MANNING v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] In 2023, a jury found William Manning guilty of burglary. The trial court sentenced Manning to four years of incarceration. Manning now appeals and presents one issue on appeal: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support Manning's burglary conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 20, 2023, Pamela Hecke lived at 1519 Andrew Street in Fort Wayne, a home that backed up to an alley. She also owned a home along the same alley, located at 818 West 4th Street in Fort Wayne (the “Storage House”), which she used for storage. The Storage House had an enclosed porch in the back and a detached garage behind it that faced the alley. The Storage House property has a fence running along the alley on either side of the garage. The side door of the detached garage was padlocked with a hasp.

[4] Between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. on May 20, Hecke's neighbors Gregory Hibler and his wife exited their house to go to breakfast. Hibler saw someone in the alley behind the Storage House. When Hibler and his wife returned home, he saw the same person, later identified as Manning, with a three-wheeled bicycle in the alley. Hibler also saw items stacked in the alley, including a desk and some other furniture, that were not there when he left for breakfast.

[5] Around 9:30 a.m., Hecke's other neighbor Kristen Grimmer went to her car, which was parked near the alley. She heard “scuffing sounds” as if someone were “dragging something heavy across concrete floor, like big pieces of furniture,” coming from the inside of the Storage House's detached garage. Tr. Vol. II at 124. She also heard “metal being ruffled through, as if you were just rearranging stuff.” Id. Grimmer sent a text message to Hecke saying that there was someone in Hecke's garage. Hecke then called 911.

[6] Grimmer stayed in view of Hecke's garage, where Hecke soon joined her. Grimmer and Hecke initially did not see anybody around the Storage House's garage. However, when Officer Anthony Shefferly of the Fort Wayne Police Department (“FWPD”) arrived on scene, Grimmer and Hecke saw Manning emerge from the east side of the garage.

[7] Shortly thereafter, FWPD Officer Daniel Raber arrived to assist Officer Shefferly. Officer Raber observed the “lock mechanism” (the hasp) on the Storage House's garage side door was totally separated from the door itself. Tr. Vol. II at 146. The hasp was still affixed to the door frame, and a piece of wood split from the door was hanging out of the lock hinge, indicating that the door had been “forcefully removed from the locking mechanism itself.” Tr. Vol. II at 147. In the alley near the garage were several items later determined to belong to Hecke, including a small desk, a black table, a cash register, and an air valve.

[8] Manning told Officer Raber he had knocked on the screen door on the Storage House's back porch to get permission from the homeowner to take the desk, but he never received a response, so he had lifted the desk from inside Hecke's fence and set it in the alley. Manning denied that he had entered the garage but claimed to know what it smelled like inside the garage—he said, “it smell[ed] like sh[*]t in there.” Ex. 8 at 9:41:45–9:42:15.

[9] Hecke identified the desk, black table, cash register, air valve, and other items stacked in the alley as belonging to her. According to Hecke, the air valve, the cash register, and some other items in the alley had been in the Storage House's detached garage. Hibler testified that Hecke had previously directed someone to “put a bolt through” the garage side door to “keep it closed” because she had “problems before with people getting in the garage.” Tr. Vol. II at 177. Hecke testified the garage side door was locked shut and that she didn't have the key to the lock.

[10] Hecke also recognized items in the alley that had previously been on the Storage House's back porch, such as the desk and black table. The porch's screen door had previously been screwed shut due to a broken handle but was now unscrewed and open, and the wooden door inside the screen door had previously been locked but was now unlocked.

[11] The State charged Manning with burglary as a Level 5 felony.¹ A jury found Manning guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Manning to four years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction. Manning now appeals his conviction.

Discussion and Decision

The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Manning's Conviction for Burglary as a Level 5 Felony

[12] Manning argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for Level 5 felony burglary. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments trigger a deferential standard of appellate review, in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [factfinder].’ ” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)), reh'g denied (Aug. 17, 2023). In our review, “we consider only ‘the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 1992)). We will reverse a guilty verdict only when no reasonable trier of fact “could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).

[13] In order to convict Manning of burglary as a Level 5 felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Manning broke into and entered a building or structure on Pamela Hecke's property with the intent to commit theft. See I.C. § 35-43-2-1. To prove the theft, the State needed to show that Manning knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the property of another person with the intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. See I.C. § 35-43-4-2. Manning argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he broke into or entered the Storage House's garage or back porch because no one actually saw Manning break the side door garage or saw him inside the garage.

[14] “The element of breaking is satisfied by showing that even the slightest force was used to gain unauthorized entry.” Davis v. State, 743 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Trice v. State, 490 N.E.2d 757, 758–59 (Ind. 1986)); Hooker v. State, 120 N.E.3d 639, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “Opening an unlocked door or pushing a door that is slightly ajar constitutes a breaking.” Davis, 743 N.E.2d at 753 (citing Utley v. State, 589 N.E.2d 232, 241 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied). “The occurrence of a breaking may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting McCovens v. State, 539 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ind. 1989)). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Kidd v. State, 530 N.E.2d 287, 287 (Ind. 1988)). “Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1192 n.5 (Ind. 2021) (citing Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 489 (Ind. 2012)). “Circumstantial evidence is evidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.” Id. (citing Hampton, 961 N.E.2d at 489).

[15] Here, the evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict shows that Manning was the person who broke into and entered the Storage House's garage and porch and removed items belonging to Hecke with the intent to deprive her of the use or value of the removed items. Between 8:00 and 8:30a.m., Hecke's neighbor Hibler saw Manning in the alley without items. When he returned from breakfast, several of Hecke's items were in the alley. Shortly after 9:30a.m., Grimmer and Hecke both saw Manning walk around from the side of the garage near where items belonging to Hecke had been removed from Hecke's property and stacked in the alley. At all times times, when Hibler left for breakfast and when Hecke and Grimmer were watching the garage, Manning was present. Additionally, Manning admitted that he was on Hecke's property by acknowledging he had knocked on the back door and that he took the desk from the porch by lifting the desk over the fence. Finally, Manning admitted being aware of what it smelled like inside the garage.

[16] The circumstantial evidence also shows that Manning broke into the Storage House's garage and porch. Hecke testified that she kept the garage side door locked, and she didn't even know where the key was. Officer Raber testified that the door mechanism or hasp was totally separated from the door itself, and, when you look at the piece of wood that attached to the hinge and the hole in the door, “it was reasonable to assume that it was—there was some type of forced entry or some type of incident that caused it [the door] to be forcefully removed from the locking mechanism itself.” Tr. Vol. II. at 147. The evidence also showed that the porch had been broken into. Hecke's testimony showed that the screen door of Storage House's porch had been screwed shut and closed and could not have been opened without using force, and the wooden door behind the screen door had been locked but was unlocked that morning.

[17] The evidence supports the reasonable inference of Manning's entry into the garage and the porch. Grimmer testified that she had heard “scuffing sounds” similar to “dragging something heavy across concrete floor, like big pieces of furniture,” coming from Hecke's garage. Tr. Vol. II at 124. She also heard “metal being ruffled through, as if you were just rearranging stuff.” Id. Grimmer remained in plain view of the garage door side and saw Manning appear from the side of the garage. Additionally, the jury could have reasonably inferred from Manning's statements about the odor of the garage that he had entered the garage. Hecke testified that the desk and the black table had come from her porch, and the air valve had come from inside the garage. Hecke also recognized some other items in Manning possession which were previously in the porch and in the garage.

[18] Manning is correct that his mere presence in the alley alone does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he broke into and entered into Hecke's garage or porch. See Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Pratt v. State, 744 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ind. 2001)). However, “presence at the scene in connection with other circumstances tending to show ․ the course of conduct of the defendant before, during, and after the offense, may raise a reasonable inference of guilt.” Id. (quoting Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000)). The State need not show direct evidence of breaking and entering. See Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 230. The lack of direct evidence does not preclude Manning's conviction for burglary given the presence of the circumstantial evidence presented here. See Hall 177 N.E.3d at 1192 n.5. Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Manning's burglary conviction.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.

Felix, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.