A.C., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2026)

A mother, A.C., appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children, E.H., born in 2019, and L.H., born in 2012. Z.S., the father of E.H., separately appeals the termination of his parental rights. The father of L.H. has not appealed the ruling terminating his parental rights, so any references to “the father” are to Z.S.

On appeal, neither parent refutes the juvenile court finding that the grounds for termination were established. The father argues that because he was still living in a hotel after his release from a minimum-security placement, he needed six months to gain unification with E.H., or in the alternative, the juvenile court should have ordered a guardianship in lieu of termination. As for the mother's appeal, she raises challenges to whether termination is in the children's best interests, whether exceptions to termination existed that should have warranted providing her an additional six months to work toward reunification, and whether a guardianship should be established in lieu of termination. The State urges that the juvenile court ruling is correct as to both parents.

On our review, we affirm the termination of the father's parental rights to E.H. as the termination is in the best interests of the child and no exception to termination applies. We also affirm the juvenile court ruling terminating the mother's parental rights to E.H. as the child cannot be returned to her custody because she is unable to resolve the issues that brought the case to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A guardianship over E.H. is not the preferred path to permanency given his age and the plan to proceed to adoption.

In our review of the record related to the best interests for L.H., we reverse the juvenile court ruling terminating the mother's parental rights and remand, directing the juvenile court to conduct a prompt permanency hearing under Iowa Code section 232.104 (2025) and if the ICPC is approved, that of the options available to L.H., a guardianship with T.C. is in L.H.’s best interests.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The children were removed from the mother's home in October 2024 after L.H. called 911 because he found the mother on the floor with a gunshot wound to her chest; they have never returned to the family home. The mother left a suicide note but has consistently insisted this was not a suicide attempt and instead the gun misfired. As HHS became involved again with the family,¹ it learned of reports that the mother's paramour was physically abusing the children, leaving bruises on the children with a belt. The children were placed with the maternal grandmother.

During this time, the father was incarcerated for sexual abuse and incest convictions and had been in prison since 2019. Before HHS's involvement, the father had no relationship with E.H. In January 2025, the children were adjudicated as children in need of assistance (CINA). In January, February, and March, L.H. was hospitalized after threats to hurt others and himself. At the end of March, the grandmother notified HHS she was unable to continue as the placement for L.H. He was moved to a foster home. But, by June, the foster home placement gave a ten-day notice to terminate their placement status and L.H. was moved to a shelter.

In August, the father was paroled but did not begin in-person visits with E.H. until October 2025. Because of the nature of the convictions against him, he could only see E.H. pursuant to the terms of a no-contact order. In September, the grandmother alerted HHS she could no longer serve as a placement for E.H., and he was moved to a foster family where he stayed through the time of the termination trial and where it was reported he was doing well.

After removal, HHS founded child abuse allegations against the mother for physical abuse because she was spanking the children with a belt, causing bruises, and for denial of critical care and failure to provide proper supervision because she shot herself in the chest while L.H. was present. As a part of the reunification plan, the mother was required to submit to drug screens for illegal substances, attend a trauma-informed parenting class, complete a mental-health evaluation, and engage in intensive individual therapy. HHS was concerned about her relationship choices, which were dysfunctional and unsafe for the children. When the mother submitted to drug testing, she tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine. Throughout these proceedings, she denied drug usage and denied that it was a suicide attempt when she shot herself.

As for L.H., the progression through the CINA case has not been an easy path. He started out under the care of the maternal grandmother, which transitioned to a foster placement, which then moved to shelter care. In November 2025, HHS sought permission from the juvenile court to move L.H. to a psychiatric medical institution for children (PMIC). During his stay in the PMIC, L.H. developed a close relationship with his therapist, T.C. She left the facility after she lost her job for “boundary issues” unrelated to her relationship with L.H. T.C. testified at trial that she was certified as a foster placement and would be willing to serve in that role or as a permanent placement for L.H. Through the time of the termination hearing, L.H. remained at the PMIC, and the testimony was consistent that there was no contingent plan for permanency yet established.

The termination hearing was scheduled over two days in March and April 2026. In June 2026, the juvenile court terminated both the father's and mother's parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ).² The juvenile court placed the children in the custody and guardianship of HHS for pre-adoptive care. Both parents separately appealed.

II. Standard of Review.

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). While we respect the juvenile court's factual findings, especially on credibility issues, “we examine the whole record, find our own facts, and adjudicate rights anew on issues properly before us.” Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass'n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 629 (Iowa 1996). “[O]ur fundamental concern” on review “is the child's best interests.” In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014).

