John Edward Bulington Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After months of harassment, K.S. obtained a protective order against John Bulington. He violated it within days and was convicted for that violation. Just a week after his release from jail, Bulington violated the protective order again. For this, Bulington pleaded guilty to invasion of privacy, a Level 6 felony based on his prior conviction. At sentencing, he acknowledged his criminal record of 16 prior felony convictions and denied K.S.’s allegations, calling her “nuts” and snorting at her as she left the courtroom. Tr. Vol. II, p. 27. The trial court sentenced Bulington to 910 days fully executed, which he now argues is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts

[2] K.S. and Bulington met in February 2024 at a transitional housing facility in Lafayette. As K.S. later explained, she became homeless after she “was in a coma from COVID and [ ] lost everything” and uses a wheelchair due to a car accident. Id. at 22. K.S. immediately tried to avoid Bulington, as she thought he was “creepy.” Id. When Bulington touched her inappropriately, she filed grievances with the transitional housing facility, but no action was taken. K.S. explained that Bulington damaged her wheelchair, “torment[ed]” her, and “wouldn't listen to the word no” when she told him to stop touching her and speaking to her. Id. at 23. K.S. stated that she “ignored him,” but “that seemed to incite him even more.” Id.

[3] K.S. eventually obtained a protective order against Bulington, but he violated it two days later. After he was arrested, Bulington's friends harassed K.S. and threatened to “beat the s**t out of [her] because [Bulington was] in jail.” Id. at 22. Bulington himself “threatened to pay someone a thousand dollars to cut off [K.S.’s] lips” because she told others “that he was a predator.” Id. at 22-23.

[4] Just nine days after he was released from jail for that violation of the protective order, Bulington violated it again. That day, K.S. entered the transitional housing facility to check her mail and noticed Bulington inside. He got out of his seat, approached her, and attempted to hand her a document purporting to show that the protective order had been vacated. She insisted that the order was still in effect. Staff told him to sit down and to leave K.S. alone, and the police were called. When officers arrived, they confirmed the protective order was still in effect. They discovered that Bulington's document was based on a prior protective order that had been vacated a year earlier.

[5] Based on this incident, Bulington was charged with invasion of privacy, elevated to a Level 6 felony based on his prior conviction for the same.¹ Bulington pleaded guilty to the charge with an open plea.

[6] At sentencing, K.S. testified to the profound impact of Bulington's harassment. She explained that she is “dying of cancer” and wants to “die in peace.” Id. At 23. She added: “I'm finally housed[,] and I want him to stay away from me for the rest of the time that I am alive.” Id. at 23-24. K.S. also explained that a medical condition with her adrenal glands makes her particularly vulnerable to the effects of stress, and she had recently had an episode that sent her to the emergency room. She asked the court to impose the maximum sentence.

[7] Bulington denied K.S.’s claims, stating that she was “nuts” and “full of crap.” Id. at 27. He alleged that K.S. was the one that followed him around. Bulington also explained that he had suffered a traumatic brain injury that affected his cognition and had serious medical conditions requiring treatment.

[8] The court found that Bulington's criminal history—16 convictions and 24 arrests—was an aggravating factor. Bulington's counsel recognized as much, noting that Bulington had accumulated convictions for theft, check deception, and fraud. The court agreed, noting that its review of Bulington's record showed a history of drug and theft offenses. It observed that Bulington had been in court “pretty regularly since about 2007.” Id. at 30. The court explained that it had “tried to fashion sentences that will get his attention[, a]nd he kind of just does what he wants.” Id. at 33.

[9] The court also found as aggravating factors that Bulington's prior attempts at rehabilitation and treatment had failed, that he lacked remorse, and that his conduct was repeated. Bulington's open plea was the sole mitigating factor, according to the court. Bulington was sentenced to 910 days executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. As he left the courtroom, Bulington “made a snorting gesture directed obviously toward” K.S., which the court noted in its sentencing order. App. Vol. II, p. 8. Bulington now appeals, claiming his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

Discussion and Decision

[10] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) authorizes an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). The question is not whether a different sentence might be more appropriate, but whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015). We give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision, attempting only “to leaven the outliers” rather than “achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (citations omitted). Bulington bears the burden of demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218.

[11] In considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the statutory range established for that class of offense. Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is 6 months to 21/212 years with an advisory sentence of 1 year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Bulington's 910 day sentence is two days short of the maximum.

[12] Bulington argues that the maximum sentence is not warranted as he did not commit the single offense in a particularly egregious manner. But this downplays the violation and views the incident in isolation. When K.S. entered the facility, Bulington chose to stand up, approach her, and engage with her despite her insistence that the protective order was still in effect and the directives from staff to leave her alone. Moreover, this interaction followed eighteen months of harassment and came just days after Bulington was released from jail for his previous conviction for violating the same protective order. This demonstrates the prolonged and persistent nature of the offense.

[13] Nor does Bulington's character warrant sentence revision. Bulington concedes that he has a criminal history but claims its details cannot be ascertained because no presentence report was ordered. However, a presentence report is not required for Level 6 felonies, and the trial court here was familiar with Bulington's history. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-8(c). The court personally observed Bulington come before it every few months for the past 6 years and noted that past attempts at rehabilitation, treatment, and probation were unsuccessful. Bulington has accumulated 16 felony and 6 misdemeanor convictions spanning more than a decade. And though Bulington's instant offense was already elevated based on his prior invasion of privacy conviction, the immediacy of his second violation of the protective order—a week after his release from jail—is concerning. See Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Ind. 2006) (noting that the significance of a criminal history turns on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense).

[14] Moreover, Bulington's conduct at the sentencing hearing does not paint his character in a positive light. Despite K.S.’s account of the toll that the harassment had taken on her health and well-being, Bulington dismissed her as “nuts” and “snorted” at her on his way out of the courtroom. Tr. Vol. II, p. 27, 36. This conduct—beyond merely denying K.S.’s allegations—demonstrates a lack of remorse and failure to recognize the harm caused by his conduct.

[15] Finally, Bulington points to his traumatic brain injury, which impairs his cognitive abilities for impulse control and memory, and essentially argues this impaired cognition reduces his culpability.² However, Bulington has been aware of this condition for years, as his psychological evaluations documented it across three separate criminal cases dating back to 2017, and he has not sought adequate treatment or otherwise endeavored to alter his conduct. Bulington failed to demonstrate any measures he has taken to mitigate the effect of the brain injury on his behavior.

[16] Given the foregoing, we conclude that Bulington has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bulington was also charged with Class C misdemeanor invasion of privacy, which was later dismissed.

2.   In making this argument, Bulington also claims that “additional factors in mitigation” existed, like this brain injury, that the trial court “failed to recognize.” Appellant's Br., p. 13. This claim implicates an abuse-of-discretion challenge. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“The reasons given [for the sentence], and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.”). This argument is distinct from a challenge brought under Appellate Rule 7(B), an exercise of our independent authority to revise a sentence. See id.; Westlake v. State, 987 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).In any case, we need not address this argument because we find Bulington's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). See Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 134 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that any error in failing to consider a mitigating factor is harmless if the sentence is not inappropriate), trans. denied; Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[E]ven if the trial court is found to have abused its discretion in the process it used to sentence the defendant, the error is harmless if the sentence imposed was not inappropriate.”), trans. denied.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur