C.H., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On May 21, 2024, C.H. shot and killed A.L. The State initiated the underlying juvenile-delinquency proceeding, alleging that C.H. was a delinquent child for committing what would be murder if committed by an adult and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. C.H. subsequently claimed that he had acted in self-defense. The juvenile court determined that the State had sufficiently rebutted C.H.’s self-defense claim and entered a true finding for what would be the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide if committed by an adult and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. On appeal, C.H. contends that the State failed to sufficiently rebut his self-defense claim and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and in excluding other proffered evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of May 21, 2024, sixteen-year-old A.L. and his friends T.G. and E.H. were riding their bicycles through an Indianapolis neighborhood when they encountered C.H. and D.D. A.L., C.H., and D.D. had been friends and had known one another from the neighborhood. After encountering C.H., A.L. asked him “about his brother's orbie gun.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. A.L. approached C.H. and initiated an altercation. T.G. observed that during the altercation, both A.L. and C.H. were “still standing up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 22. At some point, T.G. turned towards D.D. and “started tussling a little bit” with D.D. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Approximately thirty seconds after the altercation began, T.G. heard a single gunshot. After hearing the gunshot, T.G. turned around and observed A.L. face-down on the ground “on his stomach.” Tr. Vol. II p. 24. C.H. was standing up, facing A.L.

[3] D.D. immediately fled. C.H., who appeared to be looking for something on the ground, said, “[c]all the police” before fleeing. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. T.G. called 911. Police subsequently located a social-media video depicting C.H. and D.D. at some point in May 2024, with what appeared to be a tan semi-automatic pistol.

[4] Christian Ocasio, who lived in a home near the site of the altercation, heard a single gunshot and looked out of his window within “[n]o more than five seconds” of hearing the gunshot. Tr. Vol. II p. 71. Ocasio saw “a kid laying down in the patch of grass and then one of the kids [was] checking his pockets and the other two were standing right behind him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 72. The individual who was checking the victim's pockets “was standing over [the victim's] hip level right above him, checking [the victim's] pockets” and was facing “towards [the victim's] head.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 72, 73. In the approximately ten seconds that it took Ocasio to run downstairs and outside to check on the victim, the individual who had been standing over the victim had fled.

[5] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Kelsey Gembala arrived at the scene of the altercation and found A.L. face down in the grass between the sidewalk and the street. A.L. had an obvious wound to his back and another to the front of his torso. Officer Gembala rendered first aid to A.L. Officer Gembala observed that A.L. did not have a firearm in his possession, and no firearms were found at the scene. A.L. died as a result of the gunshot wound.

[6] Crime Scene Specialist Kaylee Schellhaass recovered a single nine-millimeter fired cartridge casing from the grass. No bullet was recovered at the scene. Police obtained surveillance videos from the neighborhood, which showed A.L., T.G., and E.H. riding their bikes shortly before the shooting, D.D. and C.H. walking together, and D.D. and C.H. running north after the shooting. Police executed search warrants at the homes of both D.D. and C.H., but no firearms were found. However, an empty box for a “Desert Tan” Glock handgun was found in the basement of D.D.’s residence. Tr. Vol. II p. 94.

[7] Dr. Zachary O'Neill performed an autopsy on A.L. and identified “a gunshot entrance wound on the left side of the back and a gunshot exit wound on the right side of the upper chest.” Tr. Vol. II p. 132. Dr. O'Neill indicated that the

bullet traveled through the back, it ended up going through the third uh thoracic vertebrae or a portion of the spine um in your torso. Um as it traveled through the spine, it also injured the spinal cord at that level. Um, as it traveled through the spine, it then entered into the right chest cavity where it injured the upper lobe of the right lung. Um, it then exited the right chest cavity just above the right first rib um and traveled through and fracturing or breaking the right uh clavicle or collarbone before it came through this exit wound on the right side of the upper chest.

Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Dr. O'Neill opined that the shot had likely been fired at “close range through kind of a layer of clothing[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 134. Dr. O'Neill determined that the cause of death was a “perforating gunshot wound of the back.” Tr. Vol. II p. 138.

[8] On October 3, 2024, the State alleged that then-fifteen-year-old C.H. had committed the delinquent act of murder and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. The State sought to have C.H. waived to adult criminal court. Following a hearing, the juvenile court denied the State's request to waive C.H. to adult court.