III. Analysis.

We start with the father's appeal related to the termination of his parental rights to E.H. Then, we examine the mother's challenges to the termination of parental rights to each of her children separately. We follow a three-step process: (1) the court must determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established; (2) if established, the court must apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights; and (3) if the best-interest framework supports termination of parental rights, the court must consider if any exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) preclude termination of parental rights. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706–07 (Iowa 2010).

A. Father's Appeal. We start with the father's challenge to the termination of his parental rights to E.H. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ). As the father admitted, he was unable to resume custody at the time of the termination hearing and was only asking for an additional six months. We find the grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(4). So, we are left to consider whether E.H.’s best interests support termination and if any exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3) should be applied. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021).

Drilling down to the arguments advanced on appeal, the father asserts the juvenile court should have credited him for the significant progress he made during his short time in the community, recognizing he could improve in that time and safely parent E.H., which would be in the child's best interests. Pointing to his completion of sex-offender treatment while in prison and his ability to find steady employment now that he was no longer incarcerated, he advocates for more time. Still the father faces several hurdles. First, the father was incarcerated for most of E.H.’s life, with in-person visits only starting in October 2025. Second, the father had not yet completed aftercare sex-offender treatment, which meant he was only allowed to have contact with E.H. under court-ordered visits. At the termination hearing, the juvenile court noted its concern that the father continued to deny the sexual abuse events related to his conviction. Third, although recommended that he engage in mental-health therapy, the father had not started that requirement at the time of the termination hearing.

To address the father's best-interests argument, we focus on the statutory requirement that we “give primary consideration to the child's safety” while determining what placement is best to further the child's “long-term nurturing and growth.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). That framework specifically requires that we consider the child's “physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs.” Id. After considering all of these factors, we find termination is in the best interests of E.H., noting that the child has integrated into the foster family and that the father is in no place to offer a permanent home in the short term and has not proven he could do so in the long term. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016) (examining the stability of the parent seeking custody against the integration of the child in the foster family home). E.H. needs permanency. See In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting.”).

In the alternative, the father asserts a guardianship should have been entered in lieu of termination. The permanency options available to the juvenile court are to:

[e]nter an order, pursuant to findings required by subsection 4, to do one of the following:

(1) Transfer sole custody of the child from one parent to another parent.

(2) Transfer guardianship and custody of the child to an adult relative, a fictive kin, or another suitable person.

(3) Transfer custody of the child to a suitable person for the purpose of long-term care.

(4) If the child is sixteen years of age or older and the department has documented to the court's satisfaction a compelling reason for determining that an order under the other subparagraphs of this paragraph “d” would not be in the child's best interest, order another planned permanent living arrangement for the child.

Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(d).

As E.H. was nearly seven years old at the time of the termination trial, a guardianship would not terminate for over ten years and would not provide the child with the permanency that adoption would. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477–78 (Iowa 2018). And, although the father stated otherwise, the foster family was not willing to serve as guardians but advocated for adoption. So, guardianship might not have been an option; the record is not so clear on this point. In any event, a guardianship cannot be ordered unless

the court first finds that convincing evidence exists showing termination of the parent-child relationship is not in the child's best interests and that the child could not be returned to the child's home even though services were offered to the child's family to correct the situation which led to the child's removal.

In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32–33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (cleaned up).

We credit the father for the positive changes made since entering society from incarceration. He emphasizes that he sincerely was “making positive changes and showed a commitment to being in his child's life.” The father testified to his experience as “system kid” that aged out and that “all he ever wanted to do was to go home.” He concedes that the foster family was available for adoption and the child is doing well. We conclude that a guardianship for E.H. is not appropriate on these facts.

As a final consideration, the father contends that it was not in the best interests of E.H. to terminate their legal relationship as another consequence of the termination would be that E.H. would be separated from his half-sibling, L.H. Yet, the father provided no authority that he can make that challenge and does not explain how retaining his parental rights to E.H. would even guarantee that a relationship with L.H. would continue as the father has no legal right to have a relationship with L.H. See In re E.M., No. 24-0642, 2024 WL 3518286, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2024) (noting that, by failing to cite any legal authority on an issue, the argument is waived).

In sum, we affirm the termination of the father's parental rights to E.H.

