R.B., Appellant-Petitioner v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.B. appeals after the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the “Review Board”) affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's (the “ALJ”) conclusion that R.B. untimely filed her appeal of an investigator's determination that she had been overpaid unemployment benefits for a two-month period in 2021. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 13, 2025, R.B.’s former employer filed a claim with the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the “IDWD”) alleging R.B. was ineligible for unemployment benefits that she had received between July 3, 2021, and September 4, 2021, because she “earned earnings that was [sic] more than the weekly benefit amount” during that period. (Appellee's App. Vol. II at 6.) On May 14, 2025, an IDWD claims investigator issued a “Determination of Eligibility” (the “Determination”) finding that the benefits for those weeks were “not payable as [R.B.’s] deductible income exceed[ed] [her] weekly benefit amount.” (Id. at 8) (formatting omitted). Based on that Determination, the IDWD indicated it intended to garnish R.B.’s wages from her current employer to repay the $5,833.00 overpayment. The bottom of the Determination stated: “RIGHT OF APPEAL: THIS DETERMINATION WILL BECOME FINAL ON 05/27/2025 IF NOT APPEALED. EITHER PARTY MAY APPEAL THIS DETERMINATION AND REQUEST A HEARING BEFORE AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WITHIN TEN DAYS OF THE DATE THIS DETERMINATION WAS SENT.” (Id.) (formatting in original).

[3] The Determination was uploaded the same day to Uplink, the system IDWD used to post documents for access by claimants, and a notification thereof was sent via email to R.B., who had waived notification by all other methods. R.B. attempted to access her Uplink account at that time but “was locked out of her account.” (Id. at 53.) Her access to the Uplink account was restored on August 13, 2025. R.B. did not access the Determination until September 6, 2025. After accessing and viewing the Determination, R.B. contacted an IDWD employee who told her “that she could not file an appeal because it was outside the window of appeal time.” (Id.) On an undisclosed date thereafter, R.B. was “informed that she could file an appeal.” (Id.) R.B. filed her appeal of the Determination on November 21, 2025.

[4] On January 13, 2026, the ALJ held a hearing on R.B.’s appeal, and on January 16, 2026, the ALJ issued an opinion affirming the Determination because R.B. “did not file a timely appeal” of the Determination. (Id. at 54.) On January 29, 2026, R.B. asked the Review Board to review the ALJ's dismissal of her appeal, alleging she “did not receive meaningful notice of the Determination of Eligibility nor did [she] have reasonable access to the Department's electronic delivery system within the statutory appeal period.” (Id. at 59.) She also argued that “[a] presumption of electronic delivery cannot substitute for actual notice where system access failures prevent receipt.” (Id.) The Review Board did not hold a hearing on the matter. On January 30, 2026, the Review Board issued its order affirming the ALJ's decision.

Discussion and Decision

[5] As an initial matter, we note that R.B. proceeds pro se. Those who elect to proceed pro se are “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). “Accordingly, a party proceeding pro se must ‘be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.’ ” Id. (quoting McCullough v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017)). Additionally, “[w]e will not become a party's advocate[.]” Jones v. Hawk, 233 N.E.3d 1061, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[6] R.B. argues that the Review Board erred when it affirmed the ALJ's decision that her appeal was untimely.

Under Indiana's Unemployment Compensation Act, “[a]ny decision of the review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(a) (2007).[1] The Board's conclusions of law may be challenged as to “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.” Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(f). Consistent with appellate review of other administrative adjudications, we categorize the Board's findings three ways: (1) basic, underlying facts; (2) ultimate facts derived as inferences or conclusions from basic, underlying facts; (3) and conclusions of law.

We review the Board's findings of basic facts under a substantial evidence standard, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess its credibility. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the Board's findings and, absent limited exceptions, treat those findings as conclusive and binding.

Company v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev.,113 N.E.3d 1214, 1217-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 122-23 (Ind. 2012)) (footnote added). “[W]hether an appeal of an agency decision is timely is a conclusion of law.” L.M. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 184 N.E.3d 674, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[7] Indiana Code section 22-4-17-2(f) states: “[U]nless the claimant or the employer, within ten (10) days after the notification required ․ was sent by the department to the claimant or the employer, asks for a hearing before an administrative law judge, the decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance with the decision.” Pursuant to 646 IAC 5-10-19(A),

[n]otice of all hearings or proceedings before ․ the review board, unless otherwise directed by statute, shall be given by United States mail, with proof of mailing being prima facie evidence of service, or by facsimile or electronic means, addressed to the parties’ addresses of record on file with the department.

[a] document mailed or electronically transmitted to a party is presumed to be received if the document was mailed or electronically transmitted to the complete, correct address of record unless:

(1) there is tangible evidence of nondelivery, such as the document being returned to the department by the United States Postal Service; or

(2) credible and persuasive evidence is submitted to the department to establish nondelivery, delayed delivery, or misdelivery of the document.

646 IAC 5-10-19(d).

[8] The Review Board adopted the ALJ's findings without holding a hearing. The ALJ made several findings to support its conclusion that R.B.’s appeal of the Determination was untimely:

The Determination of Eligibility was generated on May 24, 2025. There is nothing in the record to indicate Claimant received the Determination prior to September 6, 2025, when Claimant first viewed it on her Uplink account. The Determination is therefore considered sent on September 6, 2025. Claimant filed the request for appeal on November 21, 2025. Claimant was locked out of her Uplink account and had issues with identification, however, Claimant was able to get onto Uplink to view the Determination. Claimant did not have a medical emergency that interfered with filing her appeal. There is nothing in the record to indicate Claimant had good cause for failing to file the request for appeal timely after viewing the Determination. The Determination advises claimants that there is a right to appeal a decision and information on how to file an appeal can be obtained at a WorkOne Center or on the Department's website. The request for appeal was not filed within ten (10) days of the date that the Determination of Eligibility was sent or otherwise delivered to Claimant.

(Appellee's App. Vol. II at 54.) Regarding the issue of whether R.B.’s delay in filing an appeal of the Determination was based on misinformation by an IDWD employee, the ALJ found:

After viewing the Determination, Claimant called the Department and was told by someone that she could not file an appeal because it was outside the window of appeal time. Reliance on misinformation provided by a government employee is not a basis for estoppel because the government could be precluded from functioning if it were bound by its employees’ unauthorized representations. Courts are reluctant to apply estoppel against the government where a party claiming to have been ignorant of the facts had access to the correct information․ All persons are charged with the knowledge of the rights and remedies prescribed by statute.

(Id. at 53-4.)

[9] R.B. argues “[t]he record contains no evidence establishing when the [D]etermination was delivered.” (Appellant's Br. at 9.) She contends, based on the fact that the Determination was delivered via Uplink, that “[n]otice placed in an inaccessible system cannot reasonably be considered effective notice.” (Id.) The ALJ gave R.B. significant leeway when determining when she received notice of the Determination. IDWD uploaded the Determination on May 14, 2025. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-4-17-2(f), R.B. had ten days from the date the Determination was uploaded to Uplink to file an appeal. See 646 IAC 5-10-19(d) (IDWD document is “presumed to be received ․ [when] electronically transmitted to the complete, correct address of record”). R.B. attempted to access the Determination sometime shortly after the Determination was placed on Uplink but was unsuccessful because she could not log in to the system. Based on the ALJ's findings, this inability to access Uplink stopped the clock for R.B.’s appeal.

[10] R.B.’s ability to log in to Uplink was restored on August 13, 2025. Arguably, that extended the deadline for the appeal to ten days thereafter. See 646 IAC 5-10-19(d)(2) (credible evidence can demonstrate delayed delivery). R.B. did not, however, access the Determination on Uplink until September 6, 2025, which is the date the ALJ assigned as the beginning of the ten-day clock for filing an appeal. Regardless of whether August 13 or September 6 should have been assigned as the determinative date,² R.B. did not file her appeal until November 21, 2025, which was far beyond either deadline.

[11] To excuse this delay, R.B. asserts she “acted diligently and reasonably relied on misinformation from a Department representative stating that the determination could not be appealed.” (Id.) The ALJ noted R.B. received misinformation from the IDWD employee regarding her ability to appeal the Determination. However,

[w]hen the legislature enacts procedures and timetables which act as a precedent to the exercise of some right or remedy, those procedures cannot be circumvented by the unauthorized acts and statements of officers, agents or staff of the various departments of our state government[.] All persons are charged with the knowledge of the rights and remedies prescribed by statute.

DenniStarr Env't, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Env't Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d 1284, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Middleton Motors, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 380 N.E.2d 79, 81 (Ind. 1978)), trans. denied. Accordingly, R.B. could not rely on any statement by an IDWD employee to justify extending the filing deadline, and we hold the Review Board did not err when it affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that R.B.’s appeal of the Determination was untimely.

Conclusion

[12] The Review Board did not err when it concluded R.B.’s appeal of the Determination was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This version of Indiana Code section 22-4-17-12(a) remains in effect.

2.   R.B. does not allege the ALJ erred when selecting September 6, 2025, as the delivery date. Therefore, we need not decide the legal issue as to whether that date was appropriate pursuant to 646 IAC 5-10-19(d).

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.