[9] The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing on October 8–9, 2025. During the fact-finding hearing, the State introduced, and the juvenile court admitted, the video recording from D.D.’s social-media account and a screenshot from the video recording as evidence that C.H. had had access to a firearm around the time of the shooting. C.H. sought to introduce a police report dated May 4, 2024, and a text message from A.L.’s phone to a third person in which A.L. had allegedly discussed “pressing up on” and [s]howing his pipe” to C.H., which C.H. argued constituted a threat to him. Tr. Vol. II p. 161. The State objected, and the juvenile court excluded the evidence as inadmissible hearsay, explaining that there was no evidence that C.H. had had knowledge of the alleged threat before the altercation. D.D. testified that A.L. had placed C.H. in a chokehold prior to the shooting but acknowledged that he had not made this claim in his initial statement to police and gave inconsistent testimony regarding A.L.’s alleged actions.

[10] At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found that C.H. was a delinquent child for committing what would be Level 5 felony reckless homicide if committed by an adult ¹ and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court awarded wardship of C.H. to the Department of Correction and ordered that C.H. would be placed on probation “until [he] reaches the age of 21 years.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 241.

Discussion and Decision

[11] C.H. contends that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and in excluding other proffered evidence.

I. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut C.H.’s Self-Defense Claim

[12] “A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000).

In order to prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, a mutual combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor, must declare an armistice before he or she may claim self-defense. The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed.

Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800–01 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations omitted). “The State may rebut a self-defense claim by affirmatively showing that the defendant did not act to defend himself or by relying on the evidence elicited in its case-in-chief.” Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[13] C.H. asserted at the fact-finding hearing that he had acted in self-defense. In rejecting C.H.’s self-defense claim, the juvenile court stated the following:

A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect themself from what they reasonably believe to be an imminent use of unlawful force. In Indiana, self-defense requires both a subjective and objective standard, meaning you must have actually feared for your safety and your belief in imminent harm must have been one that a reasonable person in your situation would have also had force must also be a proportionate and reasonable response to the imminent unlawful threat that you perceived. After carefully considering the testimony of the evidence, this Court is firmly convinced that [C.H.] did not shoot and kill [A.L.] in self-defense.

Tr. Vol. II p. 246.

[14] While it appears undisputed that A.L. had been the initial aggressor, the evidence supports a finding that C.H. had escalated the altercation by using a disproportionate amount of force in shooting A.L. In Sudberry v. State, 982 N.E.2d 475, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), we concluded that the State had sufficiently rebutted the defendant's self-defense claim when the evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant had “escalated the fight and used more force than was reasonably necessary.” We have also concluded that “in all self-defense claims, the force employed must not be out of proportion to the apparent urgency of the situation” and that use of a disproportionate amount of force may rebut a claim of self-defense. Morrison v. State, 613 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied; see also Porter v. State, 543 N.E.2d 390, 391 (Ind. 1989) (“The jury was justified in believing that the degree of force exerted by appellant exceeded the bounds justifiable to defend herself.”).

[15] Like the situation described in Sudberry, the facts here support the juvenile court's finding that C.H. had escalated the altercation and used more force than was reasonably necessary. There is evidence that A.L. was unarmed during the altercation, so any use of a firearm could reasonably be interpreted as escalation. There is also evidence that A.L. had initiated the altercation by punching C.H. While D.D. claimed at the fact-finding hearing that A.L. had placed C.H. in a chokehold prior to the shooting, D.D. had not made this claim in his initial statement to police and gave inconsistent testimony regarding A.L.’s alleged actions. The juvenile court, acting as the factfinder, was not required to credit D.D.’s inconsistent testimony and was in the best position to weigh conflicting evidence and to determine which witnesses and evidence to credit. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (“[T]he fact finder is best positioned to judge the credibility of these witnesses, is free to credit or discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence.”). D.D. also claimed to have had his back turned to C.H. and A.L. just prior to the shooting as he was engaged in a separate altercation with T.G., meaning that he had not seen what had happened in the altercation between C.H. and A.L. prior to the shooting.

