Chelsea Duboise, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] While executing a search warrant for the residence in which Chelsea Duboise had a room, law enforcement officers discovered methamphetamine and syringes in Duboise's locked bedroom. Duboise moved to suppress the evidence recovered during the search of her locked bedroom, arguing the search violated her constitutional rights. The trial court denied Duboise's motion, and Duboise sought an interlocutory appeal raising two issues for our review, which we restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 9, 2024, Linton Police Department officer Jerrad Pirtle responded to a call that Cole Padgett was “tearing up” a residence and “had a firearm.” Tr. Vol. III at 3. The residence was owned by Holly White, who was incarcerated at the time. Officer Pirtle was aware that multiple individuals resided at the residence, including White, Todd Bennett, and Padgett. At some point unknown, Officer Pirtle became aware that Duboise was also a resident of the residence.

[4] Officer Pirtle was familiar with Padgett, knew Padgett was not legally permitted to possess a firearm, and had previously found Padgett in possession of a firearm. When Officer Pirtle arrived at the residence, he encountered Todd and Brenda Bennett outside the residence; while talking to them, Officer Pirtle could hear Padgett inside “yelling for help and banging on the walls.” Tr. Vol. II at 7. Officer Pirtle entered the residence to speak with Padgett, but Padgett refused to open the locked bathroom door separating them and “continued to yell and scream while beating on the walls.” Tr. Vol. III at 4. Believing Padgett was a “danger to himself or someone else,” Tr. Vol. II at 45, law enforcement officers eventually decided to break down the bathroom door after negotiations failed.

[5] While staging in an open bedroom, later identified as Padgett's, to prepare to break down the bathroom door, Marshal Jacob Gambill observed “what appeared to be the barrel of a small caliber handgun.” Tr. Vol. II at 66. After the bathroom door was breached and Padgett was detained, Officer Pirtle walked into Padgett's bedroom “right after leaving the bathroom” and observed syringe caps, a firearm, and pills laying on a dresser. Id. at 26. Accordingly, Officer Pirtle sought a warrant to search the residence. In support of his request, Officer Pirtle filed an affidavit outlining the January 9 incident and his observations. Officer Pirtle indicated he was looking for handguns, handgun parts, ammunition, illegal substances, and “any item used to introduce an illegal substance into a person's body” in the residence described at 109 D St NW, Linton, Greene County, Indiana. Tr. Vol. III at 3. The trial court issued the warrant, finding probable cause existed, and authorized officers to search the residence for “any firearm, any firearm parts, any ammunition, any illegal substance, [and] any item used to introduce an illegal substance to a person's body, which constitutes evidence of an offense.” Id. at 6. The search warrant noted that individuals besides Padgett lived in the residence and did not limit the search to Padgett's bedroom or common areas.

[6] Officers searched the residence, including a room locked on the outside with a padlock. There were no names or numbers displayed on the outside of the door. Officers forcefully entered the room, later identified as Duboise's bedroom. The search of Duboise's bedroom revealed locked safes containing methamphetamine, scales, syringes that tested positive for methamphetamine, and more than $1,000 in cash. The State then charged Duboise with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony ¹ and possession of a syringe as a Level 6 felony ² .

[7] Duboise filed a motion to suppress “all items seized and observations and statements made during, or as a result of, the execution of the search and arrest warrants in the above-captioned cause.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 36. In that motion, Duboise asserted that the search of her locked safe within her locked bedroom violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court held a hearing on Duboise's motion. At that hearing, Officer Pirtle testified that (1) he knew individuals other than Padgett lived at the residence but had forgotten Duboise lived there; (2) Padgett told him he had a handgun for protection; (3) while staging to breach the bathroom, another officer saw a firearm in a bedroom, and Pirtle walked to the bedroom and observed it in plain sight; (4) Officer Pirtle also observed syringe caps and pills in the bedroom; (5) when officers executed the search warrant, they did not know who the locked room belonged to or whether Padgett had a key to it; (6) Officer Pirtle's prior experience with Padgett made him believe that Padgett was likely suffering from a drug induced episode; and (7) the residence was not split into identifiable subunits. The trial court denied Duboise's motion to suppress.

[8] Thereafter, Duboise filed a motion to certify the trial court's order for interlocutory appeal, raising questions about the legality of the search warrant and law enforcement officers’ conduct. The trial court granted that motion, allowing Duboise to file an interlocutory appeal. We accepted jurisdiction over the appeal. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Before we reach the merits of Duboise's claims, we address the State's request to reconsider our motions panel's acceptance of this appeal. A writing panel of this court may reconsider a decision of our motions panel while the appeal remains pending, but we are reluctant to do so. Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1164–1165 (Ind. 2023) (citing Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 191 n.2 (Ind. 2007)) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Tichy, 122 N.E.3d 841, 844 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). Generally, we overrule a decision of our motions panel only “where a more complete record reveals clear authority establishing that our motions panel erred.” Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, 998 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Simon v. Simon, 957 N.E.2d 980, 987 (Ind. Ct. App 2011)).

