IN RE: the Edward A. Meyer and Marilyn F. Meyer Revocable Trust (2026)

Steven Meyer, William Meyer, and Diana Johnson are family members (the Family Members) who appeal from a ruling involving several issues related to the operation of the Edward A. Meyer and Marilyn F. Meyer Revocable Trust (the Trust). Primarily, their appeal focuses on actions of the co-trustee, their sister, Dorothy Schwiesow, and the court's denial of subpoenas to review her actions as their mother, Marilyn's, attorney-in-fact. Although Steven is a co-trustee, he and the other Family Members objected to Dorothy's unilateral decisions about Trust payments. Dorothy contends she only followed the directives of the Trust with Marilyn's interests in mind. The district court agreed with Dorothy as to the distribution of Trust income and refused to allow discovery related to Dorothy's actions as Marilyn's attorney-in-fact, but adjusted the amounts to be paid to certain family members for labor.

On our review, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it quashed the subpoenas, and we agree with its determination of what reasonable expenses should be paid to those family members providing services to the Trust. However, given the record as presented, we are unable to resolve the issue relating to distribution of accumulated Trust income, so we reverse and remand this case with instructions related to that sole issue.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On March 29, 2019, Edward and Marilyn Meyer, husband and wife, executed a joint revocable trust agreement. Under the agreement, they served as co-trustees, and their children—Steven, William, Diana, Dorothy, and Rita Williams—were designated as the successor co-trustees. The Trust provided the trustees with broad powers. Under the terms of the Trust, the annual net income of the Trust, which initially included property lots in town, two farms, and the family residence, was to be paid to Edward and Marilyn for life. Edward died on April 2, 2019. William, Diana, Rita, and Marilyn all signed a declination of appointment as trustee a few days after Edward's death, leaving Steven and Dorothy as co-trustees.

In the same month as Edward's death, Marilyn signed a power-of-attorney form giving Dorothy general power of attorney, with Steven as the alternate. Later, in February 2023, Marilyn also executed a new will that specifically removed William and Diana from receiving any inheritance outside of their interests in the Trust. Then, in March 2023, Steven and Dorothy, as co-trustees, issued a deed from the Trust to Marilyn transferring the family residence to her. Marilyn then signed a quitclaim deed transferring the family home to Rita. Steven contended this was because Rita agreed to take care of Marilyn and live with her.

But not all went smoothly. According to Steven, Dorothy stopped sharing information with him and terminated the oral farm lease on one of the Trust's farms that he operated in the years his father was alive. Steven testified that Dorothy took control of all bank records and transactions related to the Trust and kept the bank statements away from him. And Dorothy was the only person who handled the Trust's tax return preparation. Dorothy accumulated the annual net income in the Trust even though the tax returns for 2022 through 2024 show annual distributions to Marilyn.

In September 2024, the Family Members applied for “continuous court supervision[,] for appointment of neutral trustee, and for accounting” of the Trust, pointing to various unauthorized actions by Dorothy. Specifically, the applicants requested an accounting of all Trust financial transactions since Edward's death. While this application was pending, Steven, as co-trustee, applied to have the district court determine the validity and amount of expenses Dorothy claimed to have incurred for the benefit of the Trust. Dorothy then filed an application requesting court intervention to decide other issues affecting the Trust, including approval for payment of Trust expenses, resolution of the farm lease, and authority to enter into a wind energy lease. She also requested an order requiring that all of the accumulated Trust income be distributed to Marilyn.

At the end of December 2024, Dorothy emailed Steven and asked if “you ․ or any of your family members have hours for 2024.” She then set out some bills that the Trust should pay that included hours that her husband, Jeff Schwiesow, Rita, and Dorothy had worked for the Trust. Dorothy identified her efforts as high level ($60/hour), medium level ($18.50/hour), and physical labor work ($18.50/hour). Jeff and Rita's work was billed at the physical labor rate. Dorothy provided an itemized accounting of the date of service, description of work, and time involved, but Steven refused to sign the checks.

A hearing was scheduled on the issues related to the Trust payments, but before that time, the district court quashed subpoenas filed by the Family Members that sought production of Marilyn's personal bank records to discover Dorothy's actions as her mother's attorney-in-fact. After a hearing where Dorothy and Steven testified, the district court addressed four issues in its ruling.¹ First, it examined the Trust payments made towards the labor expenses of Rita, Dorothy, and Jeff, and determined that some of the Trust expenditures were reasonable but many were services unrelated to Trust work. Second, the court determined that the Trust should pay all accumulated annual income Dorothy identified as belonging to Marilyn, equaling $124,784. Next, the court denied Dorothy's request to terminate Steven's farm lease. Finally, the court denied Dorothy's request for authority to enter a wind energy lease. Steven immediately appealed the decision, joined by William and Diana. Dorothy did not appeal any ruling adverse to her.

