Joseph Adamje Feeney-Ruiz, Appellant-Respondent v. Jaclyn C. Emswiller, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joseph Adamje Feeney-Ruiz (Father) and Jaclyn C. Emswiller (Mother) (collectively, Parents) have one child together, E.A.F.-E. (Child). Many months prior to Child's birth, Parents executed a co-parenting agreement with numerous support and other financial obligations substantially favoring Mother (the Agreement). In July 2023, Father filed a petition to modify the Agreement. The trial court denied Father's petition. Father appeals and raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly denied Father's petition. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents were never married and had Child together in August 2020. Prior to Child's birth, on March 24, 2020, Parents executed the Agreement. Therein, Parents agreed to establish paternity through an affidavit pursuant to Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1. Parents agreed to joint legal custody, with Mother having primary physical custody and Father exercising parenting time “as the Parties may agree” “[d]ue to Father's irregular schedule[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. Father agreed to pay a child support obligation of $5,000 per month,¹ pay all education-related expenses, carry life insurance of at least $4,000,000 payable to Mother as the primary beneficiary, and make annual lump sum “gift” payments to Mother equal to the tax year's federal gift tax exclusion.² The Agreement further established third-party care provisions, uninsured health care contributions, and that Mother would claim Child as a dependent each year on state and federal taxes.

[3] On January 31, 2023, Mother petitioned the trial court to approve and enforce the Agreement. In her petition, Mother also claimed that Parents would later submit an agreed modification of the Agreement addressing an alleged substantial and continuing change in circumstances. On February 6, before Father received service of Mother's petition, the trial court entered an order approving and enforcing the Agreement “retroactively to [March 24, 2020,] the date the Agreement was signed by the parties.” Id. at 36. On February 23, Parents filed an unverified joint motion providing that “[t]he Parties’ [sic] have now determined that there is not a substantial change in circumstances such that the Parties’ original Co-Parenting Agreement is unreasonable, therefore, they wish to withdraw [Mother's] modification request ․ and continue to follow the original Co-Parenting Agreement currently approved and ordered by this Court.” Id. at 39-40. The trial court granted the joint motion and dismissed Mother's pending modification of the Agreement.

[4] In April 2023, Father, now represented by counsel, filed a motion to set aside the trial court's order approving the Agreement, arguing the trial court approved the Agreement before Father had notice or proper service or opportunity to respond. Father's motion was denied.

[5] In July 2023, Father filed a petition to modify the Agreement, seeking modification of the Agreement's provisions attendant to child support, third party care, pre-college and higher education expense contributions, uninsured health care expense contributions and other reimbursements, life insurance, non-child support “gift” requirements, and tax exemptions. A hearing was held in September 2024.

[6] Parents presented evidence that Father has a Juris Doctorate, a master's degree in business administration, and a culinary degree from a Parisian culinary school. Father testified that he previously taught as an adjunct professor at Ivy Tech but now owned and operated a food truck which earned him no income. His sole income comes from a family trust, which has consistently disbursed a monthly net income of $10,000 to Father since February 2023. Father acknowledged on cross-examination that, in addition to income distributions, the trust disbursed some of the principal annually to pay his state and federal taxes and other expenses. Specifically, Father received $26,400 in principal in 2022, a similar amount in 2023, and he anticipated receiving another disbursement of principal in 2024. Father exercised ninety-five overnight days of parenting time in 2023 and sixty-seven overnight days in 2024 as of the time of the hearing.

[7] Mother is a partner at a law firm where she practices estate and family law. She estimated her annual income has been approximately $170,000 for the past three years. Pursuant to the Agreement, Mother paid $98 per week to cover Child on her health insurance plan and $363 per week for childcare. Father requested that the trial court set his child support obligation at $10.33 per week, order Parents to equally share education-related expenses, reallocate uninsured medical expenses, reduce the amount of life insurance Father must carry with Child as the only beneficiary, enable Father to claim Child as a dependent on odd tax years, and terminate other provisions of the Agreement.

