CRAIN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brandon Crain appeals the trial court's sanction following the revocation of his probation. Crain raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve 550 days of his previously suspended sentence after orally sanctioning him to 545 days. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 10, 2023, the State charged Crain with two counts of nonsupport of a dependent, as Level 6 felonies.¹ On July 25, Crain and the State entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Crain agreed to plead guilty to one count of nonsupport of a defendant, and the State agreed to a sentence of two years, with all but 180 days suspended to probation. The trial court accepted the plea agreement, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced Crain to two years in the Rush County Jail, with 180 days executed and the remainder suspended to probation. Crain began his term of probation on August 12.

[3] On April 22, 2024, the State filed an amended notice of probation violation and alleged that Crain had violated the terms of his probation when he submitted positive drug screens, failed to make payments on his child support orders, failed to comply with substance abuse treatment, and failed to report to probation as directed.

[4] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the State's petition on August 12. At that hearing, Crain's probation officer testified that Crain had tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine twice in February and once in March and that he had tested positive for cocaine, THC, fentanyl, and methadone in March. His probation officer further testified that Crain had failed to report for a scheduled office visit, failed to report to probation as directed, failed to report for a drug screen, and failed to make child support payments.

[5] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Crain had violated the terms of his probation. The court then informed Crain:

[Y]ou were originally sentenced to the custody of the Rush County Jail for a fixed term of imprisonment of 2 years, all suspended except 180 days. Uh, you, uh, served as based upon what I've read, you've served your 180 days, that leaves um, if my math is correct, 545 days of incarceration in the Rush County Jail, which was suspended. So the Court will order ․ that the ․ suspended portion of your executed sentence is ordered served[.]

Tr. at 18-19.

[6] Following the hearing, the court entered a written sentencing order and ordered Crain to serve 550 days of his previously suspended sentence. The corresponding abstract of judgment also listed Crain's sentence as “550 days” executed. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 116. The trial court then held a second hearing on August 14 for the purpose of advising Crain of his right to appeal his sanction. During that hearing, the court stated that Crain's “original sentence was two years, all suspended but 180 days,” which would leave “a year and a half” or “the 550 days.” Tr. at 22. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Crain appeals the court's sanction following the revocation of his probation. Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion. Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014). Upon finding that a defendant has violated a condition of his probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). We review the trial court's sentencing decision following the revocation of probation for an abuse of discretion. Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs “only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before the court. Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam).

[8] On appeal, Crain challenges the court's written order that he serve 550 days because there is a discrepancy between that order and the court's oral statement that he serve 545 days. According to Crain, the oral sentencing statement accurately reflects the court's intent and that the “court's sua sponte increase of the sentence to 550 days” in the written order “was in error.” Appellant's Br. at 8.

[9] “When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them together to discern the intent of the sentencing court.” Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We then have “the option of crediting the statement that accurately pronounces the sentence or remanding for resentencing.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007). After examining both the oral and written sentencing statements, it is clear that the court's written sentencing order accurately pronounces the sentence.

[10] In its oral statement, the court stated that the “suspended portion of your executed sentence is ordered served[.]” Tr. at 18. The court then stated that “if my math is correct,” Crain had “545 days of incarceration” remaining. Id. However, we agree with the State that this was simply an incorrect calculation. The court initially sentenced Crain to two years, or 730 days, with 180 days executed. There is no dispute that Crain completed the executed portion of his sentence before he began his term on probation. Thus, after he completed 180 days in jail, he had 550 days remaining, not 545. Further, the court corrected this miscalculation prior to issuing its written sentencing order and abstract of judgment and prior to the second hearing. Based on the court's statement that it was ordering Crain to serve the entire suspended portion of his sentence, it is clear that the court intended to sanction Crain to 550 days.

Conclusion

[11] The court's written sentencing statement accurately reflects the court's intention that Crain serve 550 days. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-5(a).

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.