Devin X. Myers, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Devin X. Myers appeals his convictions for three counts of murder, as felonies; armed robbery, as a Level 3 felony; criminal confinement, as a Level 3 felony; and conspiracy to commit robbery, as a Level 3 felony. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Myers raises the following four issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses when it did not allow him to ask certain questions of his co-defendant.

2. Whether the court abused its discretion when it excluded one of his witnesses following a violation of a separation-of-witnesses order.

3. Whether the court abused its discretion when it admitted still photos from a surveillance video.

4. Whether the court abused its discretion when it denied Myers’ motion for a mistrial following an outburst by a member of the gallery during the trial.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the summer of 2022, Myers was dating Alexandra Reagan. On July 12, Reagan was at Myers’ home, and Myers’ friend, Kyler Musick, arrived. The three of them then went to Musick's house. When they arrived, the three went to the back of the house, and Myers and Musick started “looking for something.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 228. At some point, Musick showed Myers a “long gun[.]” Id. Thereafter, the three individuals went back to Myers’ house. Myers and Musick consumed illegal drugs while upstairs at Myers’ house. Myers and Musick got into a verbal argument about the drugs then went downstairs. Reagan stayed upstairs and ultimately fell asleep.

[4] Later, Reagan was woken up by Myers. Myers, who was holding a handgun, threw the gun on the bed. Myers was “nervous” and “tweaking really bad[.]” Id. at 239. Myers then told Reagan that “he had shot” Musick. Id. at 239. Myers said that Musick had “pulled his gun” on Myers and that Musick “made [Myers] shoot him.” Id. at 239-40. At that point, Myers told Reagan to go downstairs with him, and the two went downstairs and outside to the backyard. There, Reagan saw “a patch of blood.” Id. at 240. Reagan then saw Musick “behind the shed” in Myers’ backyard. Id. at 242. Musick was on the ground “not moving,” and he was covered in leaves. Id. Musick had died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. Myers asked Reagan to get bleach, so Reagan went to the basement and retrieved a bottle of Lysol. Reagan returned to the backyard and gave the Lysol to Myers, who “poured it on the blood” in the yard. Id. at 244.

[5] Myers and Reagan then went inside Myers’ house and changed clothes. They then returned to the backyard, where Myers “wrapped [Musick's body] up” in a tarp. Id. at 250. Myers “drag[ged]” Musick to Musick's car and loaded him in the back. Tr. Vol. 4 at 3. Reagan and Myers then drove Musick's car to an area near a reservoir and “dumped” Musick's body. Id. at 6.

[6] After they had removed Musick's body, Reagan and Myers drove to the home where Myers’ friend Daniel Jones was staying. Following a short conversation, Jones got into his car and instructed Reagan and Myers to follow him in Musick's car. They then drove to an alley, where Reagan and Myers left Musick's car. Reagan and Myers then got into Jones’ car, and the three drove to a gas station and then back to Myers’ house. While in the car, Myers told Jones “how he had to blow somebody's head off.” Id. at 244. Once back at the house, Reagan went upstairs and ultimately fell back asleep. Myers returned to Jones’ car and told Jones that he had a “lick” for them, meaning that he wanted to “rob somebody.” Id. at 246-47. Jones agreed to help.

[7] Jones and Myers returned to Myers’ house, and Myers changed clothes. Myers, who was already in possession of a handgun, retrieved a second handgun and gave it to Jones. Jones and Myers then drove to Musick's house, where Musick had lived with his mother Renae Perdue (“Renae”), two sisters, a brother, his grandfather Malcolm Perdue (“Malcolm”), and occasionally his aunt Kyndra Skinner. When they arrived, which was around 4:30 or 5:00 a.m. on July 13, Myers knocked on the door, and Renae answered. Myers asked if Musick was home, and Renae said that Musick was not and closed the door.

