PEOPLE v. ADAMS (2026)

OPINION

¶ 1 In October 2023, the State charged defendant, Dennis P. Adams Jr., with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)), alleging that he used his hand to touch the sex organ of K.A., who was under 13 years of age at the time.

¶ 2 Before trial, the State sought and obtained leave to introduce evidence pursuant to section 115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2022)) that defendant had previously touched R.A. and A.A. in the same manner. The State also sought and obtained leave to introduce “other bad acts” testimony of Shelly Pearson regarding defendant's statements to her about his sexual fantasies and pornographic viewing habits.

¶ 3 In December 2024, a jury found defendant guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of K.A., and in February 2025, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.

¶ 4 Defendant appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present Pearson's testimony. Specifically, defendant contends that “the trial court denied [defendant] a fair trial by allowing the State to present evidence of [defendant's] sexual fantasies and pornography viewing habits where the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighed any probative value.”

¶ 5 We disagree and affirm.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 A. The Charges and Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 8 In October 2023, the State charged defendant with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)), alleging that between December 2018 and October 2020, he used his hand to touch the sex organ of K.A., who was under 13 years of age at the time, for the purpose of defendant's sexual gratification. K.A. was defendant's daughter.

¶ 9 In November 2023, the State filed its “Notice of Intent to Present Evidence Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3,” seeking a ruling regarding the admissibility at trial of evidence that defendant had touched (1) R.A.’s vagina at least four times between the ages of 4 and 12 (approximately 2011 to 2019) and (2) A.A.’s vagina approximately four times between her sixth and ninth grade years of school (approximately 2017 to 2020). R.A. and A.A. were K.A.’s sisters and defendant's daughter and stepdaughter respectively.

¶ 10 That same month, the State filed a “Notice of Intent to Offer Out Of Court Statements of a Minor Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/115-10,” seeking to admit statements made by K.A. to (1) her foster mother, Laura A. (who was also defendant's ex-wife), (2) R.A., and (3) Nathaniel Colwell, a forensic interviewer at the Sangamon County Child Advocacy Center (CAC). K.A.’s statements to these individuals described “acts of sexual abuse and sexual assault perpetrated upon her as charged in the Information.”

¶ 11 In September 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State's section 115-10 motion (725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2022)). At that hearing, the State tendered to the court a video recording of K.A.’s August 2023 CAC interview with Colwell. The State also called Laura A., R.A., A.A., and Colwell to testify about K.A.’s statements to them. After hearing the testimony, the court continued the matter to review the video recording.

¶ 12 In October 2024, the State filed a motion to admit other-crimes evidence pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Specifically, the State sought to admit the testimony of Shelly Pearson regarding her conversations with defendant, during which she and defendant would discuss their “deepest, darkest secret.” The State alleged in its motion that defendant disclosed the following to Pearson: (1) “A.A. had caught him masturbating and A.A. began to do the same on the other end of the couch,” (2) defendant “purchased a vibrator for A.A. and showed her how to use it,” (3) defendant “enjoyed watching ‘daddy/daughter’ pornography’ and sent her pornographic videos related to step-father and step-daughters having sexual relations,” and (4) “A.A. had initiated some sexual encounters with defendant,” including “rubbing his penis” while they were watching television and, on another occasion, while they were sitting outside by a campfire. Pearson also reported that, in July 2022, defendant sent her Snapchat images showing A.A. sleeping. According to Pearson, defendant pulled A.A.’s shorts to the side, exposing her vagina, then sent further images of him holding his erect penis near her face and mouth.

¶ 13 In November 2024, the trial court heard the arguments of the parties regarding the State's section 115-10 and 115-7.3 motions and granted them both, allowing the State to introduce evidence of (1) defendant's conduct toward R.A. and A.A. and (2) K.A.’s out-of-court statements to R.A., A.A., Laura A., and Colwell regarding defendant's conduct toward K.A. (The parties agreed that the State's Rule 404(b) motion regarding Pearson's testimony should be argued on “the day of trial.”)

¶ 14 B. The Jury Trial

¶ 15 In December 2024, the trial court conducted defendant's jury trial.

¶ 16 1. The State's Rule 404(b) Motion

¶ 17 Prior to jury selection, the trial court addressed the State's motion to admit Pearson's testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b). The State first outlined for the court the testimony it sought to admit, which consisted of the following. Pearson met the defendant through Facebook and communicated with him through social media and text messages, and they then met in person and began a sexual relationship. During that time, defendant “told [Pearson] his sexual fantasies and pornography viewing habits.”

¶ 18 The State argued as follows:

“[Defendant] told [Pearson] he fantasized and viewed daddy/daughter and stepfather/stepdaughter pornography. He told [Pearson] of a time that [A.A.] caught him masturbating and then she began doing the same at the other end of [the] couch. He also told [Pearson] that he had purchased [A.A.] a vibrator and showed her how to use it, because as a dad it was his job to teach his child what sex feels like.

[Pearson] would also testify that the defendant sent her three to four nude images of what appeared to be a juvenile age girl, estimated, in [Pearson's] opinion, to be 15 or 16 years old. Defendant told her it was a girl he used to have sex with, but once he found out she was under 18, he stopped having sex with her. ***

The defendant also told [Pearson] that [A.A.] had initiated a sexual contact with him by rubbing his penis, and that he did not stop her. And that happened on two separate occasions. On July 15, 2022, [defendant] sent [Pearson] four other photographs, one was of a female whose shorts were pulled to the side exposing the female's vagina, and that the female could not be identified. The second photograph depicted the defendant holding his penis and [A.A.] was in his bed. The third photograph depicted the defendant's penis on a pillow near [A.A.’s] face. And the fourth photograph depicted the defendant's penis near [A.A.’s] mouth. [Pearson] recognized the defendant's bed in the last three pictures, and recognized [A.A.] in the pictures.

He also told [Pearson] that he fantasized about wanting to have sex with [Pearson] while [Pearson's] daughter watched, and that he wanted to have sex with [Pearson's] daughter while [Pearson] watched. And at the time of those statements [Pearson's] daughter *** was 19 years old. [Pearson] would further testify that she played into the defendant's fantasies and the two texted about those fantasies, and the text messages were about [Pearson's] daughter, and were preserved through photographs, and that the State has copies of those photographs that would also be intended to be used as exhibits as well. In those text messages, he told [Pearson] that he was looking at pictures of [Pearson's daughter] and he was masturbating, and that he wanted to come and have sex with both of them. And another text message the defendant texted about [Pearson's daughter's] body and how it looked in a particular pair of jeans in photographs that were sent.”

