Samuel E. Andrews, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Samuel Andrews appeals after a jury found him guilty of strangulation (Count 1), intimidation (Count 2), and domestic battery (Count 3). He raises two issues. First, he contends there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count 1. Finding there was sufficient evidence, we affirm that conviction. Second, he asserts his aggregate 365-day sentence (with 185 days suspended to probation) is inappropriate. While we affirm Andrews’ sentence, we sua sponte conclude the way in which the trial court “merged” Counts 1 and 3 for sentencing did not resolve its substantive double jeopardy concerns. We therefore remand for the trial court to vacate Andrews’ conviction on Count 3.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Andrews dated A.K. for two years before he and his three minor children moved into her home in the summer of 2023. On August 16 of that year, A.K. asked Andrews to go with her to get gas for her lawnmower. Andrews drove her in his van to a gas station, and after they arrived, he asked if she would pay to fill up his gas tank. When she said no, he started yelling at her, called her names, and repeatedly said she was “a lying broad” and “all ․ broads are the same[.]” Transcript Vol. 2 at 164. He continued yelling as they drove home. A.K. eventually spoke up, said she was not a liar, and explained she was light on cash because rent was due soon. Andrews continued to berate her, so she ended the relationship and told him that he and his children would have to move out of her house.

[3] Andrews “slam[med] on the brakes[,]” propelling A.K. forward and causing her to hit the dashboard. Id. at 166. He demanded she get out of the van. When she asked him to drive her home, he “reached over and grabbed [her] by the throat[,]” squeezed with so much force that she was barely able to breathe, and told her she “was going to regret having his kids and him leave and that ․ he was going to kill [her].” Id. at 166, 168. Andrews eventually let go of A.K.’s neck, and when she threatened to call the police, he told her “they wouldn't believe anything that [she] said[.]” Id. at 168. He resumed driving, still screaming and hurling insults.

[4] When they reached A.K.’s house, Andrews “passe[d] the driveway” and “continue[d] to drive ․” Id. at 169. A.K. asked where he was taking her, and he said they were going to the police station. That didn't make sense to A.K. because the closest police station “[was] in the other direction[.]” Id. She pulled out her phone and tried to call 911, but when Andrews saw what she was doing, he pulled the van over a second time, grabbed A.K. by the neck as he crawled on top of her, and started trying to pry the phone out of her grasp. She “held onto it as tight as [she] could for as long as [she] could,” but he was eventually able to take it from her. Id. 170. Fearing that Andrews was going to kill her, she managed to get out of the van.

[5] A.K. walked toward her house while Andrews drove beside her and asked her to get back in the van. She flagged down another vehicle and had the driver call the police. Officer Matthew Scott arrived at the scene soon thereafter. As Scott began speaking with A.K., Andrews instructed her to “just tell them it was an argument.” Id. at 207. That comment raised Scott's suspicions, so he separated her from Andrews, and she reluctantly recounted what happened but indicated she didn't want Andrews “to be in trouble ․” Id. at 213. As Scott spoke with her, he observed redness and petechiae (broken blood vessels) on her neck and upper chest. A.K. also had bruises on her neck, arms, and wrists.

[6] The State charged Andrews with Count 1: Strangulation, as a Level 6 felony;¹ Count 2: Intimidation, as a Level 6 felony;² Count 3: Domestic Battery, as a Class A misdemeanor;³ and Count 4: Interference with the Reporting of a Crime, as a Class A misdemeanor.⁴ At a jury trial on November 18, 2025, the State presented testimony from A.K. and Officer Scott, who testified to the facts outlined above. It also introduced into evidence photographs showing bruises on A.K.’s chest, neck, and arms, as well as audio A.K. recorded as Andrews struggled to take her phone from her.

[7] After the State rested its case-in-chief, Andrews testified in his own defense. While he acknowledged arguing with A.K. during their trip back from the gas station, he denied “ever chok[ing]” her. Id. at 246. When defense counsel asked if he “ever put ․ [his] hands on her in any way[,]” Andrews claimed he stopped the van three times, demanded A.K. get out of the vehicle, and “push[ed] on her” one of those times when she refused to do so. Id. at 247. He denied taking A.K.’s phone, asserted that she had stolen his phone, and claimed that when he could be heard in the audio recording repeatedly demanding A.K. “give [him] the f[***]ing phone[,]” he had been referring to his own phone. State's Exhibit 1 at 00:58-01:10. He also denied that he threatened to kill her or that he prevented her from calling the police. He said he drove past A.K.’s house because he was taking her to “the Sheriff's Department ․ [t]o have them get her out of the car.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 3. As for A.K.’s visible injuries depicted in the State's exhibits, Andrews claimed the red marks were a rash she got from mowing, and she also had “bumps and bruises” from her job at a golf course. Id. at 9.

[8] In rebuttal, the State re-called Officer Scott. He testified that when A.K. showed him her bruises after the incident, she explained which were from work-related injuries and which had been caused by Andrews. Furthermore, all the marks and bruises shown in the State's exhibits were those A.K. said she had suffered during the incident—not those related to her employment.

[9] After closing arguments, final instructions, and brief deliberations, the jury found Andrews guilty on Counts 1, 2, and 3, and not guilty on Count 4. The trial judge accepted those verdicts, released the jury, and said,

At this time, the Court is going to enter judgment of conviction with regard to Count 1, Strangulation, as a Level 6 Felony, Count 2, Intimidation, as a Level 6 felony, and Count 3, Domestic Battery, as a Class A Misdemeanor.

Id. at 70.

[10] The court proceeded directly to sentencing, during which Andrews testified that although he hadn't been convicted in the past, he had been arrested “a long time ago[,]” explaining, “It was with my wife, and it was dropped.” Id. at 76. He further testified that he lived with and cared for his seventy-nine-year-old mother and his three children, ages fifteen, twelve, and ten. On cross-examination, Andrews admitted he had been arrested twice for allegations of domestic battery against his wife: once in 2017 and again in 2022, but both of those charges were dismissed. After brief rebuttal testimony from Officer Scott, Andrews personally asked the trial judge not to send him to jail and said his children were “going to pay for it” if he lost his job while he was incarcerated. Id. at 84.

[11] The State requested the court sentence Andrews to one-year executed followed by one year of probation. The defense asked for one year of probation with no executed time, as even a brief incarceration would threaten Andrews’ employment and burden his dependents. The defense further argued that Counts 1 and 3 should “merge” due to substantive double jeopardy concerns. Id. at 86. The court agreed convictions on those counts would violate double jeopardy, so it “merged” them and sentenced Andrews on Counts 1 and 2 to two concurrent 365-day sentences, with 185 days suspended to probation. Id. at 93. Andrews now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] Andrews first argues “the State presented ․ insufficient evidence to convict him of [s]trangulation ․” Appellant's Brief at 14. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the fact-finder's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). Additionally, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[13] As alleged here, to convict Andrews of strangulation, the State had to prove he, “in a rude, angry, or insolent manner, knowingly or intentionally ․ applie[d] pressure to the throat or neck of another person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c) (2023). The State did as much, as A.K. testified that after he repeatedly berated and yelled at her, Andrews “grabbed [her] neck[,]” applied “[a] lot” of pressure, and restricted her breathing. Tr. Vol. 2 at 167. Despite the well-settled principle that “[a] conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of ․ the victim[,]”⁵ Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012), Andrews claims A.K.’s testimony was insufficient here because “she was not diagnosed with any injuries to her throat” and he “testified that he never grabbed [A.K.] by the throat[,]” Appellant's Br. at 15. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the State was not required to prove that A.K. suffered an injury to obtain a conviction under section 35-42-2-9(c). Even if it was, Andrews mischaracterizes A.K.’s testimony about the medical care she received. While she said she was not diagnosed with injuries to the internal structures of her throat, her medical providers found bruises on her neck. Tr. Vol. 2 at 199. A bruise is an injury.⁶ Additionally, Andrews’ reliance on his self-serving testimony is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we won't do. See Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 135 (“The evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction.”) (emphasis added). We therefore affirm his strangulation conviction.

2. Andrews’ Sentence

[14] Andrews next argues that his sentence is inappropriate. As an initial matter, we note that though Andrews has styled his argument as a request for review under Appellate Rule 7(B),⁷ the substance of his argument is that “[t]he trial court[ ] fail[ed] to include [his] dependents as a mitigating factor ․” Appellant's Br. at 16. This Court has repeatedly recognized that Rule 7(B) review and challenges to the trial court's acknowledgment or rejection of aggravating and mitigating factors “are distinct [claims] and are to be analyzed separately.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1285 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); see also Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 786 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“[A]ppellate review under Rule 7(B) is not a review of the trial court's consideration of aggravators and mitigators[.]”), trans. denied. Consequently, “inappropriate sentence argument[s] [are] waived ․ when the defendant claims to be making a 7(B) argument but instead asserts the trial court erred in its identification or weighing of aggravators and mitigators[.]” Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[15] Because Andrews makes no argument about the nature of his offense or his character, he has waived review of his sentence under Rule 7(B). And since he also failed to set forth the relevant legal standard for his claim that the court erred in failing to recognize the burden incarceration would put on his dependents as a mitigating factor, he has waived that argument, too. See Turkette, 151 N.E.3d at 786 n.4 (finding the defendant waived her argument “that the trial court's failure to properly recognize and weigh aggravating and mitigating factors resulted in an inappropriate sentence” because she did “not articulate a cogent argument in that regard”).

