Dillion W. Stolz, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Dillion W. Stolz appeals following his convictions of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine,¹ Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia,² and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood.³ Stolz asserts his rights under the federal and state constitutions were violated when an officer conducted a pat down search of him following a traffic stop. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 13, 2024, Deputy Tony Lennartz of the Jay County Sheriff's Department was driving west on Main Street in Portland, Indiana, when he observed Stolz driving a pickup truck without wearing a seatbelt. The pickup truck also had a cracked windshield, a missing bumper, and its taillights were “blacked out.” (Tr. Vol. II at 83.) Deputy Lennartz then initiated a traffic stop and Stolz pulled over into an alleyway.

[3] Deputy Lennartz approached the driver's side of Stolz's vehicle. He noticed Stolz was “just dripping sweat” and “his eyes were jerking back and forth.” (Id. at 84.) Stolz was “very agitated” and “doing jerky movements with his arms and stuff[.]” (Id.) Deputy Lennartz recognized these characteristics as signs of possible methamphetamine intoxication based upon the “hundreds and hundreds of times” he had encountered individuals under the influence of methamphetamine over his career. (Id.) Deputy Lennartz asked Stolz to exit the vehicle. Stolz initially refused to do so but shortly thereafter complied with Deputy Lennartz's request. Deputy Lennartz noticed Stolz's “pockets were bulging.” (Id. at 87.) Deputy Lennartz was concerned that Stolz had a weapon in one of his pockets, so he asked Stolz to empty his pockets. Stolz took some items out of his pockets, but Deputy Lennartz observed that Stolz's pockets did not appear empty. Deputy Lennartz performed a pat down search on Stolz and discovered a glass pipe in his pocket. The pipe had white residue inside it that was later determined to be methamphetamine. Stolz also submitted to a blood test, and the test revealed the presence of methamphetamine and marijuana in his blood.

[4] The State charged Stolz with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated,⁴ Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood. On March 27, 2025, Stolz filed a motion asserting the traffic stop and his subsequent detention were unlawful and asking the trial court to “suppress all property and evidence seized by the arresting officers, all observations made by the arresting officers, and all statements made by the Defendant.” (App. Vol. II at 54.) The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Stolz's motion to suppress and then issued an order denying Stolz's motion.

[5] Stolz's jury trial began on August 27, 2025. Prior to opening statements, Stolz noted that he had previously filed a motion to suppress evidence and that he wished to “renew that motion and object to the evidence as it was improperly obtained.” (Tr. Vol. II at 58.) The trial court explained that it would “note the continuing objection, but the Court is going to deny the renewed motion to suppress at this time[.]” (Id. at 60.) Stolz did not object during Deputy Lennartz's testimony regarding the traffic stop. He also stated “[n]o objection” when the State offered the glass pipe found on Stolz during the traffic stop, the white residue found inside the pipe, and officer bodycam footage taken during the traffic stop into evidence. (Id. at 89, 91, 104.) Stolz also stipulated to the admission of the toxicology report that disclosed the presence of methamphetamine and marijuana in his blood and the lab report stating that the white material found inside the glass pipe was methamphetamine. The jury found Stolz guilty of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood. The trial court sentenced Stolz to a term of two years for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and terms of sixty days each for Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood. The trial court ordered Stolz to serve his sentences concurrently for an aggregate term of two years.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Stolz asserts that Deputy Lennartz's traffic stop and pat down search of him violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence officers obtained during the traffic stop. Because Stolz appeals following a completed trial, his appeal is properly framed as a challenge to the admission of evidence at trial. See Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that because defendant proceeded to trial after his motion to suppress was denied, “the issue is more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial”). “We generally review a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence at trial for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Young v. State, 244 N.E.3d 950, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. Nonetheless, “we engage in de novo review when an alleged constitutional violation has resulted from the admission of evidence.” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[7] Initially, we address the State's argument that Stolz waived his challenge to the evidence discovered as part of the traffic stop. Evidence Rule 103(a) requires a party claiming error in the trial court's admission of evidence to timely object or move to strike the evidence and state the specific ground for the objection unless it is apparent from the context. Even when the evidence was the subject of a prior motion to suppress, the objecting party must still renew the objection at trial. See Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (“A contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve the issue for appeal, whether or not the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress.”). Stolz renewed his motion to suppress at the beginning of trial, and the trial court noted a continuing objection. However, Stolz then affirmatively stated he had no objection to admission of the glass pipe, the residue scraped from the glass pipe, and the officer bodycam footage of Deputy Lennartz's pat down search of Stolz. He also stipulated to the admission of the lab reports analyzing his blood and the pipe residue.