[16] Moreover, the evidence established that A.L. had been shot in the back. Evidence that the victim was shot in the back is relevant to the question of whether the State sufficiently rebutted a self-defense claim. See Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817–18 (Ind. 1995) (noting the fact that the victim had been shot in the back and finding that the evidence was sufficient to disprove the defendant's self-defense claim). During the fact-finding hearing, C.H. asked Dr. O'Neill whether it would be possible for a person to reach around “because of having someone on top of them” and shoot someone in the back. Tr. Vol. II p. 138. Dr. O'Neill indicated that

I would say that it wouldn't be impossible that a scenario like that would take place. Again, you need to have certain circumstances to to really fit that being a possibility. Um, you know, the arm has to be long enough to reach around, the firearm has to be short enough you know․. So again, um I wouldn't say it's impossible for that scenario, it just takes the right circumstances to me to be able for that to be able to happen

Tr. Vol. II pp. 138–39. While C.H. points to Dr. O'Neill’s testimony that it may have been possible for him to be standing in front of A.L. and to reach around and shoot A.L. in the back, the juvenile court was not required to find that this is what had happened. See Tharp, 942 N.E.2d at 816. Dr. O'Neill also testified that, given the path the bullet traveled through A.L.’s body, A.L. would have immediately lost function and sensation of his lower body. Thus, as the State points out, if C.H. had been standing immediately in front of A.L. when he shot A.L., A.L. would have fallen onto C.H. Nothing in the record suggests that this is what happened as T.G. testified that immediately after the gunshot, C.H. had been standing, looking down at A.L.’s body.

[17] Ocasio, who, again, lived in a home near the site of the altercation, testified that he had looked out of his window within “[n]o more than five seconds” of hearing a single gunshot and had seen “a kid laying down in the patch of grass and then one of the kids [was] checking his pockets and the other two were standing right behind him.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 71, 72. The individual who was checking the victim's pockets “was standing over [the victim's] hip level right above him, checking [the victim's] pockets” and was facing “towards [the victim's] head.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 72, 73. In the approximately ten seconds that it took Ocasio to run downstairs and outside to check on the victim, the individual who had been standing over the victim had fled.

[18] Finally, there is evidence that C.H. had fled the scene before police arrived and the firearm that C.H. had used in the shooting was never recovered. Surveillance video from the neighborhood in which the altercation occurred showed C.H. and D.D. running northbound after the shooting. The juvenile court could have reasonably found C.H.’s flight and apparent disposal of the murder weapon to indicate a consciousness of guilt that undercuts his claim that he was justified in shooting A.L. See Orozco v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1038, 1041–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (concluding that evidence that the defendant had fled and disposed of the murder weapon was probative evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have concluded that the murder was not committed in self-defense), trans. denied; see also Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999) (rejecting a self-defense claim when evidence demonstrated that the defendant had fled immediately after the shooting, rather than seeking aid for the victim or waiting to tell the police that he had acted in self-defense).

[19] While C.H. argues in his Reply Brief that flight alone is not sufficient to negate a claim of self-defense, as is outlined above, C.H.’s flight was not the only evidence presented by the State that could reasonably be interpreted as rebutting C.H.’s self-defense claim. Given the totality of the record before us, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut C.H.’s self-defense claim. C.H.’s claim to the contrary effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801.

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting the Challenged Evidence

[20] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “[W]e will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[21] C.H. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting a video recording from a social-media account of D.D.’s and a still photograph derived from the video recording. The video and picture depicted him holding a firearm. C.H. argues that the challenged evidence was inadmissible evidence because it depicted him committing another wrongful act. Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:

(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and

(B) do so before trial--or during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

(Emphases in original). “The purpose of the notice provision, under [Evidence Rule] 404(b), is to reduce surprise and promote the early resolution of questions of admissibility.” Burgett v. State, 758 N.E.2d 571, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “The defendant has the burden to make a reasonably understandable and sufficiently clear request for such notice from the State.” Hatcher v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).

[22] C.H. asserts that the State failed to give pre-trial notice of their intent to introduce the challenged evidence, arguing that “the juvenile court did not hold the State accountable for failing to provide pre-trial notice[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 32. The juvenile court noted that “I don't recall ever seeing a request for 404-B disclosure and the ․ rule does say on the request of the defendant.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. Defense counsel acknowledged that the defense had not made any specific requests for pre-trial notice of 404(b) evidence. We agree with the State and the juvenile court that, according to the plain language of Evidence Rule 404(b), pre-trial notice of the challenged evidence was not required, as it was not requested by C.H.

[23] Moreover, in Burgett, we concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce 404(b) evidence, finding that “there was no danger of surprise” as defense counsel had been aware of both the existence of Burgett's prior bad acts and the “likelihood that the State would want to use this information.” 758 N.E.2d at 579. Similarly, in this case, C.H.’s counsel acknowledged that the video at issue was no surprise to the defense, admitting that “I believe it's one of the same ones they played at the end of the” hearing on the motion to waive C.H. to adult court. Tr. Vol. II p. 118. Thus, even if the State had not provided notice of the challenged evidence, the record reveals that C.H. was aware of the evidence and the likelihood that the State would introduce the evidence during the fact-finding hearing.

