R.M., Appellant-Respondent v. L.P., Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After going through a messy breakup, L.P. obtained a six-month protective order (PO) against her ex-boyfriend's new girlfriend, R.M., based on allegations that R.M. was stalking and harassing her. Before the PO expired, L.P. asked the trial court to extend it. After a contested hearing, the court granted L.P.’s request and extended the PO for another six months. R.M. challenges that extension on appeal. We affirm the extension, as we find sufficient evidence supporting the court's finding that “[t]he conditions which caused the original [PO] to be issued continued to exist[,]” which in turn supports the conclusion that R.M. “continue[d] to represent a credible threat to the safety of” L.P. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 32.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] L.P. dated A.W. for four years before breaking up with him in February 2024. For the next year, they remained in “an on-again, off-again” relationship. Transcript at 32. In August 2024, A.W. began going on dates with another woman, R.M., and they “made [their relationship] official in October.” Id. Even after she learned about A.W.’s new relationship, L.P. continued to be romantically involved with him until early 2025.

[3] In March 2025, L.P. began receiving “mean messages” from social media accounts she believed had been created by R.M. Id. at 7. Then, on April 2, R.M. attended the same Pilates class as L.P., which L.P. found “odd[.]” Id. at 9. L.P. sent a text message to A.W. “letting him know that [she] had noticed these accounts were following [her] and that [R.M.] had showed up to this class and worked out right next to [her], and it made [her] feel uncomfortable.” Id. at 9-10. A.W. initially ignored that message, but when L.P. tried to contact him several more times, R.M. called L.P. from A.W.’s phone and explained she had not sent the anonymous social media messages, had been attending the same gym as L.P. for several months and only coincidentally attended the same class as her, and “didn't want any drama ․” Id. at 45.

[4] That phone call did not smooth things over, however, as on June 6, L.P. became upset when she saw R.M. at the gym again. L.P. confronted R.M. and accused R.M. of “following her” around the neighborhood. Id. at 45. Later that evening, R.M. sent a text message to L.P. that stated:

This narrative you've created where I'm supposedly stalking you is not only false, it's bizarre. The idea that I would go out of my way to “find” you ․ is something only someone deeply insecure or looking for drama would imagine.

․ I walk a lot. I apparently go to the same gym as you ․ If you find yourself constantly imagining that I'm watching you, maybe it's time to reflect on why that is.

․ I'm going to continue living my life, walking where and when I want, and doing whatever I want․ I had never spoken to you, and I had no plans to. But this fixation you've developed? It's weird, it's tired, and it's really not a good look.

Exhibits at 4.

[5] One week later, on June 13, L.P. filed a petition for a PO against R.M. That petition alleged R.M. had stalked, harassed, and placed L.P. “in fear of physical harm[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 4. According to the petition, between March and May 2025, R.M. “sen[t] messages” on social media that “sa[id] things like ‘ugly bitch[,]’ ” attended the same workout classes as R.M., “show[ed] up at a coffee shop [L.P.] [was] at[,]” and looked at L.P. through the window as she worked out at the gym. Id. at 9. Additionally, on May 31, R.M. went to the same farmers market as L.P. and “star[ed] at” her. Id. Based on these allegations, on July 1 the trial court issued an ex-parte PO.

[6] On July 11, the court held a contested hearing on whether to issue a permanent PO, at which L.P. appeared pro se and R.M. appeared with counsel. L.P. testified she had seen R.M. in public “too often” and in “too many places[,]” including at the gym, a coffee shop, the farmers market, and the Indianapolis Pride Parade. Tr. at 14. She also accused R.M. of going to the gym at the same time as her after the ex-parte PO had been issued. As L.P. explained to the court,

I've just been so anxious. I've lost a lot of weight. I just want to go back to living my normal life. I just want to be left alone. It was hard for me to get out of that relationship with [A.W.], and once it was finally over, I felt super relieved. And I just want to move on with my life and get away from these people, and they're making it impossible for me to do so. I just feel like I need this [PO] to finally get [R.M.] to leave me alone ․

Id. at 19-20. On cross-examination, L.P. admitted R.M. had done nothing to make her feel unsafe other than be “in the same area ․” Id. at 26. But R.M.’s mere presence put her in fear, L.P. claimed, because she had heard “[a]necdotal stories about [R.M.] being belligerent out in public[ ] [and] being banned from multiple establishments.” Id. at 25. She also conceded she had no evidence tying the social media accounts to R.M. and had simply “assume[d]” R.M. had sent the mean messages. Id. at 26.

[7] After L.P. testified, R.M. called A.W. as a witness. He explained that he, R.M., and L.P. lived in the same neighborhood near downtown Indianapolis. He also said R.M. had been working out at the same gym as L.P. twice a week since late 2024. R.M. similarly testified that when she joined that gym in December 2024, she did not know who L.P. was, and it was merely a “coincidence” that they sometimes attended the same classes. Id. at 46. She did admit, however, that on at least one occasion she moved closer to L.P.’s workout station “to be petty.” Id. at 43. But she denied following L.P. to coffee shops and said that while they had once attended the same local farmers market, it was L.P. who “followed behind [R.M. and A.W.] instead of going the other way.” Id. at 45.

