IN RE: the MARRIAGE OF Mary Ann YELTON (1997)

The petitioner, Mary Ann Yelton, obtained a divorce from the respondent, David Holtzman, after twelve years of marriage.   At the time the trial judge entered the order of dissolution, he was unaware that David had Alzheimer's disease.   As a result, he distributed the marital assets in accordance with a stipulated “marital settlement agreement” (the Agreement) entered into by the parties.   Subsequently, a guardian was appointed for David.   Pursuant to the Guardian's petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401), a different judge declared the Agreement void.   The judge then held a trial, after which he redistributed the couple's property.   Mary Ann now appeals from the judgment redistributing the property.

The relevant facts are as follows.   In April 1991, a neurologist informed Mary Ann, David, and Susan Holtzman, David's daughter from a previous marriage, that David was in the beginning stages of Alzheimer's dementia.   In May 1991, a psychiatrist confirmed that David suffered from Alzheimer's disease and depression.   Shortly after receiving the diagnosis, Mary Ann retained an attorney to draft the Agreement, which Mary Ann and David signed on June 27, 1991.   Mary Ann did not inform the attorney that David had Alzheimer's disease.

The Agreement provided that Mary Ann would retain a home located in LaGrange, Illinois, as well as all household accessories and a 1984 Buick station wagon.   She received two checking accounts containing $6,000;  three certificates of deposit with a total value of $168,970.83;  and Individual Retirement Accounts valued at $13,000.   The Agreement also awarded her all of the common stock in two companies she operated:  Carrier Audit, Inc. and Accu-Rate Traffic, Inc.   These entities earned combined profits of $36,995 in 1990.   The Agreement provided that David retain furniture from a Chicago residence;  a 1989 Buick Regal;  and the proprietorship of Morgan Metal, a company that he operated, but which was no longer profitable.   Both parties waived maintenance.

On July 16, 1991, Mary Ann filed for a divorce pursuant to the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act).  Ill.Rev.Stat.1991 ch. 40, par. 1-101 et seq. (now 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.)   On July 31, 1991, the judge entered an order of dissolution on the ground of irreconcilable differences pursuant to section 401(a)(2) of the Act.  750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2).   Mary Ann was the only witness to testify at the hearing on the petition.   Neither David nor counsel representing his interests attended the hearing.   Rather, Mary Ann's attorney presented a stipulation signed by both parties stating that the case was uncontested.   The judge also relied on Mary Ann's testimony that she and David had been living apart for two years and that the marriage was irretrievably broken.   The order of dissolution incorporated the Agreement and its distribution of marital assets.   David and Mary Ann did not advise family members of their divorce until November 1991.

On August 18, 1992, a probate judge appointed Susan Holtzman (the Guardian) as David's legal guardian.   Subsequently, the Guardian learned of the circumstances surrounding the divorce.   On September 22, 1992, she filed a section 2-1401 petition seeking to vacate the judgment incorporating the Agreement.

On November 16, 1993, after a hearing, the judge granted the petition and declared the Agreement void.   The judge found that Mary Ann's testimony at the dissolution hearing had been misleading and that she intentionally omitted important information.   Her testimony that the parties were separated longer than two years gave the impression David was living independently and was capable of properly managing his affairs.   The judge indicated that Mary Ann had misled the court about David's financial and physical condition.   Additionally, Mary Ann's testimony that the marriage irretrievably broken was misleading because the parties maintained a relationship and that, subsequent to the separation, David was living in Mary Ann's residence on a full time basis.

Furthermore, the judge found misleading Mary Ann's statements that David had signed the Agreement freely and voluntarily.   The court found that when David signed the Agreement, he lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of the property division and waiver of maintenance.   The judge noted that Mary Ann had a fiduciary relationship to David.   David trusted her and was dependent on her at the time they signed the Agreement.   Mary Ann initiated the Agreement, and the judge found that she exerted undue influence in obtaining David's signature.   The judge concluded that the secrecy of the divorce proceeding was the result of Mary Ann's planning and was to her benefit.