[24] C.H. also points to Marion Superior Court Criminal Local Rule LR49-CR00-107, which requires that the State disclose all 404(b) evidence prior to trial, claiming that because of the local rule, he did not have to request notice of the evidence. C.H. did not object to the admission of the challenged evidence on the basis of the local rule at the fact-finding hearing. As such, C.H. has waived his assertion that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence in violation of the local rule. See Grace v. State, 731 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Ind. 2000) (“Grounds for objection must be specific and any grounds not raised in the trial court are not available on appeal.”).

[25] The State asserted that the challenged evidence was being introduced to show that C.H. had had access to a firearm. C.H. claims that the probative value of the challenged evidence was “extremely low since C.H.’s position at [the fact-finding hearing] was that he did shoot A.L., but acted in self-defense.” Appellant's Br. p. 35 (emphasis omitted). C.H. further claims that he was prejudiced by the challenged evidence because his access to a firearm was not an issue, again, as he admitted to shooting A.L.

[26] “Evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon of the type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Thompson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. In Pickens, we concluded that evidence regarding the possession of a weapon similar to that alleged to have been used by the defendant in the murder was relevant to show that the defendant had “access to a weapon of the type used in the murder.” 764 N.E.2d at 299. Similarly, in Thompson, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the possibility of prejudice stemming from “a generalized concern that selling a weapon may be viewed unfavorably” was “clearly outweighed by the probative value of testimony that Thompson had access to a weapon of the type used in the murder.” 728 N.E.2d at 160. As the courts did in Thompson and Pickens, we conclude that the challenged evidence was relevant to show that C.H. had access to a firearm similar to that used in the murder and that any generalized concern that C.H.’s possession of the weapon in the video recording would make him look like a “thug” was clearly outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Appellant's Br. p. 36. As such, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

III. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding the Challenged Proffered Evidence

[27] The ․ exclusion of evidence[ ] rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the exclusion of evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Even if a trial court errs in its evidentiary ruling, we will not overturn the conviction if the error is harmless. An error is harmless if the probable impact of the evidence upon the jury is sufficiently minor so as not to affect a party's substantial rights.

Griffith v. State, 31 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015) (internal citation and quotations omitted). C.H. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by excluding evidence indicating that A.L. had previously threatened him.

[28] C.H. proffered a police report allegedly involving A.L. and certain text messages that had allegedly been sent by A.L. The State objected to the evidence, arguing that both were inadmissible hearsay. “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Cornell v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1135, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. “Hearsay is generally inadmissible, subject to a handful of specific and limited exceptions.” Id.; see also Ind. Evid. Rule 802.

[29] C.H. asserts that the police report was a public record and was therefore admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(8). Evidence Rule 803(8)(B)(i) provides that investigative reports by police and other law-enforcement personnel are not exempted from the hearsay rule “except when offered by an accused in a criminal case[.]” C.H. further asserts that the text messages were admissible under Evidence Rule 804 because they reflected A.L.’s prior statements and A.L. was not available to testify at the fact-finding hearing. Evidence Rule 804 provides that the exception for an unavailable witness does not apply “if the statement's proponent procured or wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying.”²

[30] The proffered police report did not involve C.H. It did not identify D.D., but the address listed in the report was D.D.’s address. The State argued that the statements contained in the police report were inadmissible hearsay that did not relate to the altercation in question and were only being introduced “to paint the victim in a bad light.” Tr. Vol. II p. 161. The State further argued that “[t]here's no evidence that [C.H.] knew about it at this point. So, I don't see how it is relevant to the proceedings.” Tr. Vol. II p. 161.

[31] C.H.’s defense counsel argued that the police report related to the text messages that had been sent from A.L.’s cellular telephone,

in which he shares a video of him and others going past [D.D.’s] residence. He identifies [C.H.] by name as being involved along with [D.D.]. Saw him coming from [D.D.’s] home, speaks about pressing up on ‘em. Showing his pipe, scaring him. These are statements by text. It's still a statement against interest.

