Nancy Sparks, Appellant-Respondent v. Brandon M. Sparks, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Nancy Sparks (“Mother”) appeals several aspects of the trial court's decree of dissolution in her divorce from Brandon M. Sparks (“Father”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father married in 2010. They have four children: two born before the marriage—C.S. in 2005 and G.S. in 2008—and two born during the marriage—Q.S. in 2011 and D.S. in 2012. Father filed for divorce in October 2022. Mother moved out of the marital residence that December, but the parties made efforts at reconciliation for several months thereafter, spending time together and sharing custody and expenses. In August 2023, with the case still pending, Mother quit her job with the State. At the time, she had worked for the State for nine years and nine months, meaning that if she had worked for three more months, she would have had 10 years of service and her pension would have vested.

[3] The trial court held a preliminary hearing in January 2024 and ordered Father to pay $300 per week in child support pending the final hearing. The court held the final hearing in November 2024 and issued its decree of dissolution in April 2025. The court awarded Father 54.5% of the marital estate and Mother 45.5%. The court deviated from the presumptive equal division because (1) if Mother returns to State employment for a few months, her pension will vest, giving her a large asset outside the marital estate and (2) Mother, according to the court, dissipated marital assets by trading in her 2010 GMC pickup and buying a 2015 GMC SUV shortly before Father filed for divorce. The court also found that Mother had wrongfully removed the homestead exemption from the marital residence and placed it on her new home, increasing Father's 2023 and 2024 property taxes by a total of $7,071.

[4] As to the children, the trial court ordered the parties to equally share physical custody of the three minor children and ordered Father to pay $57 per week in child support going forward. The court also determined that Father owes a support arrearage of $5,822 because he had paid $12,756 as of the date of the final hearing but his total obligation (determined retroactively) was $18,578. Specifically, the court found that, while any support obligation Father might have had for C.S. ended in April 2023, his obligation for the younger children was $333 per week from July 2023 through December 2023, $367 per week from January 2024 through April 2024, and $161 per week from May 2024 through the date of the final hearing.

[5] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court didn't abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate

[6] Mother first challenges the trial court's division of the marital estate. The disposition of marital assets is within the sound discretion of the trial court, so we review the disposition only for an abuse of that discretion. Gish v. Gish, 111 N.E.3d 1034, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. In so doing, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision, and we won't reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Id. A trial court must divide marital property “in a just and reasonable manner.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(b). The court must presume that an equal division is just and proper, but that presumption can be rebutted. I.C. § 31-15-7-5.

[7] Here, the trial court deviated from the presumptive equal division, awarding Father 54.5% of the marital estate. It did so based on (1) the fact that Mother's State pension is very close to vesting and (2) its finding that Mother dissipated marital assets by trading in her 2010 GMC pickup and buying a 2015 GMC SUV. Mother argues that the court erred in both respects. As to the dissipation finding, we agree with Mother that the evidence doesn't support it. It is undisputed that the pickup was deteriorating, and Father doesn't claim that the seven-year-old replacement SUV was extravagant. But the trial court's findings about the pension weren't clearly erroneous, and those findings alone support the deviation.

[8] The trial court's findings as to Mother's State pension were as follows:

128. The Court would also note that while Mother's pension is not vested, for purposes of the division of the marital estate, consideration must be given as Mother could go back to work for the State of Indiana and after only a few months of employment, become vested in her pension.

129. Mother testified that she is attempting to obtain her employment with the State of Indiana.

130. Had Mother's pension vested, Father would have been entitled to a percentage of her pension, especially in light of the fact that she earned a majority of it during the course of the parties’ marriage.

131. Now however, because it did not vest prior to the date of the Final Hearing, Father will be entitled to nothing, while Mother will be entitled to the entire pension, if she were to go back to work for the State of Indiana and be employed there for only a few months.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 26.

[9] In challenging these findings, Mother points to her own testimony that she isn't eligible for rehire by the State, apparently because of the way she quit her previous job. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 49. But the trial court wasn't required to accept this self-serving testimony, and Mother didn't present any documentation from the State to back up her claim. Also, after testifying that she is ineligible for rehire, Mother clarified that “some agencies” would still consider her. Id. Indeed, she testified that she was actively applying for State jobs. Id. at 48-49. On this record, while there is no guarantee that the State will rehire Mother, the likelihood is high enough that it was not unreasonable for the trial court to consider her nearly vested pension in dividing the marital estate.

[10] Mother also argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that she removed the homestead exemption from the marital residence and placed it on her new home. She is incorrect. Father testified—with no objection from Mother—that he called the Marion County Assessor's Office and was told that the exemption had been placed on Mother's new home. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 128-29. The trial court based its finding on that testimony, Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 24-25, but Mother doesn't address the testimony in her briefs.

[11] Mother has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate.

II. The trial court didn't abuse its discretion in determining Father's child-support arrearage

[12] Mother also argues that the trial court erred in determining Father's child-support arrearage. A trial court's calculation of child support is presumed to be valid and is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Ashworth v. Ehrgott, 982 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[13] Mother first contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Father's support obligation for C.S. ended in April 2023. The court made this determination under Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6(a)(3), which provides that the duty to support a child ends if the child

(A) is at least eighteen (18) years of age;

(B) has not attended a secondary school or postsecondary educational institution for the prior four (4) months and is not enrolled in a secondary school or postsecondary educational institution; and

(C) is or is capable of supporting himself or herself through employment.

[14] C.S. turned 18 in February 2023. She had graduated from high school in December 2022, and the court found that she didn't attend a postsecondary educational institution in the four months that followed. Mother cites testimony that C.S. took classes at various times after graduating high school, but none of that testimony established that she took classes between December 2022 and April 2023. See Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 20, 83, 131; Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 29, 30. The trial court did not err in this regard.

[15] The court also found that C.S. was employed after graduating high school and that while she wasn't fully supporting herself, she was capable of doing so. Mother cites evidence that C.S. was living with her and wasn't paying all of her own bills, but the fact that C.S. wasn't supporting herself doesn't mean she couldn't support herself. Father's testimony on the point provided little support for Mother's position. He testified that C.S. “probably” wasn't capable of living on her own and paying her own bills in 2023, Tr. Vol. 2 p. 83, but he said this was “just speculation” on his part, id. Because there is no evidence of any restrictions or limitations on C.S.’s ability to work after graduating from high school, the trial court didn't err by finding she could support herself through employment as of April 2023.

[16] Mother contends that the trial court made other errors in calculating Father's support arrearage, but her arguments are unconvincing. She argues that Father had a support obligation from December 2022 (when she moved out of the marital residence) through July 2023, but she doesn't address the trial court's finding that imposing an obligation for that period wouldn't be “equitable” because “the parties were attempting to reconcile, equally exercising the same parenting time, and the parties were sharing in expenses with the Minor Children.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 18. She claims that the court erred by giving Father credit for 156 yearly overnights in calculating his obligation for May 2024 through the final hearing, but she doesn't explain why the court's overnight calculation was incorrect. And she asserts that a support order entered as to C.S. in 2005—before the parties were married—automatically sprang back into effect when she moved out of the marital residence, but she doesn't cite any authority that supports this proposition.

[17] Mother has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in determining Father's child-support arrearage.

[18] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.