IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.G. (“Mother”) challenges the termination of her parental rights to her daughter (“Child”), claiming the trial court entered unsupported findings that failed to support the judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born in June 2019 to Mother and D.C. (“Father”).¹ Child lived in Knox County with Mother, her primary caregiver. At some point in 2020, Mother went to a hospital while she was caring for Child and appeared to be intoxicated. That led to involvement from the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and Mother's participation in an informal adjustment, which was approved in September 2020. At that time, Mother had two pending criminal cases in Knox County—(1) a March 2019 case with charges of Level 6 felony theft and Class A misdemeanor theft; and (2) an April 2019 case with charges of Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident and Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license. She resolved both cases shortly after the informal adjustment was established. In the first case, she pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor theft and received a one-year sentence that was suspended to probation. In the second case, she pleaded guilty to Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident and received a 180-day sentence that was also suspended to probation. About one month later, Mother was charged with Level 6 felony theft in Greene County.

[3] In February 2021, DCS requested that the informal adjustment be discharged as successful because Mother formed and committed to a safety plan, maintained sobriety and stable housing, and completed the requirements of a family services program. Upon this request, the CHINS court discharged the informal adjustment as successful on February 23, 2021. About two weeks later, DCS again became involved with the family when Mother was caught shoplifting. Child was with Mother, who appeared to be intoxicated and was exhibiting erratic behavior. Child was detained and placed in foster care.

[4] On March 12, 2021, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). The petition referred to, among other things, the recent shoplifting incident, Mother's history of substance abuse, and her criminal history. Mother was referred to the Family Recovery Court and Child was appointed a Court Appointed Special Advocate (“the CASA”). On April 5, 2021, Mother failed to personally appear at a CHINS hearing, prompting DCS to move for a default judgment. The trial court entered a default judgment. The dispositional hearing, which Mother did attend, was held on May 3, 2021, resulting in a decree requiring that, among other things, Mother refrain from using drugs and consuming alcohol, obey the law, submit to drug screens, complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations, complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, and attend all visits with Child.

[5] With services in place, Mother made progress over the next twelve months. She resolved her pending Greene County criminal case in March 2022, pleading guilty to Level 6 felony theft in exchange for a one-year sentence where 355 days were suspended to probation. The following month, on April 17, 2022, Mother was arrested for shoplifting in Knox County, resulting in charges of Class A misdemeanor theft and Level 6 felony theft. Due to the new charges, the Greene County criminal court extended Mother's probation.

[6] Despite the new charges, Mother continued to participate in services and progressed to a trial home visit in May 2022. DCS later petitioned to discharge the CHINS case, which the CHINS court successfully discharged in January 2023. At that point, services remained available to Mother, but she did not participate in them. In July 2023, Mother relapsed, using methamphetamine.

[7] On October 12, 2023, Mother's probation officer in Greene County petitioned to revoke her suspended sentence, alleging Mother failed to report for six appointments and failed to pay required fees. The next day, the Greene County court issued an arrest warrant. Mother was arrested on October 18, 2023. That day, law enforcement found a methamphetamine pipe in a bed she shared with Child. Mother also tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. Upon Mother's arrest, DCS again became involved, detaining Child.

[8] On October 19, 2023, DCS filed a CHINS petition alleging Child was neglected due to Mother's issues with substance abuse. The CHINS fact-finding hearing was scheduled for February 12, 2024. Mother failed to personally appear, at which point DCS requested a default judgment. The CHINS court granted the request and adjudicated Child a CHINS.

[9] On March 11, 2024, the CHINS court held a dispositional hearing and entered a dispositional decree. The decree required that, among other things, Mother maintain stable housing, refrain from using drugs or alcohol, obey the law, complete a substance abuse assessment and all recommendations, submit to random drug and alcohol screens, comply with existing conditions of probation, complete a psychological evaluation and all recommendations, and attend all scheduled visits with Child. Around the time the CHINS court entered the dispositional decree, Mother resolved her pending criminal case out of Knox County, pleading guilty to Level 6 felony theft. Mother received a 364-day sentence suspended to probation with placement on work release.

[10] In June 2024, Mother's work release program filed a notice alleging she violated the conditions of her placement by not complying with a cleaning policy, refusing an order, appearing to be under the influence, submitting a drug screen that was presumptively positive for buprenorphine, acting belligerently toward an officer, and being unable to gain and maintain employment. These allegations led to the revocation of Mother's probation, with Mother ordered to serve 327 days in the Indiana Department of Correction. With the application of good time credit, Mother was released in July 2024, at which point she moved in with her sister. After Mother's release, she continued using drugs, testing positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in September 2024 and again in October 2024. She also tested positive for THC in October 2024.

