IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Jana.S. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jana.S., Jani.S., Ja.H., and Je.H. (collectively, “Children”) are the biological children of L.H. (“Mother”) and Jam.S. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”). A petition alleging Children were each a child in need of services (“CHINS”) was filed because of Mother's failure to provide Children with a safe and appropriate living environment and Father's unwillingness to parent Children. After Parents failed to comply with the dispositional orders, petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights were filed, which the trial court granted. Mother and Father appeal, collectively raising five issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at the termination hearing; and

2. Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2023, Mother was participating in a plan of informal adjustment with DCS due to residential and financial instability resulting from numerous evictions and lack of employment. On November 2, DCS filed a petition alleging Children ¹ were CHINS after Mother was evicted from the Julian Center for violating their rules and was “unable to identify an alternative location where she and children could reside.” Ex. Vol. I at 138. At the time, Father had an active warrant for his arrest and pending criminal charges; his whereabouts were unknown; and he had “not demonstrated an ability or willingness to appropriately parent the children,” id. Children were therefore removed from Parents.

[4] Based on Mother's “negotiated stipulation that Children were CHINS,” Appellee's Br. at 11, and Father's failure to appear for the factfinding hearing, the trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS. The trial court ordered Mother to, among other things, participate in and complete home-based case management and home-based therapy as well as to “follow all recommendations that result from an assessment or treatment made by service providers.” Ex. Vol. I at 149. The trial court declined to order services for Father until he “appear[ed] in court or ma[de] himself available to DCS.” Mother's App. Vol. II at 171.

[5] Between November 2, 2023, and February 11, 2025, Father had no contact with Children. During that same time period, Mother lived in at least six different places, including Wheeler Mission, the Salvation Army, hotels, with family members or friends, and an apartment. In its efforts to help Mother reunite with Children, DCS made “approximately 15 referrals for home[-]based case management and parenting education, 3 referrals for home[-]based therapy, 2 referrals for a psychological evaluation, and 45 referrals for supervised parenting time.” Mother's App. Vol. II at 173. Despite these efforts, Mother did not fully engage in the process. Mother failed to successfully complete home-based therapy, home-based case management, and parenting education. Mother's frequent relocations and “volatile interactions” with service providers made maintaining services and providers difficult. Id. Mother also refused to “travel or to accept transportation from providers” to attend parenting time, so DCS transported Children “throughout the state of Indiana in order for Mother to exercise parenting time.” Id.

[6] On February 11, 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Children. After a factfinding hearing, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting the Charging Informations

[7] Father claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at the termination hearing. During that hearing, DCS offered into evidence two criminal informations alleging Father had committed several criminal offenses (the “Charging Informations”). The trial court admitted the Charging Informations over Parents’ objections.

[8] We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[9] Father specifically claims that the Charging Informations were inadmissible because they were hearsay, irrelevant, and more prejudicial than probative. Even if we assume arguendo that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the Charging Informations, any error in admitting that evidence was harmless, see Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). “An error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to the ‘substantial rights’ of a party.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1197 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)).

[10] Here, as Father concedes, “there was substantial evidence to support the termination of Father's parental rights despite the Trial Court's [alleged] error in admitting” the Charging Informations. Father's Br. at 20. For instance, at the time of the termination hearing, Father had not “had contact with the Children since at least November 2023” and had “expressed no interest or ability in parenting, providing for, developing, or maintaining a relationship with the Children.” Mother's App. Vol. II at 170. Relatedly, Father “never appeared in the CHINS proceeding nor made himself available to DCS.” Id. at 183. Accordingly, even if we assume there was error in the admission of the Charging Informations, it was harmless.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Terminating Mother's Parental Rights to Children

[11] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[12] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[13] To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the circumstances described in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) exists, there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Children, and termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025). Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions that (a) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

a. Remediation of Reasons for Removal

[14] Mother first argues the trial court erred by concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied.² On that issue, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

6. Conditions Resulting in Removal or Reasons for Placement Outside the Home -IC 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

a. The Children were removed from and remained outside Mother's care as a result Mother's residential and financial instability, underlying mental health needs, and lack of parenting skill[s] ․

b. As of the date of the termination factfinding, these conditions have not been remedied.

c. While Mother has recently married and now has a one[- ]bedroom apartment, she has an extensive history of short[-]lived progress but no sustainable change regarding residential and financial stability.

d. Mother has not made any appreciable progress in addressing her underlying mental health needs and has not meaningfully engaged in therapy or achieved any of her prior therapeutic goals.

* * *

h. Due to ․ Mother's ongoing failure to cooperate with and complete Court ordered services, residential and financial instability, untreated or undertreated mental health issues, and lack of parenting skill which all contribute to her inability to provide the Children with a safe and stable home environment and appropriate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, and supervision, the Court finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and for continued placement outside the home of parents will not be remedied.

Mother's App. Vol. II at 181–82.

[15] In reviewing the trial court's findings, we first “identify the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting and citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). Furthermore, we do “not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, ‘but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home.’ ” In re T.S., 267 N.E.3d 6, 15 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)), trans. denied, 272 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. 2025).

