Oladunni Titilayo Tejuoso, Appellant-Defendant v. Oladipupo Samuel Baruwa, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In March 2025, Oladunni Titilayo Tejuoso (Mother) and Oladipupo Samuel Baruwa (Father) divorced. In October 2025, the trial court entered its final order on custody, parenting time, and division of the marital estate. Mother appeals, challenging (1) the court's award of primary physical custody of the couple's three children to Father, (2) the court's award of sole legal custody of the children to Father, and (3) the court's inclusion of a 2022 Lexus in the marital pot. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father were married on July 11, 2015. The marriage produced three children: O.B., born September 2016; J.B., born February 2018; and L.B., born May 2021 (collectively, the Children). Mother was the primary caretaker during the marriage and stayed home with the Children until 2021 when she began working outside the home. In September 2022, Father was “charged with crimes wherein Mother was the victim and at least one (1) child was present”; Father later pled guilty to Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Appellant's App. Vol II p. 95.

[3] On October 7, 2022, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and a notice of intent to relocate the Children to Lawrenceville, Georgia. In November, Father filed an objection to Mother's intent to relocate. A guardian ad litem (GAL), Betty Harrington, was appointed in December. Following a preliminary hearing, the court issued a provisional order in January 2023, granting Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children and ordering no parenting time for Father due to a no-contact order in his then-pending criminal case. The court also preliminarily found Mother had been driving a Lexus that was sold to her sister and ordered Mother to take possession of the couple's Nissan Altima.

[4] In March, after the no-contact order was modified to allow Father to have parenting time, Father filed a motion to modify the preliminary custody order. A hearing on Father's motion was scheduled but repeatedly continued. Then, in September, Father filed an emergency verified petition for parenting time, alleging that despite the GAL's recommendation that he have parenting time and his completion of parenting and anger management courses, Mother refused to allow him to see the Children. Following mediation, Mother and Father agreed he would have parenting time beginning on October 7, 2023, increasing in time each weekend until overnights could begin on November 11, 2023.

[5] On March 4, 2024, Father filed another emergency verified petition for parenting time. He alleged Mother stopped his parenting time on November 18, 2023, and deactivated the video and audio functions in AppClose (the parties’ agreed-upon communication app), preventing him from communicating with the Children. On March 11, the court ordered Father to have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (IPTG) beginning on March 15. On March 24, the GAL filed her report recommending, among other things, that Mother have primary physical and sole legal custody and that Father have IPTG parenting time where distance is a factor.

[6] On June 4, while the dissolution and final custody determination remained pending, the court ordered that Mother could relocate to Georgia with the Children, with Father receiving IPTG parenting time where distance is a factor. The order provided that Father's seven-week summer parenting time was to begin on June 9. On June 6, Mother relocated the Children to Georgia; she did not inform Father or the court that she would be moving within the few days between the order's issuance and the start of Father's parenting time. Father was unable to drive to Georgia until June 29 to pick up the Children “causing a delay and reduction in his summer parenting time.” Id. at 102. Then, on July 26, Mother came to Father's house with police and requested to pick up the Children “because she had a meeting with her employer.” Id. Father released the Children despite having exercised only four of his seven weeks of parenting time. Later in 2024, Mother refused to allow Father Thanksgiving and Christmas parenting time. She also discontinued Father's phone and video calls with the Children.

[7] On March 5, 2025, following a hearing, the court ordered the marriage dissolved effective March 3. The court also ordered that Father have two fifteen-minute phone calls with the Children per week and parenting time during spring break. After Father's spring break parenting time, Mother said that she had “safety concerns” for the Children; thus, she refused to allow Father parenting time for the summer of 2025. Id. at 103. Mother did not provide the court with “specific details of any events nor any evidence of reports or investigations related to her concerns.” Id.

[8] The court held a final hearing on custody, parenting time, child support, and division of the marital estate in August. Mother, who was previously represented by counsel, proceeded pro se for the final hearing. Regarding the Children and parenting time, Mother and Father testified and had an opportunity to cross-examine one another. Regarding division of the estate, Mother did not offer any evidence, and Father offered a marital balance sheet that was admitted over Mother's objection that the appraisal of the home was out of date. Mother did not otherwise object to the balance sheet.