[8] In Hostetler v. State, Hostetler filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered during an inventory search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied that motion. 184 N.E.3d 1240, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Hostetler objected when the officer who performed the inventory search began describing the items found during the search, and the trial court noted a “standing objection” by Hostetler. Id. However, Hostetler affirmatively stated that he had no objection when the State introduced photographs of the items found during the inventory search, the controlled substances discovered during the inventory search, and the lab reports identifying the controlled substances. Id. at 1244. Hostetler attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the inventory search on appeal, but we held that “despite the request for a continuing objection, Hostetler has waived his appellate challenge to the admission of evidence by his subsequent affirmative statements that he had no objection to the evidence.” Id. at 1246-47. We explained “[a]n ‘appellant cannot on the one hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission of evidence and thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.’ ” Id. at 1247 (quoting Haliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 679 (Ind. 2013)). Likewise, Stolz failed to preserve his challenge to the evidence derived from Deputy Lennartz's traffic stop of him because he affirmatively stated at trial that he had no objection to those items. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, --- N.E.3d ---, 25A-CR-623, 2026 WL 759295, at *6 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2026) (holding defendant waived previously preserved objections by later affirmatively stating he had no objection to admission of the evidence), trans. denied.

[9] Waiver notwithstanding, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ⁵ generally prohibits warrantless searches and seizures subject to certain exceptions. Young, 244 N.E.3d at 958. In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held:

[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968). Deputy Lennartz initiated a traffic stop because he observed Stolz commit a traffic violation by driving without wearing a seatbelt. See Ind. Code § 9-19-10-2 (“Each occupant of a motor vehicle equipped with a safety belt ․ shall have a safety belt properly fastened about the occupant's body at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion.”). When Deputy Lennartz approached Stolz's vehicle, Stolz was sweating profusely, shaking, and had pinpoint pupils. Deputy Lennartz recognized these as signs of possible intoxication and began to investigate whether Stolz was driving under the influence. He observed Stolz's pockets were “bulging,” (Tr. Vol. II at 87), and conducted a pat down search to make sure Stolz did not have any weapons. Therefore, we hold Deputy Lennartz did not violate Stolz's rights under the Fourth Amendment because he lawfully stopped Stolz after observing a traffic violation, developed reasonable suspicion Stolz was operating his vehicle under the influence after observing signs of intoxication, and conducted a pat down search of Stolz to ensure officer safety. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 201 N.E.3d 683, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding pat down search of Miller to ensure officer safety did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment when officers had reasonable suspicion Miller was trespassing and Miller was wearing a large coat that could have hidden a weapon, put his hands in and out of his pockets, and positioned himself behind an obstruction when officers approached him), trans. denied.

[10] In addition to the Fourth Amendment, Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution ⁶ protects Indiana residents against unreasonable searches and seizures. Even though the text of Article 1, section 11 and the Fourth Amendment are identical, “we evaluate a search under our state constitution based on the reasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement officers under the circumstances, rather than on the expectation of privacy that is commonly associated with analysis under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 191 N.E.3d 878, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. We consider three factors when analyzing whether a search was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). Stolz's shaking and sweating, his initial refusal to exit his vehicle, and the bulges in his pockets gave rise to a high degree of suspicion justifying the pat down search. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 81 N.E.3d 233, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding Bell's sweating and fast heart rate, his refusal to answer officer's questions, and a bulge in his pocket supported high degree of suspicion for officer to conduct pat down search), trans. denied. In addition, a pat down search is minimally intrusive. See Hutson v. State, 215 N.E.3d 357, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“a pat-down search is a limited intrusion on an individual's normal activities”), trans. denied. Deputy Lennartz's concern for his safety also gave rise to a compelling need to search Stolz. See, e.g., id. (officer had compelling need to seize handgun given concern for his safety). Therefore, we hold the Deputy Lennartz's pat down search of Stolz did not violate Stolz's rights under Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Conclusion

[11] By affirmatively stating he did not object to admission of the glass pipe, methamphetamine residue, lab test results, and bodycam footage, Stolz failed to preserve for appeal any challenge to the admissibility of that evidence. Waiver notwithstanding, Deputy Lennartz's traffic stop and pat down search of Stolz did not violate Stolz's rights under either the federal or state constitutions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a) (2014).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) (2015).

3.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(c) (2021).

4.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a).

5.   The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

6.   Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.