II. Standard of Review.

Generally, proceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust are tried in equity, and our review is thus de novo. In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 482 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa Code § 633.33 (2024) (listing matters to be tried as law actions and noting “all other matters triable in probate shall be tried by the probate court as a proceeding in equity”). “We review the district court's interpretation of statutory provisions for errors at law.” In re Est. of Melby, 841 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 2014).

“We will reverse a ruling on a discovery matter only for an abuse of discretion.” Exotica Botanicals, Inc. v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 612 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 2000). A district court abuses its discretion “when the grounds underlying a district court order are clearly unreasonable or untenable.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

We address three issues on appeal. The first issue concerns how accumulated income in the Trust should be handled. The second issue relates to the payment for services by some family members and whether those services benefited the Trust, and if so, whether the amounts requested were reasonable. The final issue pertains to a discovery ruling quashing subpoenas that requested Marilyn's personal bank records.

A. Distribution of Accumulated Income. It is undisputed that on the Trust tax returns starting in 2022, Dorothy, as co-trustee, showed annual trust distributions to Marilyn of all the income received by the Trust. But this money was not actually distributed to Marilyn. In 2022, the reported amount was $39,482; in 2023, the amount was $35,494; and in 2024, the amount was $46,035. It is unknown based on this record if Marilyn reported these amounts as income on her personal tax returns, but it does show she was issued a K-1 tax form reporting her income share as a Trust beneficiary for each of these yearly distributions. At the 2025 hearing, Dorothy asked the district court to authorize distribution of the Trust's total accumulated income—$124,784—to Marilyn.

At the hearing, Dorothy did acknowledge that past practice with the accumulated farm income was to leave it in the Trust and use “its funds directly to pay for direct personal expenses of [Marilyn].” And some of the Trust's net income was placed into two certificates of deposit and a healthcare account. Dorothy also testified that monies Marilyn received as a beneficiary at Edward's death were also placed in the Trust to address farm-related debts, but that those funds should have gone directly to Marilyn.

Steven requested that the funds remain in the Trust and Marilyn's expenses could be paid out of the Trust as they had been doing all along. However, Dorothy felt her mother should have control over her own funds and suspected Steven and the others wanted the money in the Trust because, if Marilyn passed, it would be split between all five siblings, where if it was distributed and went through her estate, William and Diana would receive none of the money.

At the trial, Steven conceded that his understanding was “the trust income every year should be paid in full to Marilyn after [his] father's death.” But Steven also noted difficulty in answering questions about the Trust income because he did not “really know where all the money came from exactly.” As the co-trustee, Steven identified several problems with distributing the accumulated income in the amount Dorothy proposed. First, because the Family Members were not privy to an accounting of Trust income and expenditures, they could not know if the amount to distribute was accurate. Second, the Family Members argued that nineteen acres of the farmland are owned by the five siblings, but since 2019 Dorothy had failed to make rent payments to any of them. Dorothy acknowledged the ownership interest of the five siblings at the hearing but did not think rent money was owed to the siblings, qualifying that “the land should have went [sic] to my dad, and all of us siblings knew that ․ it's my dad's land.” Thus, while legally the money Dorothy intended to now distribute to Marilyn also included money that belonged to the siblings, they were never paid. No one provided a calculation of what was owed to the siblings during the trial.

The district court did not require an accounting before ordering the distribution of the accumulated Trust income. Leaving the issue “for another day,” the court “recognize[d] that a fraction of the farmland is owned by individual family members and not the Trust” but the individual owners would have to take that up. The court did encourage the trustees to distribute the income in accordance with ownership interests going forward. Finally, the district court recognized that the tax returns might not be accurate but again characterized that issue “for another day between the Trust and the Internal Revenue Service.” And the court did not specifically address the Family Members’ request that an accounting be performed before the distribution, noting that Steven's arguments related to Iowa Code section 633A.4504—governing the limitation of actions against a trustee—was not applicable as a bar to the distribution of accumulated income.