B. The Mother's Appeal. In her petition on appeal, the mother challenges the termination of her parental rights by asserting that it was not in the children's best interests and a guardianship should have been entered in lieu of termination. She also argues that multiple exceptions under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) apply to avoid termination of her parental rights. We note that the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) were conceded by the mother as to each child. In re T.M.-L., No. 24-1818, 2025 WL 548851, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (noting that a parent who concedes the statutory elements waives appellate challenge to the issue or allows the appellate court to summarily affirm).

By the time of the termination hearing, the children had been removed from the mother's home for eighteen months. At the termination hearing, the HHS social worker assigned to the case identified several reasons supporting termination of the mother's parental rights. First, the mother had not addressed or admitted to illegal drug usage, even though the mother consistently tested positive for illegal drugs when she did show up for testing. Second, the mother has significant unresolved mental health issues stemming from her own history of trauma and sexual abuse. Citing her failure to recognize the mental-health challenges, it was noted that even by the time of the termination trial, the mother still denied her October 2024 attempted suicide. Finally, the mother failed to address her ongoing behavior and history of engaging in unhealthy relationships with people who have histories of sexual abuse. The mother's therapist also opined that the mother denied the severity of her mental health issues along with how her choices contributed to unsafe parenting. The mother concedes she brought unsafe people around the children and she continues to struggle with her mental health. She maintains that her positive drug screens are the result of being around people on drugs or possibly from her prescription medicine, but not because she uses illegal substances.

Still, clear and convincing evidence supports the grounds for termination of her parental rights to E.H. and L.H. as the mother was in no place to return to custodial status at the time of the termination trial. The mother has not addressed the reasons for the removal of her children, still needs ongoing, intensive therapy but has limited insight into her issues with mental health, her unsafe relationships, and her lack of accountability. With this history and these conclusions in mind, we address the remaining arguments against termination as to each child separately.

1. E.H. The mother combines her argument that termination is not in the best interests of E.H. with her request that he be placed in a guardianship. As exceptions to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(b) and (c),³ the mother also asserts that E.H., even though not ten years old yet, expressed his desire to return to his mother's care and that they have a close relationship that should not be terminated. We look to the mother's past performance to see if the mother is capable of providing safe care that addresses the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). Overall, we consider what is in E.H.’s best interests.

Under the best-interests framework, we “give primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). With the unresolved issues the mother is facing, the concerns over the safety risks living with her would present, and the permanency E.H. can achieve through adoption with his foster family, termination is in the best interests of E.H.

After establishing that termination of parental rights is in E.H.’s best interests, the last step is to determine whether the exceptions identified by the mother in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude the termination. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. Here, the mother asserts that E.H. objects to the termination, but subsection (b) mandates that the child be over ten years old to have his or her objection considered. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(b). Everyone acknowledged that the seven-year-old voiced a desire to return to his mother's care and that he and the mother had a close relationship. Although the statute refers to that consideration of a child's opinion if the child is over ten years old, there are times when the juvenile court should still consider if a child under that age is mature enough to render an informed opinion. We do so here.

Even when we consider E.H.’s objection to termination and the closeness of his relationship with the mother, we still find termination is appropriate. Here, the mother must show that the termination would be detrimental to the child, but we are not persuaded. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014). Supporting her argument, the mother points to the child's therapist's concerns that termination might cause stress, anxiety, and depression for the child even though he is integrated into the foster family's home and doing well there. Still, E.H.’s growth emotionally, educationally, and otherwise, all while in the foster family's care, supports the juvenile court's rejection of these exceptions. While a finding of any of these factors allows us to choose not to terminate parental rights, “[t]he factors weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

Finally, the mother advocates for a guardianship in lieu of termination. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(d). As with the father's request, she has not identified a guardian that would be willing to serve as the foster family was not interested in that role. We consider the child would be under guardianship for over ten years, and allowing the foster family to adopt would support the goal of permanency and serve the child's best interests. Thus, we find the mother did not prove exceptions to termination promote the best interests of the child or that termination will be detrimental to E.H.

