Jacob Collins, Appellant-Petitioner v. Ashley Pugh, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jacob Collins (“Father”) and Ashley Pugh (“Mother”) have one child, and the parties share joint legal custody while Father has primary physical custody. After the parties were unable to resolve certain conflicts related to custody of Child, the parties filed several motions in the trial court. As a result of those motions, the Hendricks Superior Court issued an order finding Father in contempt of court, awarding Mother attorney fees, and denying Father's motion to modify Mother's child support obligation. Father appeals the order and argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt for failing to abide by the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and when it denied his motion to modify Mother's child support obligation.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother have one child who was born in February 2017. Father filed a petition for dissolution of the parties’ marriage in 2022, and, on January 30, 2023, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which they filed with the trial court. The trial court approved the agreement and issued an order dissolving the parties’ marriage on January 31. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 54.

[4] The parties agreed to share joint legal custody of Child with Father having primary physical custody. Id. at 47. Mother, who moved to South Carolina while the dissolution was pending, was given parenting time in accordance with the Parenting Time Guidelines where distance is a factor, which included eight weeks of the school summer vacation and Child's spring break and fall break. Id. at 47-48. The parties also agreed that Mother would enjoy parenting time with Child over Thanksgiving Break and Father would be entitled to the entire winter break, including Christmas. The parties further agreed to equally split the cost of any travel expenses incurred for Mother to exercise her parenting time. But Father's annual obligation toward travel expense reimbursement was capped at $2,000. Id. at 48. For reasons listed in their agreement, including the income disparity between the parties and the expenses Mother would incur to exercise parenting time, the parties agreed that a deviation from the Child Support Guidelines was necessary and that neither party would have a weekly child support obligation. Id. at 49.

[5] On December 6, Mother filed a petition to modify custody, parenting time and child support. She also requested a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and filed a motion for rule to show cause. In that motion, Mother alleged that Father was interfering with Mother's parenting time, Father had relocated without filing a Notice of Intent to Relocate, and Father had withheld Child's school and medical information from Mother.

[6] The trial court appointed a GAL, and she filed her report on August 23, 2024. See id. at 77-81. The GAL noted the communication issues between the parties but believed those issues could be resolved. Further, the GAL recommended that Father should remain as Child's physical custodian. Thereafter, Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate to Wakefield, Kansas. Mother also filed a second motion for rule to show cause alleging that Father had failed to reimburse her for travel expenses that she had incurred from January 1, 2024, to October 31, 2024. Father then filed a petition for modification of child support. The trial court ordered the parties to mediate the issues raised in their pending motions.

[7] The parties reached a partial agreement addressing the manner of communication between the parties and sharing of information, and the trial court approved their agreement on March 31, 2025. Just before the August 12 and 28 hearings held on the remaining issues, Father filed a notice of intent to relocate. The relocation was not more than twenty miles between his old and new residences but required that Child would change elementary schools within the same school district.

[8] On September 17, 2025, the trial court issued an order and entered the following pertinent findings of fact:

20. Mother incurred travel expenses in 2024 totaling $4,500.22.

21. Father refused to reimburse Mother for any of her travel expenses incurred in 2024.

22. Mother has incurred travel expenses year-to-date through April 23, 2025, totaling $1,510.89.

23. Father has refused to reimburse Mother for any of her travel expenses incurred in 2025.

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25. Father alleges that Paragraph 4.2 of the Settlement Agreement regarding travel expenses should only apply to the parenting time defined in the paragraph and not additional parenting time that Mother exercises as allowed in Paragraph 4.2.

26. Father's total obligation for travel expenses incurred by Mother for 2024 and 2025 is $2,600.74.

27. On January 29, 2023, Father informed Mother he would be moving to a new address and [Child's] school would change beginning in the fall of 2023.

28. Father did not file a Notice of Intent to Relocate.

29. In August 2024, Father moved in with his new Wife, which allowed [Child] to stay in the same school district.

30. Father did not File a Notice of Intent to Relocate.

31. Father relocated on August 1, 2025, resulting in a change to [Child's] school.

32. Father filed a Notice of Intent to Relocate on August 11, 2025.

33. Father understands that Section 4.4 of the Settlement Agreement applies to both parties, however he believes the language is contradictory because Ind. Code [§] 31-17-2.2 does not require the filing of a Notice of Intent to Relocate regardless of distance.