In their post-hearing brief, the Family Members advocated:

[Dorothy] essentially asks this court to approve the current account balances and order distribution, even though she has never provided any details of the activities of the trust during the time these funds were supposedly accumulated. She has not complied with the accounting statute [section 633A.4213], and her application to distribute should be denied for that reason alone.

In her answer to the application filed by the Family Members, Dorothy agreed to provide “any accounting as allowed and required under Chapter 633A of the Iowa Trust Code.” Still, while we are cognizant that the issues of “the appointment of a neutral trustee[ ] and for accounting,” were set to be heard later, the record is unclear as to whether the district court would resolve the accounting issues raised here. (Emphasis added). Even Dorothy indicated in her appellate brief that claims addressing whether accountings were either required or were not sufficiently performed “would be more accurately before the Court at the trial of this matter.” But the problem remains: the accounting of the funds guides what accumulated income is payable to Marilyn, which is the issue before us on appeal.

The legislature established guidelines requiring a trustee to keep beneficiaries of a trust reasonably informed, which includes the requirement that:

[A] trustee shall provide annually to each adult beneficiary ․ who may receive a distribution of income or principal during the accounting time period, an accounting, unless an accounting has been waived specifically for that accounting time period. Upon request, the accounting shall include the beginning balance and the ending balance.

Iowa Code § 633A.4213(3). The content of the required accounting is largely “within the discretion of the trustee, as long as [it is] sufficient to reasonably inform the beneficiary of the condition and activities of the trust during the accounting period.” Id. § 633A.4213(6); see In re Tr. of Muller, 989 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Iowa 2023).

We have no evidence that Marilyn, as the beneficiary to receive an income distribution, received an accounting or waived it. But we are aware that Steven, as a co-trustee, requested an accounting, which was necessary for him to sign off on the payment to Marilyn. And while the Trust terms require that the trustees “shall apply and distribute the net income” annually for Marilyn's life, that effort still requires that there be a determination of what the net income is. On this record, we simply have no idea. The parties and district court all agree that part of the funds accumulated in the Trust belong to other individuals for rent that they should have received through the years. Dorothy also contended that the Trust contained funds that should have been paid directly to Marilyn and not to the Trust. Without an accounting or determination related to what income was properly Trust income, the distribution to Marilyn is premature.

Thus, we have no choice but to reverse the district court's distribution award and remand the case so that the district court can require a full accounting of the Trust financial activity for the years 2022 through the date of the hearing to clarify what Trust income must be distributed to Marilyn and what monies should be paid to other individuals. After input from the parties, the district court can then decide how to address the question of the distribution and whether it is more appropriately resolved by a hearing, by written arguments, or at the final trial of all Trust issues.

B. Trust Expense Payments to Dorothy, Jeff, and Rita. The parties agree that our review of this issue is de novo. In re Est. of Wulf, 526 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 1994) (“[H]earings dealing with the costs of administration are equitable in nature and our review is therefore de novo”). Here, the Family Members, and specifically Steven as co-trustee, objected to any of the expense payments Dorothy requested to pay family members for services provided to the Trust. They argue that Dorothy's claims “should be denied for lack of proof and lack of credibility.” “When reviewing factual findings, particularly on the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to the probate court's findings, but we are not bound by them.” Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 482.

To support her entitlement to the payments, Dorothy offered as exhibits text messages from her siblings from 2019 that thanked her for all of her hard work “stay[ing] on top of things.” In the messages, both Steven and Diana suggested that Dorothy be compensated for everything she had done in a “fair amount for her hard work.” Dorothy approached Steven about signing checks to herself, Rita, and Jeff that she claimed were for services benefiting the Trust. He refused and filed the application to have the district court decide the issue. In the end, the district court reviewed the exhibits, heard testimony, and made significant reductions to Dorothy's request for labor and expense reimbursement to herself, Jeff, and Rita. Although Dorothy sought approval of payments totaling $9,680.62 for the 2024 labor and expenses, the district court only allowed a total of $5,841.50, an almost forty-percent reduction. It ordered the Trust to pay Jeff $296.50, Rita $878.75, and Dorothy $4,666.25.