[11] When Mother was released, she participated in services provided through DCS. Mother worked with a home-based therapist, who tried to help Mother address her issues with substance abuse. The therapist found sober living homes that could accommodate Mother, but Mother refused opportunities because she did not agree with the requirements for living there. The therapist was concerned that Mother was “putting her own needs in front of [Child's]” because Mother wanted to find sober living in Terre Haute, which was not close to where Child was living in Knox County. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 87. Mother also cancelled sessions and no-showed for other sessions, such that she made little progress in therapy.

[12] Mother also worked with a home-based caseworker, who located a sober living facility in Terre Haute. Mother lived at the facility for about one week but was asked to leave because she did not have a job and attended only three of the four required meetings. Mother lived with family for a few days, then entered a sober living facility in Terre Haute called Next Steps. Upon entering the facility in late 2024, Mother tested positive for THC and suboxone. A few months later, she was unsuccessfully discharged for testing positive for suboxone in violation of the facility's rules.

[13] Meanwhile, on January 10, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. After Mother's discharge from Next Steps, she entered a sober living facility in Terre Haute called Golden House. Mother said that she entered Golden House because she has “an addiction and [she] needed to get [her] life back on track ․” Id. at 32. Mother also admitted that she struggled to stay sober outside a sober living facility. While living at Golden House, Mother screened positive for alcohol on two occasions in May 2025. However, Mother denied using alcohol and thought that “it was either the mouthwash [she] was using or [an] energy drink” that caused her to test positive. Id. at 40.

[14] Mother regularly participated in supervised visits with Child and those visits generally went well, with evidence of a bond between them. On a few occasions, a visit supervisor “could smell marijuana” when Mother entered her vehicle, but she did not end the visits because Mother “did not appear to be impaired.” Id. at 67. During the CHINS case, Mother did not progress beyond supervised visits, which was partly because she had not stayed sober while living in Knox County and was “fresh in recovery” at Golden House. Id. at 93.

[15] The termination hearing was held on June 17, 2025, at which point Mother was living at Golden House, where she had resided for approximately five months. The hearing included testimony from Child's CASA, who was also Child's CASA in the first CHINS case. The CASA had “[n]o doubt at all” that Mother loved Child but was “concerned ․ due to the repeated pattern” of substance abuse. Id. at 76. The CASA opined that it was in Child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights, noting: “That one's very hard for me. They do love each other and it's obvious. But it's not proven that [Mother's] sobriety can be maintained. It's been obtained multiple times, but long-term maintenance is an issue.” Id. The permanency family case manager (“the FCM”) also believed termination was in Child's best interests, largely because Mother had not been able to maintain her sobriety outside of a structured environment. The FCM testified that DCS had a plan of adoption for Child.

[16] On November 12, 2025, the trial court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights,² finding a reasonable probability Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and placement outside the home, that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, that termination was in Child's best interests, and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment. The trial court stated that “[v]isits between [Mother] and [Child] do go well and there is certainly a bond between [them], however Mother has not been able to demonstrate an ability to provide consistent safety and stability beyond the scope of supervised visits.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 74. The trial court specifically referred to Mother's pattern of not being able to maintain long-term sobriety, noting that, due to substance abuse, Mother “has been incarcerated due to violations of the terms of probation.” Id. The court also referred to Child's need for permanency, noting that, “between the underlying [CHINS] case and the prior [CHINS] case,” Child “has lived a significant portion of her life as a ward of [DCS] and in a placement outside” Mother's care. Id. at 75. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Mother challenges particular findings and argues that the remaining “proper” findings fail to support the decision terminating her parental rights to Child. Appellant's Br. pp. 20–22. At the outset, we note that although the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in resolving a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination is proper where the child's emotional and physical well-being is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[18] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). “We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 642 (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). On appeal, we apply a two-tiered standard of review, setting aside the termination decision only if it is clearly erroneous. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we determine whether the evidence supported the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings supported the judgment. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[19] On appeal, Mother asks us to disregard portions of the order that she claims consist of mere “recitation of witness testimony and verbatim chronological case summary entries,” which “are not considered findings and are treated as surplusage.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. However, even if we disregard the referenced portions of the order, Mother acknowledges that the trial court specifically found that Mother “has a significant history of substance abuse issues and continues to struggle with obtaining and maintaining sobriety.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 73; cf. Appellant's Br. p. 18. This finding was integral to the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights. Thus, we need not address the additional findings Mother claims are surplusage and may focus instead on findings related to substance abuse and the associated statutory determinations underlying the judgment. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (regarding even erroneous findings as “harmless surplusage” where “there [was] evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment”).

