Ezekiel Gary Cristobal Addison, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury convicted Ezekiel Gary Cristobal Addison (“Addison”) of two counts of criminal trespass ¹ after he entered the property of a church from which he had been denied entry. On appeal, he raises two consolidated and restated issues: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about Addison's prior acts on church property?; and (2) Is the evidence sufficient to support his convictions? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] St. John the Baptist Catholic Church is located at 625 Frame Road in Newburgh. The Catholic Diocese of Evansville owns the church property, and the “campus” is home to several buildings, including the church, priest's home, grade school, office, and thrift store. Tr. Vol. 2 at 26.² One entrance to the property is off Frame Road and leads into a parking lot. Around the time of the relevant events, the church had the parking lot resurfaced with new blacktop, including the entrance to the lot where it meets the shoulder of Frame Road. There were no sidewalks along that part of Frame Road.

[3] Father Claude “Dusty” Burns has been the pastor at St. John's since 2020 and is an employee of the Diocese. Addison was once a parishioner. Sometime in 2024, Father Burns learned Addison was “parading around” the property with picketing signs, which the priest thought was “a bit odd, a bit antisocial.” Id. at 30. Father Burns convened a meeting with Addison but it “did not go very well[.]” Id. Addison got “angry” and left but stayed in the church parking lot all night. Id. Thereafter, Addison engaged in demonstrations on and around the property, sometimes making disruptive noises during services.

[4] Eventually, Father Burns felt he could no longer tolerate Addison's behavior. On August 25, 2024, Newburgh Police Department (“NPD”) Officer Mallory Ladd—also the school resource officer at St. John the Baptist school—informed Addison he was banned from church property. As a result, Addison's church membership status was terminated.

[5] On the evening of August 27, NPD Sergeant Alex Linberg was patrolling Frame Road when he saw Addison kneeling on a wooden prayer bench (“kneeler”) and praying at the entrance to the church property. Addison was on the “newly laid blacktop” where the church entrance “connects to Frame Road.” Id. at 49, 48. Sgt. Linberg confronted Addison and told him to leave because he had been banned from the property. Addison responded that he was “on an easement” and the officer “would have to arrest him.” Id. at 49. Sgt. Linberg photographed Addison as he stood praying beside the kneeler on the blacktop. Sgt. Linberg spoke to Addison for about five minutes, and then Addison picked up the kneeler and walked away along Frame Road. On September 11, the State charged Addison with criminal trespass.

[6] On October 13, Officer Ladd was off duty but working as private security for the church when she saw Addison walking on Frame Road holding a sign reading, “All are welcome here.” Ex. Vol. 3 at 5. Addison walked to the entrance of the parking lot and stood on the blacktop holding the sign. Officer Ladd photographed Addison where he stood and then arrested him. The next day, the State charged Addison under a separate cause with another count of criminal trespass.³

[7] Leading up to a combined trial on the cases, the State tendered its notice of intent to introduce evidence of certain acts Addison engaged in prior to the offenses, specifically:

That the Defendant engaged in a habitual course of disruptive demonstrations at St. John the Baptist Catholic Church while a parishioner. Those disruptions included bleating like a sacrificial lamb during church services, dressing up like Jesus Christ to draw attention to himself, carrying a physical cross on church property, holding signs in protest and contempt of the church, sending numerous unwanted emails to church leaders and parishioners, and frightening staff and parishioners alike with the escalation of his behavior.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14. A few days later, Addison filed two motions in limine, only one of which matters on appeal. In relevant part, Addison requested the trial court exclude at trial: (1) any character evidence and evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts offered for an inadmissible purpose under Evidence Rule 404(b); and (2) any irrelevant evidence, including “events that did not occur on the date [Addison] allegedly committed” the charged offenses. Id. at 25–26. The motion did not specify which prior acts Addison sought to exclude under Rule 404(b), reciting only the substance of Rule 404(b).

[8] The trial began on July 8. During a pretrial bench conference to discuss preliminary matters, the prosecutor and defense attorney argued the motions in limine to the trial court. The State contended Addison's prior acts showed his familiarity with the property and were relevant to “proving an absence of mistake” and to whether Addison acted knowingly or intentionally when he entered the property. Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. Addison argued any act he undertook prior to being banned was irrelevant to the question of whether he trespassed on the days in question. In his view, the case was “a very simple matter. Was he on their property, or was he not?” Id. at 8. The trial court partially granted Addison's motion in limine as to Rule 404(b). But the trial court declined to find all evidence of Addison's prior acts would be irrelevant and determined Addison could argue the relevance as the evidence was introduced.

[9] At trial, Father Burns testified to his interactions with Addison prior to Addison being banned, including asking Addison to stop picketing on the property. When the State asked the priest whether the demonstrations were distracting to church members, Addison objected “to the prior acts” based on “relevance,” and the State argued Addison's “prior behavior is certainly relevant to his intent to enter the property.” Id. at 32. The trial court overruled the objection. Father Burns testified Addison's actions were “very distracting” to the priest and church members. Id. at 33.

[10] Both police officers testified to some events leading to Addison being banned from the property. Sgt. Linberg testified he became familiar with Addison because “he was causing issues with the church during mass” and the church hired police officers “off duty to work there as security due to that.” Id. at 44. Officer Ladd also testified to the “sorts of things” Addison would do as demonstrations:

He would carry a cross around town, a pretty large one. He had the face of Jesus, which he would stand out in front of the school with that. He had “All are Welcome” signs. He would go to the entrance of the church and then he would go towards the school with different signs, across the street, which was close to the parish house that we have as well, that I think Father [Burns] failed to mention, where they do youth group things and whatnot. Inside the church, he ․ made some certain noise, almost like a lamb noise.

Id. at 72. At that point, Addison objected because “I believe we are leading back into [his] acts that I still maintain are not relevant to this matter.” Id. The trial court overruled the objection but urged the State to “move on[.]” Id. Officer Ladd then testified these actions led to Addison being banned.

[11] As to the church property boundaries, Father Burns testified the church parking lot was distinguishable from the public roadway because of the recently blacktopped surface. On cross-examination, Father Burns acknowledged he was not a surveyor and did not know the exact property line, but he believed the church property started at the blacktop “because [the church] wouldn't pave something that belonged to the city.” Id. at 37. Similarly, Sgt. Linberg testified the “blacktop stopped at the shoulder of the roadway on Frame Road” and for that reason he thought—although he did not know with exact certainty—the blacktop represented the property line. Id. at 44. He explained:

I believed he was on private property. I believe a reasonable person would determine that he's on private property․ I think a reasonable person would assume that, based on where the blacktop ended and wherever the road met. Because, I don't think St. John's would've blacktopped into Frame Road or be allowed to blacktop into Frame Road.

Id. at 62. Sgt. Linberg testified the blacktop started “roughly” six feet from the white line at the edge of Frame Road and Addison was standing another six inches to a foot inside the blacktop. Id. at 64. Officer Ladd, too, testified she did not know the exact boundaries of the church property line. She used “common sense and discretion” and concluded Addison was on private property “due to the newly paved area and the grass that [the church] maintain[s].” Id. at 79, 78. The State introduced the photographs taken of Addison on the dates of the charged offenses, which show Addison standing off the shoulder of Frame Road and on the blacktopped apron where the parking lot entrance meets the road shoulder. On both days, he stood in the same spot, as depicted in this photograph from October 13:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Ex. Vol. 3 at 7. The State also introduced Sgt. Linberg's body camera footage taken when he confronted Addison on August 27, which depicts Addison's position from a different angle.

[12] At the close of evidence, Addison moved for judgment on the evidence under Trial Rule 50, which the trial court denied.

[13] The jury found Addison guilty of both counts. The trial court sentenced Addison to ninety days in the Warrick County Jail on each charge, with each term suspended to six months of probation, to be served consecutively. The trial court also ordered Addison to stay off church property.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Addison's prior acts.

[14] Addison first argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Addison's prior acts. A trial court has discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and we review its decisions only for abuse of that discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). We reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the error affected a party's substantial rights. Id.

[15] The crux of Addison's argument is that by “admitting evidence about an ongoing series of behavior, ․ the State set forth a narrative that Addison was a serial disruptor, rather than an individual accused of just two acts of trespass near an unspecified boundary line.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Addison is not specific about which evidence was improperly admitted. On review of the record, the evidence adduced at trial about Addison's prior acts was witness testimony that he picketed and displayed signs or pictures on the church campus (including by the church, school, and parish house); became angry when asked to stop; once stayed overnight on the church grounds; made animal-like noises during services; and carried a cross about town.⁴ On appeal, he seems to argue evidence of any of these acts should have been excluded as irrelevant or impermissible under Rule 404(b). We address relevance and Rule 404(b) in turn.

[16] Relevance. Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to prove or disprove a consequential fact. Evid. R. 401; Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017). “This liberal standard for relevancy sets a low bar, and the trial court enjoys wide discretion in deciding whether that bar is cleared.” Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[17] To convict Addison of criminal trespass as charged, the State was required to prove Addison, not having a contractual interest in the church property, knowingly or intentionally entered the property after having been denied entry by the church or its agent. See I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(1); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32, 113. As the State notes, evidence Addison had been on the church campus many times before and met with church leaders about his activities tends to prove he “was in fact familiar with the Church grounds” and aware of the reasons he was banned. Appellee's Br. at 13. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the evidence was relevant.

