IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: La'R.T. and La'T.T. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] La'R.T. and La'T.T. (collectively, “Children”) are the biological children of M.T. (“Father”) and L.S. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”). While Father was incarcerated, Children were removed from Mother's care due to poor living conditions and educational neglect. The trial court adjudicated Children as children in need of services (“CHINS”) upon Parents’ admissions. After Parents failed to meaningfully engage in services, the trial court terminated their parental rights to Children. Father now challenges that termination ¹ and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In early November 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report alleging that La'R.T. was the victim of child abuse or neglect because “she had missed over 30 days of kindergarten, and her grades were below average.”² Appellant's App. Vol. II at 102. At that time, Father was incarcerated for an invasion of privacy conviction related to a no-contact order between him and Mother, and he was Children's non-custodial parent. In January 2024, DCS and Mother agreed to a Program of Informal Adjustment. On April 26, DCS visited Mother's home, the conditions of which were “below minimal standards,” with floors covered in clutter and trash, gnats, and empty alcohol bottles and opened medicine wrappers in Children's room. Id. at 103.

[4] A few days after the visit, the informal adjustment was discharged as unsuccessful, and DCS filed petitions alleging Children were CHINS. Parents admitted Children were CHINS. In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to cooperate with DCS, participate in all ordered and recommended services, maintain stable housing for himself and Children, obey the law and refrain from engaging in illegal activity, and follow all terms of probation currently in effect pursuant to any existing probation order.

[5] In late July or early August 2024, Father was released from incarceration. Less than one month later, a warrant was issued for Father's arrest for a probation violation. Father did not appear at some CHINS hearings because he knew about this warrant. In late July 2025, Father was arrested and released on the outstanding warrant. Thereafter, Father began participating in some services.

[6] On July 25, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Children. After a factfinding hearing in October, the trial court granted that petition, thereby terminating Father's parental rights to Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Father's Parental Rights to Children Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[7] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[8] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[9] To terminate Father's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the circumstances described in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) exists, there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Children, and termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). Father challenges the trial court's conclusions that (a) one or more of the circumstances described in Subsection (d) exists, and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

a. Existence of Circumstances Described in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)

[10] As to whether one or more of the circumstances described in Subsection (d) exists, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Father's parental rights to Children should be terminated for the following reasons: (1) pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2), Children had been removed from Father and had been under DCS's supervision for at least 15 months of the most recent 22 months and despite DCS's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify Children's family, Father has been unable to remedy the circumstances resulting in Children being placed outside Father's home; (2) pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(3), there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside Father's home will not be remedied; and (3) pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(4), there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being, safety, physical health, or life.

[11] On appeal, Father challenges the trial court's conclusions under Subsections (d)(3) and (d)(4). DCS only needed to prove either that the circumstances described in Subsection (d)(2) or Subsection (d)(3) or Subsection (d)(4) existed. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Because Father does not challenge the trial court's conclusion under Subsection (d)(2), we need not address his arguments regarding the trial court's conclusions under Subsections (d)(3) and (d)(4). However, we note that Father's arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that one or more of the circumstances described in Subsection (d) exists.

b. Best Interests of Children

[12] Father also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights over Children is in Children's best interests. The trial court specifically stated as follows:

The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationships between the parents and the children is in children's best interests in that further efforts to reunite the parents and the children are unlikely to succeed. Failure to terminate the parent-child relationships at this time would deny the children the stability and permanency to which they are entitled, and which has already too long been denied. It is in the children's best interests to have permanency, not perpetual wardship and uncertainty.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 123.

[13] To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[14] Father contends that “DCS failed to provide any evidence that the minor children were headed towards perpetual wardship and uncertainty in their lives and that [Father] could not provide stability and permanency.” Appellant's Br. at 17. In particular, Father asserts that “there was no evidence that [he] could not meet” Children's needs, id., regarding “not having to worry about being the adult in the home, making sure that they are getting up for school on their own, or worrying about having food in the home,” id. at 16–17 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 64). This is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). The trial court's unchallenged findings show that (1) at the time of the termination hearing, Father was “on active probation,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 118, and “continued to lack independent stable housing, experienced a period of incarceration, and did not make sufficient progress with service providers and has shown an inability to parent [C]hildren,” id. at 120; (2) “throughout the underlying CHINS case,” Father “demonstrate[d] a habitual pattern of conduct that the court finds leaves a high probability of future neglect and deprivation of [C]hildren and ․ the continuation of the parent-child relationship[ ] would undoubtedly place [C]hildren at risk,” id. at 120; and (3) “Father has shown an inability or unwillingness to truly put [C]hildren's needs above his own and do what is needed to provide a safe, stable home in which to reunify with [C]hildren,” id. at 122. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Children's best interests.

[15] Based on the foregoing, the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights over Children was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm that decision.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   La'R.T. was born on June 13, 2018. La'T.T. was born on November 27, 2021.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.