[20] Before parental rights may be terminated, the petitioner must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). With regard to subsection (d), in this case, DCS alleged that the following circumstances applied to support a termination order:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4), (5); see Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. Generally, “a finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence.” I.C. § 31-34-12-2. Moreover, if the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, the court “shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[21] On appeal, Mother claims there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Mother “has a significant history of substance abuse issues and continues to struggle with obtaining and maintaining sobriety.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 73. Her argument, however, consists of invitations to reweigh the evidence before the trial court. For example, Mother focuses on evidence most favorable to her position, arguing that “[t]he evidence submitted by DCS to the trial court would indicate [she] had obtained sobriety and has maintained that sobriety.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. There was indeed evidence that Mother achieved sobriety at certain points in her life. However, there was also evidence that Mother would relapse while Child was in her care, at one point leaving a methamphetamine pipe in the bed she shared with Child. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in September 2024 and again in October 2024. She also tested positive for THC in October 2024. When Mother went into a sober living facility in late 2024, she tested positive for THC and suboxone. A few months later, Mother again tested positive for suboxone.

[22] Mother herself testified she was living at Golden House because: “I have an addiction and I needed to get my life back on track ․” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 32. When asked “what type of addiction [she] struggle[d] with,” Mother said that her “addiction varies” and involves “[m]ostly meth and opiates.” Id. Further, Mother acknowledged that she struggled to stay sober outside of a structured environment. On appeal, Mother invites us to focus on her most recent efforts to achieve and maintain sobriety. Mother argues that “drug screens indicate her last illicit drug use to be October 28, 2024, at which time she tested positive for THC.” Appellant's Br. p. 18 (emphasis added). Mother also directs us to her own testimony at the hearing, which indicated that “she ․ obtained sobriety on December 5, 2024,” and “is fully prepared and supported to maintain that sobriety.” Id. We note, however, that Mother's characterization of her sobriety date conflicts with evidence that she screened positive for alcohol on two occasions in May 2025, which was approximately one month before the termination hearing. Mother denied using alcohol and claimed she screened positive due to mouthwash or an energy drink. Nonetheless, the trial court was free to regard the positive screens as evidence of a recent relapse.

[23] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the finding that Mother “has a significant history of substance abuse issues and continues to struggle with obtaining and maintaining sobriety.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 73. At this point, we would ordinarily proceed to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's statutory conclusions of law under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4, including whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied or whether there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. However, Mother does not specifically address these conclusions. Rather, the remainder of Mother's argument is limited to the following statements:

None of the trial court's proper findings singularly or collectively support a termination of parental rights. In fact, the proper findings ring truer to a CHINS adjudication than a termination of parental rights. The proper findings indicate that [Mother] and [Child] might still benefit from the assistance of DCS, but certainly do not need to be ripped from each other's lives forever.

Appellant's Br. pp. 21–22.

[24] DCS argues that Mother “fails to challenge any of the trial court's conclusions of law.” Appellee's Br. p. 21. As a result, DCS follows her lead, providing limited analysis as to the trial court's statutory determinations. See id. at 21–23. We also note Mother did not file a Reply Brief addressing those determinations. In any case, putting aside this limited briefing, we identify sufficient support for the statutory findings and judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

[25] First, it is undisputed that Child was adjudicated a CHINS on two separate occasions—first in 2021 and again in 2024. Furthermore, it is well-settled that adoption is a satisfactory plan for a child in a termination case. E.g., In re T.S., 267 N.E.3d 6, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Next, given the evidence of Mother's years-long struggles with sobriety, there was adequate support for the trial court's determination that it was unlikely she would remedy the conditions resulting in Child's removal and ongoing placement outside of Mother's home. Likewise, given that Mother was Child's primary caregiver, Mother's lack of sustained sobriety provided adequate support for the court's determination that there was a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child. Finally, in light of Mother's unremedied issues with substance abuse and Child's need for permanency—matters highlighted by the CASA and the FCM—the record discloses adequate support for the decision that it was in Child's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship.

[26] For the foregoing reasons, Mother has not identified error in the termination of her parental rights. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's termination decision.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights were also terminated; however, he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The record does not disclose a reason for the five-month delay in entry of an order on the hearing.

Foley, Judge.

Tavias, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.