The judge also entered findings regarding the Agreement's distribution of marital assets.   He concluded that two savings accounts Mary Ann had listed as nonmarital assets were, in fact, marital assets.   He also found that there had been a commingling of assets with funds being transferred from David to Mary Ann and vice versa.   Given David's illness, the judge determined that Mary Ann had greater income prospects than David when they executed the Agreement.   David's business had little or no value, and he was in the process of liquidating it when he signed the Agreement.   He had no income except for social security and a small monthly annuity payment.   Furthermore, the fact that the Agreement awarded Mary Ann most of the marital assets, combined with David's waiver of maintenance, exacerbated David's financial disadvantage.

Based on these findings, the judge concluded that the judge presiding at the initial dissolution hearing had been unaware of the “true facts.”   The judge also found that the Guardian's petition to vacate the Agreement was necessitated by Mary Ann's wrongful conduct.   Therefore, he ruled that the Agreement was unconscionable and vacated it.   He did not, however, vacate the order of dissolution because he believed that at the time of the dissolution proceeding, David was capable of understanding the non-financial nature of the divorce.

The judge scheduled a new hearing to determine the redistribution of marital property.   The Guardian filed a response to Mary Ann's original petition for dissolution and added a claim for maintenance.   Mary Ann did not file a reply.   Extensive discovery followed.   On July 18, 1994, trial commenced.   Mary Ann attempted to establish that David had dissipated the marital estate.   She presented witnesses who testified that David had a history of gambling losses and that he overbilled customers to cover those losses.   Mary Ann contended that David's assets would have been more than $200,000 had he not incurred these gambling losses and greater by an unidentified amount if he had not overbilled his company's two primary customers in 1991.

On August 30, 1994, the judge ruled that the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage occurred between January 1, 1990 and January 30, 1991 and that David had not dissipated marital assets.   The judge found that David contributed $545,000 in earnings during the marriage while Mary Ann contributed $246,000.   The judge did note that Mary Ann's contribution as a homemaker was far greater than David's.   Mary Ann owned a home valued at $155,000 and had an annual income between $30,000 and $35,000.   The judge also found that Mary Ann had spent $162,790 deposited into two separate bank accounts.   Mary Ann was in possession of these accounts as David's fiduciary.   Of the $162,670, the judge found that Mary Ann improperly spent $85,447, which she was obligated to reimburse to the marital estate.   The judge then distributed the marital assets as follows:

1.  The Guardian received 100 shares of Waste Management, Inc. stock and 80 shares of Wallace Computer stock previously held in joint tenancy by Mary Ann and David;

2.  The Guardian was awarded David's bank account proceeds in the amount of $15,859, along with his annuity paying $95.85 monthly and his life insurance policy proceeds of $6,600;

3.  Mary Ann was awarded her bank account totalling $100, as well as a 1984 Buick;

4.  A judgment was entered in favor of the Guardian in the amount of $46,955, which was David's share of the $85,447 Mary Ann owed the estate, and Mary Ann was awarded the remaining $38,492;

5.  Mary Ann was ordered to pay to the Guardian $250 per month in maintenance.

On May 9, 1995, the judge ordered Mary Ann to reimburse $47,928.43 to the Guardian for attorney's fees and costs incurred litigating the proceedings.   The court found that Mary Ann had made misleading statements in her petition for dissolution of marriage and in the Agreement, and, as a result, the payment of the Guardian's fees and costs was an appropriate sanction under Supreme Court Rule 137.   134 Ill.2d R. 137.

 Mary Ann first contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to vacate the original judgment of dissolution.   She argues that because the judge found that her testimony at the 1991 dissolution hearing that she and David had lived apart for the statutorily required two years was misleading, the evidence did not establish sufficient grounds under the Act upon which to grant a dissolution.   Relying on the decision in In re Marriage of Robinson, 225 Ill.App.3d 1037, 167 Ill.Dec. 1113, 588 N.E.2d 1243 (1992), Mary Ann contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order of dissolution, and the judgment is void.   Although Mary Ann never moved to vacate the dissolution on this ground during the original dissolution proceedings, a judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction “may be attacked at any time or in any proceedings.”  In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill.App.3d 374, 388, 193 Ill.Dec. 74, 625 N.E.2d 1195 (1994).

The issue of whether irregularities in a dissolution proceeding deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter and renders orders entered in the case void has divided Illinois courts.   In In re Marriage of Robinson, the parties sought a dissolution on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.   Then, as now, the Act required that in order to proceed on this ground, the parties must have lived apart for two years.   However, if they had lived apart for at least six months but less than two years, they could file a written waiver of the two-year waiting period.   See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 401(a)(2), (now 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2)).   The Robinsons failed to execute the waiver and file it with the court;  however, they stipulated to the waiver and neither party objected to the absence of the waiver in the record until appeal.   The appellate court vacated the judgment, held that proceedings brought under the Act are not within the general jurisdiction conferred upon circuit courts by the Illinois constitution.   Rather, a court may only act within the limited jurisdiction conferred by the Act, the provisions of which must be strictly construed.  In re Marriage of Robinson, 225 Ill.App.3d at 1038, 167 Ill.Dec. 1113, 588 N.E.2d 1243.   Because the Act required the filing of a written waiver, and the record did not contain one, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order of dissolution.   Therefore, the dissolution was void.   Robinson, 225 Ill.App.3d at 1038, 167 Ill.Dec. 1113, 588 N.E.2d 1243.

 The reasoning of In re Marriage of Robinson has been soundly rejected.   The court in In re Marriage of Jerome recognized that

“jurisdiction of the subject matter does not mean simply jurisdiction of the particular case before the court but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case before the court belongs.   Where the subject matter of the litigation is within the general jurisdiction of the trial court, the claim of want of jurisdiction by reason of irregularities, or exceptional or special circumstances, or because the court had no jurisdiction to render the particular judgment or order cannot be made for the first time on appeal.”   In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill.App.3d at 388, 193 Ill.Dec. 74, 625 N.E.2d 1195.

Contrary to the holding in In re Marriage of Robinson, under the Illinois constitution, dissolution proceedings are within the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  In re Marriage of Monken, 255 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1046, 194 Ill.Dec. 422, 627 N.E.2d 759 (1994);  English v. English, 72 Ill.App.3d 736, 741, 30 Ill.Dec. 363, 393 N.E.2d 18 (1979).   Thus, as in In re Marriage of Jerome, Mary Ann's contentions here concern only the circuit court's jurisdiction over this particular matter.   Because the parties “adjudicated their rights before the court to a final judgment without objection to the court's right to hear the cause, the parties will be bound on appeal so far as the question of jurisdiction over the particular case is concerned.  In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill.App.3d at 388, 193 Ill.Dec. 74, 625 N.E.2d 1195.

 Additionally, as the court in In re Marriage of Monken noted, “one who accepts the benefits of a divorce decree is estopped from subsequently challenging the validity of the decree even if the challenge is based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  In re Marriage of Monken, 255 Ill.App.3d at 1046, 194 Ill.Dec. 422, 627 N.E.2d 759.

Here, the judge entered a final order of dissolution on July 31, 1991.   The dissolution permitted Mary Ann to avoid legal responsibility for David's ongoing medical expenses from Alzheimer's disease.   Mary Ann benefited from the dissolution of marriage.   Mary Ann did not object to jurisdiction during the trial;  did not file a post-trial motion within 30 days of entry of the order of dissolution seeking to vacate the judgment due to lack of jurisdiction;  and did not appeal the decree.   In fact, she failed to raise the jurisdictional issue until November 24, 1993, after the decision granting the Guardian's section 2-1401 petition.   We hold that Mary Ann was, at that time and now, estopped from raising the issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction to enter the original order of dissolution.

 Mary Ann next contends that the trial judge erred in denying a motion for voluntary dismissal, which she filed after the judge denied her motion to vacate the order of dissolution.   Mary Ann claims that because she complied with section 2-1009 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1009), she is entitled to the dismissal as a matter of law.

In Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill.2d 122, 137, 129 Ill.Dec. 93, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989), our supreme court sought to curb abuse of the voluntary dismissal statute, which increasing numbers of plaintiffs were using to avoid adverse rulings.   The legislature incorporated the decision in Gibellina into an amendment to Section 2-1009.   This version of the statute was in effect when Mary Ann filed her motion on November 23, 1993.   See Gibrick v. Skolnik, 254 Ill.App.3d 970, 976, 193 Ill.Dec. 917, 627 N.E.2d 76 (1993).   Section 2-1009(a) states:

“The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or each party's attorney, and upon payment of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the cause.”  (Emphasis added.)  735 ILCS 5/2-1009(a)(West 1994).

The plain language of the statute indicates that the trial judge must grant a voluntary dismissal only if it is presented before the trial commences.   After a trial or a hearing begins, the decision to grant the motion is within the judge's discretion.  735 ILCS 5/2-1009(c).

The trial on Mary Ann's petition for dissolution of marriage commenced on July 31, 1991.   Mary Ann did not file a motion under section 2-1009(a) before that date.   She also did not do so prior the date the hearing began on the Guardian's petition to vacate the Agreement.   In fact, Mary Ann waited to present the motion for voluntary dismissal until November 23, 1993, when she realized that her original plan to manipulate the dissolution proceedings had gone awry.   Although Mary Ann did file the motion before the hearing to determine the redistribution of marital property, we do not believe that section 2-1009(a) contemplates automatic voluntary dismissal under these circumstances.   In fact, to so interpret section 2-1009(a) would thwart the legislative intent to curb the precise abuse Mary Ann has attempted:  to avoid an adverse ruling in a proceeding already begun.   The trial having begun long before Mary Ann filed her motion for voluntary dismissal, Mary Ann was not entitled to the dismissal under section 2-1009(a).

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Mary Ann raises several additional claims of trial error.   We address each in turn.   First, she contends that the judge abused his discretion when he precluded two of her expert witnesses from testifying.   Mary Ann asserts that the trial was set to begin on July 18, 1994 and that she gave adequate notice under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 220(b) (134 Ill.2d R. 220(b)), by informing the Guardian on May 16, 1994 that John Evanhouse would testify as an expert and on May 24, 1994, that Sandor Goldstein would testify.   Mary Ann argues that the 60 day discovery requirement of Rule 220(b) is inapplicable because the trial judge did not set a Rule 220(b) disclosure schedule.   She further suggests that her non-compliance could have been easily cured had opposing counsel simply deposed the experts.   Alternatively, she contends that even if she failed to comply with Rule 220(b), the judge was not required to bar her witnesses.   Mary Ann maintains that her conduct was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the trial judge's action.

The Guardian responds that the trial court properly barred the witnesses because Mary Ann, in fact, failed to comply with both Rule 220(b), as well as Rule 220(c).   We agree.   The Guardian propounded interrogatories to Mary Ann pursuant to Rule 220(c)(1) requesting the identity, qualifications, and opinions of any experts.   Mary Ann disclosed only the names, addresses, and occupations of these expert witnesses.  Rule 220(c) in pertinent part states:

“(1) Upon interrogatory propounded for that purpose, the party retaining or employing an expert witness shall be required to state:

(i) the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify;

(ii) his conclusions and opinions and the bases therefor;  and

(iii) his qualifications.”  (Emphasis added.)   134 Ill.2d R. 220(c).

If a party fails to properly disclose an expert in violation of Rule 220, the trial judge may bar the witness from testifying.  Paquet v. Steiner, 239 Ill.App.3d 866, 869, 180 Ill.Dec. 546, 607 N.E.2d 615 (1993).   In determining whether to permit the expert's testimony under such circumstances, the judge may consider numerous factors, including the surprise to the adverse party, the prejudicial effect of the testimony, the nature of the testimony, the diligence of the adverse party, the timely objection to the testimony, and the good faith of the party calling the witness.  Huelsmann v. Berkowitz, 210 Ill.App.3d 806, 810, 154 Ill.Dec. 924, 568 N.E.2d 1373 (1991).

Here, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he barred Mary Ann's experts.   First, we note that “the failure of a trial court to set a discovery schedule does not give a party freedom to reveal its experts at any time.”   Paquet, 239 Ill.App.3d at 869, 180 Ill.Dec. 546, 607 N.E.2d 615.   Discovery pursuant to Rule 220(b), must be completed within 60 days of trial.   Paquet, 239 Ill.App.3d at 869, 180 Ill.Dec. 546, 607 N.E.2d 615.   Thus, Mary Ann's disclosure on May 24, 1994 of Sandor Goldstein was a violation of Rule 220(b).

Furthermore, Mary Ann did not comply with Rule 220(c) as to either of her experts.   By merely giving the names, addresses, and occupations of both experts, she did not, in good faith, disclose the subject matter, conclusions or opinions about which they may be asked to testify.  Rule 220(c)(1) speaks in mandatory terms as to disclosure of an expert's opinion.   This court will not tolerate incomplete discovery under Rule 220(c)(1).   See Thomas v. Crouse-Hinds, ECM, 274 Ill.App.3d 396, 405, 211 Ill.Dec. 224, 654 N.E.2d 686 (1995).   The Guardian had diligently attempted to obtain the expert's qualifications and opinions by sending detailed interrogatories.   Having received no response regarding their qualifications or the substance of their testimony, the Guardian was hampered in her ability to prepare for their examination.   Furthermore, we find the failure to disclose constitutes a lack of good faith.   Although Mary Ann contends that the Guardian could have deposed these witnesses, we think that their late disclosure undermined the Guardian's ability to do that.   Thus, we do not find a lack of diligence on the part of the Guardian.   Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in barring Mary Ann's two experts from testifying.

Mary Ann next complains that because David did not properly plead a claim for maintenance, the trial court erred in awarding maintenance.   Alternatively, Mary Ann claims there was no basis for awarding maintenance because the property distribution made David whole.   She suggests that David did not need maintenance and that she could not afford to pay it.   She also maintains that in moving David to a more expensive nursing home, the Guardian created the need for maintenance.

We will not disturb an award of maintenance unless the trial court abused its discretion in making the award or if the award is against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In re Marriage of Orlando, 218 Ill.App.3d 312, 321, 160 Ill.Dec. 763, 577 N.E.2d 1334 (1991).   An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.  In re Marriage of Jones, 187 Ill.App.3d 206, 227, 134 Ill.Dec. 836, 543 N.E.2d 119 (1989).   Reviewing courts presume that the trial court's determination of maintenance is correct.  Orlando, 218 Ill.App.3d at 321, 160 Ill.Dec. 763, 577 N.E.2d 1334.

The Guardian's response to Mary Ann's petition for dissolution of marriage included a claim of maintenance for David.   Contrary to Mary Ann's claim that the move to the more expensive nursing home was unnecessary, the evidence established that the home in which David had originally been placed was not fit to his needs.   The trial judge determined that David qualified for maintenance under the criteria set forth in Section 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a)), which provides that the court consider all relevant factors including the income and property of each party, the needs of each party, the present and future earning capacity of each party, the standard of living established during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, and the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.

The judge considered Mary Ann's limited ability to afford maintenance payments.   The trial court's award of $250 per month to the Guardian constituted an attempt to balance Mary Ann's ability to pay against David's limited ability to cover the $30,000 per year shortfall between his income and expenses.   The judge held that maintenance payments were to begin August 1, 1994, but set an April 1, 1995 date to review the award of maintenance.   Moreover, the court imposed the $250 monthly obligation by calculating David's expenses before the nursing home change.   Consequently, Mary Ann's claim that the need for maintenance resulted from the move is inaccurate.   We do not believe that the judge abused his discretion by awarding maintenance, and the award is supported by the evidence.