¶ 19 The prosecutor then argued that the foregoing “[went] directly toward the type of evidence that should be admitted under [Rule] 404(b) as motive and intent” because defendant's viewing and fantasizing about “daddy/daughter” and “stepfather/stepdaughter” pornography was “directly on point in these cases,” noting that “[e]ach of the victims that are going to be testifying have that type of relationship with the defendant” and “[t]hat's what he is being accused of committing.”

¶ 20 Defense counsel argued that the evidence bore no factual similarity to the offense defendant was charged with, which was touching K.A.’s vagina, and the trial court had already ruled that R.A. and A.A. could testify about defendant's having similarly touched them. Defense counsel also asserted that A.A. had denied in an interview that she had ever masturbated with defendant or rubbed his penis. Counsel further argued that defendant's fantasies involving Pearson's 19-year-old daughter were not “other bad acts” because, although outside of the norm, they involved legal activity. Last, counsel argued that “the prejudicial effect [of admitting Pearson's testimony] would be overwhelming versus very, very little if any probative value.”

¶ 21 The State, in reply, acknowledged that Pearson did not see things firsthand, but it asserted that the fact that defendant verbalized his sexual fantasies involving A.A. and “the things he's wanting to do with these children” was “extremely probative.”

¶ 22 The trial court denied the State's motion in part, barring Pearson from testifying about defendant's statements fantasizing about (1) Pearson's adult daughter, because they were not relevant, and (2) A.A., because she had denied masturbating with defendant or touching his penis and “we don't have any of those photographs.” In so ruling, the court explained in part that “the testimony in that regard would be too prejudicial.”

¶ 23 However, the trial court also granted the State's motion in part, stating, “I do think in terms of motive, opportunity, intent that the information as to what he fantasizes about, or what he is interested in, which is the daughter and stepdaughter porn, is relevant to these areas, and I am going to allow [Pearson's] testimony as to that.”

¶ 24 2. The State's Evidence

¶ 25 The State presented the following evidence.

¶ 26 a. K.A.

¶ 27 K.A., the alleged victim in this case, testified that she was 10 years old and defendant was her father. She stated that no one should touch her “bad parts,” which she pointed to and described as what she uses to “go potty.” She said defendant would come into her room at night and touch her bad parts. K.A. did not remember how old she was when that happened, but said it occurred “[w]hen my mom [(Laura A.)] lived in the old house” and was married to defendant. She said it happened “almost every night” while they were married. After defendant and Laura were divorced, he did not touch K.A. because “his new girlfriend was always up on him and he couldn't.”

¶ 28 K.A. testified that defendant would touch her bad parts in her room when she was sleeping in her bed. She did not share a room with anyone, and no one else was present when it occurred. She stated that she usually wore shorts and he would use his hand to rub her “bad parts” over her clothing. In front of the jury, she made a back-and-forth motion with her hand to show how he would rub her. She said he typically did not say anything, but sometimes she asked him to stop, and he would say he was just checking on her.

¶ 29 On cross-examination, K.A. stated that prior to being interviewed by Colwell, she had asked her mother why defendant was in jail, and her mother told her that defendant had touched K.A.’s sisters (R.A. and A.A.) in their rooms at night. K.A. said she told her mom that he came into her room and touched her, too, and when her mom “freaked out,” K.A. asked her, “Is that bad?” K.A. testified she “didn't know that was bad.”

¶ 30 Defense counsel asked K.A. if she recalled being interviewed by Colwell previously, and she answered that she did not, nor did she remember ever telling him in a previous interview that her dad had never done bad things to her. Defense counsel also asked K.A. if she remembered talking to a police officer in her bedroom about her dad, about three years prior, and she answered that she did not.

¶ 31 b. Laura A.

¶ 32 Laura testified that she began dating defendant in August 2015 and they began living together in April or May 2016. They were married in May 2018 and divorced in April 2021. They did not have any children in common, but Laura had two children of her own, A.A. and B.A., and defendant had five children, including K.A. and R.A. (We note that, at the time of trial, A.A. was 17 years old, B.A. was 20 years old, K.A. was 10 years old, and R.A. was 17 years old.) Laura and defendant lived together with Laura's children, and defendant's children visited on the weekends. At some point, when K.A. was about two years old, defendant obtained “full custody” of K.A., and she began living with defendant and Laura “full time.”

¶ 33 Laura and defendant bought a four-bedroom home in Hartsburg, Illinois, in approximately October 2018, after they were married. Laura moved out shortly before their divorce, in approximately November 2020. K.A. and A.A. slept in two of the upstairs bedrooms. When R.A. was at the house, she slept in K.A.’s room. Laura explained that it was necessary to walk through A.A.’s bedroom to get to K.A.’s bedroom.

¶ 34 Laura and defendant shared the master bedroom, which was on the main floor. They also had turned living space in the basement into two additional bedrooms.

¶ 35 When Laura lived with defendant, she found him coming out of the girls’ bedrooms “quite a bit.” She explained that she usually went to bed around 8 p.m. because she had to be at work at 3 a.m. When she woke up and he was not in bed, she would check the living room and also look to see if his truck was there. If it was not, she would go upstairs to look for him, and she would often see him coming out of K.A.’s or A.A.’s room. Laura would ask defendant what he was doing, and “[t]here was always something, he heard something, or heard them coughing, or [he was] making sure K.A. was okay and didn't need cough medicine.”

¶ 36 Laura stated it was usually around 11 p.m. when she would find him coming out of one of the girls’ bedrooms and he was usually wearing his pajama pants or boxer shorts. She explained that he would still be in one of the bedrooms when she would catch him sitting on the side of one of their beds or just getting up from talking to them. She said, “That's all I ever thought was going on.”

¶ 37 Laura testified that the girls went to bed by 9 p.m. on school nights but they stayed up later on weekends. She also testified that defendant often gave the girls melatonin to help them sleep. He called it their “sleeping medicine” and would tell them, “you have to take your medicine so you'd go to sleep.” She believed he was giving them “three or four,” but she did not know how many milligrams each pill contained. He gave melatonin to all three girls, K.A., A.A., and R.A.

¶ 38 Laura then testified about events occurring on August 20, 2023. At that time, she had obtained custody of K.A. K.A had been asking her “for a long time” why defendant was in jail. Laura had not shared with her what had happened between defendant and R.A. but decided to tell K.A. at this time because K.A. was getting ready to start school in a small community and the other kids would likely be talking about it. So Laura told K.A. that defendant was in jail “because he was touching [A.A.] and [R.A.] in their bad parts.” K.A. “instantly started crying and said, ‘I thought he was only doing that to me, I didn't know he was doing that to them, too.’ ” Laura contacted the police, and on August 25, 2023, Laura took K.A. to the CAC to be interviewed.

¶ 39 On cross-examination, Laura testified that R.A. made claims about defendant in February or March 2021 and A.A. and K.A. were interviewed by the police as part of that investigation. Defendant was not arrested, and he continued to spend time with A.A. Further, in August 2022, the police investigated a report that defendant had taken videos of A.A. while she was sleeping. A.A. was questioned as part of that investigation. Defendant was not arrested, and A.A. continued to spend time with defendant.

¶ 40 Then, in February 2023, A.A. reported that defendant had molested her in the years prior. Both A.A. and K.A. were interviewed as part of that investigation. A.A. continued to spend time with defendant until he was arrested in June 2023.

¶ 41 On redirect examination, Laura stated that although A.A. had contact with defendant following her disclosures, that contact was never one-on-one. She explained that after A.A. made her claims against defendant, he did not know where the claims came from and Laura and A.A. were “trying to keep it so we could still see the girls [(defendant's other daughters)] because if he knew it was us that said something he wouldn't let us see the girls anymore.”

¶ 42 c. Colwell

¶ 43 Colwell, the program director and forensic interviewer at the Sangamon County CAC, testified that he interviewed K.A. on August 25, 2023. He said he also interviewed her in February 2023, which resulted in a “nondisclosure.” (We note that the August 2023 interview was played for the jury as State's exhibit No. 1 during Colwell's testimony and the February 2023 interview was played for the jury as defendant's exhibit No. 15 at the conclusion of defendant's case-in-chief.)

¶ 44 During the August 2023 interview, Colwell utilized female anatomical diagrams with K.A., on which K.A. indicated where she had been touched by drawing circles. The vagina and the buttocks were circled, and Colwell had noted that K.A. indicated she was touched “inside” her vagina and “outside” her buttocks.

¶ 45 On cross-examination, Colwell testified that during the interview, K.A., who was eight years old at the time, told him she was touched when she was four or five years old, when she was wearing a diaper or a “onesie.” She also told him she had never talked on the phone to anyone about being touched. Colwell also recalled the February 2023 interview and testified that K.A. told him at that time that defendant had never touched her “bad parts.”

¶ 46 On redirect examination, Colwell testified that it was “very, very common” for a child to delay disclosure of sexual abuse. He also testified that it was not unusual for him to interview the same child multiple times, with the child disclosing only in a later interview.

¶ 47 After Colwell testified, the State played for the jury the video recording of Colwell's August 2023 interview with K.A. During that interview, K.A. stated that her dad touched her “bad parts” while she was sleeping. She said she would wake up to him “touching it” and he would “keep on looking at the door.” K.A. clarified that she used her “bad parts” to pee. She also circled the vagina on an anatomical drawing. She said he would use his hand to “rub” her bad parts. She also said sometimes he would “squeeze” it. Sometimes he touched her over her pants and sometimes he touched her under her pants. When he touched under her pants, he touched the outside and inside of her vagina. K.A. said it happened “a lot,” beginning when she was four or five and ending when her dad and Laura broke up. (K.A. was eight years old at the time of the interview.) K.A. also said that defendant used to give her a lot of melatonin to go to sleep. K.A. said that if she was lying on her belly, he would touch her buttocks. When she would wake, he would tell her he was just checking on her and to go back to sleep. She said that, when he touched “it” and heard “mama” coming, he would “hurry up and stand up.”

¶ 48 d. R.A.

¶ 49 R.A. testified that she was currently 17 years old and defendant was her father. (Her mother was Annie G.) When she was younger, she lived with her mother during the week and with defendant every other weekend. When asked whether defendant ever touched her sexually, R.A. answered as follows:

“There would be times when [defendant] would come into my room, thinking that I'm sleeping or that I am sleeping and he would start rubbing on my leg and then go up and start trying to touch me sexually on my butt and on my vagina. And there would be times where I would have to act like I woke up so that he would stop. There would be times where I would catch him in my room touching me, and there was times when I was younger where he would have me sleep next to him, and he would start touching me where I would try to close my legs to stop it, and he would tell me to relax and to let him do it.”

¶ 50 The prosecutor asked R.A. if she remembered the first time something like that happened to her, and she answered, “When I was four.” She testified that they lived in a house outside Hartsburg at this time. She went to sleep with defendant because she did not want to sleep in her room. Defendant started touching her “at first over my underwear and started to go under.” R.A. said she tried stopping him by closing her legs tightly but “he kept forcing it.” She stated that his hand never went inside her vagina, he just “[r]ubbed my middle part.” She estimated that this would occur “[p]robably every other week” while they lived in that particular house, then it “got worse” when they moved into a house in San Jose, Illinois.

¶ 51 R.A. testified that while they lived in San Jose, defendant would touch her over and under her underwear, both in his bedroom and in her bedroom. She said she always wore a nightgown and underwear to bed. Sometimes it happened shortly after she went to bed, and sometimes she would wake up to it happening.

¶ 52 R.A. testified that it “got worse in the most recent house,” explaining that “[h]e would be in our room almost every night.” She said at that time, she shared a room with A.A. She said that she had to act like she was asleep but not fall asleep because he would come into the room and start trying to touch her; she would then act as if she woke up and would go to the bathroom “so he would stop.” R.A. also stated that she would wake up in the middle of the night with him sitting in a chair in her room, saying he was watching her TV. She also testified that she would wake to find him in her bathroom “for no reason” because there was a bathroom “downstairs right next to his room.” R.A. said, “He would come in [A.A.’s] room to check up to see if we were awake or asleep every single night.” This only happened at night, and R.A. never confronted him about it because she was “too scared.”

¶ 53 R.A. testified that “it stopped whenever he started to live with Laura.” R.A. believed she was 12 or 13 years old, “because it was around the time that I started my period.”

¶ 54 R.A. also described a trip that she took with defendant to Florida. Defendant worked in trucking at the time and took R.A. and her brother with him on a work trip in his semi-truck. They all slept in the bed in the rear of the truck. In the morning, “he would have [R.A.’s brother] go to the front, and then he would do that stuff again.” She clarified that by “that stuff,” she meant “[h]e would touch me underneath my underwear and start rubbing.” On that trip, it happened twice that she remembered. Both times her brother was up in the front of the truck.

