SMITH v. GATEWAY FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Christopher A. Smith, pro se, appeals the small claims court's grant of summary judgment to Gateway Financial Solutions (“Gateway”) in Smith's action against Gateway. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] On an undisclosed date, Smith was involved in a car accident that totaled his car, for which Gateway had provided the car loan. In 2016, Gateway obtained a default judgment against Smith for an undisclosed amount. Smith filed a direct appeal of the default judgment, but his appeal was dismissed with prejudice because Smith did not file a brief on appeal. At some point thereafter, Gateway began to garnish Smith's wages to satisfy the default judgment. Smith filed a motion for relief from judgment in the court that had issued the default judgment, but that court determined Smith was precluded from challenging the default judgment based on his unsuccessful direct appeal thereof.

[3] Then, on March 1, 2024, in a small claims court in Allen County, Smith filed a complaint ² against Gateway that asserted:

Gateway Financial Solutions obtained a Default Judgment against me on September 26, 2016 through [im]proper service, fraudulent claims and perjury. Their ten (10) day payoff notice was promptly paid by Progressive Insurance releasing any claim Gateway had on the loan therefore, invalidating any legal claims. Their actions have also cost me employment and hire [sic] credit costs or rates, um, denials, and continue to harm me until a Default Judgment is released.

(Tr. Vol. II at 6.)

[4] On April 26, 2024, Gateway filed a motion for summary judgment.³ On January 15, 2025, the small claims court held a hearing on Gateway's motion for summary judgment and entered an order that determined: “This case is both a collateral attack of case number 02D02-1608-CC-1608 and any claims that Mr. Smith alleges arose out of that action were dealt with in that case and therefore are Res Judicata.” (Appellant's App. Vol. II at 6.) Based thereon, the small claims court granted summary judgment to Gateway.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We begin by noting that Gateway has not responded to Smith's pro se appeal.

When an appellee fails to file a brief, we apply a less stringent standard of review. We are under no obligation to undertake the burden of developing an argument for the appellee. We may, therefore, reverse the trial court if the appellant establishes prima facie error. “Prima facie” is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.”

McKibben v. Kaiser, 106 N.E.3d 529, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Deckard v. Deckard, 841 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). Furthermore, when a party, such as Smith, proceeds on appeal without counsel, he is expected to follow the same procedural rules that licensed attorneys are expected to follow, McCullough v. Citimortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017), and “is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014).

[6] Smith appeals the grant of summary judgment to Gateway. “Summary judgment decides a case, or issues in a case, without a trial.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 411 (Ind. 2025). Its purpose is to withdraw issues from a fact-finder when there are no factual issues to decide. Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 685 (Ind. 2024). Accordingly, a grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when “the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[7] On appeal, we review a grant or denial of summary judgment “under a de novo standard.” Gierek v. Anon. 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025). As such, we apply the same standard from Trial Rule 56(C) that was applied by the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, we, like the trial court, must “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the non-movant's favor.” Ind. Dept. of Ins. v. Doe, 247 N.E.3d 1204, 1210 (Ind. 2024). While we review the trial court's decision carefully to confirm that a party “ ‘was not improperly denied his day in court[,]’ ” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (quoting McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009)), “ ‘the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous[.]’ ” Id. (quoting McSwane, 916 N.E.2d at 909).

[8] Smith filed an Appendix that contained neither his complaint nor Gateway's motion for summary judgment. It is nearly impossible for us to determine the small claims court erred by granting Gateway's motion when we do not have these documents before us. See Yoquelet v. Marshall Cnty., 811 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming grant of summary judgment because appellant could not prove trial court erred when appellant failed to provide evidence designated to trial court).

[9] We had, nevertheless, intended to address the merits of Smith's legal argument that res judicata should not prohibit him from challenging a prior judgment that he claims was obtained by fraud and perjury – even though he had already filed an unsuccessful direct appeal of the default judgment and filed an unsuccessful motion to set aside the default judgment in the issuing court. However, in a strange twist of irony, Smith's brief contains multiple alleged quotes of Indiana caselaw that are patently false.

[10] For example, Smith's brief says:

In Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 1999), the Indiana Supreme Court made clear that res judicata does not apply to judgments obtained through fraud. In that case, the Court emphasized that “[a] judgment obtained by fraud may be set aside even after the time for direct appeal has passed,” referencing Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). The Court held that when a party “has perpetrated a fraud upon the court,” the resulting judgment is voidable, and res judicata will not protect it from collateral attack.

(Appellant's Br. at 16) (italics in original). The Smith case contains neither quote, and the word “fraud” occurs only one time in that case. See Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1999) (“A default judgment may also be set aside for fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct of an adverse party. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(3).”). Smith also quotes Smith as stating: “ ‘The doctrine of res judicata should not shield a judgment obtained by means that subvert the judicial process itself. Id. at 1264.’ ” (Appellant's Br. at 13) (allegedly quoting Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1264). That quoted language does not exist in Smith.

[11] Moreover, Smith claims:

In In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658 (Ind. 2014), the Indiana Supreme Court reiterated that the judiciary has “inherent equitable power to vacate a judgment that was procured by fraud upon the court.” This principle allows courts to revisit a judgment where it was obtained by egregious misconduct that undermines the judicial process—such as perjury, forgery, or tampering with evidence.

(Appellant's Br. at 16-17) (italics in original). That alleged quote from our Indiana Supreme Court also does not exist.

[12] Smith furthermore claims our court has made similar holdings:

Even in cases where a judgment has been long-standing, courts have refused to let it stand if fraud upon the court is clearly established. In Kessen v. Graft, 694 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)[, trans. denied], the Court of Appeals stated: “A judgment that is shown to have been obtained by fraud on the court is voidable and subject to collateral attack.”

(Id. at 18) (italics in original) (bracketed text added).

In Kessen v. Graft, 694 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), the Court held that even though prior challenges had failed, an independent action based on allegations of fraud upon the court could proceed. The court stated:

“Res judicata cannot apply when the original judgment was procured by fraud on the court.” Id. at 320.

(Id. at 15) (italics in original). However, the Kessen opinion does not contain the word “fraud” and neither of those alleged statements exists in the opinion.

[13] Smith's argument regarding why res judicata should not preclude his collateral attack is permeated with invalid statements of alleged Indiana law regarding fraud and res judicata. Indiana Appellate Rule 46 requires an appellant to file a brief that contains cogent argument supported by citation to caselaw and the Record. A party cannot meet that obligation by filing a brief that falsifies the holdings of cases. Smith had the burden to demonstrate that the small claims court erred when it granted summary judgment to Gateway, but Smith did not meet that burden because his argument rested in substantial part on non-existent statements of law that he evidently fabricated to support the result he desired. Smith has not demonstrated the small claims court erred when it determined his claim was precluded by res judicata.

Conclusion

[14] Because Smith failed to demonstrate the small claims court erred when it granted summary judgment to Gateway, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Appendix filed by Smith does not contain a copy of this document, but the small claims court read part of Smith's pleading at the hearing.

3.   Smith also did not provide a copy of this document, so our understanding of Gateway's motion is limited to the arguments revealed at the summary judgment hearing and in the trial court's judgment.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.