[16] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that she will not remediate the reasons for Children's removal and claims her recent marriage and living arrangement show she made “sustainable progress to remedy the reason for removal.” Mother's Br. at 46–47. Mother's arguments are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). For example, Mother claims that the trial court erred by considering Mother's mental health and lack of parenting skills because they were not the initial reason for the removal, and “they were never the but-for cause of Children's continued placement outside the home,” Mother's Br. at 36. Here, one of the guardians ad litem testified that “major barriers” to reunification included Mother's housing instability and mental health. Tr. Vol. II at 132. The family case manager testified that returning Children to Mother was contrary to their wellbeing in part because Mother “continues to not have addressed goals through therapy.” Id. at 119. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Mother likely will not remedy the reasons for Children's removal or placement outside of Mother's care.³

b. Best Interests of Children

[17] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights over Children is in Children's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “[T]he recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.).

[18] Here, the family case manager and guardians ad litem all recommended terminating Mother's parental rights to Children. Even though such testimony is sufficient evidence that termination is in Children's best interest, see P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799, Mother nevertheless argues that her recent marriage to her husband proves that the trial court's best interests findings are not supported by the evidence and that the opinion of “three lay witnesses” cannot support the conclusion that termination is in Children's best interests. Mother's Br. at 51. These are clear requests to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which, again, we will not do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). The trial court's unchallenged findings include the following:

70. The three older children demonstrate significant emotional and behavioral dysregulation. They participate in therapy regularly to address their emotional and behavioral issues. The past instability of their home environment has contributed to their dysregulation and manifested in nightmares and physical aggression. It would be detrimental to the Children to move from place to place and be exposed to frequent change in their home environment.

* * *

94. [One of the guardians ad litem] was assigned to the case when Mother refused to return the Children to DCS following parenting time and essentially held the Children hostage, necessitating the involvement of law enforcement to retrieve the Children. The incident caused further trauma to the Children regarding their interactions with Mother.

* * *

104. [The family case manager and guardians ad litem] do not support the parents being afforded additional time to complete services.

Mother's App. Vol. II at 175–178. Additionally, the two oldest children expressed not wanting to visit Mother. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Children's best interests.⁴

Conclusion

[19] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain evidence, and its decision to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jana.S. was born on June 8, 2019. Jani.S. was born on June 11, 2020. Ja.H. was born on September 7, 2021. Je.H. was born on December 15, 2022.

2.   Mother challenges 10 of the trial court's 104 findings as being “stated in a manner that is potentially misleading.” Mother's Br. at 33. All of her challenges are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility which we cannot do. See Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). For instance, Mother challenges Finding 29 because it “states that Mother moved to Bloomington ‘after getting into a physical altercation with her sister,’ ” which Mother claims “implies that Mother was the aggressor.” Mother's Br. at 33 (quoting Mother's App. Vol. II at 172). Mother also challenges Finding 89, which states that “Mother has not achieved any sustainable residential or financial stability,” because the trial court should have considered that her recent marriage showed she made demonstrable progress. Id. at 35 (quoting Mother's App. Vol. II at 177). While Mother has a different view of the evidence, we do not believe that the court's findings are misleading. We decline any invitation to reweigh the evidence and reassess the trial court's credibility determinations. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123).Similarly, Mother challenges 23 of the trial court's findings that “recount witnesses’ views but fail to indicate the court's findings” and asks us to “discard them when evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to support termination of Mother's rights.” Mother's Br. at 32. Because we do not base our decision on any of these challenged findings, we do not address the parties’ arguments on this issue.

3.   Mother also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that (1) DCS made reasonable efforts, (2) there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children's well-being, and (3) Mother did not fail to substantially comply with the dispositional decree. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2), (4), (7) (effective date March 11, 2024 to June 30, 2025). Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court was required to find only that one listed circumstance was established. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). We have already concluded that the trial court did not err in its decision under (d)(3), so we need not address Mother's arguments directed at Sections (d)(2), (d)(4), and (d)(7).

4.   Mother also argues that the trial court violated her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights by basing its termination decision on Mother's “financial status.” Mother's Br. at 20. Mother did not make these constitutional arguments to the trial court. Although this court has “discretion to address the merits of a party's constitutional claim notwithstanding waiver,” Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Indiana, Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013), we decline to exercise that discretion here because Mother misrepresents the reasons for the removal and termination. The trial court did not base its termination decision on Mother's “poverty” but on her conduct. Compare Mother's Br.at 20 (claiming the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights due to her financial status), with Mother's App. Vol. II at 182 (terminating Mother's parental rights due to her “ongoing failure to cooperate with and complete Court ordered services, residential and financial instability, untreated or undertreated mental health issues, and lack of parenting skill”). Mother chose not to meaningfully engage in therapy, which might have enabled her to address mental health issues impacting her ability to provide stable housing for Children. Mother chose to leave at least two places of employment after two weeks, which impacted her ability to provide stable housing for Children. This is not a case where the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights simply because there was a “better home available” for Children. See Mother's Br. at 19. Rather, as discussed more fully above, Mother's choices and conduct appreciably and negatively impacted Children, such that termination was in their best interests. See supra ¶ 18.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.