Michael Thompson, Appellant-Petitioner v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] The Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the “Department”) denied Michael Thompson's ¹ request for unemployment benefits upon finding that Caravan Facilities Management, LLC (“Caravan”) terminated Thompson's employment for just cause. At the subsequent telephonic appeal hearing, Thompson did not answer the phone when the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) called him. This prompted the ALJ to dismiss Thompson's appeal, and the Review Board of the Department affirmed the ALJ's dismissal. Thompson now appeals; however, due to his significant noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46, he has waived his appellate claims.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 19, 2025, Caravan terminated Thompson's employment due to a “Union Shop Rules violation” and Thompson's “[r]efusal to follow instructions from [a] supervisor and restricting output.” Appellee's App. Vol. II at 31. Thompson subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. A claims investigator at the Department determined Thompson was ineligible because Caravan terminated Thompson's employment for just cause. Thompson appealed.

[4] The Department sent Thompson notice of a telephonic hearing on his appeal to be held at 9:00 a.m. on December 2, 2025. The notice included a document titled “Important Information About This Process,” which instructed Thompson that the ALJ would contact him at the phone number listed on the attached Acknowledgement Sheet and to return the Acknowledgement Sheet with an updated phone number if the listed phone number was incorrect. Appellee's App. Vol. II at 19. Thompson returned the Acknowledgement Sheet without changing the listed phone number.

[5] At the hearing, the ALJ called Thompson twice at the listed phone number. The ALJ left a voicemail both times after Thompson did not answer the phone. The ALJ then dismissed the appeal, finding, “The party who requested the appeal failed to participate in the appeal hearing.” Appellee's App. Vol. II at 50.

[6] Thompson appealed the ALJ's decision to the Review Board. Thompson claimed that on the day of the hearing, he was “sitting at home ready for [the] hearing at 8:30am and waited by the phone & Ipad and they didn't ring”; later that morning, he called the Department, which informed him that the ALJ “denied” the appeal because he “didn't answer [the] phone.” Appellee's App. Vol. II at 55.

[7] On December 19, 2025, the Review Board issued a decision affirming the ALJ's dismissal. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Thompson Has Waived Appellate Review of His Claims by Significantly Failing to Comply with Appellate Rule 46

[8] Thompson's significant noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 results in waiver of his appellate arguments. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).

[9] The purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Id. (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364).

[10] Thompson has chosen to proceed pro se on appeal; this choice does not loosen the requirements of Appellate Rule 46 for him. See Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)) (explaining that pro se litigants are “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented’ ”). Thompson fails to provide any citations to the Record in support of his statements of fact. Appellant's Br. at 5–6; see Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that statements of fact be supported by citations to the parts of the Record relied on). Thompson also fails to set forth the applicable standard of review for the issue he raises. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(b) (requiring concise statement of applicable standard of review). Additionally, although Thompson's brief contains a Summary of Argument section, it does not include an Argument section, see App. R. 46(A)(7), (8) (requiring both a summary of argument and argument section).

[11] Most significantly, Thompson does not present a “cogent argument” supported by appropriate citation as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Thompson appears to claim that Caravan did not have just cause to terminate him. This is not an appropriate challenge to the Review Board's decision because the Review Board did not decide whether Thompson was terminated for just cause. Rather, the Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision to dismiss the appeal because Thompson did not answer the phone and participate at the hearing. Thompson's brief does not address the ALJ's phone call or Thompson's participation at the hearing.² Thus, Thompson has waived appellate review of all his claims. We affirm the Review Board on all issues raised.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties did not file an affirmative request to keep their names confidential. “Our court has previously found that, notwithstanding the confidentiality mandate of Indiana Code section 22-4-19-6 and Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G), ‘it is appropriate for this [c]ourt to use the full names of parties in routine appeals from the Review Board.’ ” Bailey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't Workforce Dev., 132 N.E.3d 386, 387 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Moore v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't Workforce Dev., 951 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)); see also J.M. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 n.1 (Ind. 2012) (noting that the court's practice “going forward will be to keep the[ ] parties confidential only if they make an affirmative request”).

2.   We note that the Department's Administrative Rules provide, “If the appealing party in a hearing pending before an administrative law judge or the review board fails to appear for a scheduled hearing, after having received due notice, the administrative law judge or the review board shall dismiss the appeal.” 646 I.A.C. 5-10-6(c).

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.