Dorothy testified and provided exhibits detailing the work that she, Jeff, and Rita performed in 2024 “for the trust.” According to Dorothy, Jeff was owed $564 for use of equipment and $379.25 for his labor (20.5 hours at $18.50 per hour) and Rita was owed $1,008.25 for her labor (54.5 hours at $18.50 per hour) for mowing and trimming at the farms. On top of the Trust work, Rita requested monies for expending 281.5 hours of work “for Mom” at the same rate, for a total of $5,207.75. Dorothy also requested payment of $1,628 for physical work for her mother (88 hours at $18.50 per hour), plus she billed $7,729.12 for Trust work, including her efforts in the legal action, which included this breakdown:

68.00 Trustee-High Level Hours 108.00 Medium Level Trustee Hours 89.25 Physical Trust Hours x $60.00 = $4,080.00 Paid by Trust x 18.50 = 1,998.00 Paid by Trust x 18.50 = 1,651.12 Paid by Trust $7,729.12 Paid by Trust

Dorothy testified that “medium-level trustee work” included “filing papers, sorting papers, minimal stuff that doesn't—you don't have to put a lot of ․ how do I want to say it—less demanding thought and research and everything else.” She described the “high-level” work as “[g]etting all the information as far as together for taxes, filling out information for, I mean, like, when I sold all the grain in 2019 and 2020. I mean, there's a lot of duties. I guess I could have brought a list.”

We turn to the Trust terms. In the discretion of the co-trustees, they had the power:

To deduct, retain, expend and pay out of any money belonging to the trust any and all necessary and proper expenses in connection with the operation and conduct of the trust, and to pay all taxes, insurance premiums on any policy constituting part of the trust principal, and other legal assessments, debts, claims or charges which at any time may be due and owing by, or which may exist against the trust.

Our legislature also provided “[a] trustee may only incur costs that are reasonable in relation to the trust property, purposes, and other circumstances of the trust.” Iowa Code § 633A.4204.

But as the district court recognized, and all parties verified, the Trust property included the lots in town, “the 80” and “grandma's farm.” The family residence was now titled in Rita's name, with a life estate in Marilyn, and for that reason was no longer Trust property. From the exhibits, the district court could glean that many of the expenses submitted by Dorothy, Jeff, and Rita related to work performed on the family residence or time involved in taking Marilyn places and were thus not expenses attributable to the benefit of the Trust.

Next, as for Jeff's claimed expenses, the district court performed the same detailed analysis and cut certain entries and the corresponding equipment rental from the payment distribution. Finally, as to Dorothy's claim for labor payments, the district court could not rationalize the different levels of work and did not find “persuasive evidence” to support the distinction. Again, the court went line by line and reduced the entries to only those that clearly related to Trust work. We find this analysis to be extensive, concise, and a proper method of determining what reasonable expenses for efforts benefiting the Trust should be paid. We affirm on this issue.

C. Discovery Ruling Involving Marilyn's Personal Finances. At the time of the hearing on the Trust issues identified above, there was also a pending trial date to determine whether a different trustee should be appointed for the Trust. But, before any hearing was held, the district court quashed a subpoena directed to Marilyn's bank to provide copies of her personal bank account records. In its December 20 order, the district court determined that “[t]he action revolves around the Trust and its administration—not Marilyn's personal assets. As such, an accounting of Marilyn's personal assets is not relevant and, further, requires the unreasonable disclosure of privileged or other protected information.” The court cited Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1701(4)(d)(1)(3).

The Family Members assert that denying their discovery was an abuse of discretion. See Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Iowa 2008) (finding that rulings related to discovery are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). The crux of their argument is that Dorothy's past dealings with Marilyn as her attorney-in-fact are relevant to the questions related to Dorothy's suitability to serve as a trustee. As in In re Estate of Ragan, where the supreme court found the trustee to be unsuitable “largely because of his past dealings” that involved his role as attorney-in-fact, the Family Members urge the same situation may exist here, and the discovery is essential to answering that question. 541 N.W.2d 859, 861–62 (Iowa 1995). But Dorothy argued, and the district court agreed, that the requested information was not germane to the issues related to the distribution of accumulated income or payment of Trust expenses. We also agree that the discovery of Marilyn's personal accounts would not be relevant to these issues on appeal but make no comment on whether those personal bank accounts would be relevant to the outstanding issue of trustee qualification that is not before us at this time.

Because the district court properly exercised its discretion and the Family Members did not show grounds that were clearly untenable or unreasonable, we need not reverse the discovery ruling.

IV. Conclusion.

We affirm the district court ruling related to the payment of Trust expenses and the quashing of the subpoenas. But as it relates to the distribution of Trust income, we reverse and remand the case with instructions because on this record there remain questions that cannot be resolved without more information.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial related to the application for appointment of a neutral trustee and for accounting was set for another date and is not before us on this appeal.

Opinion by Greer, P.J.