[9] On October 8, the court issued its final order awarding Father primary physical and sole legal custody and ordering Mother to have parenting time according to the IPTG where distance is a factor. The court also divided the marital estate evenly in accordance with the marital balance sheet admitted by Father. Among other things, Mother was credited with the value of a 2022 Lexus automobile. To balance division of the estate, the court ordered Mother to pay $11,096.00 to Father. Mother now appeals. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Custody Determinations

[10] Mother challenges the court's award of physical and sole legal custody to Father. We have a well-established preference “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted). “Trial courts are enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, and, therefore, are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.” Matter of Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.’ ” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[11] “Trial courts have discretion in both initial custody and modification of custody determinations, and we review those determinations for an abuse of discretion.” A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 430. “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). And “it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.

A. Physical Custody

[12] Mother contends the court failed to meaningfully analyze the Children's best interests in awarding Father primary physical custody and the “order lacks findings on several statutory factors[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. She also argues the order was improperly punitive and driven by her violations of parenting time orders. We disagree.

[13] A trial court “shall determine custody and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8 (2017). In doing so, the court “shall consider all relevant factors,” including, among other things:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

Id.

[14] Mother notes the court's order “recites these factors but does not apply them to the evidence”; specifically, she alleges the court made no findings on factors 4, 5, 6, and 7.¹ Appellant's Br. p. 20. It is well-settled that trial courts are not required to enter specific findings and conclusions on every factor; rather, “the plain language of the statute only requires a court to ‘consider’ the factors, not to make a finding regarding each one.” A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 431 (citation omitted). Still, Mother contends the trial court violated recently enacted Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1), which requires the court's custody order to include “findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the custody order is based.” But this statute does not wholly abrogate our precedent.² Although section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) plainly requires a court to issue findings in every custody order, it does not require the court to make findings on each enumerated best interests factor. As before, the court must consider all relevant factors: the findings and conclusions requirement applies only to the facts on which the custody order is based. See McNeil v. Anonymous Hosp., 219 N.E.3d 789, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“two statutes that apply to the same subject matter must be construed harmoniously, if possible”), trans. denied. Accordingly, the trial court's order is not insufficient simply because it discussed some but not all the enumerated section 31-17-2-8 factors.

[15] Here, there is sufficient evidence for us to determine the trial court properly considered the best interests factors. At the final hearing in August 2025, Father testified that he still resided in the former marital home, where the Children resided before Mother's relocation to Georgia; that the home had four bedrooms; and that the Children were well acquainted with the home. He explained that the Children were born in Indiana and had resided and attended school in Indiana for their whole lives except for the time they were in Georgia with Mother. The Children also have relationships with friends, community, and family members in Indiana, including Father's mother, who resides in the family home. Finally, Father testified that he believed Mother would impede his relationship with the Children if she was awarded primary physical custody because “from the inception of this case ․ she has stopped every means of [him] communicating with the [Children].” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. It is clear from this that the court had the opportunity to consider factor 4, the relationship of the Children with their parents and others; and factor 5, the Children's adjustment to their school, home, and community.

[16] In addition, “we presume trial courts know and follow the law[,]” and we only overlook this presumption if the court's order leads us to conclude “an unjustifiable risk exists that the trial court did not follow the applicable law.” A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 431 (internal quotations omitted). “Absent clear indications to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all the relevant statutory factors” when deciding to award Father primary physical custody. Id. Coupling this presumption with the court's finding that Father was charged with crimes wherein Mother was the victim and its opportunity to assess the parents through their testimony, we cannot conclude that the court failed to consider the relevant factors, including factor 6, the mental and physical health of the parents, and factor 7, concerning domestic violence.

[17] Turning to the custody order, the court sufficiently enumerated the findings upon which the order was based. Among other things, the court found,

40. Both parties were involved in the [Children's] li[ves] since their birth until the parties separated in September 2022. Mother had been the primary care giver during the marriage.

