Kirstan J. Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Kirstan J. Jones was convicted of Level 3 felony aiding, inducing, or causing robbery and Class A misdemeanor battery. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years, with three years suspended. Jones presents two issues for review:

1. Is the evidence sufficient to sustain her conviction for Level 3 felony aiding, inducing, or causing robbery?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Jones's brother Tristan had previously dated Claire Lakes for approximately one year, with their relationship ending around the summer of 2023. Claire then began dating Dakota Damrell, who Jones's friend Chloe Cochran had previously dated.¹ At some point, Tristan and Dakota were involved in a physical altercation during which Claire also hit Tristan.

[4] On the night of January 17, 2024, Claire went to a gas station on her way home from work. After Claire started the gas pump, she got back into her car. Jones, Tristan, Chloe, and Matt Orr, Jones's boyfriend, arrived at the gas station in Jones's car. Surveillance video from the gas station shows that the driver stopped the car between two gas pumps on the opposite side of the pump Claire was using. Jones and Chloe exited the car wearing black clothes and masks and walked directly to Claire's car. As the driver's door opens, Chloe immediately began fighting with Claire and a few seconds later Jones began attacking Claire as well. During her attack on Claire, Jones said “This is for hitting my brother.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 67. While Jones and Claire continued to fight, Chloe went around to the other side of Claire's car and attempted to open the passenger door. After failing to open the door, Chloe went back around to the driver's door and appeared to remove something from inside Claire's car and take it back to Jones's car. Jones and Claire continued to fight, and Jones ultimately ended up on the ground during the struggle.

[5] Tristan and Matt, also wearing black clothing and face coverings, then exited Jones's vehicle. Matt separated Jones and Claire and as Claire moved away from her car, Tristan began attacking her. When Tristan retreated to Jones's car, Chloe ran after Claire but returned to Jones's car moments later. In the meantime, Matt helped Jones to her feet and, as Jones limped back to her car, Matt appeared to access the interior of Claire's car through the driver's door. Upon discovering that she was missing her phone and wallet, Claire approached Jones's car and yelled at Tristan, who was in the driver's seat, demanding the return of her property. Tristan simply shrugged his shoulders. Matt, who was still outside Jones's car, then pulled out a gun, aimed it at Claire, and said, “You better watch out, Claire. You better watch out.” Id. at 41. Tristan then drove away, stopping briefly before turning into the roadway to let Matt get into Jones's car.

[6] While discussing the incident during a phone call from jail, Jones stated that she “would do the same thing over again” and would “change nothing.” State's Exhibit 1; Transcript Vol. 3 at 13, 14. Claire's phone and wallet were never recovered.

[7] On February 27, 2025, the State filed an amended information charging Jones with Level 3 felony robbery with a deadly weapon; Level 3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury; Level 3 felony aiding, inducing, or causing robbery; Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit robbery; Level 6 felony organized theft; Level 6 felony theft; and Class A misdemeanor battery. A three-day jury trial commenced on July 8, 2025. At trial, the jury was shown the surveillance video from the gas station and heard the jailhouse calls made by Jones. The jury found Jones guilty of Level 3 felony aiding, inducing, or causing robbery and Class A misdemeanor battery and acquitted her of the remaining charges.

[8] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 22, 2025. The court sentenced Jones to nine years with three years suspended for the Level three felony and a concurrent one-year sentence for the battery conviction. Jones now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

1. Sufficiency

[9] Jones argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict her of aiding, inducing, or causing a robbery.² When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we consider only evidence that supports the verdict and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. Floyd v. State, 791 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We uphold a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

[10] Jones argues that the fact that the jury acquitted her of the other robbery and theft charges undermines the notion that she knowingly or intentionally aided in a robbery. However, “[t]he evaluation of whether a conviction is supported by the evidence is independent from—and irrelevant to—the assessment of whether verdicts are contradictory and irreconcilable.” Myers v. State, 221 N.E.3d 694, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010)). “In short, the right of a criminal jury to exercise lenity and decline to convict is ‘well recognized’ and an ‘important component of our criminal justice system.’ ” Id. (quoting Beattie, 924 N.E.2d at 648-49). Thus, the fact that the jury found Jones not guilty of the other robbery and theft charges is irrelevant to our sufficiency analysis.

[11] We now consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support Jones's conviction. A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense is considered to be an “accomplice” to the offense and is treated the same as the principal offender. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). “A jury may infer complicity and participation in a crime from [the] defendant's failure to oppose the crime, companionship with the one engaged therein, and a course of conduct before, during, and after the offense which tends to show complicity.” Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted).

[12] Here, Jones, Tristan, Chloe and Matt arrived at the gas station in Jones's car. Jones and the other members of the group all wore dark clothing and masks or face coverings as they engaged in the attack against Claire. During the attack on Claire, one or more members of the group stole Claire's phone and wallet. Following the attack, Jones and the other group members fled from the scene together in Jones's vehicle. During a phone call from jail, Jones stated that she “would do the same thing over again” and would “change nothing.” State's Exhibit 1; Transcript Vol. 3 at 13, 14.

[13] The record clearly shows that Jones acted in companionship with the other members of her group and did not oppose any of the crimes committed during the course of the attack on Claire. Moreover, the physical attack on Claire, of which Jones was an active participant, was the means through which the property was able to be stolen. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Jones committed robbery as an accomplice.³ Hopper v. State, 539 N.E.2d 944, 947 (Ind. 1989) (“Any evidence that the accomplice acted in concert with other persons who actually committed the acts constituting the elements of the crime is sufficient to support a conviction on the accessory theory”).

[14] This is so even if Jones did not intend for Claire's property to be stolen as she is still responsible for that result given her role as an accomplice. An accomplice “is responsible for all natural and probable consequences that follow the execution of the common plan regardless of whether or not it was initially intended.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Jones and the others in her group traveled together in Jones's car to a gas station where Claire was located. Each person in Jones's car was dressed in dark clothing and wearing masks or face coverings. Jones and the others then proceeded to attack Claire. During the attack, one or more members of the group stole items from inside Claire's car. The jury could have reasonably concluded that the act of taking property from Claire was a natural and probable consequence of their concerted action. Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (upholding defendant's conviction for felony murder as an accomplice where murder was a natural and probable consequence of the concerted actions of defendant and others to rob random individuals at gunpoint), trans. denied; Pugh v. State, 52 N.E.3d 955, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (upholding defendant's convictions of rape and attempted criminal deviate conduct as an accomplice even though defendant did not commit any sexual acts because such crimes were natural and probable consequences of a home invasion by six men where women were present). Jones's conviction for Level 3 felony as an accomplice is supported by sufficient evidence.

2. Sentencing

[15] “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91.

[16] Jones argues that the trial court abused its discretion in relying on acquitted conduct “to enhance a sentence” and requests that this matter be remanded for resentencing. Appellant's Brief at 12. Initially, we note that the trial court did not impose an enhanced sentence. The advisory sentence for a Level 3 felony is nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (“A person who commits a Level 3 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine (9) years”). In its sentencing statement, the trial court stated that this was its starting point in determining what sentence to impose. The court then considered Jones's lack of criminal history, that she was only nineteen years old when the crime was committed, and the undue hardship to her two small children and balanced such against what could be seen in the surveillance video from the gas station, stating:

While you were not convicted and found not guilty of conspiracy, that video clearly shows the four of you had a calculated intent to commit that violent, incomprehensible attack on the victim. It's one of the worst things I've seen as judge in 20 plus years.

Transcript Vol. 3 at 191. The court then imposed the advisory sentence and suspended three years to probation.

[17] Contrary to Jones's argument, the court did not rely on acquitted conduct in determining the sentence to impose. Indeed, the court clearly acknowledged that Jones was acquitted of conspiracy prior to commenting on the heinousness of the attack on Claire, of which Jones was an active participant. The trial court's statement reflects the fact that the attack itself was planned rather than spontaneous and that the attack was violent and incomprehensible. The court's statement does not demonstrate that the court believed the robbery committed during the attack was also planned. That Jones was acquitted of conspiracy to commit robbery does not mean that she and her confederates did not engage in a calculated attack against Claire. Indeed, such attack was clearly the basis of Jones's battery conviction. It was during the attack that one or more of Jones's companions stole items from the victim. As noted above, as an accomplice, Jones was responsible for the natural and probable consequences that flowed from that attack. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the nature and circumstances of the offense. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492 (noting that trial court may consider seriousness of the offense, which implicitly includes the nature and circumstances of the crime as well as the manner in which the crime is committed, as a valid aggravating factor).

[18] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Chloe and Dakaota's relationship did not end on good terms.

2.   “A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4.

3.   Robbery is a Level 3 felony “if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or results in bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.” Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a). Jones does not challenge the evidence as it pertains to the elevated nature of the charge.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.