[16] Waiver notwithstanding, a trial court is under no obligation to weigh aggravators and mitigators. But if it does weigh the factors, one way in which the trial court may commit error is by omitting from its sentencing statement a factor that is “clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration[.]” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). That said, a court need only indicate “mitigating circumstances it finds to be significant.” Rawson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1049, 1056 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Here, the trial court clearly explained why it did not find the hardship incarceration would pose on Andrews’ dependents to be a significant mitigating factor, reasoning,

I would note sir, that I find that your behavior is concerning, when it comes to accepting responsibility for your actions. And when you talk about being there for your kids, if you are exhibiting this kind of behavior to your partners, in the presence of your children, it's a problem.[8]

․ [M]y concern is that if I do not give you some kind of consequence today, you're going to continue in this pattern of behavior and someone is really going to get hurt.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 92. In light of this explanation, the court did not err at sentencing. See Bradford v. State, 246 N.E.3d 808, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (affirming where “the trial court considered [the defendant's] proposed mitigator but explained its reason for rejecting undue hardship as a mitigating circumstance”), trans. denied. Accordingly, we affirm Andrews’ sentence.

3. Substantive Double Jeopardy

[17] Though we affirm Andrews’ conviction on Count 1 and his sentence on Counts 1 and 2, we sua sponte conclude the trial court's merger of Counts 1 and 3 after entering judgments of conviction did not cure its substantive double jeopardy concerns. See Morales v. State, 165 N.E.3d 1002, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“As questions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights, we routinely address specific double jeopardy violations even when the parties have not begun the conversation.”), trans. denied. Substantive double jeopardy bars the State from subjecting a defendant “to multiple convictions or punishments for the ‘same offense’ in a single trial.” Moyers v. State, 227 N.E.3d 33, 38 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 239 (Ind. 2020)). And as a recent panel of this Court explained regarding the merger of convictions in cases where double jeopardy is implicated,

If a trial court does not formally enter a judgment of conviction on a finding of guilty, then there is no requirement that the trial court vacate the so-called conviction, and merger is appropriate. Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)․ Timing is key—“ ‘merger after judgments of conviction have been entered does not cure the double jeopardy violation.’ ” Gale v. State, 882 N.E.2d 808, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Morrison v. State, 824 N.E.2d 734, 742 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

Gordy v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 1238774, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[18] Here, the trial court entered judgments of conviction from the bench on Counts 1, 2, and 3 after accepting the jury's guilty verdicts on those counts. At sentencing, it agreed with Andrews that his convictions on Counts 1 and 3 violated substantive double jeopardy and reasoned those counts should merge. However, because it had already convicted Andrews on those counts, merging them did not cure the double jeopardy violation. The trial court appears to have realized this when it issued its written sentencing order, which purported to enter judgments of conviction only on Counts 1 and 2. However, it later made an entry on the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) indicating Andrews’ “conviction” on Count 3 had been “merged.”⁹ Since “the [CCS] is the official record of the court[,]” Akehurst v. State, 115 N.E.3d 515, 517 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), that entry must be amended to show that Andrews’ conviction on Count 3 has been vacated.

Conclusion

[19] Finding (1) sufficient evidence to support Andrews’ strangulation conviction, (2) Andrews waived appellate review of his sentence, and (3) notwithstanding that waiver, the trial court did not err at sentencing, we affirm. However, we remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate his “merged” conviction on Count 3 and amend the CCS accordingly.

[20] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c) (2023).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(1) (2023) (amended 2026).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2023).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-5(1) (2023).

5.   We note that A.K.’s testimony was not uncorroborated, as Officer Scott testified he observed injuries consistent with strangulation on her neck, and photographs of those injuries were admitted into evidence.

6.   Merriam-Webster defines “bruise” as “an injury involving rupture of small blood vessels and discoloration without a break in the overlying skin[.]” Bruise, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bruise [https://perma.cc/JS9Y-86PM] (emphasis added).

7.   Under Appellate Rule 7(B), we can revise a sentence if it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)).

8.   Andrews has not challenged the trial court's concern that he has exhibited problematic behavior in front of his children.

9.   Though Andrews did not include a copy of the CCS in his appendix as required by Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(a), we've accessed it using our Odyssey Case Management System.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.