Mary Ann argues that the trial court improperly distributed the marital property by awarding 1/313 of the marital estate to her and 2/323 to the Guardian.   Mary Ann claims that the trial court's findings that she dissipated the marital estate and that David or his Guardian did not were erroneous.   According to her, David dissipated the marital estate by gambling, losing clients due to overbilling, giving away rather than selling his remaining business, and moving into a more expensive nursing home.   She further suggests that the court needs to consider Mary Ann's contribution through her employment and as a homemaker.

In reviewing a division of property, the court is not justified in substituting its decision for that of the trial court.   Rather, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.  In re Marriage of Wade, 158 Ill.App.3d 255, 268, 110 Ill.Dec. 321, 511 N.E.2d 156 (1987).   To successfully show abuse of discretion in the apportionment of marital property, Mary Ann must demonstrate that the trial court acted arbitrarily without using conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial injustice resulted.  In re Marriage of Moll, 232 Ill.App.3d 746, 753-54, 174 Ill.Dec. 18, 597 N.E.2d 1230 (1992).

Section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d)), requires a trial judge to divide the marital property in just proportions “considering all relevant factors” enumerated.   The record reveals that before distributing the marital property, the trial court carefully evaluated all of the applicable statutory factors in section 503(d)(1) through (11).   We have reviewed his findings, and we cannot conclude that he abused his discretion in dividing the property.

Finally, Mary Ann contends the trial judge erred in awarding attorney's fees to the Guardian.   First, she claims that the court should not have considered the Guardian's motion to reconsider the entry of a directed finding with respect to proof of attorney services.   During the hearing on the Guardian's petition for attorney fees, the attorney failed to move to place his time records into evidence.   As a result, the judge directed a finding for Mary Ann on the petition.   The Guardian's attorney then orally moved the court to re-open the proof for the purpose of submitting the records.   The judge denied the motion.   The attorney next filed a written motion to reconsider.   The judge granted the written motion and re-opened the proof for the limited purpose of admitting the attorney timesheets and related documents into evidence.

Generally, the decision to reopen a case to allow the introduction of additional evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court.  A-Tech Computer Services, Inc. v. Soo Hoo, 254 Ill.App.3d 392, 402, 193 Ill.Dec. 862, 627 N.E.2d 21 (1993).   This court considers numerous factors including whether the failure to introduce evidence occurred because of inadvertence or calculated risk, whether the adverse party will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence, whether the new evidence is of the utmost importance to the movant's case, and whether any cogent reasons exist to justify denying the request.  United States Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Anderson, 178 Ill.App.3d 752, 755, 127 Ill.Dec. 837, 533 N.E.2d 919 (1988).

Here, the trial judge reopened the proof merely to admit records which had been presented during trial and which the attorney had inadvertently failed to offer into evidence.   Mary Ann was neither surprised nor unfairly prejudiced, as the evidence contained in the time sheets and records was subjected to extensive cross examination during the course of the trial.   Furthermore, there was no evidence of a calculated plan by the Guardian to withhold the evidence.   The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by reopening the case to admit this evidence.

Mary Ann also challenges the trial judge's initial decision admitting the timesheets into evidence.   First, she characterizes the records as summaries and claims that they should not have been admitted.   Second, Mary Ann asserts that because the Guardian's attorneys raised the attorney-client and work product privileges during discovery, the Guardian has forfeited her right to maintain a civil action.   To support the latter assertion, Mary Ann analogizes a party's right to bring a civil suit when the attorney-client or work product privileges have been asserted to the loss of a party's right to bring a civil suit when the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked.

To support an award of attorneys' fees and related costs, timesheets must be accompanied by detailed records maintained during the litigation, provide a full and particular accounting of the work completed, name the attorneys working on the matter, indicate the time expended, and specify the hourly rate charged.  Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 230 Ill.App.3d 591, 595-96, 171 Ill.Dec. 788, 594 N.E.2d 1308 (1992).   We will not disturb the trial court's admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion.  Israel v. National Canada Corp., 276 Ill.App.3d 454, 463, 213 Ill.Dec. 163, 658 N.E.2d 1184 (1995).

