Michael Drogosz, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Mary Allen, et al., Defendants-Appellees (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Michael Drogosz, pro se, appeals the trial court's dismissal of a complaint he filed on behalf of himself and his paternal grandmother, Helena Drogosz (Helena), against Mary Allen (Mary) and Darius Drogosz (Darius).¹ Drogosz presents seven issues, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the trial court properly grant Mary's motion for judgment on the evidence?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Drogosz claims that on January 9, 2023, Helena informed him that she wanted to give him property in Indiana that she had mortgaged to Mary and Darius years earlier. According to Drogosz, Helena also told him that Mary and Darius had failed to make payments on the mortgage and that they had agreed to give the property to Drogosz to avoid foreclosure. On July 19, 2023, Drogosz, allegedly at the request of Helena, filed a pro se complaint, which he titled “Civil Action,” raising claims against Darius and, to a lesser extent, Mary.²

[4] In the first cause of action, which Drogosz titled “Fraudulent Conveyance,” Drogosz alleged that Darius, using his purported authority as Helena's attorney-in-fact, wrongfully released the mortgage intended as security for large sums of money Darius and Mary borrowed from Helena to purchase the Indiana property.³ Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 15. In the complaint, Drogosz alleged that Helena had no knowledge of the POA or the release of mortgage documents filed by Darius in 2010. Drogosz further alleged that Mary and Darius's actions in this regard were done with the intent of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors and preventing foreclosure by Helena.

[5] Under the second cause of action—“Fraud and Deceit”—Drogosz accused Darius and Mary, generally, of participating in various fraudulent acts and making false representations to forestall Helena's alleged desire to foreclose on the mortgage. Id. at 16. Specifically, Drogosz states in the complaint that Mary and Darius falsely represented to Helena that they would transfer title to the property to Drogosz when in fact they had no intention of transferring the property.

[6] In the third cause of action, Drogosz claimed that Darius and Mary engaged in a “Civil Conspiracy” regarding their treatment of the debt owed to Helena and the mortgage securing it. Id. at 18. He maintains that Mary and Darius had no intention of ever satisfying the mortgage held by Helena and that they abused their position of trust to stave off foreclosure by falsely representing to Helena that they would transfer title to the property to Drogosz.

[7] Drogosz made additional claims, which he set out under the umbrella term “Fourth Cause of Action – Various.” Id. at 21. Under this heading, Drogosz states: (1) that funds he allegedly received as a child from his maternal grandmother were entrusted to Darius but had not been accounted for; (2) that Darious borrowed money from Helena for Drogosz without Drogosz's knowledge; and (3) that monetary gifts he received from Helena were entrusted to Darius without Drogosz's knowledge.

[8] Drogosz signed the complaint on behalf of himself and on behalf of Helena as her attorney-in-fact. He states in the complaint that although he endorsed the complaint on behalf of Helena, he “is not practicing law and does not represent [ ] Helena in this civil action.” Id. at 13. He attached to the complaint several supporting, handwritten documents, including an “Assignment of Mortgage” that purports to assign Helena's mortgage to Drogosz, a “Durable Power of Attorney” that names Drogosz as Helena's attorney-in-fact, a “Revocation of Power of Attorney” revoking Darius's alleged POA, and Helena's “Affidavit Supporting Revo[c]ation” in which she states that she did not give Darius POA or authorize a release of the mortgage. Id. at 29, 32, 35, 40. Each of these documents is dated April 14, 2023.⁴

[9] At a January 2, 2024 pre-trial conference, the trial court addressed Drogosz's attempt to represent Helena's legal interests given that he is not a licensed attorney. The court explained to Drogosz that he was engaging in the unlawful practice of law and that even assuming he had power of attorney for Helena, such did not convey to him the right to pursue a legal action in her name. The court informed him that given the allegations in the complaint, Helena was the real party-in-interest, and that she needed to file an appearance or hire an attorney to represent her interests. The court advised Drogosz that it would not accept any further filings by him on behalf of Helena and that any such filings would be “ignore[d].” Transcript Vol. 2 at 11. Also at this hearing, the court was made aware that Darius had passed away.⁵ At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that it would not set any discovery deadlines or set any further hearings until Helena appeared in the action, either pro se or through an attorney.

[10] On July 9, 2024, Mary filed an Ind. Trial Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 41(E). The trial court held a hearing on Mary's motions on July 26, 2024. Drogosz appeared pro se via zoom. At the start of the hearing, Drogosz orally moved to dismiss Helena from the complaint. Mary objected to an amendment of the pleadings but also noted that such would not affect her motion. The trial court denied Drogosz's motion to dismiss Helena from the complaint.

[11] The court then heard argument as to Mary's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mary argued that the claims set out in the complaint identify Helena as the aggrieved party and therefore, as the real party in interest, only Helena can assert such claims. Mary asserted that Helena had not appeared in the proceedings and was not represented by an attorney and that Drogosz, who is not a licensed attorney, cannot bring claims on her behalf. In short, Mary argued that Drogosz did not have standing to pursue the claims set out in the complaint. As to Helena, Mary requested dismissal pursuant to T.R. 41(E) for failure to prosecute a civil action.

