THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS v. DONYE ARRINGTON (2026)

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant Donye Arrington was charged with various detainable felony offenses, and the circuit court granted the State's motion that he be detained pending trial. Defendant now appeals, arguing that the State failed to show that he likely committed the charged offenses or that conditions of release could not mitigate any risk he posed. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with the offenses of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 2024)), aggravated battery with a firearm (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), unlawful possession of a weapon—machine gun parts (id. § 24-1(a)(7)(i)), and three counts of first degree murder (id. §§ 9-1(a)(1), (2)). The State filed a verified petition seeking pretrial detention.

¶ 4 At the hearing, the State proffered as follows. After a shooting that killed one victim and severely wounded another at a large “pop-up party” on a college campus, law enforcement engaged in a thorough investigation that collected multiple sources of surveillance footage, cell tower data, and information from social media.

¶ 5 From this investigation, police were able to trace defendant's movements to and from the location where the shooting took place. Video footage of the shooting was obtained, and the clothing of the suspect matched an outfit worn by defendant in a post to a social media site made close to the time of the offenses. The surveillance footage depicted the suspect approaching people in a large crowd and opening fire with a handgun modified to shoot fully automatically. Cell tower records, information obtained from defendant's Instagram account via search warrant, and surveillance footage allowed officers to confirm that the person seen in the various pieces of video footage was using a cell phone number associated with defendant and that defendant made phone calls at the same time the person on the surveillance footage was seen talking on his phone. The victim who survived the shooting described the clothing worn by the person who shot him, which matched defendant's. Furthermore, the victim described the weapon as a black handgun with a white extended magazine. An investigation of defendant's social media accounts showed that he associated with a person who was also seen with defendant at the scene of the shooting. That person had uploaded pictures of a black handgun with a white extended magazine. The caliber of the gun depicted in the photograph was the same caliber as that used to shoot the victims.

¶ 6 Police were able to determine the vehicle that dropped off defendant and several other people at a gas station adjacent to the scene of the shooting was a vehicle for hire. The address at which the driver of that vehicle said he picked up defendant matched with what the Illinois Secretary of State confirmed to be defendant's home address of record. Surveillance footage from after the incident shows defendant appearing to reenact the shooting for his associates. Photographs of defendant were sent out for identification, and two officers identified defendant by reference to his Instagram account. An image processed through the Illinois Secretary of State matched with defendant.

¶ 7 The State confirmed that the pretrial risk assessment rated defendant as a 1 on a scale of 0 to 14 as a risk to reoffend, but it argued that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the danger he posed.

¶ 8 After hearing argument, the circuit court denied defendant's pretrial release, finding that his actions of firing into a crowd with a handgun altered to shoot like a fully automatic weapon were so divergent from the norms of civil society that he posed a threat to the community and that there were no less restrictive conditions of release that could ensure the community's safety.

¶ 9 Defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). His motion argued that the State failed to sufficiently prove that he committed the alleged offenses because the surveillance footage was “dark, taken from far away, and specifically did not identify” him as the shooter. He also contended that pretrial release conditions, such as electronic monitoring and pretrial supervision, could mitigate any threat he posed.

¶ 10 At the hearing on the motion for relief, the State proffered that additional evidence had come to light since the initial detention hearing. Specifically, defendant's DNA was recovered from a cartridge casing collected at the scene. Although he argued that the video the State relied on for its proffer at the original detention hearing was inadequate to identify him, defendant did not present the video evidence at the hearing. The circuit court noted that even if it did not consider the newly proffered DNA evidence, the State had presented a strong case demonstrating the likelihood defendant committed the alleged offenses and that the initial detention decision was appropriate in light of the circumstances.

¶ 11 Defendant now appeals. The Office of the State Appellate Defender has opted not to file an appellate memorandum, leaving the motion for relief filed in the circuit court to stand without supplementation. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2024)) abolishes traditional monetary bail and provides defendants with a presumption in favor of pretrial release. In order to prevail on a petition to detain a defendant prior to trial, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) “proof is evident or the presumption great” that the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) depending on the offense, the defendant “poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case,” and (3) no condition or combination thereof can mitigate the threat the defendant poses. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). Because there was no live testimony at any of the hearings in this case, our review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 44.