2. L.H. The mother distinguishes the circumstances involving the almost fourteen-year-old L.H. from those involving seven-year-old E.H. See In re E.B., No. 15-1384, 2015 WL 5970443, at*4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (analyzing the options for several children on different tracks to address each child's specific issues). In that effort, she argues that even if we affirm the termination of her parental rights to E.H., there are good reasons to deny termination of her parental rights to L.H. She has a good point, but we underscore that L.H. cannot be returned to her custody, so the question is whether she can still maintain a place in his life. So, we address what is in L.H.’s best interests and whether the mother proved any exceptions to termination. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (“Even though the court may determine that termination is appropriate under section 232.116(2), the court need not terminate a parent's parental rights if any of the circumstances contained in section 232.116(3) exist.”).

i. History. To better understand L.H.’s needs, we review his rocky progression through this case. L.H. was initially placed with his maternal grandmother from October 2024 until the end of March 2025. He was hospitalized several times in January and February 2025 for mental-health concerns. By the end of March, L.H. was placed in and underwent a two-week partial outpatient treatment program because the psychiatrist would not order his placement in a PMIC. L.H. was released from the hospital in early April. The juvenile court transferred custody to HHS for purposes of a foster care placement for L.H., but the foster care option did not work out.

So, in June, L.H. moved to shelter care and attended a “partial hospitalization program.” In the July dispositional review order, the juvenile court noted its concern about L.H., “who has had numerous struggles emotionally and with his mental health which have caused him to be hospitalized on multiple occasions since the last hearing.” Because “he [was] not consistently seeing a provider” given his temporary placement, the court directed HHS “to find a way to ensure that [L.H.’s] mental health needs are being met.” Likewise, from February 2025 through the spring of 2025, it was noted that L.H. was not provided any educational content, even though he had struggled educationally in years past, including being retained to repeat the third grade.

L.H. was hospitalized again in July, August, and September for mental-health concerns. In September, the mother moved for consideration of reasonable efforts since the mother was not getting her in-person visits with L.H. and was alerted no one was available to transport her to visits since the week of August 18. The State stipulated that it failed to provide reasonable efforts for a period of six weeks. Based on the “inability to ensure contacts,” the juvenile court set out a formal visitation schedule. In early October, the GAL asked to continue the permanency hearing because HHS had not complied with the court's order that an updated permanency plan be prepared. In the disposition review order the juvenile court stated:

Court is concerned regarding the lack of progress in this case. [L.H.] has been repeatedly hospitalized since February of 2025. [L.H.] has been in [the area] since mid-summer with the belief he would be accepted to his current shelter's PMIC program. There have been ongoing MCM staffings since July addressing PMIC placement for the child. Unfortunately, there is still no formal admission date and [HHS] has now made application to other PMIC facilities. [L.H.] has been in the partial hospitalization since July and has not had any educational content since spring of 2025.

The juvenile court found that reasonable efforts had not been provided from August 22 until October 3.

In the mid-October HHS updated permanency report, a shelter employee, T.C., who was serving as L.H.’s case worker since June, attended a staffing about L.H. In the notes from that meeting, T.C. outlined her treatment concerns for L.H. noting he does well with an “extremely structured routine” and “regular therapeutic approach,” described his “triggers,” which involved other peers, and discussed techniques used to help deescalate the behavior. But L.H. was involved in a fight with a peer at the shelter, resulting in his treatment in the emergency room for a concussion.

Finally, in late November 2025, L.H. was placed in a PMIC program operated by the same entity as the shelter. The mother was concerned about the safety of L.H. But after the change in status, it was reported by the GAL that L.H. had a “very good relationship” with his therapist, T.C., his previous case manager. T.C. noted that because of their “good connection,” L.H. was opening up about his trauma.

For reasons we discuss later, T.C. left her employment at the PMIC program and L.H. was hospitalized in December and then in January 2026. In January 2026, the juvenile court modified the permanency goal to termination of parental rights for purposes of adoption. In the February termination report, the HHS case worker opined:

HHS has identified [T.C.], a previous worker at [the PMIC], as a possible placement for [L.H.]. HHS has begun the ICPC[4] process with [T.C.], and if [T.C.] passes this process, [L.H.] will be placed with [T.C.]. [T.C.] lives in Nebraska. She is familiar with [L.H.] from working with him in the past. [T.C.] is a licensed foster parent in the state of Nebraska, and she is licensed to take up to three children at a time.

The report concluded that T.C. wanted to be a placement for L.H. and that he “deserve[d] caregivers that can help him manage his behaviors, as well as provide the mental health support he needs.”

