Deuntay E. Pratcher, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Deuntay E. Pratcher appeals his convictions for Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. He also appeals his aggregate eight-year sentence. Pratcher raises the following three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence contraband seized from Pratcher's person during a traffic stop.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Around 2:00 a.m. on September 16, 2024, Elkhart Police Department Officer Gavin Headley observed two bicyclists, a man and a woman, on a road near the police department. Neither bicycle was equipped with the required lighting, and so Officer Headley stopped the bicyclists for their apparent infractions. Upon approaching the bicyclists, the man informed Officer Headley that his name was Robert Taylor. But Officer Headley had had prior interactions with the man and knew he was in fact Pratcher. Accordingly, Officer Headley called for assistance from other officers, and, upon their arrival a few minutes later, he arrested Pratcher for providing a false identity.

[4] Officer Headley then conducted a pat-down of Pratcher's person. Prior to doing so, Officer Headley noticed that Pratcher had “non-anatomical bulges in [his] pockets,” and Officer Headley wanted “to ensure [Pratcher] was not armed ․” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 21. And, in patting down Pratcher, Officer Headley located and seized apparent marijuana, apparent methamphetamine, and a glass pipe with a burnt white residue on it.

[5] The State charged Pratcher with Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine; Level 6 felony identity deception; Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana; and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. At the start of his ensuing bench trial, the State agreed to dismiss the possession-of-marijuana charge. Officer Headley then testified regarding his stop of Pratcher and Pratcher's companion and the ensuing seizure of evidence. Pratcher objected to the admission of the seized evidence on the ground that the seizure was not justified by a stop for improper bicycle lighting. The trial court overruled Pratcher's objection. The court then found him guilty of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and not guilty of Level 6 felony identity deception.

[6] Following a sentencing hearing, the court found the following aggravating circumstances: Pratcher was under the supervision of community corrections at the time of the instant offenses; Pratcher has a significant criminal history; and less-restrictive placements have been unsuccessful. The court also found Pratcher's “significant mental health concerns” to be a mitigating factor, although the court concluded that, despite the mitigator, “an aggravated sentence is appropriate.” Id. at 142. The court then ordered Pratcher to serve an aggregate term of eight years in the Department of Correction.

[7] This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court did not err when it admitted the contraband seized from Pratcher's person into evidence.

[8] On appeal, Pratcher first contends that Officer Headley's seizure of the contraband violated Pratcher's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and, thus, the trial court erred when it admitted that contraband into evidence. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

On appeal, an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, with reversal warranted only if the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). But when, like here, the trial court's determination involves the constitutionality of a search or seizure, that determination is a question of law to which a de novo standard of review applies. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).

[9] Regarding Pratcher's arguments under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11, we have explained:

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article [1], Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. [a]mend. IV; Ind. Const., art. [1,] § 11. These protections against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures are a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. Friend v. State, 858 N.E.2d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). When the police conduct a warrantless search, the State bears the burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. Id.

Bulthuis v. State, 17 N.E.3d 378, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[10] Pratcher contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Officer Headley stopped him for improper illumination of a bicycle, the purpose of the stop had been completed prior to the search, and Officer Headley had no reason to suspect Pratcher to be dangerous during the improper-illumination component of the stop. He adds that his providing Officer Headley with a false identity did not “in and of itself” give Officer Headley reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat down. Appellant's Br. at 22.

[11] But Pratcher's analysis disregards Officer Headley's testimony. Officer Headley testified that, once Pratcher had given a false identity, Officer Headley made the decision to arrest Pratcher. Once other officers arrived on the scene, Officer Headley then placed Pratcher under arrest, and the search of Pratcher's person was incident to that arrest. A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. E.g., Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 626 n.1 (Ind. 2017). We therefore cannot say that Officer Headley violated Pratcher's Fourth Amendment rights.

[12] As for Pratcher's argument under Article 1, Section 11, he contends only that the search itself violated his rights; he does not argue that the manner in which the search was conducted or the scope of the search was unreasonable. Cf. Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1200 (Ind. 2016) (addressing the scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest, but not the decision to search itself, under Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 360-61 (Ind. 2005)). But our Supreme Court has long recognized “general acceptance that a warrantless search incident to a valid arrest is reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, that Officer Headley searched Pratcher incident to arrest is not, without more, contrary to Pratcher's rights under Article 1, Section 11. See, e.g., id.

[13] Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it admitted the contraband seized from Pratcher's person into evidence.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pratcher.

[14] Pratcher next contends that, in sentencing him, “the trial court failed to give appropriate weight to the seriousness of his mental health ․” Appellant's Br. at 26. But the trial court did find Pratcher's mental-health issues to be a mitigating circumstance, and Pratcher's argument regarding the weight the court assigned to his mental health does not acknowledge our Supreme Court's long-standing and binding precedent that “a trial court can not ․ be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491, 493 (Ind.), clarified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We therefore do not consider his argument regarding the weight the trial court assigned to the mitigating circumstance of his mental health.

3. Pratcher's sentence is not inappropriate.

[15] Last, Pratcher asserts that his aggregate eight-year sentence is inappropriate. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[16] However, appellate revisions of sentences under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[17] The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve years, with an advisory term of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2024). The sentence for a Class C misdemeanor is not more than sixty days. I.C. § 35-50-3-4. Here, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court ordered Pratcher to serve eight years for his Level 4 felony conviction along with a concurrent sixty-day term for his Class C misdemeanor conviction.

[18] We cannot say that Pratcher's aggregate sentence of eight years is inappropriate. While under the supervision of community corrections, Pratcher was found carrying approximately eleven grams of methamphetamine and a glass pipe. The contraband was discovered after he lied to an officer who knew him. Further, while, like the trial court, we recognize Pratcher's history of mental illness, he also has seven prior felony convictions, ten prior misdemeanor convictions, and a long juvenile history. And, on appeal, he does not direct us to any compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light. We therefore affirm his sentence.

Conclusion

[19] For all of these reasons, we affirm Pratcher's convictions and sentence.

[20] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.