Anthony Liner, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Anthony Liner was stopped by law enforcement for speeding, and while the officer was writing a warning, a K-9 alerted to the presence of illegal drugs in Liner's vehicle. A subsequent search revealed a handgun, methamphetamine, and numerous items of contraband. Liner was found guilty of several drug- and gun-related charges. Liner now appeals and presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 27, 2025, Noblesville Police Department Officer James Ellis was patrolling State Road 37 in Hamilton County, Indiana, when he encountered Liner, who was driving ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. Officer Ellis initiated a traffic stop and requested Liner's license and registration. Liner provided his driver's license but did not have his vehicle's registration. Officer Ellis then went back to his patrol vehicle “to write [Liner] a written warning” for speeding. Tr. Vol. II at 153. Less than four minutes after stopping Liner, Officer Ellis requested a K-9 to conduct an open-air sniff of Liner's vehicle because “he's got a history of priors,” State's Ex. 8 at 04:20–04:30, including methamphetamine-related charges. While waiting for the K-9 to arrive, Officer Ellis continued working on the written warning.

[4] Less than nine minutes after Officer Ellis stopped Liner, two other officers and K-9 Aris arrived on scene. One officer went to get Liner out of the vehicle while the other prepared K-9 Aris to conduct the sniff. Approximately 10 minutes into the stop, Officer Ellis exited his vehicle because it looked like “Liner didn't want to get out of the car,” but Liner ultimately exited his vehicle. Tr. Vol. II at 155. Officer Ellis then continued working on the written warning, and in the three minutes it took him to finish doing so, K-9 Aris indicated the presence of illegal substances in Liner's vehicle. Less than 14 minutes elapsed from the time Officer Ellis stopped Liner until the officers began searching Liner's vehicle.

[5] Officers found a handgun, a brick of methamphetamine weighing 49 grams, two bags of methamphetamine, a digital scale, a grinder, multiple pill bottles containing various colored pills, and suspected marijuana. The State charged Liner with dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony,¹ two counts of possession of methamphetamine as Level 3 felonies,² unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a Level 4 felony,³ unlawful carrying of a handgun as a Level 5 felony,⁴ unlawful carrying of a handgun as a Class A misdemeanor,⁵ and possession of paraphernalia as a Class C misdemeanor ⁶ ; the State also alleged that Liner is a habitual offender ⁷ .

[6] A jury found Liner guilty of the four drug-related counts as charged, the trial court found Liner guilty of the gun-related counts as charged, and the trial court found that Liner is a habitual offender. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court vacated all Liner's convictions except for three: dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a Level 4 felony, and possession of paraphernalia as a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 40 years—35 years of incarceration, 5 years on community corrections placement, and 5 years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Certain Evidence at Trial

[7] Liner claims that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial. Before trial, Liner filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, arguing that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated when Officer Ellis unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. The trial court denied this motion. At trial, Liner renewed the arguments from his motion to suppress and objected to any evidence obtained after Officer Ellis unreasonably prolonged the stop; the trial court overruled his objections.

[8] On appeal, Liner argues his federal and state constitutional rights were violated when the trial court admitted evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle because the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged.⁸ “Although an abuse-of-discretion standard typically applies to a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence, we engage in de novo review when an alleged ‘constitutional violation has resulted from the admission of evidence.’ ” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013)).

[9] We first address Liner's argument under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We then address Liner's arguments under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

a. United States Constitution

[10] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, and “[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment ․ is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials[,]” Dunem v. State, 254 N.E.3d 559, 565–66 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018)), trans. denied, 262 N.E.3d 816 (Ind. 2025).

[11] “A seizure ‘justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.’ ” Dunem, 254 N.E.3d at 566 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). That is, “the Fourth Amendment does not countenance an indefinite seizure,” id.; instead, “the ‘tolerable duration’ of a seizure for a traffic violation is shaped by the stop's ‘mission’—addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attending to related safety concerns,” id. (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). Aside from determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's “mission” includes “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,” such as “checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 566–67 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). Law enforcement authority for the seizure ends once the “tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 567 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). Thus, law enforcement “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” but they “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).

[12] One such “unrelated check” an officer may conduct “is summoning a police canine to conduct a dog sniff for contraband.” Dunem, 254 N.E.3d at 567 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356). “When this occurs, the critical question is one of timing: Does conducting the dog sniff prolong the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the ‘mission’ of the stop?” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357). If the answer to this question is “yes,” then law enforcement “must have reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). And when a defendant challenges such a stop, “the State bears the burden of showing the time for [the] traffic stop was not impermissibly increased due to a dog sniff.” Id. (citing Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied).

[13] For instance, in Dunem v. State, a law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of a bus, and approximately 10 to 12 minutes after initiating that stop, a canine arrived on scene and began sniffing for drugs. 254 N.E.3d at 567. As the canine sniffed, the officer conducting the stop “finished inspecting the driver's license and proof of insurance and rejoined the bus's driver to start filling out a written warning.” Id. The canine “ ‘alerted’ to the presence of contraband within a minute,” while the officer “was still writing the warning.” Id. This court concluded that “[t]he dog sniff did not impermissibly prolong the traffic stop.” Id. (citing Hansbrough v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1112, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied).

[14] Here, K-9 Aris arrived on scene approximately nine minutes after Officer Ellis stopped Liner. While Officer Ellis was “finishing up the citation,” Tr. Vol. II at 13, K-9 Aris sniffed Liner's vehicle. K-9 Aris took less than three minutes to complete the open-air sniff. Liner argues Officer Ellis unreasonably prolonged the stop based on his unfamiliarity with the systems and software in his patrol vehicle. Officer Ellis had worked for another law enforcement agency for approximately 15 years before joining the Noblesville Police Department, and he finished his training period with the department only 10 days before this stop. Officer Ellis did testify that his unfamiliarity with the ticketing system caused a delay in his ability to complete the warning ticket. It is possible that had Officer Ellis been more proficient with the ticketing system, the stop could have taken less time, but there is no evidence the stop would have been completed before K-9 Aris arrived. Regardless of whatever technical difficulties Officer Ellis may have encountered, there is no evidence that this traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged in order to have a K-9 do an open-air sniff. Here, Officer Ellis stated that if the K-9 had been more than ten minutes away, he would have proceeded with the warning without doing a K-9 sniff. We therefore cannot say Liner's rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated such that the search-related evidence was inadmissible.

b. Indiana Constitution

[15] Like the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits “unreasonable search or seizure.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. When reviewing an unreasonable search or seizure claim under the Indiana Constitution, we “ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021) (citing Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020)). In conducting this analysis, we employ the framework set forth by our Supreme Court in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which requires us to balance three factors: (1) “the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred,” (2) “the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities,” and (3) “the extent of law enforcement needs.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (quoting Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361). We address each factor in turn.

[16] Degree of Suspicion. Liner argues that the “increase[d]” degree of suspicion present after K-9 Aris alerted on his vehicle did not “come within a reasonable time” to justify the ensuing search and seizure. Appellant's Br. at 13. At the time of the traffic stop, Officer Ellis had observed Liner driving ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. Officer Ellis had a high degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred. Furthermore, less than four minutes after stopping Liner, Officer Ellis discovered that Liner had prior convictions for drug-related offenses. The degree of suspicion present before K-9 Aris even arrived on scene was high.

[17] Degree of Intrusion. Liner does not make an argument regarding the second Litchfield factor. However, our Indiana Supreme Court has held a traffic stop “amount[s] to a small intrusion” on a defendant's “ordinary activities.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019). Further, the dog sniff itself was not a search and, particularly because the dog sniff occurred shortly after Liner was stopped, the intrusion into Liner's ordinary activities was minimal. See Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1036 (Ind. 2013) (concluding dog sniff conducted shortly after a legitimate traffic stop did not intrude into defendant's ordinary activities).

