MCDOWELL v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Vance Parviz McDowell appeals his conviction for criminal confinement as a level 5 felony. He contends the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 6, 2023, McDowell drove and picked up his girlfriend, C.D., from work around 11:00 p.m. He used her car, a 2019 Toyota, to do so with her permission. When they arrived at C.D.’s Lafayette apartment, they began arguing about their relationship. Shortly after midnight on February 7, the couple continued to argue and C.D. threw her purse against the wall. This angered McDowell, and he “ended up strangling [C.D.] and toss[ing] her on the bed.” Transcript Volume II at 24. He grabbed C.D.’s neck with “two hands” “literally on [her] throat” so that she “couldn't breathe” and was “gasping for air.” Id. at 24-25. C.D. managed to get away, ordered McDowell to pack his belongings, and then he strangled her again in the closet. C.D. got away again, McDowell followed her into the bathroom, approached her from behind, and “chok[ed]” her a third time causing her to “kind of” black out. Id. at 25.

[3] Following the third choking incident, McDowell grabbed C.D.’s car keys without her permission in order to “take [her] car” from her. Id. at 27. C.D. demanded that he return her keys, but McDowell refused, and told her to “move” out of the way. Id. at 28. Although C.D. was only wearing a shirt and underwear, she chased after McDowell as he left the apartment and approached her car. C.D. tried to prevent McDowell from getting into the driver's seat, but he pushed her and entered the car. C.D. did not want McDowell to take her car, so she jumped in the backseat “to prevent him” from taking it. Id. She thought he “wouldn't drive off” if she was in the car. Id. at 28. However, McDowell drove away with C.D. in the backseat.

[4] As he drove, McDowell “[wouldn't] let [C.D.] out of the car and he [wouldn't] stop.” Id. at 29. C.D. called 911 and pretended to speak to a friend named “Diamond” while trying to direct the 911 operator to her and McDowell's location. Supplemental Transcript Volume at 2-6. As she was on the phone with the 911 operator, C.D. could be heard crying and repeatedly asking McDowell to stop the car and let her out. Officers were dispatched to C.D.’s approximate location, and they saw her waving her arm out the window of the Toyota to alert them. Two officers drove their vehicles behind C.D.’s car and began a “high risk” traffic stop. Transcript Volume II at 38. McDowell drove for several seconds before briefly stopping and then speeding away. Officers could hear C.D. screaming for help from the backseat of the vehicle. McDowell then drove through a parking lot, crashed C.D.’s car into an embankment, jumped out of the car, and fled on foot before being apprehended. The officer that helped C.D. out of the vehicle observed that she was “scared,” “in a panic,” “wasn't wearing any pants or shoes” despite the cold weather, and “had injuries on her neck.” Id. at 40.

[5] The State charged McDowell with criminal confinement as a level 5 felony, auto theft, strangulation, resisting law enforcement, and leaving the scene of an accident as level 6 felonies, and domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. McDowell pled guilty to resisting law enforcement and leaving the scene of an accident, and he was found guilty of the remaining charges following a bench trial.¹

Discussion

[6] On appeal, McDowell challenges only his criminal confinement conviction. He asserts that C.D. “chose to get into the car in order to stop him from taking it” and that she subsequently “had the ability to exit, but did not.” Appellant's Brief at 10. Accordingly, he argues, “[a]s he did not force [C.D.] to enter or remain in the car, there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for criminal confinement.” Id.

[7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] To convict McDowell of criminal confinement as a level 5 felony as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally used a vehicle to confine C.D. without her consent. Ind. Code § 25-42-3-3(a)-(b)(1)(B). To “confine” means “to substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1.

[9] The record reveals that, after repeatedly strangling C.D., McDowell drove away in her car without permission with her inside of it, and he would not let her exit the vehicle despite her repeated pleas for him to stop and let her out. C.D.’s call to 911 demonstrated her intense fear, her lack of consent, and the substantial interference with her liberty. Indeed, even assuming C.D. initially voluntarily entered the vehicle as emphasized by McDowell, there is ample evidence to show that she was subsequently forced to remain in the car against her will especially after McDowell sped away from police attempting to initiate a traffic stop as she frantically screamed for help. See Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 204 (Ind. 1997) (finding evidence sufficient to support criminal confinement conviction and noting that, “[w]hile it may be true that the victim initially entered the car voluntarily, at some point in time she decided she wanted to leave” but was not permitted to exit). The State presented sufficient evidence to support McDowell's conviction for criminal confinement as a level 5 felony.

[10] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm McDowell's conviction.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   During sentencing, the trial court vacated the misdemeanor domestic battery conviction because “the same set of facts [gave] rise to both the battery and the strangulation.” Transcript Volume II at 77.

Brown, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.