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Devonte C. Travier, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] On February 19, 2023, Devonte Travier participated in the murder of Diasha Fitts. On February 27, 2023, Travier attempted to dispose of evidence relating to Fitts's murder by intentionally crashing a car into a water-filled ditch and discarding the evidence in the ditch under the vehicle. The next day, knowing that police were looking for him in connection to Fitts's murder, Travier led police on an approximately six-minute high-speed chase, during which he threw a bag containing nearly 128 grams of methamphetamine out of his car window. Travier was charged with, and convicted of, murder, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to an aggregate ninety-five-year sentence.
[2] Travier contends on appeal that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to sever the murder charge from the other charges, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, and (3) his sentence is inappropriate. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Travier's request to sever the murder charge from the other charges. Additionally, without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, we conclude that because there was significant independent evidence of Travier's guilt, the admission of the challenged evidence was, at most, harmless. We also conclude that Travier's ninety-five-year aggregate sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Sometime prior to February 14, 2023, Demaury Haywood developed “some personal problems” with Brandon Golden. Tr. Vol. II p. 157. Knowing that Trevon Giddens frequently visited the Eagles Casino (“the Casino”) in Fort Wayne, Haywood asked Giddens to let him know if Giddens saw Golden at the Casino. After seeing Golden at the Casino on February 14, 2023, Giddens “texted [Haywood] and told him that [Golden] was there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 157. Haywood indicated that he “was sending” Travier to confront Golden and asked about what Golden was wearing and “what kind of car he was in.” Tr. Vol. II p. 158. Golden left the Casino before Travier arrived. Haywood instructed Giddens to delete their text messages.
[4] A couple of days later, Haywood again instructed Giddens to watch for Golden at the Casino. On February 19, 2023, Giddens saw Golden at the Casino with Fitts. Giddens texted Haywood about seeing Golden at the Casino and described what Golden was wearing. Haywood told Giddens that he was coming to the Casino with Travier and that Travier was driving. Haywood instructed Giddens to wait at the casino, watch Golden, and report on what vehicle Golden got into when he left. Giddens waited until Golden left and alerted Haywood that Golden had gotten into a minivan and had driven away on Winchester Road. Giddens “didn't see [Fitts] get in the” minivan with Golden or mention her presence. Tr. Vol. II p. 165.
[5] At an intersection a short distance away from the casino, Travier and/or Haywood fired shots into the minivan that Golden was driving. Fitts was struck twice, once in the “right lateral chest” area and once “in the right upper neck.” Tr. Vol. III p. 100. The shot through her neck passed through her throat and “caused a lot of bleeding with aspiration of the blood there.” Tr. Vol. III p. 100. Golden drove back to the Casino and, upon re-entering the Casino, was yelling “She's been shot, she's been shot, she's been shot! Help me, help me!” Tr. Vol. II p. 193. Police and medics responded to the Casino. Fitts died as a result of the gunshot wound in her neck.
[6] The next morning Haywood contacted Giddens, wanting to purchase a new gun from Giddens because “[h]e didn't have one anymore” and had “[p]retty much got rid of the one he had.” Tr. Vol. II p. 166. Haywood told Giddens about the shooting. Giddens agreed to sell Haywood a new gun.
[7] In the days following the shooting, after having identified Giddens on the surveillance video at the Casino, police obtained a search warrant for Giddens's cellular telephone. A few days later, the police “pull[ed Giddens] over to tell [him] that they have ․ a warrant for [his] phone.” Tr. Vol. II p. 168. The next morning, police pulled Giddens over again and informed him that they had a warrant for his arrest in connection to the shooting. Giddens eventually decided to tell the police what he knew about the shooting and identified Haywood and Travier as the perpetrators.
[8] On February 26, 2023, Haywood was arrested at a casino in Michigan, after which he was transported to the Noble County Jail. Haywood called Travier from the jail numerous times. In one call, Haywood informed Travier that homicide detectives were looking for him and
there were going to be questions about the type of vehicle that he had been driving, uh, phone numbers, wanting to know his whereabouts and to not talk to law enforcement. To – to keep his mouth shut. Uh, he even went on to tell him that it was, um, necessary to ditch the vehicle.