[18] Law Enforcement Needs. Liner also does not make an argument regarding the third Litchfield factor.⁹ Nonetheless, we observe that Officer Ellis learned within four minutes of stopping Liner that he had drug-related convictions, which provided at least a moderate level of need for an open-air sniff. See Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 947 (observing that law enforcement's need to fight drug trafficking is significant). And again, there is no evidence that Officer Ellis delayed the traffic stop in order for K-9 Aris to arrive.

[19] Based on the foregoing, the State has shown that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged based on the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, that stop and the ensuing search did not violate Article 1, Section 11. Because Liner's rights under neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article 1, Section 11 were violated, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence obtained pursuant to the traffic stop.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Instructing the Jury

[20] Liner argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury by giving Final Instruction 11. That instruction provided as follows:

A person may be convicted of Dealing in Methamphetamine only if:

(1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to deliver or finance the delivery of the drug; or

(2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 150. Liner objected to Final Instruction 11, stating it was “cluttered” and “somewhat confusing,” Tr. Vol. II at 249, and requesting the word “only” be stricken from the first line, id. at 250. The trial court overruled Liner's objection and gave Final Instruction 11 as reproduced above.

[21] We review “a trial court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 453 (citing Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024)). An abuse of discretion occurs “when the instruction is erroneous and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484–85 (Ind. 2015) (citing Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 2001)), cert. denied. In making this determination, we consider “(1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which are given.” Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. 2002)).

[22] “The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’ ” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 199 (quoting Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)). A “jury instruction on a statute ‘is presumptively correct’ if it tracks ‘verbatim’ the language of a statute.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 277 (Ind. 2014)).

[23] Final Instruction 11 tracked almost verbatim the language of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(b), which reads as follows:

(b) A person may be convicted of an offense under subsection (a)(2) only if:

(1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to deliver or finance the delivery of the drug; or

(2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams.

Subsection (a)(2), under which Liner was charged, provides that a person commits dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 5 felony when he possesses methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, with intent to deliver it or finance its delivery I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2). Another final instruction informed the jury of these elements.

[24] Liner argues that when Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(b) is used as an instruction, it “remove[s] the element of ‘intent to deliver’ from the crime of dealing.”¹⁰ Appellant's Br. at 9. We cannot agree. A plain reading of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2) and (b) reveals that our General Assembly has decided that if a defendant possessed at least 28 grams of methamphetamine, a factfinder may infer that the defendant intended to deliver that methamphetamine or to finance its delivery. That is exactly what Final Instruction 11 communicated to the jury here.

[25] Final Instruction 11 correctly states the law as found in Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(b). There was evidence in the record to support the giving of Final Instruction 11. And the substance of Final Instruction 11 was not covered by other instructions that were given. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by giving Final Instruction 11.

Conclusion

[26] In sum, the trial court did not err by admitting evidence seized pursuant to the traffic stop, and it did not abuse its discretion by giving Final Instruction 11. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(1), (d)(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c) (effective July 1, 2023, to June 30, 2025).

4.   I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(b), (e)(2)(B).

5.   I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(b), (e).

6.   I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(2) (effective July 1, 2015, to June 30, 2025).

7.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

8.   Liner does not challenge the legitimacy of the initial traffic stop. Nor does Liner contend the dog sniff by itself violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

9.   More specifically, Liner does not present any argument on this factor in his opening brief. Instead, Liner argues this factor for the first time in his reply brief. It is well-settled that we cannot consider arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief. Steele v. Steuben Lakes Reg'l Waste Dist., 168 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1180–81 (Ind. 2016)).

10.   On appeal, the State argues Liner has waived this argument by failing to specifically raise it to the trial court. As Liner concedes, trial counsel's objection to Final Instruction 11 was not particularly “artful.” Appellant's Br. at 10. And “to ‘properly preserve an issue for appellate review,’ ․ a defendant ‘must state with reasonable specificity the grounds for his objection while before the trial court.’ ” Bradley v. State, 248 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Todisco v. State, 965 N.E.2d 753, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). Inartful as trial counsel's objection may have been, it was reasonably specific enough to preserve Liner's arguments for our review.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.