[8] Five to ten minutes later, Myers knocked on the door again, this time with Jones hiding under a window. Renae did not open the door but asked who was there through the closed door. Renae could not hear because of a passing train, so she opened the door slightly. Myers then “pushed the door in” and held a gun to Renae's head. Tr. Vol. 2 at 85. Jones and Myers then entered the house. Skinner was staying at Renae's house, and Jones held a gun to her head. Myers and Jones took Renae and Skinner to the back room of the house, and Myers asked, “where is the AR,” referring to a rifle, and “where's the pills.” Id. at 89. Malcolm was asleep on the couch in that same room, and Myers said that he would “kill” Malcolm if Malcolm woke up. Id. at 90. Myers and Jones ultimately found “two long rifles,” “a bag of pills,” and a safe. Tr. Vol. 5 at 12.

[9] At some point, Renae's four-year-old son came into the back room. Jones then took Renae and the boy to another room where her daughter, Nevaeh King, was sleeping. King woke up, and Jones told her that “you're being robbed[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 91. Renae and Jones then “heard two gunshots” from the back bedroom. Id. At that point, Jones ran out of the room, and Renae ran to her neighbor's house to call the police.

[10] Jones reentered the back bedroom and saw Myers “shoot [Malcolm] in the head.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 16. Jones “grabbed the bag with the safe” along with another bag and “took off running.” Id. Meanwhile, King went to the back bedroom and saw Malcolm and Skinner not moving and blood “[e]verywhere.” Tr. Vol. 2. at 173. Both Skinner and Malcolm died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head. Jones got back into his car and saw “the police coming towards” him. Tr. Vol. 5 at 18. Jones started to drive away but “got in a high[-]speed chase with the police.” Id. at 17. Jones was initially able to evade the police, but they ultimately found him at his house, where he “surrender[ed].” Id. at 23. Renae told police that Myers had robbed them, and she showed them a photograph of Musick and Myers from Musick's Facebook page.

[11] Later that morning, Reagan woke up and noticed that Myers was in bed and “passed out.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 23. Myers “fell off the bed” and “started to have what looked like a seizure.” Id. Reagan was concerned, so she called the police. Officers, who had been surveilling Myers’ residence, entered the home and transported Myers to the hospital, and they also arrested Reagan. Reagan initially lied to the police because she was “scared” of Myers, but she later told them what she knew. Id. at 24. Once Myers recovered, police interviewed him, and he told police where he had placed Musick's body.

[12] The State charged Myers with three counts of murder, as felonies (Counts 1, 2, and 4); two counts of felony murder, as felonies (Counts 3 and 5); armed robbery as a Level 3 felony (Count 6); criminal confinement, as a level 3 felony (Count 7); conspiracy to commit robbery, as a Level 3 felony (Count 8); and obstruction of justice, as a Level 6 felony (Count 9).¹ The State also alleged that Myers was a habitual offender and that he had used a firearm in the commission of the offenses.

[13] The trial court held a multi-day, bifurcated jury trial beginning on October 21, 2024. On the fourth day of trial, the mother of Musick's baby, who was watching the trial from the gallery, said: “You're a piece of s**t – I swear to God – swear to God – No, I'll leave – I'll leave – but you're a piece of s**t ․ you took my baby's daddy, punk.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 68-69. She was escorted out of the courtroom, and the bailiff escorted the jury to the jury room. Myers then moved for a mistrial and alleged that the “outburst” had “taint[ed] the jury and prejudice[d]” him. Id. at 70. At that point, the court individually questioned each juror, including the alternates, under oath and asked if each one could continue to be fair and impartial. Each responded in the affirmative. The court also individually admonished each juror to disregard the disruption and to not hold the disruption against either party. See id. at 73-94. The court then denied Myers’ motion.

[14] The State called Jones as a witness. Jones acknowledged that he had been charged with offenses related to his involvement in the events at Musick's house. He further testified that, while he had not been offered anything in exchange for his testimony, he was testifying pursuant to a Use Immunity Agreement and that “nothing that [he] say[s] here can be used against” him. Tr. Vol. 5 at 25. On cross-examination, Myers asked Jones about the charges he was facing, and Jones testified that he had been charged with murder, robbery, criminal confinement, resisting arrest, and obstruction of justice. Then, during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Myers indicated his desire to question Jones about the possible sentence he could receive if convicted of the charges and the charges underlying the habitual offender enhancement. The court informed Myers that he could ask Jones about the current charges, including an enhancement for being a habitual offender, but that he could not ask Jones about the range of penalties he faces or the prior convictions underlying the enhancement. In the presence of the jury, Myers asked Jones if the State had also filed a habitual offender enhancement against him, and Jones acknowledged that the State had.

[15] The State also called Renee West, who lived in a house near Myers. West testified that she had six to eight cameras around her house that her husband had installed and that would automatically record and input a date and time stamp. The State moved to admit as evidence three still photographs taken from her camera system that included a date and time stamp. The photographs showed a parked truck and a parked jeep as well as an individual dressed in dark clothes. See Ex. Vol. 11 at 76-78. As a preliminary question, Myers asked if West had set up the cameras or the date and time stamps. West acknowledged that her husband had set them up and that she could not personally verify the accuracy of the date and time stamps. Myers then objected to the portion of the photographs that contained the date and time stamp as hearsay. The court overruled the objection and admitted the photographs as evidence.

[16] The State rested at the end of the day on October 28. At the beginning of the day on October 29, the State moved to exclude as a witness Myers’ mother, Karen Myers (“Karen”), on the ground that Karen had violated a separation-of-witnesses order previously issued by the court. In support, the State presented a jail phone call from the previous Friday in which Myers and Karen had an “extensive conversation” about the trial, “evidence and testimony that has been presented,” “what questions she's going to be asked,” and the “topics she's going to be providing testimony about[.]” Tr. Vol. 6 at 19. Myers “concede[d]” that there had been “a violation of the Court's separation of witnesses rule,” but argued that excluding Karen was an “extreme remedy[.]” Id. at 21. The court noted that the phone call was “initiated by” Myers and that it was “a direct knowing violation of a court order[.]” Id. at 34. The court then determined that, because of the “clear violation,” exclusion of Karen was “certainly the appropriate remedy.” Id. at 35.

[17] Myers testified in his defense. He testified that he had killed Musick but claimed that he had acted in self-defense after Musick pointed a gun at him. He also acknowledged that he was at Renae's house for the robbery, but he testified that it was Jones who wanted to commit the robbery and that he only went to “make sure that things don't go bad[.]” Id. at 106. He also testified that it was Jones who shot Skinner and Malcolm.

[18] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Myers guilty as charged. The court entered judgment of conviction for all counts except for the two counts of felony murder and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 251 years in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Cross-Examination of Jones

[19] Myers first contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment Right to cross-examine witnesses when it did not allow him to cross-examine Jones about the possible sentences he was facing for the charges he received as a result of his involvement or about the offenses underlying the State's allegation that Jones is a habitual offender. As this Court has stated:

“The right to cross-examine witnesses is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. It is one of the fundamental rights of our criminal justice system.” Nelson v. State, 792 N.E.2d 588, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (citations omitted). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not prevent a trial judge from imposing limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Meagher v. State, 726 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. 2000). Rather, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 265. Only a clear abuse of discretion warrants reversal. Id.

Collins v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Further, in cases “ ‘where there has been no plea agreement between the witness and the State or a patent benefit for testifying, we have found no abuse of discretion in limiting the testimony of a witness as long as the jury has been sufficiently apprised of the circumstances surrounding the testimony.’ ” Id. (quoting Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 556 (Ind. 2001)).

Possible Sentence

[20] On this issue, Myers first contends that the court violated his right to cross-examine Jones when it did not allow him to question Jones about the possible sentence Jones faced for his charges. Here, while Jones testified pursuant to a Use Immunity Agreement that prevented the State from using his testimony against him, he also testified that he had not received any deals from the State in exchange for his testimony. Stated differently, other than not being penalized by having his testimony used against him, Jones had no motivation to testify against Myers. The State did not offer him a plea agreement in exchange or any sort of leniency following his testimony.

[21] Further, while Myers was prohibited from asking Jones about the possible sentence he could face, Myers elicited testimony from Jones that he was facing charges for murder, robbery, criminal confinement, resisting arrest, and obstruction of justice. In addition, Myers was able to elicit testimony that Jones had prior arrests and convictions, and that the State had alleged that he is a habitual offender. That testimony was sufficient to inform the jury of the seriousness of the charges that Jones faced. The court therefore did not violate Myers’ Sixth Amendment rights when it did not allow him to question Jones about the possible sentence he faced.

Prior Convictions

[22] Myers also contends that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right when it did not allow him to question Jones about Jones’ prior convictions “that formed the basis of” the habitual offender enhancement. Appellant's Br. at 26. Specifically, Myers sought to introduce evidence that Jones had previous convictions for intimidation, escape, and residential entry.²

[23] However, Indiana Evidence Rule 609(a) provides that, for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime “must be admitted but only if the crime committed” is “murder, treason, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, arson, or criminal confinement” or is a crime involving dishonesty or a false statement. Here, none of Jones’ prior convictions is included in that list, and none of them are crimes of dishonesty. As such, evidence of those convictions was not admissible under Evidence Rule 609, and the court did not violate Myers’ Sixth Amendment right when it prohibited Myers from asking Jones about those prior offenses.

Issue Two: Exclusion of Karen

[24] Myers next contends that the court abused its discretion when it excluded Karen as a witness following a violation of the separation-of-witnesses order. Myers does not dispute that his phone call with Karen violated the separation order. However, Myers contends that excluding Karen as a witness was “exceedingly harsh” and “undermined his ability to present his defense in full.” Appellant's Br. at 32.

[25] “The determination of the remedy for any violation of a separation order is within the discretion of the trial court.” Spinks v. State, 122 N.E.3d 950 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “We will not disturb the trial court's decision on such matters absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. And this Court has held that, “if the party objecting to the witness’ testimony can show that the party calling the witness somehow connived or caused the witness to violate the court's order then disqualification of the witness is appropriate.” Smiley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

[26] Here, as Myers concedes, he “was responsible for initiating the contact with his mother, which was in violation of the separation order.” Appellant's Br. at 31. In addition, during the phone call between Myers and Karen, Myers informed Karen about “what was going on in the case,” including “what testimony had been given in court,” and he talked with her about certain aspects of her testimony. Tr. Vol. 6 at 34. Further, as the court pointed out, Myers had heard the court “admonish or instruct” each witness about the separation order “for five days.” Id. Because Myers caused the violation of the separation order and because of the extent of the conversation between Myers and Karen, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it excluded Karen as a witness.

Issue Three: Admission of Exhibits

[27] Myers also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the still photographs from West's security footage. As our Supreme Court has stated:

Generally, a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is accorded “a great deal of deference” on appeal. Tynes v. State, 650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. 1995). “Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion” and only reverse “if a ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.’ ” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013)).

Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015). Myers specifically contends that the court abused its discretion when it admitted the photographs because those photographs contained hearsay in the form of time and date stamps that could not be confirmed by West.

[28] However, we need not decide whether the trial court erred when it admitted the photographs as evidence. “It is well settled that a claim of error in the admission or exclusion of evidence will not prevail on appeal unless a substantial right of the party is affected.” Caesar v. State, 139 N.E.3d 289, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied (quotation marks omitted). “That is, even if the trial court errs in admitting or excluding evidence, this Court will not reverse the defendant's conviction if the error is harmless.” Id. “An error in the admission of evidence is harmless where the ‘probable impact’ of the erroneously admitted evidence, ‘in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights’ of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)).

