SMITH v. BUSS (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Roy Smith appeals the trial court's dismissal of his action against certain prison and department of correction officials (“the Appellees”). Concluding the action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Smith's complaint.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September 2021, Smith, who was incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison, filed a prisoner's civil complaint against the Appellees, alleging violations of his civil rights.

[3] One month prior, Smith had filed the same complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under cause number 3:21-cv-613-JD-MGG. In December 2021, the federal court determined that Smith's complaint did not state a claim but gave him an opportunity to file an amended complaint. See Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 36-46 (Opinion and Order). Smith ultimately filed an amended complaint on May 16, 2022. On September 21, 2022, the federal court dismissed Smith's action stating that, although he had “been given the chance to fix the problems identified in the first complaint,” he “persisted in making the same claims,” and the court did not “believe a second attempt would go any differently.” Id. at 74 (Opinion and Order).

[4] In March 2023, the Appellees in the present action moved to dismiss Smith's state action based on the doctrine of res judicata. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Appellees’ motion and dismissed the matter with prejudice. Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Smith appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Freels v. Koches, 94 N.E.3d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[6] The doctrine of res judicata serves to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same. Hilliard v. Jacobs, 957 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The doctrine has two components: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Id. Claim preclusion occurs when a final judgment on the merits has been rendered in an action, and it acts to bar a subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties. Evergreen Shipping Agency Corp. v. Djuric Trucking, Inc., 996 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). More specifically, claim preclusion applies when the following four factors are satisfied: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action was between the parties to the present suit or their privies. Id. (quoting Hilliard, 957 N.E.2d at 1046).

[7] While the bulk of Smith's brief on appeal is dedicated to the trial court's failure to recognize his constitutional claims, he does briefly assert that his state action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it was filed prior to the filing of his federal action. He reasons that, as the state action was first in time, it could not be “a re-litigation” of a federal action. Appellant's Br. p. 16. In addition, he claims that because the state action was filed first, the federal court could not be a court of “competent jurisdiction.” Id.

[8] Smith is mistaken. First, contrary to his assertion, the record on appeal shows that his federal action was filed on August 18, 2021, while his state action was filed one month later on September 22, 2021. See Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, p. 2; Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15. Regardless, Smith's position is meritless. The determining factor in claim preclusion is “the sequence of judgments, not the sequence of filings[.]” Jones v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 489 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied. Here, the federal court entered judgment in Smith's action on September 21, 2022, while judgment in the state action was not entered until June 5, 2023. See Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 69-77; Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 14. Moreover, it is undisputed that the federal district court was a court of competent jurisdiction to hear Smith's constitutional claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).

[9] As we have noted, Smith's claims and the parties here are identical to those in his federal action, and Smith acknowledges as much. See Appellant's Br. pp. 26-27.

[10] The only remaining question then is whether the federal court's dismissal of Smith's prior action is a judgment on the merits. To answer this question, we turn to federal case law. See H.A.L. NY Holdings, LLC v. Guinan, 958 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2020) (preclusive effect of federal court judgment is determined by federal common law). The federal courts have determined that a dismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. See Tartt v. Northwest Cmty. Hosp., 453 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the federal district court's dismissal of Smith's action for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of this cause of action.

Conclusion

[11] We conclude that claim preclusion bars Smith's suit against the Appellees, and the trial court properly dismissed his complaint.

[12] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.