Cameron Dibble, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Cameron Dibble fell into a jurisdictional gap relating to prosecution for acts committed by an individual when he was a juvenile but for which charges were not brought until he had reached the age of majority. While the Indiana General Assembly has since closed this gap, the question remained as to whether the changes in the law applied retroactively to Dibble and the others who had fallen into the jurisdictional gap. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the amendments do not apply retroactively. See Brown v. State, --- N.E.3d ---, 2025 WL 586703 (Ind. Feb. 24, 2025). Applying the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Brown to the instant matter, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Dibble and consequently erred in denying Dibble's motion to dismiss the charges that were ultimately filed against him in adult court. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to dismiss the case against Dibble.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Dibble was alleged to have committed what, if committed by an adult, would be child molestation on Victim in December of 2011, when Victim was seven years old. State v. C.D., 177 N.E.3d 832, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Dibble was alleged to have been fourteen or fifteen at the time. Id. Dibble's alleged actions were not reported until May of 2019. Id.

[3] On December 18, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that sometime between December 1 and December 31, 2011, Dibble had committed what would be Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult. Id. The State also filed a petition to waive jurisdiction from juvenile court to criminal court. Id. Dibble had been fifteen years old during the alleged period but, at the time of the filing, was twenty-three years old. Id. On June 29, 2020, the juvenile court granted the State's waiver petition. Id. at 833–34. The State subsequently filed the charge in criminal court. Id. at 834.

[4] On September 8, 2020, our Indiana Supreme Court held that juvenile courts lack jurisdiction to waive juvenile offenders into adult court after those offenders reach age twenty-one. [D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1216–17 (Ind. 2020)]. Based on this holding, [Dibble] filed a motion for relief from judgment in the juvenile court seeking to set aside the jurisdictional waiver order. On September 24, 2020, the juvenile court granted [Dibble's] motion and dismissed the juvenile case with prejudice in accordance with D.P. The State then moved to dismiss the corresponding criminal charge. On September 28, 2020, the criminal court granted the State's motion to dismiss the criminal charge that arose from the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction to adult court.

On September 24, 2020, the State filed the criminal case directly in the Cass Circuit Court alleging that between May 12, 2011, and December 31, 2011, [Dibble had] committed Class B felony child molesting. On October 20, 2020, [Dibble] filed a motion to dismiss the new charge, arguing the Cass Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged offense occurred when [he] was a juvenile and there is no Indiana Statute that allows the charge to be filed in criminal court. On December 14, 2020, the criminal court granted [Dibble's] motion and dismissed the case.

Id. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's order dismissing Dibble's case. Id. at 837.

[5] On June 23, 2022, the Indiana Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 157 (Ind. 2022), holding that adult criminal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal charges filed against adults for conduct committed while a juvenile for which no waiver of jurisdiction had occurred. In response, effective July 1, 2023, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4, a statute relating to juvenile-court jurisdiction, to read, in relevant part, as follows:

(d) A court having adult criminal jurisdiction, and not a juvenile court, has jurisdiction over a person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age for an alleged offense:

(1) committed while the person was a child; and

(2) that could have been waived under [Indiana Code chapter] 31-30-3.

[6] On November 9, 2023, the State charged Dibble with Class B felony child molesting under cause number 09C01-2311-FB-1 (“Cause No. FB-1”), alleging that “between May 12, 2011 and December 31, 2011[,] ․ Dibble did perform or submit to deviate sexual conduct [with] Victim 1, a child under the age of fourteen years[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. Dibble filed a motion to dismiss on December 13, 2023, followed by an amended motion to dismiss on January 17, 2024. The State opposed Dibble's motion. On March 25, 2024, the trial court denied Dibble's motion to dismiss. The trial court subsequently certified the case for interlocutory appeal and, on June 14, 2024, we accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion and Decision

[7] The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that “courts typically have only such jurisdiction as the legislature grants them.” Neukam, 189 N.E.3d at 156 (citing D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1213). In Neukam, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that generally, because criminal and delinquent acts are distinct classes of conduct determined by age in the Indiana Code, a circuit or superior court with jurisdiction over criminal offenses allegedly committed by an adult does not have jurisdiction over acts allegedly committed before an individual turns eighteen.¹ 189 N.E.3d at 157. The Court further noted that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction when the alleged offender is older than twenty-one and recognized that “this jurisdictional gap means certain delinquent acts will not be prosecuted—for no other reason than the delinquent act was not reported until the alleged offender turned twenty-one.” Id. As is noted above, after the Indiana Supreme Court had issued its opinions in D.P. and Neukam, effective July 1, 2023, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4(d) to provide that “[a] court having adult criminal jurisdiction, and not a juvenile court, has jurisdiction over a person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age for an alleged offense” that was committed while the person was a child and could have been waived to adult court.

[8] In challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss, Dibble contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. The Indiana Supreme Court recently considered this question in Brown, in which the defendant fell into the same jurisdictional gap as Dibble. --- N.E.3d ---, 2025 WL 586703 *1–2. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had not had jurisdiction over Brown because the amendments to Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4(d) were not remedial and, even if they had been, were not intended to apply retroactively to Brown and those similarly situated. Id. at *2.

[9] With regard to the question of whether the amendments to Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4(d) were remedial, the Indiana Supreme Court stated

Absent express language to the contrary, statutes generally don't apply retroactively. But there is an exception for remedial statutes. A remedial statute is a statute enacted to correct one or more defects, mistakes, or omissions. But when the legislature passes a remedial law, retroactivity is permissive, not mandatory. [S]uch laws are normally to be applied prospectively absent strong and compelling reasons. When the evident purpose of the remedial statute is served by retroactivity, strong and compelling reasons exist. But retroactive application is not appropriate if it would violate a vested right or a constitutional guarantee.

Id. at *4 (brackets in original, internal citations and quotations omitted). Noting that the amendments in question “do more than just close the jurisdictional gap[,]” the Indiana Supreme Court found that the amendments made significant changes to how courts “handle various aspects of a case with an adult defendant who committed the charged offenses as a minor.” Id. The amendments in question were not “simply remedial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court went on to conclude that given the lack of a clear statement or any evidence indicated that the General Assembly had intended for the amendments to Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4(d) to apply to pending cases, the amendments “do not apply retroactively.” Id. at *6.

[10] Dibble fell into the same jurisdictional gap as the defendant in Brown. Applying the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Brown to Dibble's case, we must likewise conclude that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over Dibble. The trial court, therefore, erred in denying Dibble's motion to dismiss.² See id. (reversing Brown's conviction and remanding with instructions to dismiss because, given the lack of jurisdiction, Brown's conviction was void).

[11] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Indiana Supreme Court recognized, however, that the Indiana Code does provide some instances when a juvenile actor can be transferred to adult criminal court. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d at 156.

2.   Because we find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Dibble, we need not consider his alternative arguments relating to ex post facto laws and res judicata.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Foley concur. Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.