Bryant Lashawn Lacey, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Bryant Lashawn Lacey (“Lacey”) was convicted after a jury trial of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon,¹ Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon,² and Level 3 felony criminal confinement.³ Lacey was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-five years executed in the Indiana Department of Corrections. He appeals, raising one issue for our review: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for criminal confinement. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2025, Becky Sally (“Sally”), who had been homeless, began living with Lacey and his girlfriend, Cassie Richter (“Richter”), in Lacey's second-floor apartment. On March 7, 2025, Sally was out with Benjamin Vanvynckt (“Vanvynckt”) and Stacy Brown (“Brown”), who were also acquainted with Lacey and Richter. Lacey called Sally and instructed them all to come to his apartment. Sally, Vanvynckt, and Brown arrived sometime around 10:00 p.m.

[3] Upon arriving at the apartment, everyone sat in the living room and began using drugs. Lacey sat on the couch, and Sally sat in a chair across from the couch, near the bedroom. About thirty minutes later, Lacey, armed with a revolver, began questioning Sally about a missing pistol he believed she had stolen from him. Sally denied ever possessing the missing gun. Lacey then became aggressive and struck Sally in the face with the butt of the revolver, causing her to bleed. Lacey then took Sally's phone and told her not to move while he used Sally's phone to make calls, asking people whether Sally had recently sold them a gun for drugs.

[4] Lacey then ordered Sally to move from the chair and stand in a corner of the living room with her nose to the wall. Sally complied. While Sally stood in the corner, Lacey hurled insults and derogatory remarks at her and struck her. Over the next several hours, Sally continued to stand in the corner while Lacey continued to verbally and physically abuse her by insulting her, pointing a revolver at her, and hitting her with a fistful of rings, a machete, and a flashlight. Lacey also threatened to kill Sally, telling her he intended to chop her body up and hide her remains in a well. Lacey made plans with Vanvynckt to purchase the supplies to do so. Lacey also bagged and removed Sally's belongings from the apartment so no one would know she had been there. Sally remained in the corner because she did not want to escalate the situation further, and she believed that Lacey would shoot her before she could escape.

[5] Lacey briefly left the apartment on two occasions during the night, and before leaving, he provided Richter a gun and instructed Richter to shoot Sally if she moved. The first time he left to dispose of Sally's belongings and the second time was to get the supplies to dismember Sally.

[6] Believing she was going to die after Lacey left the second time, Sally convinced Richter to let her use the bathroom. While on the way to the bathroom, Sally climbed out of the window onto the roof and began yelling for help. At the same time, Lacey was sitting in his vehicle, heard Sally yelling from the roof and ran back into the apartment. Lacey came to the window and told Sally he would shoot her if she did not return inside. Sally jumped from the roof, which caused her to suffer a compression fracture in her lower back. Nonetheless, Sally got up and ran into the street, where, around 5:00 a.m., an ambulance happened to be passing by. The emergency medical technicians provided Sally with medical assistance and notified the police. Sally was transported to the hospital, where she remained for seven days and required a walker and a back brace upon discharge.

[7] On March 11, 2025, the State charged Lacey with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon. The State later amended the charging information to add a count of Level 3 felony criminal confinement. A jury trial commenced on September 2, 2025, and concluded on September 4, 2025. At trial, Sally testified she was in the corner for hours, never felt free to leave Lacey's apartment, and that she believed that if she had tried to leave, Lacey would have shot her. Vanvynckt and Brown each testified that they also believed Sally was not free to leave. Outside the presence of the jury, Lacey admitted his status as a serious violent felon. The jury found Lacey guilty on all three counts, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of twenty-five years, all executed in the Indiana Department of Correction.⁴ Lacey now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Lacey argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.” Id. Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[9] To convict Lacey of Level 3 felony criminal confinement, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally confined another person without their consent and that his act resulted in serious bodily injury. Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(B). A person “confines” another by substantially interfering with the liberty of the person. I.C. § 35-42-3-1. Confinement may not be inferred solely from a victim's injuries. Cunningham v. State, 870 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Any amount of force, no matter how temporary, can cause confinement. Dorsey v. State, 262 N.E.3d 181, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. To prove confinement where a defendant is also charged with battery, there must be evidence, other than the battery, that the victim's liberty was substantially interfered with without consent. Mickens v. State, 115 N.E.3d 520, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendants’ battery, involving grabbing the victim's hair and pouring beer on her, was separate from the confinement, where the defendant dragged the victim across the room).

