's home.

(3) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in each child's removal, or the reasons for placement outside Mother's and/or Father's home will not be remedied, as each of the parents have been given ample time and opportunity to remedy the circumstances which caused the Children's removals, specifically, substance use/abuse/addiction and instability in housing, and neither parent has taken advantage of the opportunities, services, and support provided during the course of each CHINS case. During the CHINS cases, and through the date of the Termination hearing, the service providers have stood ready and willing to reengage both Mother and Father in services, support, referrals, and most importantly, visitation with their Children. At best, while Mother and Father made intermittent effort, that, at one time revealed deep bonding, compassion, and some nurturing, neither parent was consistent in the efforts needed to have the Children returned to either parent's home.

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(11) DCS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. The parents’ involvement with DCS is long-standing, with multiple services referred to assist and support parents in remedying the circumstances which have continued to bring them to DCS's attention, and little, or no, demonstrable progress has been made by either of them, and is unlikely to be made in the foreseeable future.

***

Id. at 187–90. Mother and Father filed a joint notice of appeal but separate briefs. DCS was granted permission to file a consolidated brief responding to both.

Father's Appeal

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence over Father's objection.

[19] Father's sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a series of exhibits which he claims “were not relevant as they contained the incorrect name for [him] in the caption of the documents.” Father's Appellant's Br. at 16.

[20] A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence. In re K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020). “Appellate courts generally review decisions to admit evidence for abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “It is well-established that ‘errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.’ ” Id. (quoting Sibbing v. Cave, 922 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind. 2010)).

[21] Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Evid. R. 402.

[22] Here, the exhibits in question concerned Z.J.’s CHINS adjudication and adoption. At the termination hearing, Father objected to admission of the documents on relevancy grounds, arguing: “The father listed in this is [D.A.J.], the father in this instant cause is [A.J.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 117. After considering other indicators, the trial court overruled the objection because it found problems regarding the name went “to weight rather than to admissibility.” Id. at 118.

[23] The evidence was relevant to the termination proceedings because the exhibits allowed the court to evaluate Father's fitness as a parent to Children. See In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d 603, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding no abuse of discretion occurred where “there was sufficient nexus” between termination proceedings and challenged exhibits relevant to “the probability of future parenting problems”). As the State contends, the evidence tended to show “uncorrected [parenting] deficits” and failure to alter “patterns of abuse and neglect.” Appellee's Br. at 16. Moreover, the cause number found in the challenged exhibits matched that found in previously admitted evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.³

Mother's Appeal

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion to continue the termination hearing.

[24] Mother first argues the trial court abused its discretion when the court denied her motion for a continuance on the second day of the termination hearing. She alleges “[t]here is no indication that granting a brief continuance would have resulted in a significant delay or undermined the need for an early determination.” Mother's Appellant's Br. at 19.

[25] “A court's ruling on a motion to continue is generally subject to review for an abuse of discretion and ‘turns on the circumstances present in a particular case.’ ” In re A.B., 277 N.E.3d 98, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. 2020)). “An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion, but no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.” In re A.R., 271 N.E.3d 1161, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 244 (Ind. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[26] A motion to continue is governed by the following requirements:

(B) Motions. Unless made during a hearing or trial, or otherwise ordered by the court, an application to the court for an order must be made by written motion. The motion must state the grounds therefor and the relief or order sought and be accompanied by a separate proposed order.

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(D) Written Motions for Continuance.

(1) A party must file a motion for continuance as soon after the cause for continuance or delay is discovered by the party seeking the same.

(2) Any written motion to continue a matter must be filed pursuant to subdivision (B) and must include:

(a) A statement that the opposing party has no objection;

(b) A statement that the opposing party objects; or

(c) A statement that the opposing party's position is unknown, and the date, time, and method by which the moving party filing the motion attempted to obtain agreement and the result, or why such outreach was not possible.

(3) If a party did not comply with subdivision (D)(2), a court may grant a motion for continuance only if the moving party certifies to the court, in writing, the efforts made to give notice and the reasons supporting the moving party's claim that actual notice should not be required.

(4) A party's motion must include:

(a) the approximate amount of time needed to elapse before the matter can be heard, and,

(b) a good faith estimate of the time needed for the rescheduled hearing or trial.

Ind. Trial Rule 7(D) (emphasis in original); see also In re C.J.B., ---N.E.3d---, No. 25A-JT-3154, slip op. at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. May 11, 2026) (recognizing although Trial Rule 7(D) does not have the “good cause” reference of its predecessor, the rule “appears to leave continuances to the discretion of the trial court, so long as the procedural requirements of the rule are met”).

[27] Time limits for hearings on termination petitions are governed by statute:

(a) Except when a hearing is required after June 30, 1999, under section 4.5 of this chapter, the person filing the petition shall request the court to set the petition for a hearing. Whenever a hearing is requested under this chapter, the court shall:

(1) commence a hearing on the petition not more than (90) days after a petition is filed under this chapter; and

(2) complete a hearing on the petition not more than one hundred eighty (180) days after a petition is filed under this chapter.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-6 (2023).