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42. Mother has demonstrated a pattern of behavior of putting up barriers to Father's parenting time.

43. Mother has continuously interfered with Father's parenting time with the [Children] in direct violation of the Court's previous Orders.

***

46. Mother has safety concerns for the [Children] after Father's 2025 spring break parenting time but offered no specific details of any events nor any evidence of reports or investigations related to her concerns.

47. That it is in the best interest of the [Children] to have a healthy relationship with both Mother and Father.

48. Mother's actions have interfered with Father's parenting time for many years.

49. Mother has not learned from the proceedings and threat of incarceration but has continued to thwart Father's parenting time with the [Children].

50. The [Children] were all born and raised in Indiana until Mother moved them to Georgia in June 2024.

51. Father resides in the marital home where the [Children] resided for most of their lives. Residing in Father's home with him are Paternal Grandmother, Father's girlfriend and the girlfriend's son.

52. Father intends to enroll the [Children] back into their school they have attended while they resided in Indiana.

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55. Absent a change of custody, there is no belief Mother will comply with this Order and will continue to create barriers to Father's parenting time and relationship with the [Children].

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 101-04. From these findings, we can discern that the court determined awarding physical custody to Father was in the Children's best interests.

[18] Still, Mother contends the custody award is punitive and based “in large part” on Mother's non-compliance with parenting time orders. Appellant's Br. p. 17. Mother correctly notes that a parent's violations of custody and parenting time orders may be considered alongside other best interests factors but may not be the sole basis for a custody determination. See, e.g., Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (observing that isolated acts of misconduct may not serve as a basis for custody modification; but egregious violations that place the child's welfare at stake are a sufficient basis for modification), trans. denied. We do not agree with Mother's contention, however, that the court failed to consider factors other than her noncompliance with court orders.

[19] It is true that the court enumerated many instances of Mother interfering with Father's parenting time and contact with the Children and noted that such interference violated its preliminary orders. However, the court appropriately explained that it was in the Children's best interest to maintain relationships with both parents and that Mother's continuous interference with Father's parenting time thwarted his ability to maintain that relationship. See In re Marriage of B.K. and B.P., 873 N.E.2d 729, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Fostering a child's relationship with the noncustodial parent is an important factor bearing on the child's best interest and, ideally, a child should have a well-founded relationship with each parent.”), trans. denied. Mother's actions go beyond isolated instances of misconduct and directly impact the Children's welfare by limiting their relationship with Father. It was also appropriate for the court to infer Mother's “future lack of cooperation” because she disregarded preliminary orders regarding Father's parenting time. Id. And, as we explained above, the court based its custody determination on a variety of additional facts including the Children's connections to their community and family in Indiana. For all these reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father primary physical custody.

B. Legal Custody

[20] Mother also challenges the court's award of sole legal custody to Father. We review a trial court's legal custody determinations for an abuse of discretion. A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 430. In determining whether joint legal custody would be in the best interests of the Children, a trial court is required to consider whether the parents agree to joint legal custody. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15 (2008). A court shall also consider:

(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;

(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;

(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;

(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;

(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:

(A) live in close proximity to each other; and

(B) plan to continue to do so; and

(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.

Id. We have noted that the second factor—the parents’ willingness and ability to cooperate to advance the Children's welfare—is particularly important in determining legal custody. In re Paternity of E.P., 194 N.E.3d 160, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). However, “[w]here the parties have made child-rearing a battleground, joint custody is not appropriate.” Id.

[21] Again, Mother argues the court did not issue specific findings on the section 31-17-2-15 factors, and she asserts the court was required to do so pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1). As with the best interests factors relevant to physical custody, section 31-17-2-15 requires the court to consider the enumerated factors in determining legal custody. And, as we have already explained, section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) does not require the court to enter a finding on each enumerated statutory factor; rather, the court is required to issue findings that formed the basis for its custody determination.

[22] Here, there is ample evidence to support the court's decision to award sole legal custody of the Children to Father. Mother was unable or unwilling to communicate with Father to exchange the Children for his parenting time on multiple occasions spanning more than two years. At various times, she was also unwilling to cooperate with the court's preliminary orders that Father have audio and video calls with the Children. The evidence showed that Mother was the Children's primary caregiver during the marriage and that Father sustained a meaningful relationship with the Children during the marriage; and the court later found that it was in the Children's best interests to continue relationships with both parents. The court also heard testimony about the family dynamic in Father's household and that the Children have community support where Father lives. In addition, the court had the opportunity to consider the credibility and character of each parent and knew that the parents do not live in close proximity to one another. Thus, the record demonstrates the court had sufficient evidence to consider all the statutory legal custody factors. And the court's findings, including those provided above, adequately reflect the facts the court based its legal custody determination upon. See ¶17 supra. Mother has failed to demonstrate a clear indication that the trial court did not follow the law. See A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d at 431. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's legal custody determination.

II. Division of Marital Property

[23] Lastly, we turn to the division of marital property. In considering property division, the court engages in a two-step process, first determining what property must be included in the marital estate, then dividing that property. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Mother's sole challenge is to the court's inclusion of a vehicle (the 2022 Lexus) in the marital pot.

[24] All marital property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a) (1997); Webb v. Schleutker, 891 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The “one-pot” theory ensures that all assets are subject to the trial court's power to divide and award. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d at 914. While the trial court may ultimately determine that a particular asset should be awarded solely to one spouse, it must first include the asset in its consideration of the marital estate to be divided. Id. We review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital property for an abuse of discretion, “considering only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the property[.]” Hatten v. Hatten, 825 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[25] Mother contends the court erroneously included the 2022 Lexus, the value of which the court assigned to Mother, in the marital pot. She asserts that in the court's “January 12, 2023 preliminary order, the trial court found, after hearing testimony from both parties, that ‘Mother has been driving a Lexus that was sold to Mother's sister and Mother is paying her sister to use.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 27 (quoting Appellant's App. Vol II p. 40). Mother then argues “[t]his finding made clear that Mother's sister owned the Lexus and that Mother held only a possessory interest.” Id. Thus, Mother contends the Lexus should not have been included in the marital pot. Mother's argument fails.

[26] First, a trial court is not bound by its own provisional orders on possession of property, the terms of which “may be revoked or modified before the final decree on a showing of the facts appropriate to revocation or modification.” Ind. Code § 31-15-4-15 (1997); see also Dillon v. Dillon, 696 N.E.2d 85, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Moreover, a provisional order terminates when a final appealable decree is entered. Ind. Code § 31-15-4-14 (1997).

[27] Second, only one piece of evidence regarding the marital pot was submitted at the final hearing: Father's marital balance sheet, which included the 2022 Lexus. See Ex. Vol. III p. 9. Mother objected to admission of the balance sheet solely on grounds that the home appraisal was out of date. She made no objection based on Father's inclusion of the 2022 Lexus in the marital pot. Mother also failed to present any evidence regarding ownership of the Lexus, including whether it was indeed sold to her sister or whether the proceeds from said sale were included in the marital pot. Mother did not even mention a Lexus until her closing argument. At that time, she mentioned that she was previously “using a Lexus and that Lexus, per the preliminary hearing, was sold to Mother's sister.” Tr. Vol. II p. 189. But Mother's statements made during her closing argument were not sworn testimony and are not evidence. Because the evidence most favorable to the court's distribution of the property demonstrates the 2022 Lexus was part of the marital pot, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion.

Conclusion

[28] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Father primary physical and sole legal custody or in including the 2022 Lexus in the marital pot. We affirm the trial court's final order.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On page 20 of her brief, Mother challenges the alleged absence of findings on factors 4, 6, and 7; but in her subsequent argument she also discusses the alleged absence of factor 5.

2.   We noted in Matter of Paternity of E.S., 25A-JP-351, at *4 n. 6 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2025) (mem.), that enactment of Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2(b)(1) abrogated the former rule that a trial court was not required to make specific findings unless requested by a party pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A).

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.