[10] Lacey only challenges the “confinement” element of crime and contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that he substantially interfered with Sally's liberty. Appellant's Br. p. 8. Lacey argues that the only evidence the State offered to support the confinement element was that Lacey battered Sally and possessed a firearm, which facts were used to support his convictions under Counts I and II. Lacey does not argue that his conviction under Count III was a violation of substantive double jeopardy, but rather that there was no direct evidence of confinement and no confining act beyond the battery itself. Cunningham, 870 N.E.2d at 554.

[11] The evidence most favorable to the verdict established that Lacey became angry with Sally about his missing gun and accused her of stealing it and struck her in the face with the butt of his revolver. Lacey then ordered Sally to stand in a corner and told her not to move, Sally remained in the corner through the night, fearful that Lacey would kill her if she moved. During the ordeal, Lacey was armed with his revolver, which he repeatedly pointed at her, and threatened to kill her, dismember her body, and hide her remains in a well. Both Vanvynckt and Brown testified that they did not believe that Sally was free to leave the apartment. Sally eventually did escape the apartment by falsely claiming she had to go to the bathroom then climbing out the second-floor window and onto the roof when she jumped to the ground, fracturing vertebrae in her back.

[12] Lacey relies on Cunningham for his contention that the evidence presented was not sufficient.⁵ In Cunningham, this court reversed a confinement conviction because there was no direct evidence of confinement and no confining act beyond the battery itself. 870 N.E.2d at 554. There, the victim never testified that she felt confined, and the trial court relied solely on an inference drawn from the severity of her injuries. Id. Here, no inference is required because direct evidence was presented that Sally felt confined. Sally testified that she never felt free to leave and believed Lacey would shoot her if she tried, which testimony was corroborated by Vanvynckt and Brown. In addition, there was evidence of numerous acts of confinement entirely apart from the battery. The State presented ample evidence aside from Sally's injuries and the battery from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Lacey substantially interfered with Sally's liberty, and that caused Sally to feel she was not free to leave.

[13] Lacey also argues that to the extent Sally was confined, the confinement occurred while she was under the control of Richter and not Lacey, who was briefly outside of the apartment. However, Lacey fails to acknowledge the acts he committed while inside the apartment. Lacey first battered Sally with a gun, told her not to move, then ordered her to stand in a corner, repeatedly pointing a gun at her. Setting aside the battery, Lacey engaged in numerous acts of confinement, such as threatening to kill and dismember Sally, telling her not to move, forcing her to remain in the corner, and ordering Richter to hold her under gunpoint while Lacey briefly left the apartment. Each of the foregoing acts was a subsequent, independent act from the initial battery and provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Lacey guilty of confining Sally. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Lacey's conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(B).

4.   The trial court sentenced Lacey as follows: Count I, Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, 10 years; Count II, Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon, 5 years; Count III, Criminal Confinement resulting in serious bodily injury, 15 years. Counts I and II ran concurrently, and both were consecutive to Count III.

5.   Lacey also cites Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 1990), and Harvey v. State, 719 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) in support of his argument. We do not address those cases here, as both were decided under Indiana's included-offense statute, using a double jeopardy analysis rather than a sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis. See Perry v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1028, 1031–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (where the appellant raised arguments similar to a double jeopardy challenge but only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the court addressed the claims as sufficiency claims).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.