After T.C. left the PMIC program, L.H. worked with two different therapists. L.H. reported being unhappy with his placement and that no one listened to him. He was not getting video calls with E.H. ever since T.C. left employment at the PMIC. Reports were that L.H. did better with one-on-one therapy. L.H. struggled in the PMIC program, and by all accounts, did not have a close relationship with his current therapist, as they were only beginning to know each other. By the time of the termination hearing, L.H.’s current therapist reported she had only seen L.H. three times. Complicating the treatment, there were issues about the other children targeting L.H. as in February, L.H. was assaulted by a peer who struck him in the back with a spoon. Other peers reported that L.H. was “bullied” by other residents. There were incidents where L.H. acted inappropriately as well. He was moved from the male area to female area of the facility for safety reasons and was quoted as saying, “I just want to stop getting assaulted if not I just want to kill myself.”

At the March meeting to discuss his care, the long-term goal was to complete treatment at the PMIC program and discharge to a foster home, but the multi-disciplinary group noted that his treatment was impacted by the changing therapists and high turnover at the facility. In a March report to the court, the GAL opined that “[L.H.] has had many ups and downs during his time in PMIC. The therapist he was extremely close to left [the PMIC] abruptly which caused great disturbances in [L.H.’s] behavior.” This came around the same time that L.H. learned about the possibility that his mother's parental rights would be terminated.

The termination hearing was set and tried over two days: March 2 and April 21. At the time of the last termination hearing, L.H. was set to discharge from the program on May 18, having reached maximum benefits. Still, the discharge plan was unclear and offered no permanent option for L.H. The HHS social worker indicated that L.H. would likely go to another shelter if no foster care placement was found. Given L.H.’s history, we turn to what plan will promote his best interests.

ii. Best interests. On review of what is in L.H.’s best interests, we give primary weight “to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The mother centers her argument on her claim that she can foster the child's long-term best interests because there will be more harm to L.H. if her rights are terminated than if he is placed in a guardianship so she can maintain contact.

Once we have established that the termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the last step of our analysis is to determine whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude the termination. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. “But, even though the court may determine that termination is appropriate under section 232.116(2), the court need not terminate a parent's parental rights if any of the circumstances contained in section 232.116(3) exist.” B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 33 (cleaned up). So given L.H.’s history, and without a permanent option for L.H., we can say that placement with the mother is not in L.H.’s best interests, but neither is the termination of the mother's rights. And, because the mother's best-interests arguments are more focused on the exceptions to termination and her request for a guardianship, we turn to those issues, acknowledging that the L.H.’s best interests include consideration of several exceptions to termination.

iii. Permissive exceptions to termination. At the termination trial and on appeal, the mother identifies three exceptions under section 232.116(3) that should be considered:

(1) 232.116(3)(b): The child is over 10 and objects to the termination. (2) 232.116(3)(c): Termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. (3) 232.116(3)(d): The child is placed in a facility or institution for care and treatment, and continuation of the parent-child relationship is not preventing a permanent family placement for the child.

The State argued to the juvenile court that “termination would give finality to the child[ ] to begin to process that loss [of the mother] in a therapeutic setting.” Yet, the State recognized that placement of L.H. would be “difficult.”

iv. L.H.’s objection to termination. We first consider the child's objection to termination, but we find this record concerning. In reviewing the child's preference in termination-of-parental-rights cases, we have borrowed from considerations in marriage-dissolution cases. See In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (citing cases addressing custody disputes in divorce cases). In A.R., our court weighed the teenage daughters’ testimony along with:

(1) their age and education level; (2) the strength of their preference; (3) their intellectual and emotional make-up; (4) their relationship with family members; (5) the reason for their decision; (6) the advisability of honoring the children's desire; and (7) the court's recognition it is not aware of all the factors influencing the children's view.

Id.

On this record, we cannot do that analysis here because we do not have the benefit of L.H.’s testimony or a record about any of these factors from his perspective.⁵ Interestingly, the child came to the first day of the hearing, but neither the noted appearances on the transcript nor the juvenile court's order reflected his presence. L.H.’s attorney indicated that “before we proceed [with T.C.’s testimony], [L.H.] is here now. It is his wish ․ to be present at the hearing. I understand the [GAL] is not in agreement, so I would like the court's opinion on that.” The juvenile court noted it would take the issue up in a moment. No record was made except for the court's statement that the child wanted to stay for T.C.’s testimony but after that “he would like to leave.” The court allowed him to stay through the testimony, and then no other record was made concerning his objections to termination or the reasons behind it. Given his age, we would prefer to have the information about his position directly from him in his language and to know if he was dissuaded from being at the trial or testifying as opposed to being encouraged to be heard.