[12] In response, Drogosz argued that Helena assigned the mortgage to him. The court pointed out that, according to the complaint, the mortgage that was supposedly assigned to him in 2023 was released in 2010. Thus, the court explained there was no mortgage in existence to assign to him in 2023 and the assignment did not revive the previously released mortgage. On July 29, 2024, the court entered an order granting Mary's motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss. Drogosz now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[13] A motion for judgment on the pleadings under T.R. 12(C) “tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a redressable claim, not the facts to support it.” Circle Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Y/G Indiana, L.P., 762 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Book v. Hester, 695 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) and Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Everton by Everton, 655 N.E.2d 360, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). “A judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly entitle the moving party to judgment.” Id. (citing Bledsoe v. Fleming, 712 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). “A trial court should grant such a motion only when it is clear from the pleadings that the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed under the facts and allegations therein.” Id. “In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings this court conducts a de novo review.” Id. (citing Eskew v. Cornett, 744 N.E.2d 954, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied). “We look only to the pleadings in making this assessment. We will accept as true the well-pleaded material facts alleged. The moving party is deemed to have admitted well-pleaded facts in favor of the nonmovant, and this court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

[14] A trial court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if the party bringing the action lacks standing to do so. See, e.g., Midwest Psychological Ctr., Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Admin., 959 N.E.2d 896, 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Because standing is a “threshold issue,” we address it first. Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022).

[15] The doctrine of standing constitutes a significant restraint on the ability of Indiana courts to act. Jones v. Sullivan, 703 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Standing is a threshold question that “asks whether the plaintiff is the proper person to invoke a court's authority.” Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 589 (Ind. 2019). In order to have a justiciable dispute, a plaintiff must have standing. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022). To establish standing, a party must show: (1) an “injury in fact,” i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, actual and imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Hulse v. Ind. State Fair Bd., 94 N.E.3d 726, 730-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

[16] Here, the trial court properly found that the facts alleged in the complaint relate primarily to Helena and not Drogosz. Indeed, the complaint alleges that Mary and Darius approached Helena and requested a large sum of money, that Helena held a mortgage for such sums, that unbeknownst to Helena, Darius abused his attorney-in-fact status for Helena in filing a release of mortgage in 2010, and that Darius falsely represented to Helena that he would transfer title to the mortgaged property to Drogosz to forestall Helena from seeking foreclosure. Clearly, the facts in the complaint demonstrate that it was Helena who had a mortgage, that Helena, not Drogosz, was harmed by Mary and Darius's alleged actions, and that it is Helena who has the ability to seek redress for the harm caused. It is therefore Helena, and not Drogosz, who has standing to assert the claims of fraudulent conveyance, fraud and deceit, and civil conspiracy. As noted by the court, Helena never appeared to assert her claims, and Drogosz, who is not a licensed attorney, could not assert the legal claims on her behalf. Drogosz's attempt to sign the complaint as Helena's attorney-in-fact suggests that he labored under the misconception that serving as an attorney-in-fact permitted him to do so. Further, Drogosz identified “no independent identifiable rights” of his own to assert. Transcript Vol. 2 at 22.

[17] The trial court appropriately dispensed with Drogosz's argument that he had standing based on the fact that Helena assigned the mortgage to him. The complaint alleged that Helena held a mortgage to secure a debt owed by Mary and Darius. The complaint also alleged that the mortgage was wrongfully released in 2010 by Darius. Drogosz argued that Helena assigned the mortgage to him in 2023, thirteen years after the mortgage was released. While the trial court acknowledged that the facts alleged might, broadly speaking, provide Helena with a claim against Darius and/or Mary for some type of fraud or other claim based on Darius's wrongful release of the mortgage, no post-release assignment could revive the mortgage itself. The assignment of the mortgage has no bearing on the outcome.

[18] Even accepting the material facts as alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Drogosz is not the real party-in-interest and lacks standing to assert the claims raised therein. Because Drogosz cannot in any way succeed on the claims raised in the complaint, the trial court property entered judgment on the pleadings.⁶

[19] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Darius is Drogosz's father. Mary and Darius were married at some point but are now divorced.

2.   Each count of the complaint contains a mix of allegations against Darius and Mary, individually, and Darius and Mary, collectively. The majority of the allegations pertain to Darius's actions.

3.   Included in the record is a general power of attorney (POA) naming Darius as Helena's attorney-in-fact. This document is dated May 21, 2010. A Release of Mortgage was executed by Darius as attorney-in-fact for Helena and filed with the Starke County Recorder on June 7, 2010.

4.   Drogosz admitted that he prepared these documents and sent them to Helena, who now resides in Poland. He claims the documents were translated for Helena, who speaks very little English, before she signed and returned them.

5.   The court rejected Drogosz's oral request to amend the complaint to add “a special representative of the state” in place of the now deceased Darius. Id. at 14. Drogosz then made an oral motion “to establish an estate and appoint a special representative.” Id. at 15. The court advised Drogosz that the current proceeding was not the place to accomplish such request and reminded him that if he wanted to file an amended complaint, he needed to follow the rules.

6.   Under the fourth cause of action in the complaint, Drogosz asserts claims that pertain to him. The trial court found that these “remaining portions of the Complaint do not amount to an independent cause of action for Michael Drogosz.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 11. Although Drogosz states in his brief that the court's conclusion in this regard is “reversible error,” he cites no authority and makes no cogent argument. Appellant's Brief at 7. He has therefore waived the issue for review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8).

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.