¶ 55 R.A. said she never saw defendant touch anyone else, he never touched any other part of her body beside her vagina and “butt,” he never made her touch any part of his body, and he never touched her with any other part of his body.

¶ 56 R.A. described receiving a phone call from K.A. in August 2023, during which K.A. told her that defendant had touched her “over and underneath her underwear.” R.A. had not previously told K.A. that defendant had touched her in the same way, explaining that K.A. “was too young.”

¶ 57 On cross-examination, R.A. stated she never told anyone what defendant had been doing to her until February 2021. At that time, R.A. was living with her mother and seeing defendant every weekend. R.A. and defendant got into a “heated” argument about R.A. wanting to quit volleyball; defendant did not want her to quit because he had spent a lot of money on it. During the argument, defendant told R.A. he was going to go back to court to get full custody of her and she would have to live with him. After that argument, R.A. told her mother that defendant had been touching her vagina.

¶ 58 On redirect examination, R.A. testified that she came forward at that time because she “didn't want to live with it the rest of [her] life.” She said, “I was hiding it and trying to keep it because I didn't want the girls to be touched and because he was abusive.” She stated that she had not disclosed previously because she believed as long as he was touching her, he would not be touching her stepsisters.

¶ 59 e. A.A.

¶ 60 A.A. testified that she was currently 17 years old and living with her mother, Laura, and K.A. Defendant was A.A.’s stepfather. She lived with defendant from the time she was approximately 8 to 10 years old and stopped living with him when she was about 14 years old. She explained that her mom and defendant slept downstairs while she and R.A. shared a room upstairs. K.A. also had a room upstairs, and “you had to walk through my room to get to [K.A.’s] room.”

¶ 61 When asked whether, when she lived with defendant, he ever touched her in a sexual way, A.A. answered that he did. She described that the first time it happened, she was eight years old, before he moved in with them. She fell asleep in his room and awoke to him touching her vagina under her clothes. A.A. said she had to “move around so he would stop,” and when he stopped, she got up and left the room. She did not say anything to anyone.

¶ 62 A.A. described another incident that occurred “a couple months” later after defendant moved in with them. She woke to find him sitting on her bed and touching her under her pants. She “had to move around and act like I didn't know what he was doing” and “had to act like I was waking up so he would stop.” He was touching the inside of her vagina.

¶ 63 After that, it happened about three more times. Two of those times, A.A. recalled that she was lying on the couch and had fallen asleep, waking up to find him touching her. Each time, she did not say anything to him when she awoke, and he did not say anything to her. Each time, he touched the inside of her vagina. The last time it happened occurred “right before we moved out of the house” and also occurred on the couch. Two of the times it occurred in the bedroom in the middle of the night while R.A. was also in the room but was sleeping.

¶ 64 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked A.A. about being interviewed in August 2022 as part of an investigation into whether, in July 2022, any photographs had been taken of her while she was sleeping. She told the police that in July 2022, she was not even around defendant; her mother had divorced him, and he was not living with them. During that investigation, A.A. did not tell the police that defendant had previously touched her sexually.

¶ 65 A.A. further testified that after her mother divorced defendant in 2021, she still spent time with him even though she could have easily not done so. She enjoyed spending time with him, attending demolition derbies with him and communicating by Snapchat.

¶ 66 A.A. came forward about defendant's touching her in February 2023 after a rumor went around that her friend's father had seen defendant put his hand up A.A.’s shirt at a demolition derby. The day that she told the police about defendant's touching her, she also sent a message to R.A. saying, “[W]e think he was doing shit to me.”

¶ 67 On redirect examination, A.A. testified that defendant never touched her after she and Laura moved out of the house. She continued to have contact with him after that “because of [her] siblings,” with whom she was close and with whom defendant still had custody or visitation rights. She did not disclose the abuse when she was interviewed in 2022 because (1) she was scared and (2) if defendant got “locked up,” her siblings would have to go back to their biological moms, who “at the time *** weren't good people.”

¶ 68 A.A. came forward in 2023 because her friend convinced her that she should do it to save other people, including her siblings, from being touched. A.A. also explained that her Snapchat messages with defendant were just “normal stuff” like exchanging pictures of their faces with Snapchat filters or asking if she was going to see her little sister that day.

¶ 69 f. Pearson

¶ 70 Just prior to Pearson's taking the witness stand, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

“[E]vidence is about to be received that the defendant has been involved in conduct other than that charged in the information. The evidence is about to be received on the issue of defendant's intent and motive and may be considered by you only for that limited purpose. It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in *** these offenses and, if so, what weight should be given to the evidence on the issue of intent and motive.”

¶ 71 Pearson then testified that she met defendant in March 2022 through a dating app. She described their relationship as primarily “sexting,” although they met twice in person. During their electronic communication, defendant told her about his sexual fantasies and pornography viewing habits. She explained, “[M]ost of his sexual fantasies or pornography fantasies were daddy/daughter, stepdad/stepdaughter, more of less those types of things.”

¶ 72 Pearson testified that during one conversation about masturbation, defendant told her the following:

“[H]e told me there was a time where he was masturbating on the couch, and [A.A.] was at one end and he was at the other. He was masturbating. [A.A.] was asleep.

***

She woke up, he was masturbating. She began masturbating. Neither one stopped until they were finished, that type of thing.”

Pearson explained that she interpreted it as a fantasy because she “didn't feel like that was something that a stepparent and a stepchild would do.”

¶ 73 Next, the prosecutor asked Pearson whether defendant ever talked about any other scenarios involving A.A. Pearson answered that defendant told her that on two occasions he was sitting at a campfire with A.A. when A.A. started rubbing his genitals on the outside of his jeans.

¶ 74 During another conversation, Pearson and defendant were discussing vibrators, and defendant told her that he bought A.A. her first vibrator because he “[felt] like it was his job as her dad to show her how to use it and *** show her how sex should feel.” Again, Pearson interpreted defendant's comments as fantasy. However, she also told defendant not to “cross that line” because she “wanted him to know that once he crossed it, he couldn't come back.”

¶ 75 On cross-examination, Pearson testified that most of her communication with defendant was by electronic messaging. She did not retain copies of any of the conversations she testified about on direct examination.

¶ 76 On redirect examination, she explained that, when using Snapchat, a user can choose to have the messages (1) deleted after opening, (2) deleted after 24 hours, or (3) saved. Pearson's default setting was to have the messages deleted after 24 hours.

¶ 77 g. Stipulation

¶ 78 At the close of the State's case, the trial court read for the jury a written stipulation stating that A.A. would testify (1) she did not catch defendant masturbating and begin masturbating herself, (2) defendant did not buy her a vibrator or show her how to use one, and (3) she did not initiate any sexual contact with defendant by rubbing his penis.

¶ 79 3. Defendant's Evidence

¶ 80 Defendant presented the following evidence.

¶ 81 a. Detective Michael Block

¶ 82 Block, a detective with the Logan County Sheriff's Department, testified that he interviewed K.A. in March 2021 at her home as part of his investigation into the allegations R.A. had raised against defendant. He did not obtain any information that would lead him to believe K.A. had been sexually abused. Defendant spoke willingly with Block as part of that investigation.

¶ 83 On cross-examination, Block testified that when he spoke with K.A., it occurred at her home where she resided with defendant. The interview was informal with other children present and the television on. Block said K.A. was about six years old at the time, and he had a hard time getting her to sit with him.

¶ 84 b. Peggy Adams

¶ 85 Adams testified that she was defendant's mother. Defendant obtained custody of K.A. because K.A.’s mother “was an alcoholic and a bad mother.” Over the years, Adams had seen defendant interact with K.A. and R.A. She never saw either girl express any fear toward defendant or hesitation to be around him. Adams also testified that she saw A.A. spend time with defendant, noting that she would come to holiday gatherings and birthday parties even though defendant and Laura had divorced. Adams never saw A.A. express any fear toward defendant, either.

¶ 86 On cross-examination, Adams testified that the gatherings she described occurred during the daytime with many people present. Additionally, Adams had never spent the night at defendant's home.

¶ 87 c. Race and Nicole Damm

¶ 88 Race and Nicole Damm, a married couple who lived near defendant, each testified that they had known defendant since 2019 and were close to him. Race saw defendant with K.A. and A.A. regularly and never saw either girl express fear or hesitation to be around defendant. Nicole saw K.A. around defendant regularly and, similarly, saw no fear or hesitation. She had seen A.A. around defendant only two or three times but did not observe any fear or hesitation on A.A.’s part.

¶ 89 On cross-examination, Race acknowledged that he did not know what went on at defendant's house at nighttime. Nicole testified that she had spent the night at defendant's home twice, but the girls were not there either time. Race had seen R.A. only one time and had never spoken to her. Nicole testified that she was employed at a school, was a mandated reporter, and had received training “to determine *** if someone has gone through trauma, *** sexual abuse, [or] neglect.” Nicole agreed that children respond differently to trauma and a child may not always respond with fear toward his or her abuser. She also agreed it was not uncommon for a child to still want to be with their abuser at times.

¶ 90 d. Defendant

¶ 91 Defendant testified that he was convicted of intimidation in 2015 and theft in 2019. He also stated that he had five children—R.A., An. A., L.A., J.A., and K.A.

¶ 92 Defendant provided a timeline of his past relationships, residences, and the births of his children. He stated that Annie G. was the mother of R.A. and An. A. Beth C. was the mother of L.A. and J.A., and Samantha V. was the mother of K.A. Defendant was in a relationship with Annie beginning in 2006, and R.A. was born in 2007. He and Annie split up in 2008 but maintained contact and, in 2009, An. A. was born. In 2010, Annie moved away with R.A. and An. A. Defendant began a relationship with Beth that lasted about four years. They lived together in a house outside of Hartsburg. In 2011, twins L.A. and J.A. were born to defendant and Beth. At the end of 2011, defendant obtained full custody of R.A. and An. A. In 2014, Beth moved out, and all four children stayed with defendant.

¶ 93 In 2014, shortly after Beth moved out, defendant began a relationship with Samantha that lasted only about a year and a half. They lived together in the house outside of Hartsburg until they moved to San Jose in October 2014. They were briefly married, divorcing in 2016. Defendant started dating Laura in 2015, they married in 2017, and they split up in October 2020. When defendant and Laura started dating, he lived in San Jose, and she lived in rural Hartsburg. Shortly thereafter, defendant moved into Laura's house. At that time, defendant's twins were living with Beth, and R.A. and An. A. were living with Annie.

¶ 94 In October 2018, defendant and Laura moved from rural Hartsburg into Hartsburg proper. At that time, defendant, Laura, A.A., L.A., J.A., and K.A. lived together; R.A. and An. A. visited every other weekend and stayed a week or two during the summer.

¶ 95 Defendant testified about the Florida trip that R.A. had described. He said it occurred in 2015 or 2016, when he was employed as an over-the-road truck driver. He was hauling a load of fertilizer and took R.A. with him; An. A. did not go on the trip. Defendant denied touching R.A. sexually on that trip.

¶ 96 Defense counsel asked about October 2020, when Laura moved out. At that time, defendant had R.A. and An. A. on the weekends. Although Laura took A.A. with her, defendant continued to see A.A. “pretty close to every other weekend.” He said A.A. would come over to spend time with R.A. when R.A. was there. Defendant said he talked to A.A. daily. He also had full custody of K.A. at the time and continued to allow Laura to see K.A. because he did not want K.A. to lose another mom.

¶ 97 Defendant testified that he spent time alone with A.A. after Laura moved out. He said that they went to dinner a couple of times and they went to derbies.

¶ 98 After Laura moved out in 2020, defendant started dating Stephanie B., who moved in with defendant. He continued to have R.A. every other weekend. In February 2021, defendant and R.A. began having some “difficulties” because she was “failing school” and she told him she did not want to play volleyball anymore. During an argument over text and phone, he told her that he was going to seek full custody of her, and R.A. screamed at him in response. The next day, defendant was contacted by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) regarding allegations by R.A. of sexual abuse. Defendant said he cooperated with the investigation and, as part of DCFS protocol, sent K.A., L.A., and J.A. to live with Laura. After the investigation concluded in March 2021, he received custody back. After that, he did not want to see R.A. Laura allowed him to have contact with A.A. and, in his observation, A.A. wanted to see him, too.

¶ 99 While defendant was dating Stephanie, he began an online relationship with Pearson in 2022, meeting her on Facebook. Most of his communications with her were electronic. The communications lasted about four or five months. In August 2022, an investigation occurred into allegations that defendant took videos or photos of A.A. in July 2022. Defendant cooperated with that investigation. Defendant denied telling Pearson that (1) A.A. had caught him masturbating on the couch and began doing the same thing on the other end, (2) he purchased a vibrator for A.A. and taught her how to use it, (3) he liked to watch daddy/daughter pornography, and (4) A.A. had initiated sexual contact with his penis.