[29] Here, the challenged pictures show two vehicles and an individual in dark clothes in an alley at approximately 10:45 p.m. on July 12, 2022. That alley was near Myers’ house, which was the location of Musick's murder. But there was other substantial evidence to demonstrate that Myers killed Musick. Indeed, Reagan testified that she, Myers, and Musick had spent the day together; that at one point she went to sleep; and that she was woken up by Myers, who said that “something had happened and that he killed” Musick. Tr. Vol. 3 at 213. She then testified that Myers wrapped Musick in a tarp, loaded Musick's body into Musick's car, drove to a reservoir, and left Musick's body. In addition, Jones testified that, while in the car with Myers, Myers said that “he had to blow somebody's head off.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 244. Further, and notably, Myers admitted to having shot Musick. Indeed, he testified at trial that he “fired a shot” at Musick and that Musick “hit[ ] the ground[.]” Tr. Vol. 6 at 76.

[30] In light of all of the evidence before the court, we can say with confidence that the probable impact of the three photographs was sufficiently minor so as to not affect Myers’ substantial rights. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the court's admission of that evidence was harmless.

Issue Four: Denial of Mistrial

[31] Finally, Myers contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial following the outburst from the gallery during the trial. “[G]ranting or denying a mistrial is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1283 (Ind. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). A defendant is entitled to a mistrial “only if the defendant demonstrates that he was so prejudiced” by misconduct “that he was placed in a position of grave peril.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 198 (Ind. 2014). A “mistrial is an extreme remedy in a criminal case which should be granted only when nothing else can rectify a situation.” Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1284 (quotation marks omitted). “Our deferential review of decisions to grant or deny a mistrial reflects that the trial court is in the best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of the event and its impact on the jury.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[32] Here, there is no dispute that there was an outburst from the mother of Musick's child, who stated during trial that Myers was a “piece of s**t” who “took [her] baby's daddy.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 68-69. After the outburst, the woman was removed from the gallery, and the bailiff escorted the jury to the jury room. The court then questioned each juror, including the alternates, individually and under oath about whether the outburst would impact their ability to be fair and impartial. Each juror responded that they could remain impartial and follow the court's instructions. See id. at 72-94. The court then admonished the jurors that they should disregard the outburst and not consider it.

[33] Where the trial court adequately admonishes the jury, such admonishment is presumed to cure any error that may have occurred. Johnson v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1168, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Given the circumstances of the incident, where the court promptly had the spectator removed; individually questioned each juror, who indicated his or her ability to remain fair; and admonished each juror, we see no likelihood that Myers was placed in a position of grave peril that would have required the granting of his motion for a mistrial.³ The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Myers’ motion for a mistrial.

Conclusion

[34] The trial court did not violate Myers’ Sixth Amendment right when it did not allow him to question Jones about the possible sentence he faced should he be convicted of charges related to his involvement or the offenses underlying the State's allegation that he is a habitual offender. The court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Karen as a witness following her violation of the separation order. Further, any error in the admission of the photographs as evidence was harmless considering the overwhelming evidence of Myers’ guilt. And the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Myers’ motion for a mistrial. We therefore affirm Myers’ convictions.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Myers does not appeal his conviction for Count 9. The State also charged Myers with being a prisoner possessing a deadly weapon, three counts of intimidation, and criminal mischief. But the court dismissed those charges on the State's motion.

2.   We note that the only crime Myers specifically asked Jones about during trial was his prior conviction for residential entry. Once Myers asked about that conviction, the State objected, and Myers only generally referenced “prior felony convictions” during a hearing outside the presence of the jury. Tr. Vol. 5 at 30.

3.   Myers contends that our Supreme Court's opinion in Lindsey v. State additionally required the trial court to collectively admonish the jurors after they reconvened. 295 N.E.2d 819, 824 (Ind. 1973). The Court in Lindsey provided that, if any jurors are exposed to material outside of the trial, “he must be individually interrogated by the court outside the presence of the other jurors,” individually admonished, and then the jury “should be assembled and collectively admonished[.]” Id. (emphasis added). However, contrary to Myers’ assertion, we do not read that as requirement that a court both individually and collectively admonish the jury. Rather, we read it as merely instructive. Further, nothing in Lindsey indicates that a trial court's failure to follow that protocol necessitates a mistrial.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.