[28] In this case, neither Father nor Mother attended day two of the termination hearing. When neither parent showed, Father's attorney felt “duty bound to ask for a continuance.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 77. Mother's counsel moved to “join in that request” as well. Id. Yet Mother had been informed of the continuation date at the conclusion of day one of the hearing. The trial court admonished Parents that it would not continue the matter. Mother had an established pattern of failing to appear for services and at least one prior CHINS hearing. Her oral motion for a continuance communicated no reason for her absence, nor did she clarify when she would be available for a future hearing. See T.R. 7(D)(4). DCS objected, arguing the parties had “already continued this out far enough.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 78. As the trial court explained, termination proceedings are under “very serious timelines” controlled by statute. Id.; see I.C. § 31-35-2-6(a). Allowing Mother to sideline a trial by simply choosing not to appear would run contrary to the time constraints our General Assembly has established in Section 31-35-2-6. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.⁴

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

Standard of Review

[29] A decision to terminate parental rights is among the most difficult a trial court is called upon to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). “We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” N.G., 51 N.E.3d at 1170 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will affirm the termination of parental rights unless the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Statutory requirements to terminate the parent-child relationship

[30] A parent has a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise his or her child. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But the right is not absolute. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[31] When terminating a parent's rights to his or her child, DCS must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024) (“termination statute”). DCS alleged the following subsection (d) circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family ․ the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(4); see Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 36–45. The State bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). Because subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489. In the event the court finds the allegations of a termination petition proven, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c)(1) (2012).

Challenged Findings

[32] Mother urges us to disregard findings 54–56, 59, 66–68, 77, 83, 91, 95–98, 105, and 116–17 because “these statements recount witnesses’ views but fail to indicate the [trial] court's findings.” Mother's Appellant's Br. at 11. According to Mother, we should not rely on these findings “when evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to support termination” of her parental rights. Id.

[33] A reviewing court “must determine whether the specific findings are adequate to support the trial court's decision.” In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “A court ․ does not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z. Rather, the trier of fact must find that what the witness testified to is the fact.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citation omitted). It is the trier of fact's duty to determine what is true, not merely to restate what a witness said. In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). “Any statements in the court's order that amount to improper findings, while not harmful error, are mere surplusage to be disregarded.” Id. (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). We will not reverse a trial court's judgment unless its findings constitute prejudicial error. B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 20. “A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.” Id.

[34] Here, the trial court's order stated the court “gave careful consideration to the testimony and evidence” and “observed the demeanors of the witnesses and parties, and judged their credibility[.]” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 156. As the State persuasively argues, the “challenged findings are pieces of testimony that the trial court credited and, read in context, adopted for itself.” Appellee's Br. at 24; see also Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 156 (the trial court's order stating, “The [c]ourt, based upon clear and convincing evidence, makes the following findings of fact[.]”). On the whole, we cannot conclude the challenged findings merely recite witness testimony. See G.V., 274 N.E.3d at 1001.

[35] But even if we disregard the challenged findings as surplusage, “there is evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment[.]” B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 20. The trial court's unchallenged findings show Mother was not compliant with services. Referrals were canceled or suspended because of lack of parental participation. The court found—and Mother does not challenge—Children were doing well with their pre-adoptive family, who “met all the needs of the Children[,]” including their “emotional, educational, medical, therapeutic, and special nutritional needs.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 178. And both FCMs and the GAL recommended Children not be returned to Mother's care. And, as discussed further below, the unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Children; termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests; and there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c), (d)(3).

Remediation of Conditions

[36] Mother next argues the evidence presented at the termination hearing was insufficient to prove DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Children with Mother, there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being, and termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. See Mother's Appellant's Br. at 11–15. The trial court made factual findings and concluded DCS proved: Children had been removed from Parents’ care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(A); despite reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify Children with Parents, neither Mother nor Father had remedied the circumstances that resulted in Children being placed outside the home, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(B); there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from and continued placement outside Parents’ care and custody will not be remedied, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3); and there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Parents and Children poses a threat to the well-being of Children, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(4). DCS needed to prove only one of the three circumstances listed under Subsection (d). See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d); see also A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489. Accordingly, we focus on the reasonable probability the conditions leading to removal will not be remedied.

[37] To determine whether there is a reasonable probability the reasons for a child's continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a trial court looks first at what conditions led to the child's placement outside the home and then determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. The trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, considering evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the trial court must balance recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to decide whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability a parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[38] DCS first became involved with Mother in January 2017 when it alleged her son Br.D. was a CHINS after he was found unconscious in Mother's home. In February, the State charged Mother with one count of Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent. Br.D. was adjudicated a CHINS, and Mother later pleaded guilty as charged in the criminal matter. The following year—while Mother was serving her criminal sentence—DCS filed a second petition alleging Parents’ son, Z.J., was a CHINS as he had been born with drugs in his system because “Mother was using illegal substances” during the pregnancy. Ex. Vol. 1 at 57. Mother consented to the adoption of Br.D. and had her rights to Z.J. terminated. Father consented to Z.J.’s adoption.

