State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Clayton Lee Guzzle, Defendant–Appellant. (2026)

Clayton Lee Guzzle appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of domestic abuse assault as a third or subsequent offense.¹ On appeal, he argues the district court erred in imposing a three-year mandatory minimum sentence. Upon our review, we affirm Guzzle's sentence.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On November 12, 2024, Waterloo police officers responded to a 911 call at Guzzle's residence. The officers talked to Guzzle's girlfriend, who reported that Guzzle had thrown a plate at her that hit her in the eye.

The State charged Guzzle with one count of domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury (third offense), a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(4) (2024). The State later amended the trial information to charge Guzzle as a habitual offender under Iowa Code section 902.8. Guzzle pled guilty to domestic abuse assault (third or subsequent offense), and in exchange the State agreed to not seek the habitual offender enhancement. The parties agreed they would be free to argue what the mandatory minimum sentence should be at sentencing.

At sentencing, Guzzle argued for a one-year mandatory minimum sentence, while the State argued for a three-year mandatory minimum. After hearing the parties’ arguments, Guzzle's allocution, and the victim's impact statement, the district court sentenced Guzzle to a five-year sentence with a three-year mandatory minimum. The district court reasoned:

Mr. Guzzle, having pled guilty to assault domestic abuse third or subsequent offense in violation of the previously mentioned code section, I will sentence you to five years in prison․ The only thing left I think to be determined is how long of the prison term you will serve, and it will be the full three years. The extent to which you have injured this victim along with your lengthy history of assaults and violations of no contact orders, the thing that jumped out to me, too, was on page 12 of the presentence investigation through page 18, [which lists] over forty offender interventions that have been utilized by the State in an attempt to prevent you from committing more crimes. They start with AA and NA. There's [the Achieving Change through Value-Based Behavior (ACTV)] program. There's [ACTV] Aftercare. There's Black Hawk-Grundy Mental Health[Center mental-health treatment]. Cage Your Rage, CALM, Cognitive [Restructuring/]Criminal Thinking [Class], CompACT, Corrective Thinking, Hawkeye Community College [Pathways to Education and Employment for Reentry (PEER) program], GED, [Iowa] Domestic Abuse Program. There's numbers of various of these. JobWorks. Life skills, [Moral Reconation Therapy], motivational enhancement groups, New Frontiers Outpatient Program. Pathways [Behavioral Services]. Psychological services. Substance Abuse Relapse. A program called The Other Way. Also Victim Impact [Program]. And it doesn't appear that you really learned a lot from any of this. And I—I guess what you need to understand is all of this is violence. And that is why you're sitting here today[,] because of the violence you have become involved in․ [A]lso, you have had your parole revoked. So just being in custody here hasn't changed anything for you. I don't know exactly what it's going to take, but I am going to impose the three-year mandatory minimum.

In its written order, the district court further stated that the sentence “is most likely to protect society and rehabilitate [Guzzle] based upon the nature of the offense, [Guzzle's] prior record, and the recommendation of the parties and for the reasons stated in the [presentence investigation report (PSI)], if any.”

Guzzle now appeals.

DISCUSSION

“When a sentence imposed by a district court falls within the statutory parameters, we presume it is valid and only overturn for an abuse of discretion or reliance on inappropriate factors.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa 2015).

Under Iowa Code section 902.13, because Guzzle plead guilty to a third or subsequent offense of domestic abuse assault, the district court's only discretion in this case was the mandatory minimum to be set. Section 902.13 states:

1. A person who has been convicted of a third or subsequent offense of domestic abuse assault under section 708.2A, subsection 4, shall be denied parole or work release until the person has served between one-fifth of the maximum term and the maximum term of the person's sentence as provided in subsection 2.

2. The sentencing court shall determine, after receiving and examining all pertinent information referred to in section 901.5, the minimum term of confinement, within the parameters set forth in subsection 1, required to be served before a person may be paroled or placed on work release.

Under section 901.5, the district court must consider pertinent information, including “the [PSI] and victim impact statements.” The record shows the district court considered both at the sentencing hearing. First, the district court explicitly referenced the PSI and its findings. Additionally, the district court heard the victim's impact statement before sentencing Guzzle.

Guzzle argues the district court's rationale focused almost exclusively on his prior criminal history and his perceived failure to benefit from past interventions without adequately addressing mitigating factors, such as his allocution, the non-life-threatening injury to the victim, and his potential for rehabilitation. Accordingly, Guzzle asserts that the district court's failure to meaningfully weigh such factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. Guzzle concedes that while the seriousness and gravity of the offense is an important factor, he emphasizes it alone is not determinative. See State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982).

Despite Guzzle's argument, the district court is not “required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, “the failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.” Id. The district court heard Guzzle's allocution before sentencing him, considered the victim's injury, and noted the various opportunities Guzzle had to correct his violent behavior. Although the district court's discussion of some of the factors was terse, it was sufficient for our review. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (“A terse and succinct statement is sufficient ․ when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the record before the court.”).

“And even if the district court gave more weight to aggravating factors than mitigating factors, that does not amount to an abuse of discretion.” State v. Harmison, No. 25-0371, 2026 WL 892508, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026); see also State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023) (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various factors differently.”). Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm Guzzle's sentence.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because Guzzle is challenging the discretionary sentence imposed on his conviction rather than the plea itself, he has good cause to appeal. See Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).

Opinion by Chicchelly, J.