34. On September 22, 2023, Father informed Mother that he signed [Child] up for a program to see a new dentist and scheduled [Child] to start seeing a child therapist beginning October 11, 2023.

35. Father did not communicate with Mother about the dentist or therapist until after he unilaterally selected the dentist and therapist.

36. Mother had to request the information for the dentist and therapist on two separate occasions before Father provided the information to her.

37. Father took [Child] to church services on different occasions without communicating with Mother first.

38. Father contends that Mother didn't object after [he] unilaterally made decisions regarding changing schools, the dentist, selecting a therapist, and taking [Child] to church so therefore she consented.

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41. Father contends that the language in the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous and therefore he did not willfully violate the Court's Order.

Id. at 135-37.

[9] The trial court concluded that, under the parties’ Settlement Agreement, Father was only required to pay half of Mother's travel expenses that were incurred for parenting time specified in the Agreement and not unscheduled parenting time. The court ordered Mother to submit adjusted itemized travel expenses to Father and ordered him to pay up to $2,000 of those expenses for the years 2024 and 2025. The court then found Father in contempt for failing to reimburse Mother for any travel expenses incurred in 2024 and 2025. Id. at 140.

[10] The court also concluded that, under the Agreement, the parties were required to file a notice of relocation any time he or she relocated regardless of the distance involved. The court concluded that Father had breached this provision of the agreement twice but declined to penalize him because he and Child have remained in the same school district with each relocation. Id. The court also found Father in contempt for making unilateral decisions concerning Child's health care and religious training without consulting Mother. Id. at 142. The court ordered Father to jointly make decisions with Mother concerning Child's attendance at church services and Mother must agree to Child's attendance at any future church services. After finding Father in contempt of court, the court ordered him to pay Mother's attorney fees in the amount of $2,975. The court also denied Father's request to modify the parties’ child support obligations. Father then filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.

[11] Father now appeals.

Standard of Review

[12] The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte. We will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Where, as here, the court entered findings and conclusions sua sponte, we “review[ ] issues covered by the findings with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). We review any issue not covered by the findings under the general-judgment standard, meaning we may affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. at 124. Moreover,

there is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 247 Ind. 201, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).

The court did not abuse its discretion when it found Father in contempt.

[13] We review a contempt finding for an abuse of discretion and will reverse it only if there is no evidence or reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom that supports the finding. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016). We neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (Ind. 2016).

[14] A person who willfully disobeys an order lawfully issued by the court of record or the proper officer of the court is guilty of indirect contempt. See I.C. § 34-47-3-1; Henderson v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Father bore the burden of showing that his disobedience was not willful. See Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2012).

[15] The trial court found that Father willfully disobeyed several provisions of the parties’ settlement agreement (“the Agreement”). Parties may freely negotiate their own settlement agreements and may incorporate those into a dissolution decree. Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17. Such agreements are contractual in nature, and, once incorporated into a trial court's final order, the agreements become binding on both parties. Whittaker v. Whittaker, 44 N.E.3d 716, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[16] Father challenges the trial court's findings and conclusions holding Father in contempt for violating the terms of the Agreement concerning travel expenses, notices of relocation, health care decisions for Child, and decisions concerning Child's religious training. We first address Father's claims concerning his failure to file Notices of Intent to Relocate.

[17] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it held him in contempt of court for failing to file two notices of intent to relocate. The Agreement provides that “Indiana Code 31-17-2.2 requires the filing of a Notice of Intent to Relocate with respect to any proposed relocation, regardless of distance.”¹ Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 48, 134.

[18] Father's first move occurred near the date of the court's January 31, 2023, approval of the Agreement and order dissolving the parties’ marriage. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 47-49. Two days before the court approved the Agreement, Father notified Mother via text message that he was moving but did not file a formal notice of relocation. Father's second move occurred in July or August 2024 when Father remarried, and that move did not result in a change of school for Child. Id. at 50-51. Father notified Mother of the move but did not file a Notice of Intent to Relocate. Mother agreed that, under Indiana Code chapter 31-17-2.2, Father would not have been statutorily required to file a notice. Id. at 51. And Father's attorney advised him that he did not need to file a formal notice of relocation. Ex. Vol. p. 12. Father's third move occurred on August 1, 2025. Over thirty days before Father moved, he consulted with his attorney and anticipated that his attorney would file a Notice of Intent to Relocate.² Ex. Vol. p. 14. Father's attorney did not file the notice until August 12.