¶ 100 Defendant testified about the investigation in February 2023 after A.A. came forward with allegations that defendant had touched her as well. He stated that he tried to “get an interview” with the police but they would not give him one. Just prior to A.A. coming forward, in January 2023, Beth sought and obtained visitation every other weekend with the twins, L.A. and J.A. By April 2023, the twins were placed with Beth, and defendant placed K.A. with Laura. Defendant continued to visit with K.A., L.A., and J.A., although the visits were supervised due to the pending investigation.

¶ 101 Defendant stated that between February 2023 and April 2023, he saw A.A. in person two or three times—once when he was dropping the kids off and again when she came to his house while he was “out in my shop.” She came to his house once when he was not home to see his dog. They communicated electronically by phone, text, and Snapchat. He described the conversations as “casual.” Defendant stated he had heard the rumor about his putting his hand up A.A.’s shirt at a derby and denied ever doing so.

¶ 102 Defense counsel then asked defendant about Laura's testimony that he would check on the kids in the evenings. He said he did do that almost every night and did not believe it was unusual. He explained that the girls always fell asleep with the television on or their glasses on, so he would turn off the television and take off their glasses. Defendant also testified that he did give the girls melatonin and did not believe it was improper. He said that Beth introduced him to melatonin and he just “continued on giving it to them” to help them “settle down” and as a “sleep aid.”

¶ 103 Defendant denied ever touching R.A., A.A., or K.A. in a sexual manner.

¶ 104 On cross-examination, defendant stated that he went into the girls’ bedrooms “almost every night” to turn off their lights or TV, or take off their glasses, and that Laura was aware he did that. He would have to walk through A.A. and R.A.’s room to get to K.A.’s room. He generally spent two to four minutes in their rooms—however long it took to find the remote, turn off the TV and lights, etc.—and denied ever sitting on their beds or crouching near them in the middle of the night.

¶ 105 e. K.A.’s February 2023 CAC Interview

¶ 106 After defendant testified, defense counsel played for the jury a video recording of K.A.’s CAC interview by Colwell in February 2023. During that interview, K.A. said she lived with defendant, Stephanie, L.A., J.A., and Stephanie's two kids. Stephanie was “dad's girlfriend.” When asked what she was there to talk about, K.A. said that her dad had to sleep in the camper because someone kept calling saying he had been doing bad things. She said, “But he's nice to us, he hasn't done any bad things.” She said she had to talk to someone at school that asked her “a whole bunch of different questions,” including whether K.A.’s dad had touched her bad part, and K.A. told the person “dad hasn't touched me on my bad parts.”

¶ 107 4. Closing Arguments

¶ 108 During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel commented briefly about Pearson's testimony while focusing primarily on the rest of the evidence.

¶ 109 The prosecutor summarized Pearson's testimony, noting that defendant told Pearson about his sexual fantasies involving fathers and stepfathers being with daughters and stepdaughters, including specific fantasies about A.A. The prosecutor emphasized that defendant's statements were fantasies, not reality, and also argued that Pearson had no reason to lie. The prosecutor stated, “The defendant has a motive and intent to touch little girls,” then noted that defendant “had the opportunity to act on those urges” when he went “almost nightly” into the girls’ rooms when Laura was asleep or at work.

¶ 110 Defense counsel argued that Pearson's claims were unsupported by physical copies of the messages and A.A. denied defendant did any of the things to her that he talked to Pearson about doing. Counsel suggested that Pearson was angry that defendant ended their relationship.

¶ 111 5. The Jury Instructions and Verdict

¶ 112 The jury was instructed, pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (approved Oct. 17, 2014), as follows:

“Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in conduct other than that charged in the information.

This evidence has been received on the issue of defendant's intent and motive and may be considered by you only for that limited purpose.

It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in those offenses and if so, what weight should be given to this evidence on the issue of intent and motive.”

¶ 113 The jury found defendant guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault to K.A.

¶ 114 C. The Posttrial Motion and Sentence

¶ 115 In December 2024, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit Pearson's testimony regarding defendant's “sexual fantasies, acts involving his stepdaughter, and watching ‘daddy/daughter pornography’ ” because the conduct Pearson described was not factually similar to the charged offense and the prejudicial effect of her testimony substantially outweighed its probative value.

¶ 116 In February 2025, following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. That same day, the court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.

¶ 117 This appeal followed.

¶ 118 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 119 Defendant appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present Pearson's testimony. Specifically, defendant contends that “the trial court denied [defendant] a fair trial by allowing the State to present evidence of [defendant's] sexual fantasies and pornography viewing habits where the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighed any probative value.”

¶ 120 We disagree and affirm.

¶ 121 A. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 122 The State sought to admit the evidence in question—namely, Pearson's testimony—for the purpose of showing defendant's motive and intent. In support of the State's request, the State cited Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), which states the following:

“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith except as provided by sections 115-7.3, 115-7.4, and 115-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3, 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4, and 725 ILCS 5/115-20). Such evidence may also be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

¶ 123 The trial court conducted a hearing on the State's motion to admit this evidence and granted it in part by permitting Pearson to testify only to portions of what defendant had told her. (We earlier discussed the testimony from Pearson the court permitted. Supra ¶¶ 70-74.)

¶ 124 In People v. Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 38, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the standard of review applicable to a trial court's admission of other-crimes evidence and wrote the following:

“The trial court has discretion to decide whether to admit evidence of prior misconduct, and this court will not disturb the trial court's determination unless the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Smith, 2022 IL 127946, ¶ 25 (‘A trial court's decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991) (‘The admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court's decision may not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’); see People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003) (‘We will not reverse the trial court's decision to admit other-crimes evidence unless we find that the court abused its discretion.’).”

¶ 125 Defendant's primary argument is that Pearson's testimony regarding defendant's “sexual fantasies, acts involving his stepdaughter, and watching ‘daddy/daughter pornography’ ” was not relevant to the charge against defendant. Defendant also argues that “the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighed any probative value.”

¶ 126 We address these arguments in turn, starting with defendant's contention that Pearson's testimony was not relevant.

¶ 127 B. The Relevancy of Pearson's Testimony

¶ 128 Illinois Rule of Evidence 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) defines “relevant evidence” as follows: “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

¶ 129 Noting that defendant was charged with a single count of predatory criminal sexual assault against K.A. by touching her private area while she was sleeping, defendant argues that Pearson's testimony, which the State offered to show defendant's motive and intent, was not relevant. Defendant contends that there was no need to establish motive or intent because those elements were not at issue in this case.

¶ 130 In response, the State asserts that Pearson's testimony was properly admitted for the following reasons:

“[I]n the present case defendant's fantasies and pornography viewing habits emulated the act carried out in the charged crime, and the acts testified to by each of defendant's victims. Defendant's stated interests involved ‘daddy/daughter’ or ‘daddy/step-daughter’ scenarios. During defendant's trial, three witnesses that had either father/daughter or father/step-daughter relationships with defendant, testified that he had sexually assaulted them as children on many occasions. Defendant did so by touching their vagina with his hand at night in their beds while they were sleeping. The obvious similarity between what defendant said to Pearson about his sexual fantasies and pornographic viewing habits and the victims’ testimony makes Pearson's testimony relevant for a number of non-propensity purposes.”

¶ 131 We agree with the State.

¶ 132 Defendant acknowledged from the witness stand that he went into the girls’ bedrooms “almost every night” to turn off their lights or TV or to take off their glasses. Laura's testimony similarly described this behavior by defendant. She testified that she found him coming out of the girls’ bedrooms “quite a bit.” She also testified that sometimes she would see defendant sitting on the side of one of their beds or just getting up.

¶ 133 Defendant denied ever sitting on their beds or crouching near them in the middle of the night and claimed he generally spent two to four minutes in their bedrooms.

¶ 134 Defendant's testimony directly contradicted the testimony of K.A. and the other girls regarding defendant's behavior when he went into their bedrooms at night. Accordingly, Pearson's testimony was relevant to assist the trier of fact in determining whether to believe K.A.’s testimony that defendant touched her vagina at night in her bedroom or defendant's testimony that he had never done so.

¶ 135 Pearson's testimony was admissible under Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was admitted to show defendant's intent and motive when he went into the girls’ bedroom. We agree with the State's contention that “[t]he statements about defendant's sexual fantasies and pornographic viewing preferences were relevant, as each of the victims had the type of relationship with defendant, being the defendant's daughter or stepdaughter, which matched his fantasies and preference for pornography depicting the same.”

¶ 136 We also reject defendant's claim that “there was no need to establish motive or intent as those elements were not at issue here. The only issue was whether was whether [defendant] committed the charged acts.” The State charged defendant with using “his hand to touch the sex organ or K.A., who was under 13 years of age at the time, for the purpose of defendant's sexual gratification.” (Emphasis added.) That is to say, the State was required to prove not only that defendant touched K.A.’s vagina, but also that such contact was not accidental or incidental to some nonsexual purpose. Accordingly, defendant's motive and intent were at issue in this case.

¶ 137 We conclude that Pearson's testimony clearly meets the standard of Rule 401 for being relevant evidence. Her testimony that defendant voiced sexual fantasies about fathers and their daughters makes it more probable that his motive or intent by touching K.A.’s vagina was for his sexual gratification, which was a fact of consequence in the determination of the charge against defendant.

¶ 138 C. The Probative Value of Pearson's Testimony Was Not Substantially Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair Prejudice

¶ 139 We note the directive of the Illinois Supreme Court in Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 48, that a “court should not reach the probative versus prejudicial balancing test of Rule [of Evidence] 403 [(eff. Jan. 1, 2011)] unless it first determines that the evidence” is relevant. Because, in accordance with that direction, we have concluded that the evidence in question (Pearson's testimony) was indeed relevant, we will now address the probative-versus-prejudicial balancing test of Rule of Evidence 403.

¶ 140 Rule of Evidence 403 provides as follows: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Il. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

¶ 141 Defendant argues that even if Pearson's testimony could be viewed as relevant, the trial court still erred by admitting that testimony because “Pearson's testimony was too prejudicial.”

¶ 142 We disagree.

¶ 143 1. The Proper Standard Under Illinois Rule of Evidence 403

¶ 144 We begin our discussion by pointing out that defendant has incorrectly stated the issue regarding the trial court's admitting Pearson's testimony. Defendant repeatedly states the issue as being whether “the prejudicial impact of that evidence outweighed any probative value.”

¶ 145 That statement of the issue is not correct.

¶ 146 Instead, consistent with Rule of Evidence 403, the issue, correctly stated, is whether the probative value of Pearson's testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Defendant's argument omits any reference to the words “substantially” and “unfair,” but we deem these modifiers to be critical aspects of Rule 403.

¶ 147 That is because Rule 403 states that relevant evidence may be excluded not just when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, but only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

¶ 148 These are clearly different standards, and we take the Illinois Supreme Court at its word that it intended, by promulgating Rule 403, to impose the stricter standard of excluding relevant evidence only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10 (when interpreting supreme court rules, “[w]here the language used is plain and unambiguous, we may not ‘depart from its terms’ or read into the rule exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the drafters’ intent”).

¶ 149 Similarly, defendant's argument does not distinguish between “prejudice” and “unfair prejudice.” Rule 403 is concerned only with “unfair prejudice.” In the next section of this opinion, we discuss this distinction. See infra ¶¶ 154-61.

¶ 150 We will analyze the trial court's admission of Pearson's testimony in accordance with the correct standard contained in Rule 403.

¶ 151 2. Applying the Rule 403 Standard to Pearson's Testimony

¶ 152 Defendant initially argues that “there was no evidentiary support beyond Pearson's testimony that these messages even existed. Therefore, as they could not be verified, they had minimal probative value.”

¶ 153 We reject this argument because (1) there is no requirement that some evidentiary support beyond Pearson's testimony needed to exist before Pearson's testimony could be admissible and (2) it essentially goes to the weight to be given to Pearson's testimony, not its admissibility. That is, whether Pearson's testimony had “minimal probative value” was for the jury—as the trier of fact—to determine, not this court.

¶ 154 D. All Relevant Evidence Is Prejudicial

¶ 155 Essentially, defendant's argument is that Pearson's testimony makes him look bad and adds little to the State's case. However, that is not the standard for either this court or the trial court to apply when determining whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

¶ 156 We reiterate what this court wrote in People v. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914, ¶ 70, in which we rejected the defendant's claim that the probative value of the evidence at issue was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice:

“Although [the evidence] was ‘prejudicial,’ this evidence was properly admitted because, as we have explained, the evidence did not ‘cast a negative light upon *** defendant for reasons that have nothing to do with the case’ or cause the jury to decide the case on an ‘improper basis, such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, or horror.’ (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) [People v.] McSwain, 2012 IL App (4th) 100619, ¶ 37.”

¶ 157 When the State has charged a defendant with a criminal offense, it is entitled—and, indeed, obligated—to present evidence showing that the defendant, in fact, committed that offense. By definition, such evidence makes a defendant look bad because it shows he committed a crime and, accordingly, may be deemed “prejudicial.”

¶ 158 Indeed, if evidence that a defendant broke the law were not “prejudicial” for having that effect, it would not be relevant at the defendant's criminal trial.

¶ 159 We reiterate what this court wrote in People v. Zimmerman, 2018 IL App (4th) 170695, ¶ 120, as follows:

“[A]ll evidence offered at trial is prejudicial in that it is introduced for the purpose of proving the proponent's case or undermining the opponent's case; if it were not prejudicial, it would not be relevant. [Citation]; Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 403.1, at 234 (2017 ed.) (‘Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of damaging the party against whom offered, only unfairly prejudicial evidence calls for exclusion ***.’). Hence, Rule 403 only prohibits unfairly prejudicial evidence, and even then, only when the probative value is substantially outweighed by that prejudice. Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) ***.” (Emphases in original.)

¶ 160 In People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329 (1995), the Illinois Supreme Court wrote the following:

“Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would be without the evidence. [Citation.] However, even when evidence is relevant, it may, in the trial court's discretion, be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. [Citation.] In this context, prejudice means ‘ “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, or horror.” ’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 161 In People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 102 (2010), the supreme court wrote that “[a] court may exercise its discretion and exclude evidence, even if it is relevant, if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs any probative value.” We view that language as supportive of the distinction we draw between normal, relevant evidence offered by the State in a criminal case, which is prejudicial to the defendant on trial, and evidence that is not only prejudicial, but unfairly so. As we earlier noted, unfairly prejudicial evidence would cast negative light upon the defendant standing trial for reasons that have nothing to do with the case.

¶ 162 The supreme court in Smart wrote that “[a] trial court has discretion to decide whether to admit evidence of prior misconduct, and [the supreme court] will not disturb the trial court's determination unless the trial court abused its discretion.” Smart, 2025 IL 130127, ¶ 38. The supreme court in Smart also wrote that “[t]he admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court's decision may not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 163 In accordance with the above standard of review, we have considered Pearson's testimony in the context of all of the evidence presented at defendant's trial, and we conclude that (1) the probative value of that testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Pearson's testimony.

¶ 164 E. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Did Not Make Any Findings as to Whether the “Prejudice [of Pearson's Testimony] Outweighed [Its] Probative Value”

¶ 165 Last, defendant asserts that because the trial court failed to explicitly state its conclusion that the probative value of Pearson's testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court erred by admitting that testimony. We disagree.

¶ 166 Defendant is correct that after the trial court conducted the hearing on the State's motion to admit Pearson's testimony pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), the court did not refer to the standard set forth in Rule of Evidence 403 that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the entire context of that hearing, including the arguments of counsel and the court's ultimate ruling, demonstrated that the court understood this standard and correctly applied it.

¶ 167 We note that the State's motion to admit Pearson's testimony under Rule 404(b) included a proffer of substantially more of Pearson's testimony than the trial court ultimately admitted. In fact, the portion of Pearson's testimony the court ultimately allowed the jury to hear was only a small portion of the proffer of Pearson's testimony the State sought to admit.

¶ 168 We also note that defendant's lawyer at that hearing successfully argued to keep the trial court from admitting large portions of Pearson's testimony on the ground that “the prejudicial effect would be overwhelming versus very, very little if any probative value.”

¶ 169 In addition, when the trial court gave its ruling admitting some of Pearson's testimony but rejecting the majority of it, the court explained, in part, that some of the testimony it was excluding “would be too prejudicial.”

¶ 170 Of course, this issue should never arise. That is, when ruling on the State's proffer of Pearson's testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b), the trial court should have made explicit reference to the standard in Rule 403 that the court was using when deciding whether the portions of Pearson's testimony the court found relevant should be excluded—namely, whether the probative value of some of that testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, as we have noted, the context of the hearing on the State's motion, as well as the court's statements, makes clear that the court understood and applied the correct standard when deciding to admit some of the State's proffer of Pearson's testimony.

¶ 171 We note that although defendant argues on appeal that the trial court did not use the correct standard from Rule 403 when deciding whether to admit any of Pearson's testimony, defendant made no objection on that basis to the court's admission when the court made its ruling after conducting the hearing on the State's motion to admit Pearson's testimony pursuant to Rule 404(b). We view defendant's failure to raise the court's absence of reference to the Rule 403 standard when the court made its ruling as akin to a defendant's raising on appeal for the first time a claim that the State failed to present a proper foundation for some evidence the State offered at trial. Under those circumstances, a defendant will be deemed to have forfeited the objection.

¶ 172 In People v. DeHart, 2025 IL App (4th) 231554-U, ¶ 103 (quoting People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005)), this court wrote that application of the forfeiture rule “ ‘is particularly appropriate when a defendant argues that the State failed to lay the proper technical foundation for the admission of evidence, and a defendant's lack of a timely and specific objection deprives the State of the opportunity to correct any deficiency in the foundational proof at the trial level.’ ”

¶ 173 In another case discussing forfeiture, People v. Bryant, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1078 (2009), this court wrote the following:

“had [the] defendant raised the argument at the trial level that he now seeks to raise on appeal, the trial court would have had the opportunity to address any alleged deficiencies in its findings to overcome the problem. Entertaining [the] defendant's argument on appeal would make it advantageous for defendants at trial to refrain from presenting all the grounds they possess when objecting to a court's ruling, and we are disinclined to create such an advantage.”

¶ 174 In People v. Korzenewski, 2012 IL App (4th) 101026, ¶ 7, this court wrote that “[a]n objection requirement is especially important in cases of an improper foundation because errors in laying a foundation are easily cured.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

¶ 175 However, because we have already concluded that the trial court's failure to mention the Rule 403 standard when it ruled on the State's motion to admit Pearson's testimony was not a basis to reverse that ruling under the particular circumstances of this case, we need not determine whether defendant has forfeited this claim on appeal. Nonetheless, defendant should have raised this claim in the trial court.

¶ 176 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 177 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 178 Affirmed.

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Zenoff and Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.