Alan Gregory Huber, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The trial court found Alan Gregory Huber guilty of domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor and entered a no-contact order in favor of Huber's victim. On appeal, Huber challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the duration of the no-contact order. We affirm Huber's conviction and remand with instructions to amend the no-contact order.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Huber lived in a mobile home in Galveston. M.J. moved in with him at the beginning of 2024, and at some point they began “hooking up[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 49. Eventually, their physical relationship ended, but M.J. continued to reside in the home. On June 23, 2025, both Huber and M.J. were at home. Huber asked to talk with M.J., but she “did not want to talk.” Id. at 35. Huber “didn't like that, so he ran out of his bedroom and ran to [her] bedroom and slammed the door shut and barricaded [her] from being able to enter [her] bedroom.” Id. M.J. “tried to get past him to get into [her] room[,]” but he “pushed [her] back.” Id. She “lost [her] footing and fell face first into the corner of the wall.” Id. M.J. again tried to enter her room, but Huber “grabbed [her] by [her] shoulders, shoved [her] against the wall and kissed [her] against [her] will.” Id. M.J. slapped Huber, and he scratched her face. M.J. was finally able to enter her bedroom and told Huber not to come in. Huber “kept yelling[,]” told her to “get off [his] f-ing bed[,]” and “ripped” the mattress off the frame. Id. at 36. M.J. called the police, who arrested Huber.

[3] The State charged Huber with domestic battery pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), which makes it a Class A misdemeanor for a person to “knowingly or intentionally ․ touch[ ] a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner[.]” Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-128(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a]n individual is a ‘family or household member’ of another person if the individual ․ (2) is dating or has dated the other person [or] (3) is or was engaged in a sexual relationship with the other person[.]” The charging information did not specify the basis for M.J.’s alleged “family or household member” status.

[4] At a bench trial on January 26, 2026, M.J. and a responding police officer testified for the State, and Huber testified in his defense. At the close of evidence, the trial court found that the State had “met its burden of proof.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 59. The State asked the court to place Huber on probation and enter a no-contact order in favor of M.J. The court granted the State's request for a no-contact order and indicated that the order would “extend throughout the probation.” Id. at 62.

[5] Next, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.7(a), the court determined whether Huber had “committed a crime of domestic violence (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-78).” Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-78 provides in pertinent part that a “crime of domestic violence” is an offense that “(1) has as an element the: (A) use of physical force; or (B) threatened use of a deadly weapon; and (2) is committed against a family or household member, as defined in section 128 of this chapter.” Specifically, the court stated,

Now find the Defendant committed a crime of domestic violence as defined in Indiana Code 35-31.5-2-78, I'm specifically finding that there was, they were engaged in a, or it says, “is or was,” which is “was engaged [in] a sexual relationship with the other person.” I'm not going to put in dated because it doesn't sound like from the evidence that it was an actual dating situation ․. But that you were in a sexual relationship with this individual. Because of that, I'm advising you upon conviction that you shall lose your right to possess a firearm or ammunition.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 62 (some quotation marks omitted).

[6] The court placed Huber on probation for 365 days and awarded him two days of credit time, which resulted in a probation period of 363 days. Appealed Order at 2. The no-contact order states that its terms shall be effective until January 26, 2027, which is two days after the end of the probation period. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 41. Huber now appeals his conviction and the duration of the no-contact order.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of Evidence

[7] Huber challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[8] Huber does not argue that the State failed to prove that he battered M.J. Instead, he asserts that she is not a “family or household member” for purposes of the domestic battery statute because their dating relationship and/or sexual relationship had ended before he battered her. When resolution of a sufficiency claim turns on the interpretation of a statute, we are presented with a pure question of law, which we review de novo. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022). Our primary goal in interpreting any statute is to effect the legislature's intent. Cowan v. State, 276 N.E.3d 154, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply no rules of construction other than giving effect to the language's plain and ordinary meaning. Id.

[9] Huber engages in a lengthy disquisition regarding the meaning of “is dating or has dated” as used in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-128(a)(2), which is irrelevant because the trial court specifically found that Huber and M.J. were never in “an actual dating situation[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 62. As for Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-128(a)(3), Huber has neglected to acknowledge Williams v. State, 924 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, in which we stated that “[t]he phrase ‘is or was engaged in a sexual relationship’ makes clear that the status of the relationship at the time of the offense is not relevant. Rather, the level of the offense is heightened[¹ ] depending upon, among other things, whether the offense results in bodily injury to one with whom the perpetrator has or ever had a sexual relationship.” Id. at 128 (emphases added). We are unpersuaded by Huber's attempt to obfuscate the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, and therefore we affirm his conviction.

Issue Two: Duration of No-Contact Order

[10] Huber also argues that the no-contact order “impermissibly” extends two days beyond his probationary period, and he asks that we remand with instructions to amend it accordingly. Appellant's Br. at 23. The State acknowledges the trial court's stated intent for the “order to be in effect for the same time period as Huber's probation[,]” and it “does not oppose remand to modify the no-contact order by two days so that it expires when Huber completes his probation.” Appellee's Br. at 11-12. It is so ordered.

[11] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   When Williams committed battery against his ex-girlfriend in March 2008, the base level of the offense was a Class B misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a) (Mar. 2008). The offense was elevated to a Class D felony if it resulted in bodily injury to “a family or household member (as defined in IC 35-41-1-10.6)” and additional facts were proven. I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(M) (Mar. 2008). Indiana Code Section 35-41-1-10.6 was recodified as Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-128 in 2012, and the two provisions are identical in all relevant respects. See Williams, 924 N.E.2d at 127 (quoting I.C. § 35-41-1-10.6(a)).

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.