[19] We agree with Father that he did not willfully disobey the terms of the parties’ agreement by failing to file Notices of Intent to Relocate for his first two moves and by untimely filing the notice for his third move. Father's first move occurred within days of the court's approval of the parties’ Agreement, and he communicated the change of address to Mother two days before the court approved the Agreement. Father consulted with his attorney about the second and third moves. On the advice of counsel, Father did not file a notice concerning the second move. And Father's attorney filed the notice for the third move approximately six weeks after Father notified counsel about his impending move. For these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion when it found Father in contempt of court for failing to file Notices of Intent to Relocate. Because Child remained in the Brownsburg School District, the court declined to penalize Father for this contempt. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 140. Therefore, on remand, the court shall vacate its contempt finding on the issue of relocation.

[20] Next, we consider Father's arguments concerning his failure to reimburse Mother for travel expenses. Father contends that, as found by the trial court, the parties’ Agreement was ambiguous, and, therefore, the court erred when it concluded that he willfully disobeyed the court's order by refusing to reimburse Mother for any 2024 and 2025 travel expenses. Father observes that the parties had several disagreements concerning Mother's travel expenses and whether he was required to pay half of certain expenses under the terms of the Agreement. Specifically, Father did not believe he was obligated to pay half of Mother's expenses for exercising unscheduled parenting time or the costs Mother incurred to travel to the airport to pick up Child.

[21] Under the terms of the Agreement, the parties agreed to “equally split the cost of any travel expenses that” Mother incurred to exercise her parenting time, but Father's annual obligation was capped at $2,000.00. Id. at 48, 134. Because the trial court concluded that Father was only required to pay half of Mother's expenses incurred to exercise the parenting time specified in the Agreement, Mother was ordered to submit adjusted itemized expenses for 2024 and 2025. Mother submitted adjusted expenses for exercising her scheduled parenting time showing that Father owed $1,530.79 for 2024 and $0 for the year-to-date in 2025.

[22] Given the ambiguity in the parties’ agreement, Father reasonably declined to reimburse Mother for certain travel expenses. However, Mother incurred expenses to exercise her parenting time specified in the Agreement, and Father refused to pay his share of those expenses. Therefore, Father willfully violated the terms of the parties’ Agreement by failing to pay half of Mother's expenses in 2024 that he could not reasonably dispute that he owed under the terms of the Agreement.

[23] Finally, Father argues that the court abused its discretion when it found him in contempt for failing to include Mother in the decision-making concerning Child's health care providers and for taking Child to religious services without Mother's agreement. The parties’ Agreement provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of Child, “meaning that both parties shall share authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child's upbringing, including their health care, education, and religious training.” Id. at 47.

[24] Father failed to consult with Mother before selecting a dentist and therapist for Child. Father admitted that he did not give Mother the opportunity to share in the decision-making concerning Child's dentist. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 139. Father expressed his belief that he was allowed to make unilateral decisions concerning Child's health care without consulting Mother. Id. at 132. Father argued that Mother was required to object to his decisions and they could consider changing the health care providers if Mother did so. Id. Mother also had to request the name of Child's therapist twice before Father provided the information to her. Id.

[25] Father argues that Mother acquiesced to his unilateral decisions. The trial court concluded that “[n]otifying Mother after making decisions is not sharing in the authority or responsibility to make the decision.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 141. We agree. Under the terms of the parties’ Agreement, Father was required to consult with Mother before choosing Child's health care providers.

[26] Concerning Child's attendance at religious services, Father took Child to several religious services and never discussed Child's attendance at the services with Mother.³ Father argues they attended fewer than five services with his wife and he did not “impose any religion on” Child. Appellant's Br. at 29. But Father conceded that attendance at a church service is religious training. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 133. Child informed Mother that Father had taken her to church services. The trial court concluded that “whether the child is allowed to attend a church service should have been a decision made by both parents together.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 141.

[27] Father violated the parties’ Agreement to share joint legal custody by making unilateral decisions concerning Child's health care providers and failing to consult with Mother before taking Child to a religious service. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Father in contempt.

[28] As a penalty for Father's contempt, the trial court awarded attorney fees to Mother. “The trial court has inherent authority to award attorney fees for civil contempt.” Winslow v. Fifer, 969 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)), trans. denied.

[29] Father challenges the attorney fee award but argues that the award should be vacated because the finding of contempt was not valid. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Father was in contempt for failing to pay Mother's travel expenses and making unilateral decisions about Child's healthcare, we affirm the court's decision to award Mother attorney fees.

[30] Father also challenges the amount of attorney fees awarded. Mother testified that she was requesting $1,855 in attorney fees, which amount is consistent with counsel's attorney fee affidavit admitted as Respondent's Exhibit J. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 26; Ex. Vol. pp. 65-66. And the trial court found that “Mother incurred $1,855.00 in attorney fees related to the Motions for Rule to Show Cause through the August 12, 2025, Hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 137. The court also found that “Mother incurred an additional 3.2 hours of attorney fees, or $1,120.00, for the hearing on August 28, 2025.” Id. Therefore, the court awarded Mother $2,975 in attorney fees. Father argues that the additional $1,120 awarded to Mother is not supported by any evidence in the record.

[31] We agree with Mother that it was within the trial court's discretion to award attorney fees incurred for the August 28 hearing. But the amount awarded must be supported by the evidence. Mother does not cite any portion of the record supporting the award of $1,120 for attorney fees incurred during the August 28 hearing, and our review of the record leaves us guessing as to how the trial court calculated that amount. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the trial court's attorney fee award to Mother and remand this case with instructions to reduce the attorney fees awarded to Mother to $1,855.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to modify the parties’ child support obligations.

[32] In the Agreement, the parties agreed to deviate from the child support guidelines because of the income disparity between the parties, the allocation of parenting time, and Mother's costs to exercise parenting time. The terms of the Agreement provided that neither party would incur a child support obligation. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 49.

[33] On appeal, Father argues that he proved that the parties’ child support obligations should be modified because Mother's income has increased and she is now married, which are substantial changes since the parties’ marriage was dissolved. Appellant's Br. at 32. Father bore the burden of proving that the parties’ child support obligations should be modified. See Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[34] Father argues that he proved that modification of Mother's child support obligation was warranted under Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b). That statute allows the trial court to modify or revoke a child support order only:

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; and

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting modification was filed.

[35] The trial court denied Father's request to modify Mother's child support obligation because “[t]he reasons the parties agreed to deviate from the child support obligation worksheet back in January 2023 still exist. Nothing has changed related to the parties and their financial obligations to each other.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 142.

[36] We agree with the trial court that there has not been a substantial change in the parties’ circumstances from the date they entered into the Agreement. Mother's parenting time remains the same. It has become more difficult for Mother to exercise her parenting time with Child because Mother moved to Missouri and the closest airport does not have direct flights to Indianapolis. Although Mother's income has increased, her monthly income is still less than $1,000 per month, and, therefore, there is still a significant income disparity between the parties. Moreover, although over twelve months had elapsed since the parties entered into the Agreement, Father failed to prove that Mother's 2025 child support obligation would have differed by more than twenty percent from her 2023 obligation if the parties had utilized the child support guidelines in 2023.⁴

[37] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to modify Mother's child support obligation.

Conclusion

[38] The trial court acted within its discretion when it held Father in contempt and denied Father's motion to modify Mother's child support obligation. However, the court's order requires correction in two respects. First, the court abused its discretion when it found Father in contempt for failing to file Notices of Intent to Relocate. And the court's attorney fee award to Mother is not supported by the evidence. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order awarding Mother $2,975 in attorney fees and instruct the court to reduce the attorney fee award to $1,855.

[39] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This provision is not consistent with Indiana Code 31-17-2.2-1, which provides that a relocating parent must file the requisite notice unless the relocation results “in a decrease in the distance between the relocating individual's residence and the nonrelocating individual's residence” or the relocation results “in an increase of not more than twenty (20) miles” between the residences and allows “the child to remain enrolled in the child's current school.” The parties’ Agreement required notice regardless of distance, and the trial court found that language to be unambiguous even though the language in the Agreement does not track with the language in the statute.

2.   In a message to Mother dated July 24, Father stated that he thought Mother would have already received the Notice of Intent to Relocate. Ex. Vol. p. 61. Father had also sent a follow up email to his attorney on July 1 concerning the Notice of Intent to Relocate. Id. at 14.

3.   Both parents are atheists, but Father's wife attends religious services, and Father and Child have attended them with her.

4.   In fact, in her brief, Mother asserts that her obligation in 2023 would have been $46 per week had the child support guidelines been followed and Father argued that Mother's child support obligation should be modified to $51 per week, which does not meet the requirements of section 31-16-8-1(b)(2). See Appellee's Br. at 27.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.