[39] In August 2023, DCS alleged K.J. and E.J. were CHINS because their physical or mental conditions were impaired as a result of Parents’ inability to provide for their needs. See id. at 131–33. At the time of the filing of the CHINS petitions, Mother was unhoused and living in a tent with E.J. Parents admitted the two children were CHINS; DCS ultimately placed K.J. and E.J. in foster care. In early 2024, DCS filed yet another petition, this time alleging M.D. was a CHINS after he tested positive for amphetamine at birth. DCS removed M.D. on an emergency basis and placed him in foster care; Parents subsequently admitted M.D. was a CHINS as well. On multiple occasions in these CHINS proceedings, the trial court ordered Parents to participate in home-based case management, submit to random drug screens, and complete parenting and substance use assessments. See id. at 148 (parental participation order regarding K.J. and E.J.), 176 (parental participation order regarding M.D.).

[40] Yet Parents failed to consistently engage in home-based case work or parenting education. DCS referrals for home-based services were either put on hold or eventually terminated for lack of compliance. Parents did not contact providers to re-engage services. Parenting time with Children was so inconsistent the visitation facilitator implemented a 24-hour confirmation policy prior to all visits. Parents refused to adhere to visitation guidelines, were unprepared, missed appointments without explanation, and appeared intoxicated on at least one occasion. Visits were put on hold, which meant they were inactive unless Parents chose otherwise—they didn't. By the time of the termination hearing, neither parent had completed a substance use assessment. Mother only submitted to three random drug screens and Father to none. Parents continued to lack stable housing. The GAL testified he did not believe Children should be placed with either parent as they had failed to remedy the reasons DCS became involved, mainly “substance abuse, lack of stability, and being engaged in services.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 178. FCM Rojas testified Mother had made scant progress in addressing her substance use problems. Both FCMs testified they did not believe more time would allow Parents to remedy the conditions that led to Children's removal. This evidence pointed to a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. In short, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding there was a reasonable probability the reasons for continued placement outside Parents’ home would not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

Best Interests

[41] Lastly, Mother challenges the trial court's finding that termination was in Children's best interests. She argues the court's determination “rests on the premise that the adoptive home offered greater stability and support than [she] could provide.” Mother's Appellant's Br. at 17.

[42] Parental rights cannot be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1151. Nor is the need for permanency “enough to terminate parental rights where the parent has an established relationship with his/her child and has taken positive steps ․ towards reunification.” Id. at 1152 (citation omitted). That said, a child cannot wait indefinitely for his or her parent to “work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. And the trial court need not “wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[43] To decide whether termination is in a child's best interests, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. “[A] recommendation by the case manager or a child advocate, such as a guardian ad litem, to terminate parental rights is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 853–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[44] At the termination hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Children's prospective adoptive father, Viergutz. He testified Children had “pretty consistent routines[,]” having “their meals and naps and bedtimes ․ at the same time each day.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 81. K.J. was in first grade and practiced Taekwondo. E.J. completed speech therapy, and M.D. had learned some 200 words and was “developing really quickly into a toddler.” Id. at 80. Children visited their siblings at their placement, and they had weekly outings. FCM Theil believed Children had the stability they needed and testified they were “thriving in their current environment.” Id. at 94. He feared a return to parental visits would lead to regression in Children's behavior. FCM Rojas testified termination was in Children's best interests because Parents “were not able to successfully demonstrate sobriety” which hindered their ability to develop “meaningful contact with the children[.]” Id. at 157. The GAL similarly recommended termination because Parents failed to “demonstrate sobriety, [have a] consistent bond in parenting time with the kids or remedy why DCS is involved.” Id. at 178. The recommendations of both FCMs and the GAL, coupled with evidence of scant parental progress towards reunification, are sufficient to show termination is in Children's best interests. See C.D., 141 N.E.3d at 853–54.

Conclusion

[45] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence or in denying Mother's oral request to continue the termination hearing. And clear and convincing evidence supports the court's termination decision.

[46] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Br.D. is not part of this appeal.

2.   Z.J. is not part of this appeal.

3.   Even if error occurred in the admission of the exhibits, Father concedes “there was substantial additional evidence to support the termination” of the parent-child relationship. Father's Appellant's Br. at 17. He therefore cannot demonstrate injury to his substantial rights. See Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 834. If any error occurred, it was harmless error. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (stating “[n]o error or defect in any ruling” is ground for reversal on appeal where “its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties”).

4.   To the extent Mother argues the trial court's denial of her motion violated her rights to due process, see Mother's Appellant's Br. at 19–20, she failed to raise a due process argument below and accordingly waived the claim on appeal. See C.J.B., slip op. at *4; see also In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal”).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.