[18] Evidence Rule 404(b).⁵ Under Rule 404(b), evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). But such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). “The list of other purposes is illustrative not exhaustive.” Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ind. 1997).

[19] Rule 404(b)’s purpose “is to prevent the jury from indulging in the ‘forbidden inference’—that a defendant must be guilty of the charged crime because, on other occasions, he acted badly.” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 565 (Ind. 2019). “But Rule 404(b) does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts evidence—only its use as character evidence.” Id. at 568. When the State claims other-bad-acts evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court is tasked with deciding whether that evidence “is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Id. (quoting Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 219). If the evidence is relevant, the trial court then looks to Rule 403's balancing test, under which the court may admit evidence if its probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. (quoting Evid. R. 403). As this Court has observed:

All relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial to a defendant. Because the bar for unfair prejudice, rather than mere prejudice, is high, courts err on the side of admissibility and consider whether there is risk that a jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.

Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[20] Initially, we are not entirely convinced Addison's acts implied bad character under Rule 404(b). The Rule “has normally applied to evidence of a defendant's extrinsic activity” indicating an “unsavory character trait with which [the defendant] could have acted in conformity” when committing the charged crime. Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 423 (Ind. 1997). Perhaps, as Addison argues, such evidence suggests he was a provocateur or “serial disruptor.” Appellant's Br. at 12. But the evidence introduced at trial paints a fairly benign picture of Addison's demonstrations while a parishioner, even though his conduct eventually became untenable to church leadership. Moreover, none of this evidence speaks to his propensity to commit the charged act of criminal trespass. That is, Addison's allegedly disruptive character did not necessarily invite the jury to make the “forbidden inference” that he was inclined to enter private property after being banned from it. We are not convinced Rule 404(b) applies to the evidence of Addison's prior acts. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (evidence of mere possession of weapon not a “bad act” for Rule 404(b) purpose), trans. denied; Dixson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 704, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (evidence implying defendant's marital infidelity does not fall within purview of Rule 404(b) in murder case), trans. denied.

[21] Even assuming the testimony was the sort of evidence to which Rule 404(b) applies, Addison would still not prevail. The evidence was relevant to matters other than his propensity to trespass, including Addison's familiarity with the church property, knowledge of the ban, and even motive arising from his contentious relationship with the church.⁶ See, e.g., Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 222–23 (holding evidence of prior acts showing hostile relationship between the parties admissible to prove defendant's motive for charged act).

[22] As to Rule 403 balancing, evidence of Addison's prior acts has probative value—it explains how Addison was familiar with the church campus, why he had been denied entry, and his tense relationship with the church leadership. It also suggests a motive as to why he returned to the property with a kneeler and sign. Addison does not explain how he was “unfairly” prejudiced by this evidence, other than to assert it “substantially impacted the defense.” Appellant's Br. at 12. But nothing about the evidence of Addison's prior interactions with the church suggests the jury would substantially overestimate the evidentiary value when determining whether Addison entered the church property on the days in question. Nor does the evidence appear calculated to arouse or inflame the jury's passions or sympathies. The reasons for Addison's demonstrations were not disclosed at trial. We therefore cannot conclude the unfair prejudice, if any, to Addison substantially outweighed the probative value of the testimony about his prior acts.

[23] Evidence of Addison's prior activities on the church property was not barred under Rule 404(b). Nor was the evidence irrelevant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

Sufficient evidence supports Addison's convictions.

[24] Next Addison argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[25] Addison's chief argument on appeal is the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was on church property because “[n]o witness was able to affirmatively identify the property line.” Appellant's Br. at 15. In support of his argument, Addison relies on Powell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), in which this Court reversed a defendant's conviction for criminal trespass based on insufficient evidence the defendant entered the property. Id. at 482. In Powell, a bouncer escorted an apparently intoxicated defendant out of a club. Outside, a police officer ordered the defendant to leave the property. The defendant wanted to go back inside and announced his intention to do so. The officer refused to let him and explained he would be arrested for trespassing if he tried. After the defendant began screaming at the officer and bystanders, the officer escorted him across the street. At a bench trial, the officer's limited testimony established only that the defendant was on the sidewalk at the time the officer asked him to leave, and there was no indication the defendant attempted to re-enter the club or cross the threshold. Accordingly, this Court held there was insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction. Id.

[26] Unlike in Powell, there was ample evidence of where Addison stood at the relevant times. On both days, police officers photographed Addison as he stood off Frame Road and on the blacktopped entrance to the church parking lot. Sgt. Linberg's body camera footage also shows Addison's location from a different vantage point than the photographs. Sgt. Linberg testified Addison was standing six to seven feet from the white line at the edge of Frame Road. The evidence firmly establishes Addison's location as off the shoulder of Frame Road and on the church parking lot entrance.

[27] As to whether Addison stood on church or public property, Father Burns testified the church property was clearly distinguishable from the public roadway due to the recent parking lot resurfacing. Sgt. Linberg observed the new blacktop stopped at the Frame Road shoulder, and for that reason considered the blacktop to be part of the church property. Officer Ladd similarly concluded Addison was on private property “due to the newly paved area and the grass that [the church] maintain[s].” Tr. Vol. 2 at 78. Although on cross-examination none of the State's witnesses professed to be a surveyor or to know the exact property line, all three testified Addison was on church property. Coupled with the photographs and body camera footage showing Addison's exact position, the witness testimony was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Addison was on church property when he stood off Frame Road and on the blacktopped parking lot surface. Any argument to the contrary is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 570.

[28] Moreover, even if we assumed the testimony was somehow insufficient to show Addison stood on church property, we would still affirm his convictions on the basis of Walls v. State, 993 N.E.2d 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In Walls, an intoxicated defendant awakened a resident of an apartment complex by kicking on her apartment door. She opened the door, and he asked to be let in. When she refused, the defendant continued to bang on her door and yell. The tenant asked the defendant to leave several times before calling the police. Meanwhile, the defendant did the same to another apartment, whose occupants also opened the door and refused him entry. The defendant then attempted to put his foot through the threshold of the second apartment, but the tenants pushed him out. The defendant was subsequently convicted of criminal trespass. On appeal, he argued only the apartment complex owner or its agent could ask him to leave the common area. But a panel of this Court held the tenants had a sufficient possessory interest in “at a minimum, their apartment doors, the threshold of their apartments, and the immediate adjacent areas by which they accessed their leased apartment units,” which would permit a criminal trespass conviction of someone who refuses to leave those specific areas after being asked to do so. Id. at 267.

[29] Although Walls focuses on a tenant's possessory interest in the common area immediately outside their apartment, we find the facts of the case sufficiently analogous to the circumstances present here. Even if we assume the church parking lot apron extended into public property where it abutted the road shoulder, Addison was undeniably standing at the threshold and on the access point to the church parking lot. Addison's position on the apron/access point is analogous to the Walls defendant's position at the thresholds of the tenants’ apartments. We believe the landowner church had sufficient possessory interest in the spot at which the parking lot met the shoulder of the road to ask someone to leave under threat of criminal trespass. See id. We therefore affirm Addison's convictions for criminal trespass.

Conclusion

[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence, and sufficient evidence supports Addison's convictions.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1) (2024).

2.   The page numbers on the transcript do not match the PDF page numbers. We cite to the PDF page numbers for ease of reference.

3.   The State later amended both charging informations to correct misspellings.

4.   Evidence of some of the prior acts mentioned in the State's pretrial notice—including that Addison sent numerous emails and frightened staff and parishioners—was either not introduced or excluded at trial.

5.   As an initial matter, the State argues Addison's Rule 404(b) argument is waived because he confined his trial objections to relevancy. Yet at the outset of trial, the court granted Addison's motion in limine as to Rule 404(b) evidence, to which the State did not object. And when Addison objected during trial, both parties referenced “prior acts” and the court's preliminary rulings. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2 at 32. For these reasons, we decline to impose waiver on this issue.

6.   Addison argues the State could not use the purported prior-bad-acts evidence to prove his intent because he never put his intent at issue. As Addison correctly observes, the Indiana Supreme Court held in Wickizer v. State that the use of prior-bad-acts evidence to prove a defendant's intent to commit the charged act is a narrow exception and available only “when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability and affirmatively presents a claim of particular contrary intent.” 626 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ind. 1993). In other words, to use the intent exception, the State needs more than the defendant's mere denial of involvement in the offense; he must first claim he did not possess the necessary mens rea for the offense. Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 569. In Wickizer, the Court was concerned a broad interpretation of the intent exception would defeat the overarching purpose of Rule 404(b) because “mental state or culpability of a defendant is an element to be proven by the prosecution in virtually every criminal case.” 626 N.E.2d at 797. But this concern is not present in all other Rule 404(b) exceptions, and so the Court has declined to extend Wickizer's narrow interpretation in all cases. See Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ind. 1997) (defendant need not first raise issue of “plan” for the State to use 404(b) evidence to prove it); Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 222 n.12 (same as to “motive” exception); but see Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 568 (404(b) evidence to show lack-of-accident exception may be admitted only (1) when the State has “reliable assurance” an accident defense will be raised, or (2) after the defendant places accident at issue at trial). The proffered evidence relates to matters other than intent, and so Addison need not have first raised intent for the trial court to admit this evidence.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.