Tr. Vol. III pp. 23–24. Haywood gave Travier “encrypted directions on how to discard some of the evidence ․ related to the – to the case.” Tr. Vol. III p. 24. In other calls, Haywood instructed Travier to go to a place that they knew was secluded and difficult to find and when Travier arrived, “you know what to do.” Exhibit 314 Track 5 5:22–5:24. Haywood told Travier to convince other people not to talk to the police. Haywood said, “I was gonna have you pull up on a couple motherf[***]ers” and “You remember that one person ․ that we didn't trust, right? I'm gonna need one of you to pull up over there to tell him” not to speak to police. Exhibit 314 Track 3 1:38–1:40, 1:49–2:04.
[9] On February 27, 2023, Travier crashed a black Kia “into a ditch full of water.” Tr. Vol. III p. 28. After the water receded, the police found the keys to the gray Nissan Versa that Haywood and Travier had been driving during the shooting. The police also recovered DNA from both Travier and Haywood inside the Nissan Versa.
[10] On February 28, 2023, police officers in Fort Wayne were looking for Travier and had been made aware that “he was supposed to be in a black Nissan Versa.” Tr. Vol. III p. 178. An officer initiated a traffic stop after observing Travier commit a traffic infraction while driving the Nissan Versa. When the officer activated his “red and blue” police lights, Travier “immediately hit the gas and started to accelerate rapidly away from” the officer. Tr. Vol. III p. 181. Travier led police on a high-speed chase for approximately six minutes. As he drove, Travier threw a bag containing 127.77 grams of methamphetamine out of his car window. Travier eventually stopped his car and surrendered.
[11] On March 6, 2023, the State charged Travier with murder, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. While in jail awaiting trial, Travier called Haywood's wife, who initiated a three-way call with Haywood. Haywood told Travier not to talk to anyone about the case. Haywood also told Travier that he thought the police had a confidential informant who had told the police about Travier crashing the car into the ditch where the key was later found. Haywood told Travier that Giddens had only known about Travier's involvement in the murder through the conversations between Giddens and Haywood.
[12] Travier moved to sever the murder charge from the three other charges against him prior to the commencement of trial. In support, Travier argued that trying the four counts together in one trial “would impact negatively on a jury's ability to handle the complexity of the evidence to be offered, as well as distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently to each offense.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 118. The trial court denied Travier's motion to sever the charges. Travier again moved to sever the charges on the first day of trial, a motion which the trial court denied.
[13] Giddens testified on the first day of the trial to facts relating to the murder charge. Giddens testified that he was friends with Haywood, that he knew Travier through Haywood, and that he had seen Haywood and Travier together. Giddens testified that he would go to the Casino almost daily, knew who Golden was and what he looked like, and had previously seen Golden at the Casino. Giddens testified that after he had become aware of “personal problems” between Haywood and Golden, Haywood had asked him to alert Haywood if Golden came to the Casino. Tr. Vol. II p. 157. Giddens described his conversations with Haywood relating to what Haywood would like for him to do if Golden appeared at the Casino, detailing text-message conversations on both February 14, and February 19, 2023.
[14] Travier objected to Giddens's testimony regarding his text-message conversations with Haywood, arguing that the State had not met the foundational requirements for a conspiracy. The trial court responded
So, I guess, what I recall from his testimony, was is that his knowledge was is that he was passing this information along to Haywood, and he knew that the defendant was going to confront him.․ He said that, and as far as confrontation, that could mean a lot of different things. But, it would seem to indicate that there was some sort of agreement and plan taking form, especially when you have two different attempts on two different days.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 161–62. The trial court further stated that “the testimony that I heard is that this witness understood that he was to track [Golden] down for [Haywood] so that [Haywood] and/or [Travier] could confront him” and that the “person [Giddens] knew as [Travier] was going to confront [Golden].” Tr. Vol. II pp. 163, 164. The trial court determined that there was a preponderance of the evidence to establish a conspiracy involving Giddens, Haywood, and Travier, and overruled Travier's objection. In addition to Giddens's testimony, with respect to the murder charge, the jury also heard evidence establishing that Travier's DNA had been recovered from the vehicle used by the perpetrators during the murder; jail telephone calls between Haywood and Travier in which they discussed the murder, destroying and/or disposing evidence, and convincing witnesses not to speak to police; and that Travier fled police after being made aware of the fact that police were looking for him in connection with the murder.
[15] The jury also heard evidence relating to Travier's attempt to discard evidence relating to the murder and his flight from police. With regard to the Level 2 felony dealing charge, the State presented evidence that Travier had thrown a bag containing 127.77 grams of methamphetamine out of his car window during his attempt to flee police. Fort Wayne Police Detective Shane Heath testified that a typical user of methamphetamine would usually possess a few grams, “I'd say three grams. Three and a half grams would be an eight ball up to maybe five or six tops.” Tr. Vol. III p. 202. Detective Heath opined that an individual possessing approximately 128 grams of methamphetamine was likely a drug dealer, rather than merely a drug user. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Travier guilty as charged.
[16] Before sentencing, the probation department prepared a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report that listed Travier's lengthy delinquent and criminal history. The PSI report indicated that Travier had previously violated his probation on multiple occasions. It also indicated that Travier was a “VERY HIGH” risk to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 116 (emphasis in original).
[17] The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 15, 2025, during which the parties argued aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors and Travier told the trial court “I'll be back[.]” Tr. Vol. V p. 81. The trial court found that several significant aggravating sentencing factors applied, but that no mitigating circumstances applied. The trial court imposed a sixty-five-year sentence for murder, a thirty-year sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, a two-year sentence for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and a two-year sentence for Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. The trial court ordered that the murder and dealing charges would run consecutively and the resisting and obstruction charges would run concurrently to the dealing charge, for an aggregate ninety-five-year sentence.
Discussion and Decision
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Travier's Motion to Sever
[18] Travier contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the murder charge from the other charges. Generally,
[t]wo (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses:
(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or
(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.
Ind. Code § 35-34-1-9(a).
Whenever two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses. In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense considering:
(1) the number of offenses charged;
(2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and
(3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.
Ind. Code § 35-34-1-11(a).
[19] Travier concedes that he “does not have a mandatory right to severance” under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a). Appellant's Br. p. 15. When a defendant does not have a mandatory right to severance, “[a] trial court's refusal to sever charges ․ is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “On appeal, a defendant must show that in light of what actually occurred at trial, the denial of a separate trial subjected him to prejudice.” Id. (internal brackets, ellipsis, and quotation omitted).
[20] In arguing that his murder charge should have been tried separately from the other charges, Travier asserts that “[t]he case at hand consists of complex evidence, a high volume of witnesses, both lay and expert, a large amount of scientific and crime scene evidence, as well as videos and recordings.” Appellant's Br. p. 17. In Garrett v. State, 273 N.E.3d 122, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied, defendant argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever his criminal charges. In concluding that “there was little overlap in the evidence ․ and minimal risk of confusing the jurors[,]” we noted that “while there was a large amount of evidence (39 witnesses and over 500 exhibits),” defendant did not identify “anything particularly complex” about the eleven incidents at issue, each of which occurred “at a discrete time and place.” Id. The Indiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Kahlenbeck v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind. 1999) and Eubank v. State, 456 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ind. 1983). In Kahlenbeck, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the surviving victims’ testimony, ballistics evidence, and defendant's statement could not be considered to be “complex” evidence. 719 N.E.2d at 1216. In Eubank, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever the charges because it could not be said that the evidence in the case was complex or that a fair determination of defendant's guilt or innocence was hindered when he was tried on all charges in one trial. 456 N.E.2d at 1017. Similarly, in Hall v. State, 870 N.E.2d 449, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, we concluded that defendant's statements, testimony by the investigating detectives, photographs, evidence of the weapons used, and the blood found on defendant's clothing could not be considered “complex” evidence. The evidence in this case, which included DNA, lay- and expert-witness testimony, video and audio recordings, and test results for the weight and identity of the methamphetamine is no more complex than the evidence discussed in Garrett, Kahlenbeck, Eubank, and Hall. As such, we conclude that the evidence was not so complex that a fair determination of Travier's guilt or innocence was hindered when he was tried on all four charges in one trial.
[21] Travier also asserts that the murder had no connection to the other charges, as it occurred “[a] full ten (10) days” before the high-speed chase and his arrest. Appellant's Br. p. 17. We disagree. The record establishes that Travier had attempted to dispose of evidence relating to the murder. In addition, on February 28, 2023, police were looking for Travier in connection with Fitts's murder and Travier knew that police were looking for him in connection with Fitts's murder. Upon locating Travier and observing him committing a traffic infraction, police attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Travier's actions that followed connected the resisting and dealing charges to the murder charge. The interconnected investigations justified the trial court's denial of Travier's motion to sever his criminal charges. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1266–67 (Ind. 2015) (providing that an interconnected police investigation that produced overlapping evidence was a valid reason not to sever criminal charges). The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Travier's motion to sever the murder charge from the other criminal charges.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting the Challenged Evidence
[22] Travier next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial. The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[23] Travier argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting text messages sent between Haywood and Giddens on February 14, and 19, 2023. The text messages allegedly proved that Travier, Haywood, and Giddens had conspired to act against Golden prior to Fitts's murder. Travier claims that the text messages contained inadmissible hearsay and should have been omitted from the record.
[24] We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, however, because we conclude that its admission was, at most, harmless.
Generally, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. In viewing the effect of the evidentiary ruling on a defendant's substantial rights, we look to the probable impact on the fact finder. The improper admission is harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Moreover, any error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial, and is therefore harmless, if the same or similar evidence has been admitted without objection or contradiction.
Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012) (internal brackets, citations, and quotation omitted).
[25] In this case, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Travier's guilt. Giddens provided unchallenged testimony that established Travier's involvement in the murder. In addition, DNA evidence connected Travier to the vehicle used by the perpetrators during the murder. In numerous jailhouse telephone calls, Haywood and Travier discussed the murder, with Haywood instructing Travier to convince witnesses not to speak to police and to dispose of evidence relating to the murder and telling Travier, “you know what to do.” Exhibit 314 Track 5 5:22–5:24. Travier then wrecked a car in a flooded ditch and discarded of evidence related to the murder in the ditch below the vehicle. In addition, knowing that police wanted to speak to him in connection to the murder, Travier fled from police, leading them on an approximately six-minute, high-speed chase. Travier's flight and attempt to discard relevant evidence both demonstrate a consciousness of guilt. See Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990) (“Evidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.”); Grimes v. State, 450 N.E.2d 512, 521 (Ind. 1983) (“Any testimony tending to show an accused's attempt to conceal implicating evidence ․ may be considered by the trier of fact as relevant since revealing a consciousness of guilt.”).
[26] Again, “[t]he improper admission is harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238. Travier's conviction for murder is overwhelmingly supported by the above-discussed independent evidence of guilt. Given the overwhelming evidence of Travier's guilt, we cannot say that the text messages between Haywood and Giddens, which were largely cumulative of Giddens's unchallenged testimony, were likely to have contributed to Travier's murder conviction or negatively impacted Travier's substantial rights. As such, any potential error in the admission of the challenged evidence is, at most, harmless as its probable effect on the jury was minor enough to avoid affecting Travier's substantial rights. See generally Jordan v. State, 244 N.E.3d 445, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“Error is harmless if its probable effect on the jury, given all the evidence in the case, is minor enough to avoid affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”).
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sentencing Travier
[27] We note that in challenging his sentence, Travier conflates the standards of review for sentencing challenges involving an abuse of the trial court's discretion and the appropriateness of the defendant's sentence. Travier does not appear to argue that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, only that his sentence is inappropriate. We will therefore review his sentence through the lens of an appropriateness challenge.
[28] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[29] Again, Travier was found guilty of murder, Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). “A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half (171/212) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. “A person who commits a Level 6 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (21/212) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b).
[30] Travier does not develop an argument relating to the nature of his crimes or his character, but rather merely argues that his sentence is inappropriate because he is not the “worst of the worse.” Appellant's Br. p. 22 (italics omitted). We disagree. While Golden appears to have been Travier's and Haywood's target due to the alleged personal problems between Haywood and Golden, Fitts was killed, meaning that Travier participated in the senseless murder of an innocent person. At Haywood's direction, Travier then attempted to convince witnesses not to cooperate with police and attempted to dispose of evidence related to the murder. Travier then led police on a high-speed chase for approximately six minutes, during which he discarded approximately 127.77 grams of methamphetamine out of the vehicle's window in a residential area.
[31] As for his character, Travier has a significant criminal history including delinquent adjudications and numerous felony and misdemeanor convictions. Prior attempts at leniency have been unsuccessful. In addition, Travier was determined to be a “VERY HIGH” risk to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 116 (emphasis in original). Travier has failed to carry his burden of convincing us that his aggregate ninety-five-year sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez, 891 N.E.2d at 176.
[32] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bradford, Judge.
Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2283
Decided: June 17, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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