[8] After the presentation of evidence, R.M.’s counsel argued there had been no stalking or harassment, and though L.P. had apparently suffered some emotional distress due to the coincidental run-ins with R.M., any fear on L.P.’s part was not objectively reasonable. But the trial judge expressed skepticism that “all of the contact” R.M. had with L.P. was “merely coincidental[,]” and said to the parties,

You both obviously look to me like you work out, and being physically fit is very important to you, which ․ obviously is a healthy thing. The only unhealthy thing that I'm aware of is a relationship that's overlapping.

So I'm going to grant the [PO] for six months

Id. at 53, 55. In a subsequently issued written order, the court found that R.M. “represent[ed] a credible threat to the safety of [L.P.]” and “that stalking or repeated acts of harassment ha[d] occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of [a PO].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 15. The PO prohibited R.M from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with [L.P.]” Id. As a condition of the PO, the court ordered that R.M. could “attend [the] gym on Tuesdays” but had to leave the gym “all other times” if L.P. was present. Id. at 16. R.M. did not appeal the issuance of the PO.

[9] The PO was originally set to expire on January 11, 2026, but on October 15, 2025, L.P. filed a motion to extend it. In support of that request, L.P. alleged there had been seven “PO Violation[s]/Incidents” in July, August, and September. Id. at 25. These included occasions when R.M. spoke with the owner of the gym to try to schedule workout sessions so she would not be at the gym at the same time as L.P., which caused the gym's owner to pass indirect communications between R.M. and L.P. Additionally, on August 1, R.M. and A.W. “walked past” the gym “several times” while L.P. attended an event inside. Id. at 25. On another occasion, R.M. allegedly “slowly walk[ed] past” a different gym “while [L.P.] [was] working out.” Id. L.P. also accused R.M. and A.W. of attending public events at the same time as her, including a pizza festival in August and “a neighborhood street fair” in September. Id.

[10] The court held a hearing on L.P.’s motion on November 6, at which both L.P. and R.M. appeared pro se. There, L.P. testified that R.M. had contacted the owner of the gym to coordinate the parties’ workout schedules and had tried to attend the gym on days other than Tuesday. Additionally, L.P. claimed,

[I]t's been at least like four or five times that we've had to coordinate schedules. There have been other times where we've talked about how [R.M.] wanted to [go to the gym], but she couldn't because [the owner] told her I was going to be there. There have been times when I think [R.M.] showed up when I was there, but she left.

Tr. at 65. She also said she had seen R.M. and A.W. at several public events, including “Pizza Fest” where she “saw them walking around the perimeter.” Id. at 68. She further explained that when R.M. saw her at the September street fair, R.M. made eye contact and waved before A.W. “pulled [her] away[.]”¹ Id. at 93.

[11] After R.M. cross-examined L.P. about these incidents, the court said it wanted to hear from the gym's owner, who was present to testify. She explained that given the gym's small class sizes, trying to accommodate both R.M. and L.P.—especially when R.M. wanted to attend the gym on a day other than Tuesday—was difficult “[f]rom ․ a logistical perspective” and had been a burden on her business. Id. at 97. As she explained,

If [a class is] full and [R.M.] is taking a spot[,] ․ I know it's going to cause a problem when [L.P.] shows up because I'm going to have to say, [R.M.] you have to leave, then it's preventing somebody else from getting into a class. It's causing a problem that I frankly don't really want to have anyone deal with because this isn't fun.

Id. at 96-97. When L.P. cross-examined the owner, she testified that R.M. “ha[d] continuously attempted to come to [the gym] outside of Tuesdays[,]” which caused L.P. and the owner to have “numerous ․ discussions about [R.M.] and the scheduling[.]” Id. at 100.

[12] R.M. and A.W. admitted in their testimonies to having attended the pizza festival and street fair, but they denied doing so to harass L.P. At the end of the hearing, the court said the following to R.M. before indicating it was taking the matter under advisement:

I believe some of, at least some of, the contact that you've had [with L.P.] is probably inadvertent. Some of it. Not all of it.

․

․ I believe ․ you did go to efforts [to comply with the PO]. I understand that. I just – I've already said it. Go to a different [gym] because ․ it's not going to stop. It's not going to go away. It's only going to go away if you go to a different [gym].

Id. at 133-34 (emphasis added).

[13] On November 10, the court issued an order extending the PO through July 11, 2026. In that order, the court found that “[t]he conditions which caused the original [PO] to be issued continue[d] to exist” and concluded R.M. “continues to represent a credible threat to the safety of” L.P. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32. R.M. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] R.M. argues there “was not sufficient [evidence] for the [t]rial [c]ourt” to extend the PO. Appellant's Brief at 9. We first note that L.P. did not file an appellee's brief. In its absence, we will not develop arguments on her behalf “but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if [R.M.’s] brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct App. 2024) (quoting In re Adoption of E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “Prima facie error means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). Still, we must apply the relevant law to the facts of the case “to determine whether reversal is required.” Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d at 352.

[15] We add that R.M. does not ask us to reverse the trial court's July 2025 decision to issue the PO. In fact, she explicitly concedes she cannot ask us to reverse the July findings that she stalked and harassed L.P. because she did not appeal the original issuance of the PO. Therefore, the scope of our review is limited to the court's November decision to extend the PO, not its July decision to issue it in the first instance. See Mishler v. Cnty. of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d 149, 152 (Ind. 1989) (“Even an erroneous judgment is voidable only through direct appeal.”); In re Marriage of Traux, 522 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (“[M]ere errors of law do not ․ open a judgment to collateral attack; such judgments are voidable and can be corrected only by direct appeal.”), trans. denied.

[16] POs are governed by the “Civil Protection Order Act (CPOA), which exists to promote the protection and safety of all victims of domestic or family violence and harassment in a fair, prompt, and effective manner.” P.D. v. D.V., 172 N.E.3d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1(1-2) (2021)). “Because of the potentially severe limitations on a restrained person's liberty, the petitioner must prove the respondent is a present, credible threat to the petitioner or someone in the petitioner's household.” Id. (quoting S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 2217 (Ind. 2020)). Additionally, “the threat posed by the respondent is viewed objectively, and the threat must be credible, meaning plausible or believable.” Id. Before a court can issue or extend a PO, “the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner or the petitioner's family.” S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 220. Our standard of review for the issuance or extension of POs is well-settled:

[POs] are similar to injunctions, and, therefore, a trial court must sua sponte make special findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Fox v. Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)․ Our standard of review of the trial court's findings and conclusions is two-tiered: we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the [PO]. Id. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues and the witnesses, we will only reverse where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the order. Id. In addition, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The appellant bears the burden of establishing that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Id.

P.D., 172 N.E.3d at 310.

[17] Under the CPOA, “domestic or family violence ․ includes stalking ․, whether or not the stalking ․ is committed by a family or household member.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-50 (2025). Stalking, in turn, is defined as

a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened. The term does not include statutorily or constitutionally protected activity.

Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1 (2025). Moreover,

“[h]arassment” ․ means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact:

(1) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and

(2) that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.

Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-80(a) (2025).

[18] Had R.M. appealed the July 2025 order, she might have had a good argument that the trial court erred in finding L.P. had shown “by a preponderance of the evidence[ ] that stalking has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of a protective order” and that as a result, R.M. “represent[ed] a credible threat to [her] safety ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 12. Indeed, L.P.’s own testimony at the July 2025 hearing cut against these findings, as she admitted the only reason she felt unsafe was because of R.M.’s mere “presence in the same area ․” Tr. at 26. Given that R.M. and L.P. live near one another and are both active in their community, the fact that they often ran into one another in public, without more, does not lead to the conclusion that L.P. reasonably felt “terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.” I.C. § 35-45-10-1.

[19] That said, we remain mindful of the limited nature of review and that R.M. did not appeal the trial court's July 2025 findings that her run-ins with L.P. were not coincidental and amounted to harassment and stalking. And while our Supreme Court has instructed that the mere existence of a PO “does not, by itself, justify ․ renewing or extending” it, “[e]vidence that the respondent violated a [PO] may alone justify extending the order's duration because it shows a disregard of judicial efforts to ensure a prior victim's safety and security.” S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 220-21. This Court applied this principle in Mason v. Mares, where a PO was entered against a father who committed acts of domestic violence against the mother of his children. 188 N.E.3d 42, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Though he was prohibited from speaking with her about any matter not related to the children, he sent her a handful of messages complaining about the PO and disparaging her. Id. at 43-44. Relying on S.H., the panel concluded there was sufficient evidence that the father violated the protective order, which supported the trial court's judgment. Id. at 45. The panel added that because mother had been found to be a victim of domestic violence, it was objectively reasonable for her to be fearful because of the father's impermissible communications. Id.

[20] Though the facts of Mason are not quite the same as this case, several parallels can be drawn. As of July 2025, L.P. had been adjudicated a victim of stalking and harassment, yet R.M. continued to engage in actions like those that led to the issuance of the PO in the first place. Especially egregious was R.M.’s conduct at the street fair, where she stared at L.P. and waved—acts that violated the PO. On these facts, it's difficult for us to say the trial court erred in concluding that the same conditions that justified the issuance of the PO in July continued to exist in November. This Court often stresses that we must be “mindful of the deference that we owe to the trial court's proximity to the issues[.]” J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. And “[i]n close cases ․ when the evidence could lead a court to grant or deny a petition, ․ ‘the trial court is the one to make that call.’ ” S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 498 (Ind. 2023) (quoting S.D. v. G.D., 195 N.E.3d 406, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (Altice, J., dissenting), trans. granted). Accordingly, R.M. has not carried her burden to show prima facie error in the trial court's decision to extend the PO for six months.

Conclusion

[21] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   L.P.’s sister corroborated this account, testifying that she went with L.P. to the street fair and saw R.M. make eye contact with L.P. and wave. According to that testimony, L.P. and her sister “were speechless that [R.M.] would do that considering [L.P.] ha[d] a [P.O.] against her ․” Tr. at 106. L.P.’s sister interpreted the gesture “[a]s antagonizing and intimidating.” Id.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.