¶ 14 A. Evidence of Defendant's Commission of the Charged Offenses

¶ 15 Defendant initially contends that the video surveillance footage relied on by the State is of poor quality and insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he committed the charged offenses. This case presents a useful illustration of the role that the hearing on the motion for relief can play in ensuring a complete record for review. As we have previously held, it is permissible for either party to introduce additional evidence in connection with the hearing on a motion for relief and for the circuit court to consider that evidence. People v. Kelly, 2026 IL App (4th) 260002, ¶¶ 41-47; see also People v. Person, 2026 IL App (4th) 251272-U, ¶¶ 45-51 (Lannerd, J., specially concurring) (agreeing with Kelly).

¶ 16 At the initial detention hearing, the video footage in question was described via proffer, but the videos themselves were not introduced into evidence. We can hardly fault defendant for failing to tender the videos at that time, as we have no way of knowing whether he possessed or had even seen them at that early date. However, if the inadequacy of the videos was a major focus of defendant's motion for relief, it was incumbent upon him to ensure that the circuit court could see them. Moreover, the videos would have to be part of the record on appeal in order for us to assess which described the content of the videos more accurately: the proffer or defendant's characterization. Defendant's failure to include the videos in the record makes it impossible for us to meaningfully review his assertion. See Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984) (stating the appellant has the burden of presenting a record enabling review of a claim of error, and in its absence, it is presumed the circuit court conformed to the law and had an adequate factual basis for its judgment).

¶ 17 For its part, the State took full advantage of its right to present additional evidence at the hearing on the motion for relief. It proffered that, subsequent to the initial detention hearing, forensic evidence had established that defendant's DNA was on a bullet casing recovered from the scene.

¶ 18 As we have previously commented, when a judge reviews a defendant's detention, such as in deciding a motion for relief, the evidence reviewed is effectively cumulative; the record developed at all prior detention hearings is relevant. People v. Fuller, 2026 IL App (4th) 251329, ¶ 36. That is to say, the court is not sitting as a court of review or looking with blinders at individual prior decisions; it is deciding the motion as it presents at the time of the hearing. When the circuit court here considered defendant's motion for relief, the question was not whether defendant should have been released at some earlier date, but whether he should be released as of the date his motion was being decided. This circumstance is analogous to the situation seen in civil cases where a party seeks to dissolve an injunction entered earlier in the case. The court hearing the motion to dissolve does not sit as a reviewing court that is limited to consideration of the evidence originally submitted. Instead, the court decides the motion “upon the weight of the evidence” (735 ILCS 5/11-108 (West 2024)), including any new evidence bearing on the justification for continuing the injunction (Bank of Wheaton v. Village of Itasca, 178 Ill. App. 3d 626, 632-33 (1989)).

¶ 19 Consequently, it was proper for the circuit court to act in full awareness of not only the strength of the record developed at the initial hearing, but also the new DNA evidence offered by the State. After all, defendant's DNA being found on the bullet casings found at the scene is strong evidence supporting the conclusion that he likely committed the charged offenses, though in another case the new evidence offered in connection with a motion for relief might favor the defendant's release. See, e.g., Kelly, 2026 IL App (4th) 260002, ¶ 47 (proper to consider newly available inpatient treatment option in deciding to grant pretrial release). The stakes—an infringement on the liberty of a person presumed innocent versus protection of the safety of the public—demand that the court should decide the motion on all relevant information available to it.

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the State showed by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses.

¶ 21 B. Adequacy of Conditions of Release

¶ 22 Turning to the issue of conditions, we agree with the circuit court's reasoning that although defendant received a low score on the pretrial risk assessment, his alleged actions “reflect such a departure from the basic expectations of civil society that it becomes difficult to predict the defendant's compliance with court orders—or even societal norms regarding the safety of others—if the defendant is placed on pretrial release.” People v. Romine, 2024 IL App (4th) 240321, ¶ 20. “The questions of whether a criminal defendant poses a threat sufficient to deny pretrial release and whether a condition or conditions can mitigate that threat ‘are two sides of the same coin.’ ” Kelly, 2026 IL App (4th) 260002, ¶ 36 (quoting Romine, 2024 IL App (4th) 240321, ¶ 16). Defendant's alleged actions in this case of traveling to confront a specific person and then opening fire into a large crowd, killing one person and severely wounding another, with a handgun modified to shoot fully automatically is the kind of conduct that would deprive a court of confidence that he would comply with conditions of pretrial release.

¶ 23 We conclude that conditions of release would not adequately mitigate the risk defendant posed to the community.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.