In any event, L.H.’s attorney did file a written objection to the termination on the child's behalf, urged that the mother was the only family tie for L.H., and argued her advocacy and relationship were critical for his mental health. The child recognized that his mother supported his safety and mental health, and as the reports indicated, was someone who listened to him. He valued her presence in his life.

What was clear even from this cold record was that L.H. feels isolated and alone and that his bond with the rotating therapists, except for T.C., was non-existent. We give L.H.’s preference weight because he recognized and gravitated to those people who offered him support, help, and a connection. For those who stood by him, he opened up and addressed the previous trauma he experienced—as the reports show he did that in sessions with his mother and in counseling with T.C.

v. Closeness of the parent-child relationship.Here a strong bond. As a soon-to-be fourteen-year-old, L.H. advocated, only through his counsel's brief, to not terminate his mother's parental rights. As argued, the mother was the only person who advocated for L.H., and because of his fragile mental health state, “termination of [the mother's] rights would be detrimental to [him].” L.H.’s counsel argued that he and his mother have a very strong and close relationship, and this was confirmed by the juvenile court and the other witnesses.

The therapist that saw L.H. three times commented that it might not be a healthy relationship between the mother and L.H., but when asked about her observations, she said the most meaningful conversation she had with L.H. was when his mother was sitting in the evaluation. Visitations have been supervised and even when the mother was there to tell L.H. about the death of a family member, the mother allowed the therapist to stay in the room to help support them. The therapist said that, until then, L.H. had not engaged with her. She observed that the mother addressed “some of the things that they had been through together.” When asked if the damage to L.H.’s mental health caused by the termination could be easily repaired, the therapist opined, “No. Not easily.”

L.H.’s current therapist had only known L.H. for about one month. The therapist admitted that L.H. had not yet warmed up to her and they were still developing a relationship. As for her experience with the mother, she stated the mother acted appropriately in L.H.’s evaluation except for her version of the suicide attempt. And as for L.H.’s behaviors following the mother's visits, this therapist could not say if it was because of issues related to their contact or because of the emotion of ending the visit, thus making her statements that visits are causing L.H. emotional harm less credible.

The juvenile court also noted the strong bond between L.H. and the mother but adopted the therapist's general conclusion that it did not mean the relationship was healthy. True, the mother was a protector for the child and raised concerns when he was assaulted and bullied, but we do not find that these efforts should be viewed as a negative influence in L.H.’s life. Other than pointing out those disruptions to his care, no one rebutted the benefit to L.H. when he had his mother in his camp. And T.C., his previous therapist with whom he had a close relationship, opined that based upon her discussions with L.H., losing contact with his mother would be harmful to him. No other professional or lay witness provided any rebuttal to those observations, only offering general statements. We find the mother showed that the termination would be detrimental to the child based upon their very strong bond. Still, although the mother could not serve as a safe custodial parent to L.H., she gave strong reasons for why she should still be in his life as his mother.

vi. L.H. still in treatment. Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(d) provides a permissive exception to termination when: “It is necessary to place the child in a hospital, facility, or institution for care and treatment and the continuation of the parent-child relationship is not preventing a permanent family placement for the child.” The mother argues avoiding termination of her rights will not impact L.H.’s permanency or safety given the plan to pursue either a long-term placement or if he stays at a treatment or other shelter placement. See In re M.H., No. 14-0884, 2014 WL 4635462, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2014) (noting that while “the continuation of the parent-child relationship is not preventing a permanent family placement for the child,” it did not warrant denial of the termination considering the child's best interests given the impact to the child of the parent's inconsistent exercise of visitation rights).

If HHS places L.H. in a foster-care placement with T.C. as a permanent family placement, the mother could still maintain a relationship but under the watchful eye of the juvenile court. But if termination is upheld, with no plan for what happens after L.H. is transitioned from the PMIC facility, L.H. becomes an orphan of the State with the risk of a placement providing no close adult attachments. As the mother's counsel argued to the juvenile court, the prognosis for L.H. would likely be that the child

will languish in the shelter and remain in the foster care/child welfare system until he is 18. The availability of foster homes in Iowa, especially for a teenage boy with [L.H.’s] behaviors and circumstances is basically non-existent. This is based on the undersigned's personal experience in this system and the court's experience and knowledge of available foster homes. The lack of adoptability makes termination of [the mother's] rights to [L.H.] not in his best interest.

While the State disagreed with this position, calling it mere speculation, it did concede placement for L.H. would be “difficult.” Both the mother and the child's attorney feared L.H. would become a “legal orphan.” See In re C.S., No. 21-1248, 2022 WL 468958, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) (citing Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights of Children after Termination of Parental Rights, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 125, 126 (2005)).

As HHS had not yet prepared or discussed a permanency plan for L.H., it is difficult to know where he might be in the next few months, let alone the next four years. As we see it, L.H. faces a plan similar to the revolving-door placement history he has experienced the last several months, where L.H. now is an orphan of the state without anyone advocating for his safety, mental health, or happiness. With the mother still in the picture, at least he can maintain an emotional connection that might keep him from the suicidal thoughts he had prior to the termination hearings.

In applying the exceptions to termination with the facts here, we exercise our discretion, after examining the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, if the factors in sections 232.116(3)(b), (c), or (e) save the parent-child relationship. M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 225. We have observed that there is “[l]ittle precedent describ[ing] what unique circumstances” cause a court to refrain from terminating a parent's rights when a statutory ground and best-interests finding support termination. See A.R., 932 N.W.2d at 592. Each of these factors alleged by the mother mitigate against termination of the mother's rights, but the mother's failure to progress with both mental-health and substance-use treatment so that the child could be cared for in a safe home operates to prohibit returning L.H. to her home. Because the factors support the relationship with the mother, just not custody to the mother, we examine the feasibility of a guardianship along with the denial of the termination of the mother's parental rights.

vii. Other permanency options. We start with the refrain “that a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 32. But isn't that so because we expect termination to lead to a stable and permanent placement? When it does not, should we not be creative? And there are some rumblings in the legal landscape that we should “reorient permanency discussions and ensure that guardianship is fully considered.” See Tara Urs & Alexandria Cinney, 5 Ways to Correct the Misunderstanding that ASFA Prioritizes Adoption over Guardianship, A.B.A. (Feb. 25, 2026), https://perma.cc/R4CU-AYHL (highlighting five practical ways to address research-based findings that suggest a guardianship option should be on the same plain as termination). As those authors commented, a “guardianship's flexibility aligns with child development: families change, relationships shift, and children's needs evolve in ways that rigid legal structures cannot always accommodate.” Id.

We emphasize that decisions about a child's life cannot be made under a “one-size-fits-all” analysis. There are several options available. See E.B., 2015 WL 5970443, at *4 (noting a juvenile court “can return the child home; continue placement for six months if it finds the need for removal will no longer exist after six additional months; direct the State to pursue termination; or, if it finds termination is not in the child's best interests, services were offered to correct the circumstances leading to removal, and the child cannot be returned home, order guardianship and custody transferred to a suitable person, order sole custody with the other parent, or order [a planned permanent living arrangement]”); see B.T., 894 N.W.2d at 32–33 (citing Iowa Code § 232.104(2)–(3)). So, while section 232.104(2)(d) allows for the establishment of a guardianship as a permanency option, we note that section 232.104(3)(a) requires “a judicial determination that [a] planned permanent living arrangement is the best permanency plan for the child.” And when contemplating a placement transfer, the paramount concern is the child's best interests. See Iowa Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 27 N.W.3d 76, 83–84 (Iowa 2025).

When left with the possibility that L.H. remains without a permanent solution and no family connection, we are compelled to consider these other options for placement. For example, in a case involving a sixteen-year-old with mental-health and other challenges, we affirmed the juvenile court's plan based on its consideration of the practical realities of the case. In re T.S., No. 11-1406, 2012 WL 162923, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012) (finding termination was not in the best interests of the teenager). There, although the court found that the child's “safety would have been compromised had she been permanently placed with [the father],” the best alternative was a planned permanent order given the existence of “compelling reasons ․ that prohibit the entry of a more permanent order, namely, the age of the child which would be a barrier to adoption, as well as the ongoing bond and relationship she has with her father.” Id.

Here, the mother also proposed maintaining the possibility of a guardianship until the ICPC is approved for T.C. As an alternative, if the approval is not yet confirmed, then guardianship could be transferred to HHS “pending a more long-term guardianship with an appropriate placement.” So, in determining whether there is a long-term placement for L.H., we recognize the role HHS will play but also note concerns with the record related to one option that was discussed during the trial—that T.C. be a placement option, foster care option, or L.H.’s guardian. See Iowa Code § 232.104(5).