[8] On January 16, 2025, the trial court denied Father's petition to modify and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Father received $176,310 from the trust in 2022 and 2023, consisting of $26,400 in principal and $149,910 in income. It calculated Father's gross weekly income to be $3,391 and Mother's gross weekly income to be $3,269. Father was found to have exercised sixty-seven overnights of parenting time in 2024 as of the time of the hearing and was on schedule to exercise ninety-one to ninety-five overnights by the year's end. Accordingly, the trial court found Father's weekly support obligation would be $449 and “the current order is in excess of what the Indiana Child Support Calculator establishes as a just and reasonable calculation of support based upon the income of both parties.” Id. at 20. Even so, the court observed that Parents “are free to agree to provide for their child in excess of the recommended amount” and that Father failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of the Agreement. Id. at 20-21. The court summarily denied all other pending issues, including Father's request to modify the Agreement's contracted “gift” and other non-child support provisions. Father filed a motion to correct error, which was denied. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[9] We have “a well-established preference in Indiana ‘for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.’ ” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993)). “Appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[10] Where, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, “the reviewing court will not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous[.]” Id. at 123 (internal quotation and citations omitted). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them.” Id. at 125 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Clear error occurs when our review of the evidence most favorable to the judgment leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Maddux v. Maddux, 40 N.E.3d 971, 974-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh'g denied. “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).

[11] We review a trial court's grant or denial of a request for modification of child support for an abuse of discretion. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court misinterprets the law or the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. A petitioner seeking to modify child support obligations bears the burden of proof. See MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). “[C]hild support obligations are modifiable whether they are court ordered or the result of parties’ agreements.” Hay v. Hay, 730 N.E.2d 787, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Generally, a parent's child support obligation may be modified only:

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; and

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting modification was filed.

Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1(b) (2019).

[12] At the outset, we note the trial court and Mother rely on an abrogated holding in Hay, 730 N.E.2d at 795, for the proposition that, because Parents contracted for a child support payment above the Indiana Child Support Guidelines amount, Father needed to demonstrate both (1) a substantial change in circumstances and (2) that his payment deviated more than twenty percent from the Indiana Child Support Guidelines amount and the order was issued at least twelve months prior to his petition.³ But our Supreme Court abrogated this holding in Hay—“[t]he ‘or’ separating subsections (1) and (2) clearly indicates that the two subsections establish separate grounds for modification[.]” Rolley v. Rolley, 13 N.E.3d 521, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), adopted in part and summarily aff'd in part, 22 N.E.3d 558, 559 (Ind. 2014) (per curiam) (granting transfer and adopting the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the available grounds for modification). Therefore, Father may prevail under either subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2). We address each in turn.

II. Subsection (b)(1)

[13] Father claims substantial changes in circumstances occurred because Child was born after Parents executed the Agreement, Father exercised more overnight parenting time since 2022, and each Parent's income has changed. Father's arguments as to Child's birth and increased parenting time rely on facts occurring from 2020 to 2024, despite previously representing in Parents’ joint motion of February 23, 2023, that there was no substantial change in circumstances. Because of Father's prior representation, the trial court limited its review to facts occurring after February 23, 2023; we do the same. See Rea v. Shroyer, 797 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that a trial court ruling on a petition to modify custody can consider changes that have occurred since the last custody determination).

[14] Father's arguments that Child's birth and an increase in overnight parenting time constitute substantial changes in circumstances fail. Father exercised ninety-five overnight days of parenting time in 2023, and the trial court found Father was on schedule to exercise ninety-one to ninety-five overnights by the end of 2024. Further, Child's birth is not a substantial change in circumstances when Parents executed the Agreement in anticipation of Child's birth. See Hay, 730 N.E.2d at 793 (holding a substantial change in circumstances did not occur when parents agreed on the payment of college expenses and child later enrolled in college).