[10] The State specifically contends that we should dismiss this appeal because Duboise filed her motion for this court to accept jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal two days after the deadline to file. Our acceptance of jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal is discretionary, Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B)(2), and Indiana courts have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits, see Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). We thus reject the State's request for us to reconsider our motions panel's acceptance of Duboise's motion to accept jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and proceed to the merits of Duboise's claims.

[11] Duboise claims the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the “warrantless search” of her room violated both the Indiana and United States Constitutions. Appellant's Br. at 8, 12. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in decisions to admit or exclude evidence. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress evidence, we necessarily review that decision “deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.” Id. However, we “consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error, declining invitations to reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. ․ If the trial court's decision denying “a defendant's motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure,” then it presents a legal question that we review de novo. [Id].

Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). Duboise specifically argues that the search of her locked bedroom violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because she was not listed on the warrant or affidavit.³

[12] Duboise raises a number of issues in support of her argument that the search of her room violated her constitutional rights. In particular, Duboise asserts that the search of her bedroom, warrant notwithstanding, violated her federal and state constitutional rights because the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not (1) identify Duboise as a resident of the home; (2) disclose that a door in the home was locked by a padlock; (3) “disclose to the issuing judge the fact that multiple bedrooms in the residence were occupied by separate individuals,” Appellant's Br. at 11; or (4) establish a nexus between Padgett's “potential illegal activity” and Duboise, id. at 12. In sum, Duboise argues that the search warrant was invalid as to her and her bedroom so the items seized there should be suppressed.

[13] The exclusionary rule is intended to deter egregious or reckless police misconduct. Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 276 (Ind. 2020). Even assuming without deciding that the search warrant covering the whole residence was invalid or lacking in probable cause as to Duboise or her bedroom, “[s]uppression of illegally obtained evidence is not required ‘if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2009)). The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in situations where (1) the trial court is “misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,” or (2) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Jackson, 908 N.E.2d at 1143 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). See also Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5 (codifying the good faith exception).

[14] While Duboise argues the warrant lacked probable cause as to her and her room, she does not contend on appeal that the good faith exception does not apply—nor does she assert that the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Jackson, 908 N.E.2d at 1143; see generally, Appellant's Br. at 8–16. Duboise does, however, argue that Officer Pirtle's affidavit was deficient for omitting the fact that Duboise was a resident and not specifying that one room in the home was locked with a padlock. This argument is unpersuasive; she has failed to prove that Officer Pirtle's omissions were intentional, reckless, or rendered the information in the affidavit false. First, the affidavit describes the residence as a single-family home owned by White in which Padgett resided. Second, the warrant clearly acknowledges that multiple residents live in the home yet, did not narrow the search warrant location to only Padgett's bedroom or the common rooms. Third, Officer Pirtle's testimony during the hearing illustrates that any omission regarding Duboise residing in the home was nondeliberate as, while executing the search warrant, officers still did not know to whom the locked room belonged and did not know to which rooms Padgett had access. Officers learned that the locked room belonged to Duboise only after breaching the room and finding court paperwork addressed to DuBoise. See I. C. § 35-37-4-5(b)(1)(A).

[15] Further, Duboise attempts to compare the search of her unmarked, padlocked bedroom in a shared residence to the search that took place in Figert v. State, 686 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. 1997). In Figert, a single search warrant was used to “search three separate residences occupied by different persons,” Figert, 686 N.E.2d at 831, and the Indiana Supreme Court declined to apply the good faith exception because the affidavit simply gave a conclusory statement that the attesting officer had probable cause to believe drugs would be found within the three trailers, id. at 833. We fail to see the similarities between searching a bedroom in a shared home that has no identifiable subunits and searching three completely separate homes. Nothing in this record suggests the existence of reckless or egregious law enforcement conduct. Accordingly, Duboise has not demonstrated that the trial court committed reversible error by denying her motion to suppress evidence seized from her bedroom during law enforcement's execution of a search warrant. We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying Duboise's motion to suppress.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (c)(1).

2.   I.C. § 16-42-19-18.

3.   On appeal, Duboise claims the search warrant was invalid because it afforded the executing officer “unbridled discretion regarding the items to be searched.” Appellant's Br. at 9. As this argument was not addressed before the trial court, we decline to address it in this interlocutory appeal. See Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. 2011). Thus, this argument is waived.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur