Jana Jo Johnson, Appellant-Respondent v. Kenneth Andrew Hutton, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2019, Kenneth Hutton (Father) filed a petition to establish paternity and other child-related matters for the three children he shared with Jana Johnson (Mother). After an evidentiary hearing in April 2025, the trial court entered an order granting Father and Mother [collectively, Parents] joint physical custody and Father sole legal custody of their children. The court also ordered Father to pay down his child support arrearage, but it offset the arrearage by $4,200 Mother purportedly received from COVID-19 stimulus payments. Mother appeals, challenging both custody determinations, Father's income calculation, and the $4,200 offset against his arrearage. We affirm the court's custody determinations and the calculation of Father's income, but because Father agrees there is no evidence in the record that Mother received $4,200 in stimulus funds, we remand to the trial court with instructions to recalculate Father's arrearage without the $4,200 offset.

Facts and Procedural History

1. Early Case History

[2] Parents have three children together: twins Mal.H. and Miy.H. (the Twins) (born July 2015) and Mia.H. (born February 2018) [collectively, the Children].¹ During Parents’ relationship, Father worked as an over-the-road semi-truck driver. He was gone multiple nights during the week but was home on weekends. Parents never married but lived and raised the Children together until their separation in the fall of 2018. Mother stayed home with the Children from the time the Twins were born until she returned to work in 2020. The Children lived with Mother after the separation, and she told Father he “could see the kids every other weekend ․” Transcript Vol. 3 at 24. This arrangement fell apart when Mother began denying most of Father's requests for more time with the Children.

[3] In July 2019, Father filed a petition to adjudicate paternity and establish custody and support. After a provisional hearing in October, the court appointed Vicky Jelly as the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) and entered a provisional custody order granting Parents joint legal custody of the Children. Mother retained physical custody subject to Father's parenting time every other weekend. The court specifically noted, “Due to Father's work schedule as an over-the-road truck driver, [he was] not ․ afforded midweek” parenting time. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 158. Father was also ordered to pay Mother $251 a week in child support. Because the evidence presented at the hearing revealed Parents struggled to communicate civilly, the court ordered them to

at all times communicate with one another timely, and in a respectful manner regarding matters pertaining to their children. At no time shall either parent make any disparaging remarks or statements about the other parent to, or, in earshot of[,] any of their minor children.

Id. at 159.

[4] In July 2020, Father requested the court appoint psychologist Dr. Linda McIntire to perform a child custody evaluation. The trial court granted his motion, appointed Dr. McIntire, and ordered Parents to share the costs equally. In October, the court held Mother in contempt for “fail[ing] to pay any amount toward” the custodial evaluation. Eventually, she paid her portion, and the evaluation was able to move forward. Id. at 184.

2. Child Custody Evaluation

[5] Between November 2020 and April 2021, Dr. McIntire conducted the custodial evaluation, which consisted of: (1) individual, in-person interviews with Mother, Father,² Father's wife (then-girlfriend), the Twins, Father's two oldest children, Mother's oldest daughter, and relevant third-parties; (2) an observation session with Father, his five children, and his wife; (3) an observation session with Mother and her four children; (4) a review of collateral information including medical and education records, court orders, DCS case records, and background checks; and (5) psychological testing for Mother and Father.³

[6] Dr. McIntire issued her report on April 6, 2021. In it, she summarized her findings, in relevant part, as follows:

[Mother] likely has no acute mental health disorder, but demonstrates characterological disturbance; in tandem with her somewhat lower intellectual ability, she is prone to impulsive, histrionic, intense, poorly-thought out actions and stubborn refusals, punctuated by episodic outbursts. Secondary to these difficulties, she has engaged in some unsophisticated deceptions in attempt to maintain custody.

Mother's functioning is further compromised by her reported health problems; while the nature of her conditions (such as thyroid disorder and kidney stones) would not typically diminish functional capacity, she reports extreme and debilitating symptoms across her extensive medical records including fatigue, dizziness and vertigo, weakness, daily headaches, and pain in multiple other body sites. While her somatization is likely at least exacerbated by, if not secondary to, her histrionic personality traits, her reported and demonstrated impairment raises concern about her ability to care for the children safely and without explosive episodes, maintain a safe home, and sustain employment.

[Parents] have discrepant parenting styles. [Father] is authoritative, while [Mother] is passive. He demonstrates an ability to be proactive and to constructively guide behavior. The children are better behaved with [Father] and in other settings than with ․ [M]other. Also relative to parenting, there is evidence of Mother's inappropriate and harmful efforts to influence the children, including coaching them to make negative statements about ․ [F]ather in this evaluation, as well as allegations of disparaging and alienating comments about Father, his partner, and paternal half-siblings.

․

․ [T]he children have attachments to both parents, enjoy both homes, and the [T]wins express [a] desire to spend more time with ․ [F]ather. They have adapted well to transitioning between homes.

․ [P]arents have been virtually unable to minimally co-parent, despite significant external controls. The primary problem is [Mother's] unwillingness to share decision-making power and her efforts to exclude [Father], but [his] abrasive emails and texts contribute to the dysfunction. Given the etiology, duration, degree of dysfunction, and lack of improvement while monitored and admonished, the prognosis for change is grim. On a positive note, exchanges of the children are generally free of overt conflict, though the children are likely aware of and affected by the tension.

Parents are polarized on some topics, most specifically diet and vaccinations but also as related to school. It is unlikely that they can agree or effectively compromise on these topics without either sole legal custody or specific [c]ourt intervention.

The children have older siblings in both homes, and enjoy all of these relationships. Maternal half-sister is in Mother's home full-time, but her loyalty to Mother, struggle with anger, and issues with her own father may complicate her influence on the younger children. Paternal half-siblings are positive assets for the children, but are only in Father's home part-time and in fact, have been restricted due to [Mother's] allegations.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3. at 17-18. Based on her findings, Dr. McIntire recommended that Father exercise sole legal custody of the Children. As for physical custody, she recommended that either: (1) Father exercise primary physical custody and Mother receive parenting time pursuant to Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines or (2) Parents exercise equal parenting time (shared physical custody) with monitoring to ensure they cooperate.

3. The GAL's Reports

[7] The GAL completed four reports throughout these proceedings, the first in November 2022, the second in March 2023, the third in April 2024, and the last in April 2025. These reports were based on the GAL's observations, review of relevant records, and interviews with Parents, the Children, and individuals close to the family. In every report, she conveyed concern about Mother's unwillingness to coparent with Father. For example, the 2022 report discussed Mother's persistent “angry outbursts” directed at Father and the GAL. Id. at 75. It also noted that Father continuously “demonstrated his goal which is to always try to co-parent with [Mother]” and “remain actively involved in his children's li[ves] ․” Id. at 76. In contrast, “[t]hroughout the case [Mother] continue[d] to exhibit non-compliant, dramatic, and avoidant[ ] behaviors” and “tend[ed] to be very dramatic and ․ give partial information but never the proof to validate her concerns.” Id. at 77. In summary, the GAL reported that

[t]hroughout the entirety of the case[,] the one constant has been [Father's] ability despite huge, almost insurmountable obstacles set in motion by [Mother]. [Father] has persevered and demonstrated his ability to care for his children, invest time in them, changed his entire work career around to be home and available for [them]. Only to be met with a mother who exaggerates, tells fabricated half-truths, [and] when there is no other option, she will become non-compliant and confrontational to avoid the topic at hand.

Id. at 79.

[8] The GAL's subsequent reports expressed similar concerns. In the 2023 report, she concluded that

[s]hared parenting is not recommended ․ There is no evidence that [Mother] can effectively communicate with [Father] without anger, impulsive behavior (drives[-]by of [Father's] home, confrontational accusatory emails and lies). [Mother's] continued health concerns for the kids[,] including that they are vegan due to other health issues[,] is troubling and remain unproven. Despite being asked to provide proof of this medical diagnosis[,] [Mother] won't.

Id. at 91. In the 2024 report, the GAL observed that

Mother continue[d] to demonstrate behaviors that appear consistent with parental alienation. Her actions [in the] case appear[ ] to have caused the children to be placed in the middle of situations that they should not have been placed in․ Mother will not or perhaps cannot cooperate with my office or [F]ather.

Id. at 120. In her final report issued a few weeks before the April 2025 bench trial, the GAL described Parents’ ongoing difficulties at parenting time exchanges and Children's extracurriculars as well as their struggle to share information. Specifically,

[t]he [C]hildren witnessed [M]other yelling at [F]ather[ ] [and] police present at [M]other's request for no apparent reason.

[Mother] insists on bringing her parents to visit exchanges. Healthy communication at exchanges is nonexistent. Instead of using this time to reinforce with the children to have fun with [F]ather, [Mother] and her parents opt to videotape the exchanges. They have yelled out the windows and have even brought ballo[o]ns and signs welcoming the children back from their visitation verbally and non-verbally suggesting they are now safe back in their care. Causing undue stress for the children at every exchange․

[Mother] has been observed restricting the [C]hildren from sitting, talking or in any way interacting with [F]ather and his wife at the [C]hildren's games. She will show up to sporting events and lure the [C]hildren away from their [F]ather by bringing a wagon full of food and other items to provide for the kids even when it is [F]ather's parenting time. The [C]hildren have shared that this makes them sad because they want to see dad and his wife․

․

Recently when [M]other's home burnt to the ground, she failed to contact [F]ather to let him know the [C[hildren were safe and ok[ay]. Father called the GAL office the next day frantic to hear from mom about his [C]hildren's safety and wellbeing․ GAL learned about [the] fire from social media and so did [F]ather. Mother had permitted the kids to go back to the burnt ruins of their home and sadly when they did, they had to see the burnt dead remains of their beloved animals still locked in their cages.

Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 43. In every report, the GAL recommended that Father be granted sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children.

4. Bench Trial 4

[9] In April 2025, the parties participated in a four-day bench trial to determine custody, parenting time, and child support. Both Parents sought sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children. Father's evidence included the GAL reports, Dr. McIntire's custody evaluation, and testimony from himself, his wife, and the GAL. Mother's evidence included her own testimony and testimony from Dr. McIntire, her father, a friend, and several coworkers. Mother also presented a report and testimony from Dr. Gundu Reddy, a licensed psychiatrist, to refute the findings in Dr. McIntire's custody evaluation. See Exhibits Vol. 1 at 213-241.

[10] The GAL testified in accordance with her reports. She described Parents’ communication breakdown at length. Although Father's communication with Mother improved during the proceedings, she testified that Mother's “[d]isintegrated.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 132. Referencing her 2023 report, the GAL explained, “Things have been going [on] for such a long time and the break in communication, what started as a crack is now the Grand Canyon, and ․ it does come a lot from mom to dad.” Id. at 144.

[11] Parents testified about their various points of disagreement, specifically vaccinations, education, extracurricular activities, diet, information sharing, and parenting time exchanges. Father acknowledged he had a child support arrearage of approximately $27,000. Mother expressed her belief that the GAL was biased against her stemming from a separate custody case involving her oldest daughter, Mak.J. She claimed that, as a result, the GAL “blame[d] [her] for everything throughout this case” and favored Father. Tr. Vol. 4 at 167. Toward the end of trial, several of Mother's witnesses testified to having observed her interact with the Children and described her as a loving and involved parent.

[12] A large portion of the trial focused on testimony from Dr. McIntire and Mother's expert, Dr. Reddy. Dr. McIntire testified extensively about her (1) methodological approach to conducting custody evaluations and administering the psychological tests in accordance with the American Psychological Association's guidelines, (2) her interactions, observations, and interviews with Parents and the Children, (3) the psychological tests she employed and why they were chosen, and (4) whether Parents’ test results remained accurate over time. She also responded to Dr. Reddy's criticisms about her evaluation and the methodologies. Regarding the test results, she explained that of the five tests Parents completed, the results of three of them remained relatively stable over time.⁵ The two remaining tests, which assess parental stressors and expectations, were “short term measure[s]” whose results could change as children age and parental responsibilities shift.⁶ Tr. Vol. 4 at 22. Dr. McIntire also explained that she reviewed a plethora of medical records, educational records, digital communications, and DCS records to verify the information she collected during the interview phase.

[13] In her report and testimony, Dr. Reddy offered several criticisms of Dr. McIntire's methodology for the custody evaluation. She believed Dr. McIntire relied too heavily on psychological testing rather than the interviews with Parents. And as for Mother's interview, Dr. Reddy testified that Mother told her the interview with Dr. McIntire lasted only ninety minutes rather than the five hours and forty minutes recorded by Dr. McIntire. Tr. Vol. 5 at 4-5, 14. Dr. Reddy confirmed at trial that she did not conduct a custody evaluation, but rather a “fitness to parent evaluation[,]” see Tr. Vol. 4 at 214, in which she assessed Mother's reasons for wanting custody of the Children and “screen[ed] for signs of parental alienation or ․ excessive hostility[.]” Tr. Vol. 5 at 7. In completing her report, Dr. Reddy relied on interviews with Mother, conversations with references Mother gave her, and court documents. Based on that information, she disagreed with Dr. McIntire's “damning allegations ․ about [Mother's] ability to parent.” Id. at 47-48. However, Dr. Reddy admitted she had no contact with Father or the Children in compiling her report. And despite opining about custody in her recommendations, see Exs. Vol. 1 at 238 (“It is my medical opinion that [Mother's] children should not be removed from her care without good cause ․”), she testified that she was “not commenting on who should have primary custody.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 47.

[14] On July 24, 2025, the court entered a comprehensive order deciding all outstanding issues including custody, parenting time, and child support. Finding “[t]he [C]hildren appear[ed] to be healthy and well-adjusted, love[d] and ha[d] a close bond with both parents, and express[ed] a desire to spend time with both” of them, the court concluded that “equal parenting time [was] in the best interest of the” Children. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65, 80. Accordingly, the court ordered Parents to share custody on a one-week-on, one-week-off basis. It also awarded Father sole legal custody of the Children. In support of that determination, the court made numerous findings about Mother's unproven accusations, adversarial behavior, failure to provide Father with information about the Children, and Parents’ general disagreements on various issues. The court calculated that Father's child support arrearage was $27,640.58, but it offset that amount by $4,200 in stimulus funds Mother received related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Father was ordered to pay Mother $36 per week in child support plus an additional $20 per week toward his arrearage. Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided in the Discussion as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Mother presents numerous arguments on appeal. Specifically, she asserts the trial court erred in both of its custody determinations, its calculation of Father's income, and its $4,200 offset to Father's child support arrearage. Relatedly, she challenges many of the trial court's findings of fact. But before we address her arguments, we note the

well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal, it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.

Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). With this in mind, we turn first to the challenged findings.

1. Challenged Findings

[16] When a trial court enters findings of fact under Indiana Trial Rule 52, we review them for clear error. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) (“[T]he court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous[.]”). A finding is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence, or reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, to support it. Maddux v. Maddux, 40 N.E.3d 971, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh'g denied. In our review, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.

[17] First, Mother challenges Finding (V)(F)(8), which provides:

Father has implemented a family environment where rules are followed, routines are implemented, and consequences are felt, demonstrated by consistency in mealtimes, bedtimes, and a healthy diet. The same is not the case in Mother's home environment.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63. Mother claims this finding is clearly erroneous because Father's testimony showed that he “just allows the ․ Children to eat whatever they wish which includes unhealthy foods.” Appellant's Brief at 13. She also argues “[n]o evidence was presented [ ]or argument or claims that [she] was incapable of providing consistent mealtimes, bedtimes, or a healthy diet.” Id. at 14. We disagree.

[18] The GAL's 2023 report states that “[t]he children have become adjusted to being in their father's care. They can follow established rules, consequences, and routines[,] which is something mom has not been able to establish in her home. They have consistent mealtimes, bedtimes, and a healthy diet in their dad's home.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 90. This observation from the GAL directly supports the trial court's finding. And while Father did testify that he allowed the Children to choose some of their groceries on one occasion— including macaroni and cheese, hot dogs, and pizza rolls—he purportedly did so to determine whether the Children were observing a vegan diet at Mother's home. He explained that the Children

wouldn't eat anything that [Mother] said ․ they were eating[,] [s]o [he] took them to the store one day[ ] [and] said, “You know what? You guys pick out whatever you want. What do you get at mommy's house?” And they picked out Kraft macaroni and cheese, Velveeta shells and cheese, Oscar Mayer hot dogs, [and] Totino's pizza rolls that day.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 53. Moreover, Mother offers no evidence to show that a child's occasional consumption of these foods necessarily amounts to an overall unhealthy diet. This finding is supported by the record and therefore, is not clearly erroneous.

[19] Mother also challenges Finding (VI)(D)(2), in which the court found that “[o]ver Father's objection, Mother placed the twins in the same class․ McIntire testified that studies indicate placing twins in separate classes [helps them] develop individual personalities and social circles.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 68-69. Mother claims Father never objected to this arrangement and, despite McIntire's testimony, “the overwhelming evidence shows that the ․ Children have not suffered from being in the same classroom ․” Appellant's Br. at 15. First, Father testified that he voiced this objection to Mother. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 37. Second, the court did not find the Twins suffered from this arrangement; it simply noted Dr. McIntire's relevant testimony on the issue. Nor did the court need to find that this arrangement harmed the Twins. Rather, this finding just cites one of many examples of Parents’ inability to agree on important matters—here, the Twins’ education. This finding is supported by the evidence and thus, not clearly erroneous.

[20] Next, Mother challenges Finding (VI)(E)(3), which provides,

Despite McIntire's concerns for Father's inappropriate communication style in 2021, the GAL, who has monitored the parents’ interactions throughout the nearly six years of her appointment, testified [that] Father's communication has improved. The GAL testified that Mother's has not; rather, the GAL testified that Mother's communication with Father appeared to worsen as the case progressed.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 69. Mother argues this finding “is clearly erroneous because [the] GAL was mostly concerned with Mother's communication with her [rather] than between Mother and Father.” Appellant's Br. at 15. While Mother is correct that the GAL testified about Mother's lack of communication with her, she also testified about Parents’ persistent struggle to communicate with each other. For example, she testified that “if [Father] ․ asked [Mother] something about medication or [a] prescription ․, she would be very defensive. She didn't want to respond.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 142. Overall, the GAL explained that “the break in communication, what started as a crack is now the Grand Canyon, and ․ it does come a lot from mom to dad.” Id. at 144. And she testified that only Father improved in this respect. Id. at 132-33. Given the GAL's testimony, we cannot say this finding is clearly erroneous.

[21] Mother also challenges Finding (VI)(G)(9), which provides,

Mother has refused to get the children vaccinated, despite Father's ongoing objection to this position. Father acknowledged that he had agreed to delay the children's vaccinations, but he did not support failing to vaccinate them at all.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 77 (footnote omitted). Mother takes issue with this finding “because Father agreed to a delayed vaccination schedule.” Appellant's Br. at 20. However, the finding explicitly acknowledges as much. She further asserts that “[t]o use Mother's decision to not vaccinate the ․ Children, and Father's wish to do so, against [her] creates a presumption that Father had final decision[-]making authority ․ and that [she] was simply to acquiesce to Father's decisions.” Id. But this finding does not focus on Mother's beliefs about vaccination as much as it provides another example of Parents’ inability to agree on critical matters affecting the Children—here, healthcare. Furthermore, the finding is supported by the record. Father testified that he tried to discuss vaccinating the Children with Mother, but the discussion was unsuccessful. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 56. And Mother later testified that she believed vaccinations were unnecessary. See id. at 213. In light of the evidence, Finding (VI)(G)(9) is not clearly erroneous.

[22] As for the remaining findings challenged by Mother,⁷ her arguments as to each one amount to nothing more than requests to reweigh the evidence. She either calls into question the evidence relied on by the trial court or directs us to conflicting evidence in the record. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 20 (arguing “the trial court improperly centered its custody decision on Mother's friction with the GAL and Dr. McIntire rather than her actual parenting”); id. at 19 (challenging the GAL's testimony and claiming to present “[t]he truth of the matter”); id. at 22 (asserting that “Mother provided unrefuted testimony that the [C]hildren never saw the [pets] in the fire[,]” despite the GAL's testimony and note in her report that the Children told her they saw the burned remains of their pets, see Tr. Vol. 5 at 169.). Because we will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, Mother's arguments fail to show the court's findings are clearly erroneous.⁸

2. Legal Custody

[23] Next, Mother argues the trial court erred by awarding Father sole legal custody of the Children. For an initial custody determination, there is no presumption as to either parent. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124; see Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.⁹ The court must make its determination based on the best interests of the Children and in consideration of:

(1) The age and sex of the [Children].

(2) The wishes of the [Children]’s parents.

(3) The wishes of the [Children], with more consideration given to the [Children]’s wishes if [they are] at least fourteen ․ years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the [Children] with:

(A) the [Children]’s parents;

(B) the [Children]’s siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the [Children]’s best interests.

(5) The [Children]’s adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic violence or family violence by either parent.

I.C. § 31-14-13-2.¹⁰ The court's consideration may extend beyond these factors, however. In re Paternity of V.D., 226 N.E.3d 816, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). It must “consider all evidence from the time of [the] [Children]’s birth[s] in determining the custody arrangement that would be in the[ir] best interest[s] ․” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of M.W., 949 N.E.2d 839, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)) (first alteration in original). We review the court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. A court has abused its discretion if its decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting M.W., 949 N.E.2d at 842). We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court's and reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Purnell v. Purnell, 131 N.E.3d 622, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[24] Here, the trial court's custody determination is well supported by the record. The GAL's report observed that Father had established routines with the Children for meals, bedtimes, activities, and discipline. And Dr. McIntire testified that Father's approach to discipline is comprised of “redirecting, ․ encouraging, [and] prompting[,]” and the Children “clearly[ ] ․ recognize him as an authority.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 110. In contrast, Mother is “totally passive” and “fail[s] to follow through” with her discipline of the Children. Id. at 72. Also, the evidence showed that Parents’ communication issues stemmed primarily from Mother. And while Father contributed to those difficulties early on in the case, the GAL testified that his communication with Mother improved as the proceedings continued whereas Mother's deteriorated.

[25] There was also evidence about Mother's interactions with the Children that caused the GAL, Dr. McIntire, and the trial court concern. Namely, there was evidence Mother coached the Children before interviews with Dr. McIntire and the GAL to say disparaging things about Father, consistently refused to cooperate with him, scheduled numerous extracurriculars during his parenting time, failed to share important information with him about the Children, and engaged in inappropriate behavior during exchanges such as yelling, bringing family members, and keeping the Children with her for up to twenty minutes beyond the exchange time before allowing them to leave with Father. The court also found that many of Mother's accusations throughout the proceedings were untrue. For example, she claimed Mal.H. always experienced gastrointestinal issues at school after Father's parenting time because he did not feed them vegan food. But when Dr. McIntire discussed this concern with the school nurse, she reported that Mal.H. only had three accidents during the relevant period, they did not involve diarrhea or a stomachache, and they did not occur after Father's parenting time. See Tr. Vol. 4 at 63-64.

[26] And as noted above, both Dr. McIntire and the GAL recommended Father receive sole legal custody of the Children. Those recommendations were grounded in their extensive experience with Parents, the Children, and the surrounding circumstances. Despite this, Mother contends “the weight of the evidence demonstrates that [her] proven history of providing a stable, nurturing, and specialized environment makes her the only parent suitable to serve as the [C]hildren's primary custodian.” Appellant's Br. at 26. However, this is nothing more than a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[27] Mother claims this case is “eerily similar” to Day-Ping v. Ramey, where a panel of this court reversed a custody modification. Appellant's Br. at 26 (citing Day-Ping, 175 N.E.3d 844, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied). However, Mother's comparison misses the mark for several reasons. First, Day-Ping reviewed an order to modify custody, which involves a “more stringent standard” than initial custody determinations like we have here. In re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ind. 1992)). Second, the facts at issue in Day-Ping created “unique circumstances” in which reversal was appropriate—circumstances that do not exist here. In re Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

Primary among these were that many of the alleged issues with [the] mother's care of the child were later the basis for a civil suit brought by [the] mother against two DCS caseworkers, [the] father, and his girlfriend. The mother alleged, and proved, that [the] father and his girlfriend had made false claims of child abuse or neglect to DCS. The case against DCS settled for almost $1,000,000, and the mother was awarded over $200,000 in her case against [the] father and his girlfriend.

Id. Nothing of the kind occurred in this case.

[28] The Day-Ping panel also considered the testimony of two experts who criticized the custody evaluation produced for those proceedings, which, coincidentally, had been conducted by Dr. McIntire. 175 N.E.3d at 852-53. Here, Mother points to Dr. Reddy's criticisms of Dr. McIntire's report as the primary similarity to Day-Ping. See Appellant's Br. at 27. However, the Day-Ping panel found the criticisms offered there were particularly concerning “when viewed in light of [the] [f]ather and [g]irlfriend's fraudulent behaviors in related matters[.]” 175 N.E.3d at 853 (emphasis added). Again, the facts here provide no such lens through which to view Dr. Reddy's critiques. Furthermore, unlike in Day-Ping, it is clear from the trial court's order that it considered Dr. Reddy's opinions in reaching its custody determination. Compare id. at 854 (“[T]he [trial court's] order ․ relies on Dr. McIntire's custody evaluation without acknowledging or appearing to weigh the substantial criticisms of her report ․”) with Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 85-92 (acknowledging Dr. Reddy's critiques of Dr. McIntire's evaluation).

[29] Notably, when Day-Ping appealed again following remand, the subsequent panel affirmed the trial court's modification of custody to father. Day-Ping v. Ramey, No. 21A-DR-2353, 2022 WL 1233654, at *19 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2022) (mem.), trans. denied. In doing so, the panel noted that although one of the mother's experts “raised questions regarding Dr. McIntire's custody evaluation and her methods, he had neither personally examined [n]or evaluated any of the parties nor performed a custody evaluation himself.” Id. at *17. It also heeded the trial court's finding that the mother's other expert “did not substantially refute Dr. McIntire's findings.” Id. The same can be said here—Dr. Reddy only examined one party, admitted that she did not perform a custody evaluation, and in the trial court's view, did not effectively refute Dr. McIntire's findings. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 92 (“The [c]ourt does not accept the conclusions made in the Reddy Report as persuasive when compared with [Dr. McIntire's] custodial evaluation.”). Given the lack of any particularly unique circumstances here, and because the trial court clearly weighed Dr. Reddy's opinion when coming to its decision, we are unpersuaded by Mother's reliance on Day-Ping.

[30] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding it was in the Children's best interests for Father to have sole legal custody.  ¹¹

3. Physical Custody

[31] Mother also challenges the trial court's physical custody determination. In determining physical custody, the court must consider the children's best interests and the statutory factors discussed supra in Part 2. I.C. § 31-14-13-2; see Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Again, we will not disturb a trial court's custody determination absent an abuse of discretion. V.D., 226 N.E.3d at 827. Here, the court decided shared custody was in the Children's best interests because, “despite the conflict between the parties, the [C]hildren have a strong bond with both parents and desire to spend time with each of them, and the parties live within a thirty-minute drive of one another.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 80. Mother argues this shared custody arrangement threatens the Children's stability and “is contradictory” to Dr. McIntire's concerns about Mother's ability to care for the Children. Appellant's Br. at 30.

[32] In support of her argument that sharing physical custody of the Children threatens their stability, Mother cites to Father's change in employment several times during their proceedings, the likelihood that the Children will change school districts since Father has legal custody, Mother's service as the primary physical custodian throughout the Children's lives, and the possibility that Father could have up to seven children in his home at any one time. Id. She also takes issue with the court's reliance on Dr. McIntire's “stale, four-year-old report” and its conclusions about Mother's parenting. Id. at 31. However, based on the court's extensive findings regarding Parents’ health, parenting styles, employment, and family dynamics cited in support of its physical custody determination, we find the court considered the evidence Mother highlights. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 58-65. It specifically “acknowledge[d] the age of the McIntire report, the length of time this matter ha[d] been pending before final resolution (approximately six years), and the entirety of the evidence presented by the parties.” Id. at 65. And based on evidence showing Children were cared for, loved, and bonded with both Parents, it found shared physical custody was appropriate. We decline Mother's invitation to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court's.

[33] Turning then to her next argument, Mother insists that “[i]f the court truly believed [she] posed a genuine safety risk, it could not have logically concluded that granting her equal parenting time served the [C]hildren's best interests.” Appellant's Br. at 31. However, we disagree with Mother's premise. In her evaluation, Dr. McIntire concluded,

[w]hile [Mother's] somatization is likely at least exacerbated by, if not secondary to, her histrionic personality traits, her reported and demonstrated impairment raises concern about her ability to care for the children safely and without explosive episodes, maintain a safe home, and sustain employment.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 17-18; see Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 61-62 (Finding (V)(E)(10)). However, Dr. McIntire simply expressed concern for Mother's ability to care for the Children; she did not affirmatively declare that Mother was in fact incapable, nor did the trial court find as much. We reject Mother's suggestion that recognizing a concern about her behavior—and as a result, her capability to provide a safe home—necessarily equates to a finding that she is an unsafe caregiver who should not exercise shared physical custody. As stated above, the court considered the entirety of the evidence when making its determination, including testimony from several witnesses who described her as “a caring and effective parent.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65.

[34] In sum, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Parents shared physical custody of the Children.

4. Father's Income Calculation

[35] Next, Mother argues the trial court erred in determining Father's income for purposes of calculating child support. First, she claims Father was voluntarily underemployed and thus, the court should have imputed his previous, higher income to him. Second, she argues the court should have imputed his wife's income to him as well. We address each argument in turn.

[36] “If a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(3). More specifically, “[a] trial court has wide discretion with regard to imputing income to ensure the child support obligor does not evade his ․ support obligation.” Miller v. Miller, 72 N.E.3d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Miller v. Sugden, 849 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh'g denied, trans. denied). While Mother contends Father reduced his income to avoid paying child support, she offers no evidence to support this argument other than the fact that his income changed. Father testified that he left over-the-road trucking and pursued a job in construction when he sought full custody because he “couldn't live in a truck and take care of [the] children at the same time.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 26. His decision to make the change “so that [he] could be more of an active parent” resulted in a significant reduction in his income. Id.

[37] The trial court found that “[h]e demonstrated his commitment to being a major part of the [C]hildren's lives by finding other employment that allowed him to be home through the week, despite the significant drop in income.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63-64. Nothing in the record indicates Father changed jobs to avoid paying child support. In fact, he acknowledged his large arrearage, agreed that any child support paid by Mother would be credited against it, and expressed his willingness to make additional payments to reduce his arrearage. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 65. We also note that while a trial court is permitted to impute potential income to a parent, it is not required to do so. Mother has failed to show the court abused its discretion by declining to impute potential income to Father based on a theory of voluntary underemployment.

[38] As for whether Father's wife's income should have been imputed to him, Mother waived this issue because she did not raise it with the trial court. See Exs. Vol. 1 at 211 (Mother's Child Support Obligation Worksheet); see also Holtswarth v. Oliver, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 796741, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (noting that “[i]ssues raised for the first time on appeal are waived”). Waiver notwithstanding, we recognize the Child Support Guidelines permit “regular and continuing payments made by a ․ subsequent spouse ․ that reduce the parent's costs” to be imputed to the parent's income for calculation of child support. Child Supp. G. 3A Comment. 2(d). However, there was no evidence presented about the extent to which Father's wife contributes to their household income or reduces Father's expenses, if at all. On the contrary, his wife testified that she has her own home in Michigan where she resides to care for her children from a previous marriage. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 104. Mother contends that the fact that Father's wife stays with him every other week and works remotely from his home “suggests an integrated economic unit where household resources are shared.” Appellant's Br. at 34. But again, there is no evidence in the record to support such a suggestion, let alone evidence quantifying her monetary contributions, if there were any. Mother's argument fails.

5. Stimulus Funds

[39] Lastly, Mother argues “the trial court erred in calculating Father's arrearage by crediting $4,200.00 against his total owed.” Id. at 35. Relatedly, she challenges Finding (X)(K), in which the court found that “Mother received ․ $4,200 in child stimulus payments.”¹² Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 96. Father concedes this is in error as it is unsupported by the record. See Appellee's Br. at 25, 38. Indeed, we find nothing in the record indicating that Mother received $4,200 in stimulus funds. As a result, it was erroneous to offset Father's total arrearage by that amount.

Conclusion

[40] We affirm the trial court's custody determinations and calculation of Father's income. However, we reverse its calculation of Father's child support arrearage and remand with instructions for the trial court to recalculate it without the $4,200 stimulus offset.

[41] Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father also has two older children from a prior marriage, K.H. and F.H. Mother has an older daughter, Mak. H., from a different relationship.

2.   The individual interviews with Mother and Father lasted four to six hours.

3.   Parents each completed the Weschler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II); Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Second Edition (MMPI-2); Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, Fourth Edition (MCMI-IV); Parenting Stress Inventory, Fourth Edition (PSI-4); and the Child Abuse Potential Inventory (CAPI).

5.   WASI-II, MMPI-2, and MCMI-IV.

6.   PSI-4 and CAPI.

7.   Findings (V)(G)(1); (VI)(E)(6); (VI)(F)(5), (10), (14), (15); (VI)(G)(10), (12), (16); and (VI)(G)(17)(b), (d), and (e).

8.   She also challenges Finding (X)(K), which we address infra in Part 5.

9.   We recognize that some of the case law upon which we rely involves Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, which is an almost identical statute in dissolution matters that lists the factors to be considered in a custody determination. See In re Paternity of V.D., 226 N.E.3d 816, 827 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Many of “the statutes relating to paternity and dissolution are substantially similar ․” In re Paternity of K.J.L., 725 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting “the underlying principle behind” both sets of statutes is “the best interest[s] of the child”). Thus, “a case involving child custody ․ that arises in the dissolution context may be instructive and authoritative in a case that arises in the paternity context, and vice-versa[.]” Id.

10.   The statute contemplates two additional factors that are not relevant to this appeal. See Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8(8), (9).

11.   We note that the trial court considered the factors under Indiana Code 31-14-13-2.3 in its legal custody determination. That provision pertains to whether joint legal custody is in the best interests of the Children. Neither Mother nor Father sought joint legal custody of the Children, and Mother does not allege on appeal that they should have been granted joint custody. We note that the record supports the conclusion that joint legal custody was not appropriate here. “[O]f primary, but not determinative, importance” in an award of joint legal custody is whether the parties have agreed to such an award. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.3(c). Another critical factor is whether the parties “are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the [Children]’s welfare[.]” I.C. § 31-14-13-2.3(c)(2); see Rasheed v. Rasheed, 142 N.E.3d 1017, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “Where the parties have made child-rearing a battleground, joint custody is not appropriate.” Rasheed, 142 N.E.3d at 1022. Given that Parents did not agree to share legal custody, and Mother's unwillingness to communicate with Father and share pertinent information with him, the court did not err in finding that joint legal custody was inappropriate here.

12.   Though Mother's opening brief purportedly challenges Finding (X)(L), the challenged language appears in Finding (X)(K).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.