[15] We are also unpersuaded there has been a substantial change in either Father's or Mother's income. Relying on the trial court's finding that his income was $3,391 in 2022 and 2023 and evidence Father had a monthly income of $10,000 in 2024, Father claims his weekly income decreased by $1,000 in 2024. However, Father testified that he consistently received a monthly net income of $10,000 from the trust since February 23, 2023, received additional payments from the trust to pay his taxes and other expenses in prior years, and anticipated receiving funds for the same purpose in 2024. The trial court properly relied on this evidence in finding Father's income had remained consistent, calculating his gross weekly income to be $3,391. Turning to Mother, she testified that her annual income of $170,000 had remained consistent since 2023, and the trial court calculated Mother's gross weekly income to be $3,269.⁴ The trial court did not err in concluding Father had failed to demonstrate any substantial and continuing change in circumstances.

III. Subsection (b)(2)

[16] Father also seeks to modify the Agreement on the basis that his current child support obligations are more than twenty percent in excess of the amount he would pay under the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. As noted above, a party seeking to modify a child support order under Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b)(2) must demonstrate that the amount ordered differs by more than twenty percent from the Indiana Child Support Guidelines and that the order was issued at least twelve months before the petition requesting modification was filed.

[17] The trial court's February 2023 order expressly operated “retroactively to” March 24, 2020, thus satisfying subsection (b)(2)’s 12-month requirement. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. The trial court also found “the current support order is in excess of what the Indiana Child Support Calculator establishes as a just and reasonable calculation of support[.]” Id. at 20. But, because of the trial court's reliance on Hay, it did not address Father's argument under subsection (b)(2) and instead erroneously determined he was not entitled to modification solely because he had not satisfied subsection (b)(1). However, as we concluded above, Father may be entitled to a modification of his child support obligation based on his satisfaction of subsection (b)(2) alone. Additionally, Father may be entitled to a modification of the provisions regarding payment of medical expenses.⁵ See King v. King, 615 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (instructing trial court to consider modification of father's payment for medical expenses on remand to be consistent with the Indiana Child Support Guidelines).

[18] Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to modify Father's child support obligation and the provision regarding medical expenses to be consistent with the Indiana Child Support Guidelines,⁶ or to set forth its rationale for any deviation therefrom, with an effective date not to predate the filing of Father's petition to modify.

[19] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Per the Agreement, this amount “shall be reviewed and evaluated on an annual basis and shall be modified as needed depending on the Child's needs and any change in financial circumstances of the Parties.” Id. at 30.

2.   In 2020, the year of the Agreement, this amount was $15,000. For tax year 2026, this amount is $19,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b); Rev. Proc. 2025-32, § 4.42(1), 2025-45 I.R.B. 695, 704.

3.   Father contends the reasoning in Hay does not bar his attempt to seek modification because he was unaware of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines when he executed the Agreement with Mother. We need not reach this argument given our conclusion that Rolley forecloses the Hay rationale on independent grounds.

4.   Father's contention that Mother verified her income in 2024 was $3,846 is unsupported by the record. Mother's child support worksheets showed her weekly income in 2024 was $3,269, and she disputed the $3,846 amount on cross-examination.

5.   The non-child support provisions of the Agreement, such as the $4,000,000 life insurance obligation and mandatory annual “gift,” among others, are not modifiable under Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b) and are instead governed by contract law. See G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 80 N.E.3d 264, 269-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (observing settlement agreements between parents are contractual in nature). We respect the freedom of parties to contract and will enforce non-child support provisions absent a party raising issues of, e.g., fraud, duress, misrepresentation, unconscionability, manifest inequities, or public policy. See Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ind. 1998)). No party raises such an issue here, so we decline to address the non-child support provisions.

6.   Relying on Hay and its progeny, Mother argues that Father invited any error by agreeing to pay in excess of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines and is therefore estopped from relying on the twenty percent deviation under subsection (b)(2). That estoppel rationale derives from Reinhart v. Reinhart, 938 N.E.2d 788, 791-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), which our Supreme Court rejected in resolving the conflict in Rolley. Because Rolley established that subsection (b)(2) is an independent ground for modification, Mother's invited error argument cannot stand. See Rolley, 13 N.E.3d at 526-31.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.