Tr. Vol. II p. 161. Defense counsel further argued that the text messages were “not hearsay because it's a statement against interest and [A.L. is] unavailable to witness[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 162. The State responded that A.L. was only unavailable because C.H. “made him unavailable!” Tr. Vol. II p. 162. The State further responded that

there has been no evidence that this statement was made to [C.H.] or that [C.H.] knew about it at this point. So, unless and until the defendant state of mine [(sic)], and unless or until [C.H.] says, “I knew about that.” Would that be able to come in? The text messages are still hearsay. The video, I don't know, but [C.H.] would have to say he knew about that.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 162–63. The parties clarified that the text messages had not been sent to C.H. or D.D., but rather to “a different peer” and that C.H. and D.D. had not been involved in sending or receiving the text messages “at all.” Tr. Vol. II p. 163.

[32] In excluding the police report and text messages, the juvenile court ruled that the proffered evidence could become relevant “if it becomes an issue that [C.H.] knew about this uh communication and that it impacted his state of mind[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 164. The juvenile court explained that

under [Evidence Rule] 804-A, which is criteria for being unavailable, subsection four indicates that the declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if a declarant cannot be present or testify at trial or hearing because of death or event existing confirming physical illness or mental illness. So that seems to include [A.L.], but this subdivision A does not apply if this statement[’]s proponent procured the wrongful the declaran[t's] and [un]availability as a witness in order to prevent the declar[ant] from attending witness or testifying at all. Now ․ I think it's undisputed that [C.H.] killed [A.L.]. The question is whether or not he murdered him. If [C.H.] killed [A.L.], he procured his own [un]availability, do you not agree?

****

Alright, so, my ruling is going to be that ․ the objection um that has been made with regard to hearsay in this particular text thread.․ Okay, my ruling thus far is that what you are trying to get into, is inadmissible hearsay. I will give you an opportunity to try to continue to flesh that out if you think there's a way around it, but right now you haven't done it and so the objection is going to be sustained. It's hearsay. Um, if you have case law that you think that I need to review, give me that case law. I'll take a look at it um but I I am currently of the belief that you're trying to do is you're trying to get this hearsay statement to establish that your client was fearful of [A.L.]. That would make any sense at all if we knew that [C.H.] knew about that conversation.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 165–67.

[33] As it relates to the text messages, C.H. argues that in cases involving a self-defense claim, “prior threats from the alleged victim are highly probative of the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of the victim.” Appellant's Br. p. 26. In support, C.H. cites to Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, in which we noted that “[i]ntroduction of specific acts to prove the defendant's state of mind would support the proposition that the defendant had a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary.”

Self-defense requires reasonable apprehension of harm by the defendant. When a defendant claims that he acted in self-defense, evidence legitimately tending to support his theory is admissible. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that evidence of the victim's character may be admitted to show that the victim had a violent character giving the defendant reason to fear him. The victim's reputation for violence is pertinent to a claim of self-defense. Thus, the victim's reputed character, propensity for violence, prior threats and acts, if known by the defendant, may be relevant to the issue of whether a defendant had fear of the victim prior to utilizing deadly force against him. Therefore, a defendant is entitled to support his claim of self-defense by introducing evidence of matters that would make his fear of the victim reasonable.

Id. at 780 (internal citations omitted). “Although the victim's threats or violence need not be directed toward the defendant, the defendant must have knowledge of these matters at the time of the fatal confrontation between the victim and the defendant.” Id.

[34] C.H. has failed to argue, much less establish, that he had knowledge of the proffered statements outlining the alleged threat by A.L. C.H. could not have reasonably been in fear of A.L.’s alleged threat if he had not had knowledge of the same. The juvenile court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in excluding the text messages when there was no evidence that C.H. had been aware of the alleged threat prior to the altercation. See id.

[35] As for the police report, “[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.” Ind. Evid. Rule 805. In Hardiman v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 2000), the Indiana Supreme Court applied Evidence Rule 805 to mean that in attempting to introduce a police report, the defendant must show that each assertion, i.e., both the report and the statements therein, fit within an exception to the hearsay rule. It is unclear from the record exactly what statements in the police report, beyond those describing the text messages, C.H. proffered for admission.

[36] During the fact-finding hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that the police report “doesn't say anything about who was involved or not involved.” Tr. Vol. II p. 161. Given the record before us, we are unable to determine the relevance of the police report or whether the contents of the police report fell under an exception to the hearsay rule. See Ind. Evid. Rule 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”) As such, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding the police report.

[37] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The juvenile court noted that Level 5 felony reckless homicide is a lesser-included offense of murder.

2.   We are not persuaded by C.H.’s suggestion that he could not be found to have rendered A.L. unavailable pursuant to Evidence Rule 804 because he had not killed A.L. for the purpose of ensuring that A.L. did not testify at trial.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.