T.C. testified at the termination hearing and stated she had a master's degree in social work and had applied for a license in therapy and social work in her home state, Nebraska.⁶ She described her history working in various social-work-related jobs. And at the time of the hearing, T.C. was just starting employment at the Iowa HHS as a children and family caseworker. As one of the only witnesses to describe L.H., she stated:

When I was around [L.H.], he was just very silly. He was calm. If he did get in an argument with another kid or staff, he would just walk over to me, we would talk it out, we would go for a walk.

I really never saw behaviors from [L.H.] If I had already been there—there was a lot of times I would get called in when behaviors were happening or he would run out of programming and he would come to my office, and then he would sit with me and he would always calm down.

He just would always tell me that he felt safe enough to be able to talk about what he was going through. So, like I said, just very limited behaviors. I mean, he would just laugh and be silly and be, like, a kid, which, you know, we didn't see a lot. But when he was with me, I did see that a lot. He just seemed happy and calm.

She testified she was able to help him understand that he could not go home and appreciate that his mother had issues to work through so he would not be so upset when she left after a visit. No one produced any evidence that there were problems with the relationship between T.C. and the mother.

Noteworthy, in its response to the petition on appeal, the State opined that “it is in the best interests of L.H. to complete his PMIC treatment then be moved to either T.C.’s care or another home which can provide him with safety and stability for the remaining years of his childhood.” But there are conflicting positions from the State in this record, and we urge the juvenile court to move quickly to a resolution so that L.H. can have his interests heard and begin his transition to adulthood supported by the people to whom he has a bond.

So, as a final note, we address our review of the record relative to the concerns over T.C. Most of the information we can glean from the reports, testimony, and exhibits reflect that T.C. and L.H. have a close relationship, that until just before the last termination hearing, T.C. was a viable option as a placement, and that option was considered to be in L.H.’s best interests. During T.C.’s testimony, she disclosed that she had been asked to leave her employment at the PMIC facility because of boundary issues and the State pursued other suggestions of boundary concerns during its cross-examination of T.C. Trouble is, we did not see the relationship between the examples raised and any negative influence that would bring upon L.H. For example, the reason for her leaving the PMIC was because she was helping a youth who had aged out of the facility and at least some of the supervisory employees were aware of her efforts. No one rebutted this version. Next, the State raised an example that T.C. visited L.H. in the hospital after she had been asked to leave the PMIC, and the State appeared to find fault with that action. T.C. stated she obtained permission from the HHS case worker, and the evidence established that her visit was positive for L.H. as he hugged and cried when T.C. arrived because he had never been told by the facility why and where T.C. had gone. He thought she was “dead.” Finally, the State took issue with T.C. for bringing L.H. to court and spent time drilling her about who had told her to do so, along with other details. Then, the State chastised T.C. because L.H. went to his mother in the courthouse hallway and had a conversation with the mother, somehow blaming T.C. for not monitoring this reunion.

From our vantage point, none of these unrebutted actions reflect a negative boundary issue. Instead, we find that T.C.’s behaviors were supportive, caring, and youth-focused—all characteristics of an appropriate caregiver. We are particularly concerned that there was any pushback to L.H., as a child over ten years old, wanting to be at court to determine his fate. We give no credence to the “concerns over boundaries” referenced by the State or the juvenile court on this record as here we have trouble squaring the testimony with the credibility findings.

So, we reverse the termination of the mother's parental rights as to L.H., and on his case, remand to the juvenile court for a prompt permanency hearing under section 232.104. Consistent with the discussion above, we urge the juvenile court that if the ICPC is approved, a guardianship with T.C. is in the best interests of L.H.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Concerns were raised through the years starting in 2019, when the mother's roommate spanked L.H. leaving bruises. In 2020, L.H. was given alcohol by a male caregiver. As recently as 2023, E.H. fell from a second story window, breaking his rib.

2.   Before termination can be ordered, this section requires proof that the child (1) “is four years of age or older”; (2) was adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) has been removed from the parent's custody “for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months”; and (4) cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents, supported by clear and convincing evidence. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ).

3.   These sections allow for the juvenile court to not terminate the parent child relationship if “[t]he child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination,” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(3)(b), or “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship,” id. § 232.116(1)(3)(c).

4.   Interstate compact on placement of children. See Iowa Code § 232.158.

5.   Even if there was evidence that, emotionally, L.H. might not be able to testify, as an alternative, a letter from the teenager would help with our review and allow the child's reasoning to be known. See A.R., 932 N.W.2d at 590 (noting letter from fifteen-year-old expanded on the reasons she objected to termination of her mother's rights).

6.   T.C. lived just ten miles from the Iowa border.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.