Our review of the record reveals that the timesheets included a concise explanation of the work undertaken and services performed, as well as the name, amount of time, and hourly rate of the attorneys involved.   Therefore, the trial court properly admitted them.   Furthermore, Mary Ann never suggested that the hourly rate or the number of hours was unreasonable.   The trial court found the rate and fees to be reasonable.   In addition, related costs were listed in subcategories such as photocopying, filing fees, postage, and messenger service, portions of which the court did not award to the Guardian.   We conclude, therefore, that the timesheets were sufficiently specific to support the award of the Guardian's attorneys' fees and related costs.   Johns v. Klecan, 198 Ill.App.3d 1013, 1018-19, 145 Ill.Dec. 71, 556 N.E.2d 689 (1990).

We consider frivolous Mary Ann's argument that the assertion of attorney-client and work product privilege is equivalent to the constitutional right to remain silent.   Because no one in this case asserted a fifth amendment claim, the lengthy recitation regarding a party's loss of their right to bring a civil action once they have invoked it is irrelevant.   As we have previously noted, adequate documentation for awarding attorney fees existed.   The Guardian's attorneys were not required to disclose their work product and the substance of privileged communications.

Mary Ann's final contention is that the trial judge should not have awarded attorney fees to the Guardian at all.   First, she suggests that the Guardian's fee petition did not meet the specificity requirements of Supreme Court Rule 137 (134 Ill.2d R. 137), thereby limiting her ability to challenge the expenses.   Mary Ann also argues that the court should not have allowed the Guardian's legal fees under section 508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/508), for probate services as those fees were not connected to the maintenance or defense of any proceeding under the Act.

We begin by examining the Rule 137 claim.   A party who violates Rule 137 may be subject to sanctions, which may include the award of reasonable attorney fees.  In re Marriage of Pitulla, 256 Ill.App.3d 84, 90, 195 Ill.Dec. 99, 628 N.E.2d 563 (1993).   We will not reverse an award of Rule 137 sanctions absent an abuse of discretion.  Pitulla, 256 Ill.App.3d at 90, 195 Ill.Dec. 99, 628 N.E.2d 563.   In reviewing an award of sanctions, we consider whether the trial judge's decision was based on valid reasons following logically from the application of the reasons stated to the circumstances of the case.  Liddle v. Cepeda, 251 Ill.App.3d 892, 894, 191 Ill.Dec. 259, 623 N.E.2d 849 (1993).

As required by Rule 137, the trial judge set forth with specificity the basis for imposing sanctions.   He did so because Mary Ann filed the Agreement, which he concluded was unconscionable.   The judge also found that she had obtained the Agreement by exerting undue influence on her husband, who lacked the mental capacity to understand the ramifications of the Agreement.   The Guardian incurred reasonable fees and costs in order to vacate the unjust Agreement.   Mary Ann was given notice and opportunity to argue against specific fees.   The judge's reasons for imposing sanctions followed logically from the circumstances of this case.   Thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by imposing Rule 137 sanctions.

Mary Ann's conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion by awarding attorney fees for services performed in the probate division is also misguided.   By statute, the court may order a reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs for the modification or appeal of any order or judgment including, “[t]he maintenance or defense of a petition brought under section 2-1401 of the Code * * * seeking relief from a final order or judgment under this Act.”  750 ILCS 5/508(4).   Due to his mental incapacity, David was incapable of filing a petition to vacate the marital settlement agreement on his own behalf.   Consequently, a guardian vested with the legal power to do so was appointed.   Under section 11a-18(c) of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11a-18(c) (West 1992), the Guardian “shall appear and represent the ward in all legal proceedings.”   The Guardian was David's legal representative and determined to contest the Agreement in a section 2-1401 petition.   Accordingly, an award of fees was appropriate under section 508(4) of the Act.   The trial judge properly exercised his discretion to award attorney's fees for the services performed in the probate division.

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For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.   The order staying the judgment is vacated.

Affirmed.

Justice LEAVITT delivered the opinion of the court: