D.G., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.G., a minor, was adjudicated a delinquent child. On appeal, D.G. argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his adjudication for committing dangerous possession of a firearm. We find that the State presented sufficient evidence to support D.G.’s adjudication, and we, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] D.G. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support D.G.’s adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm.

Facts

[3] On June 11, 2025, Officer Tarah Butcher of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department pulled into a gas station and noticed D.G. standing outside. D.G. looked nervously at Officer Butcher, grabbed at a bulge in his waistband, and pulled his shirt down. Officer Butcher believed the bulge was a firearm. Officer Butcher observed D.G. get into a truck that was pulling a trailer without a license plate. Once the truck left the gas station, Officer Butcher initiated a traffic stop for improper plate display. When Officer Butcher approached the vehicle, D.G. was sitting in the passenger seat, and Officer Butcher noticed a tan handgun, a nine-millimeter Glock, between the center console and D.G.

[4] D.G. was not wearing a seatbelt, so Officer Butcher asked for D.G.’s name and date of birth. Officer Butcher learned that D.G. was a minor and returned to her vehicle to confirm D.G.’s identity and call for backup. Once backup arrived, Officer Butcher returned to the stopped vehicle and noticed that the tan firearm was no longer between the center console and D.G.’s seat. The driver, Adon Mickens, said that he had placed it inside the center console. Officer Butcher and the assisting officers removed D.G. and Mickens from the vehicle. Once the passengers were removed, Officer Butcher noticed loose ammunition throughout the vehicle.

[5] On June 12, 2025, the State filed a petition alleging that D.G. was a delinquent child for committing dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor. On October 10, 2025, D.G. was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing dangerous possession of a firearm. D.G. was placed on probation that would be allowed to terminate once D.G. completed a gun violence prevention class. D.G. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] D.G. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his adjudication. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “ ‘do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility,’ but appraise ‘only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it.’ ” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (quoting B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018)). “We will affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” B.T.E., 108 N.E.3d at 326 (citing Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993)). We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[7] Here, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) D.G. (2) a child (3) knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly (4) possessed a firearm (5) for any purpose other than those described in Indiana Code Section 35-47-10-1.¹ I.C. § 35-47-10-5. D.G. challenges only the possession element and argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed the handgun found in Mickens’ vehicle.

[8] Our Supreme Court recognizes “both actual and constructive possession of weapons.” Hoffman v. State, 520 N.E.2d 436, 437 (Ind. 1988). This case concerns constructive possession. “Evidence of constructive possession is sufficient if the State shows that the defendant had both the capability and the intent to maintain dominion and control over the contraband.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006). When a defendant has non-exclusive control over the premises where contraband is found, intent may be inferred from “additional circumstances” that indicate that the person knew of the contraband. Id. at 574. These additional circumstances may include:

(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. 2011). “A defendant's proximity to contraband ‘in plain view’ ․ will support an inference of intent to maintain dominion or control.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997)).

[9] The first prong of the test for constructive possession is whether D.G. had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the handgun. D.G. concedes that it is reasonable to infer that D.G. had this capability. Appellant's Br. p. 12. The handgun was between D.G.’s seat and the center console, and D.G. could have picked up the handgun and taken actual possession of it.

[10] Next, the second prong of the test for constructive possession is whether D.G. had the intent to maintain dominion and control over the handgun. D.G. rightfully points out that we are presented with a non-exclusive control case as D.G. was a passenger in Mickens’ truck. For this prong, we turn to additional facts and circumstances from which intent may be inferred. When D.G. saw Officer Butcher at the gas station, D.G. made furtive gestures by reaching for the bulge in his waistband and pulling his shirt down. The handgun was very close to D.G. in the truck, and it was in D.G.’s plain view. These factors support an inference that D.G. intended to maintain dominion and control over the handgun.

[11] In Grim v. State, this Court found that Grim constructively possessed a handgun without a license when Grim was a passenger in the vehicle, the handguns were underneath the passenger seat, one handgun was plainly visible when the passenger door was open, and there were bullets and ammunition in plain view. 797 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Like the defendant in Grim, D.G. was a passenger in the vehicle, the handgun was near D.G., the handgun was in plain view, and ammunition was in plain view.

[12] Given D.G.’s furtive movements, the bulge at his waistband, his close proximity to the gun in the vehicle, and the fact that the handgun was in plain view, sufficient evidence exists from which the fact-finder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that D.G. constructively possessed the handgun. The evidence was, accordingly, sufficient to support D.G.’s adjudication.

Conclusion

[13] The State presented sufficient evidence to support D.G.’s adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm, and we, thus, affirm that adjudication.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code Section 35-47-10-1 provides exceptions for dangerous possession of a firearm. These exceptions include hunting, practicing in an established range, competing in competitions, etc. D.G. does not argue that this case was covered by an exception under Indiana Code Section 35-47-10-1.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur